SOURCE/LINK: https://youtu.be/1UmAAqZcS7A
#Inter-American Commission on Human Rights - Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza talks about Freedom of Expression on the Internet
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• May 12. from 2017
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Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
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Exhibition within the framework of the Ninth School of the South of Internet Governance (SSIG 2017) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
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GILBERTO MARTINS BORGES1 second ago
HISTORICAL LIVE SOURCE / LINK: https://youtu.be/V8YXY_cTLTk # constitution #SERGS #debate #SERGS - The Balance of Powers in 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution CF
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Transcription
00:00
good morning to all and to all I want
00:01
say hello to the south school
00:04
internet governance in particular to its
00:06
director olga cavalli and the foundation
00:09
getúlio vargas for this invitation to
00:12
this ninth course on an internet
00:14
open and accessible within the framework of
00:18
important work the school does
00:20
to disseminate and promote the exercise of
00:23
fundamental rights through
00:25
internet and development internet and
00:27
possibility that all
00:29
people and sectors of the
00:31
society can enjoy this
00:33
wonderful tool for the
00:35
knowledge for access to rights and
00:38
for the exercise of freedoms
00:40
fundamental
00:42
I will briefly refer today to which ones
00:45
are the inter-American standards in
00:46
matter of guiding principles of a
00:49
open internet and in particular how
00:52
improve accessibility or rather
00:55
what are the obligations of the state
00:56
in terms of facilitating access to the
01:00
population internet rights
01:03
human rights and in particular the right to
01:05
freedom of expression found in
01:07
internet a unique instrument for
01:09
unfold the enormous potential of this
01:11
tool in different sectors of the
01:14
population, that's why we say that
01:16
human rights must also be
01:17
protected on the internet and especially
01:21
let's say the potential of this tool
01:23
of the internet has to do with your
01:25
interactive multidirectional structure
01:27
its speed the relative low cost and
01:30
decentralized design precisely
01:33
it is because of these characteristics that we are
01:35
convinced that when they are adopted
01:37
public policies are adopted
01:39
laws should be kept these
01:41
fundamental characteristics of
01:43
internet guiding principles have
01:46
to do with the opening with the
01:47
decentralization with
01:48
privacy and neutrality and also the
01:52
multisectoral form of government in
01:55
special I want to refer to the beginning
01:56
of net neutrality always the
01:59
rapporteurs on freedom of expression and
02:01
own inter-American commission has
02:03
considered a necessary condition for
02:05
exercise freedom of expression and is a
02:08
principle let's say transversal to
02:10
remaining guiding principles because it is
02:13
what net neutrality perceives
02:15
well it just facilitated freedom of
02:17
access and choice of users
02:19
both application content the
02:22
faculty to climb by any
02:23
platform and receive information without
02:26
blocking leaks or interference
02:29
by any actor several countries
02:31
of the region luckily they are adopting
02:33
this principle of net neutrality
02:34
and you have to watch the possible
02:36
setbacks in moments where you are
02:39
talks about blocking or taking action
02:41
in the name of national security or
02:43
maximize this benefits from some
02:46
sectors or companies just mentioned
02:49
about the guiding principles of
02:52
Internet
02:53
obviously wide open access
02:59
decentralization privacy and
03:01
neutrality as a cross-cutting principle
03:04
the remaining in this opportunity by
03:06
time reasons I'm going to refer
03:08
only at the beginning of access as
03:11
a fundamental element for precisely
03:13
ensure that the population in your
03:16
set and all sectors look
03:18
benefited by proponent network the
03:21
Internet access constitutes
03:23
definitive a sine qua non condition
03:25
for the effective exercise of
03:27
human rights today
03:29
including obviously and especially the
03:32
right to freedom of expression and
03:33
opinion but not only this also the
03:35
right of association of assembly of
03:37
health education of access to
03:39
culture lack of internet access
03:42
ultimately increases the
03:43
vulnerability and deepens
03:45
inequality perpetuates the exclusion of
03:48
vulnerable people is for all this
03:50
that the rapporteur has highlighted that
03:52
states must ensure connectivity
states must ensure connectivity
03:54
and equitable ubiquitous universal access
03:58
and affordable
04:00
of adequate quality to the technologies of
04:03
information to infrastructure and
04:05
this extend it as far as
04:07
possible throughout the territory for this
04:09
public policies must be developed
04:11
develop infrastructure despite
04:14
of the commitment assumed by the countries of
04:16
the region on various occasions in
04:19
America a third of the population is still
04:21
find without internet connection and this
04:24
it is obviously a major problem
04:26
to finish I want to mention which ones
04:29
are some elements that we say
04:31
constitute this principle of access
04:34
universal and it's not just let's say
04:37
obviously facilitate access to
04:39
information technologies and
04:41
connectivity required to access
04:43
the internet also has to do with
04:46
what has been called the
04:47
digital literacy access to
04:49
internet is not satisfied solely with
04:52
connecting to the internet is also
04:54
It is necessary that people somehow
04:56
have the information and
04:59
technical knowledge required to
05:01
let's say get the most out of it
05:03
to technology
05:06
enjoy making use of it in
05:08
our region is also important
05:10
linguistic plurality to achieve the
05:13
Internet access on equal terms
05:14
conditions and without discrimination
05:17
this is intrinsically linked to
05:19
something that is also important in
05:21
internet and has to do with the creation
05:23
local content with this
05:25
contemplate the languages of the peoples
05:28
indigenous and Afro-descendants who
05:30
are also part of the diversity of
05:33
our continent
05:35
to close also mention in
05:37
briefly what is the role of the sector
05:39
private in precisely the possibility of
05:42
bring access and connectivity to the entire
05:45
territory of the states of our
05:46
America and be able to facilitate that all
05:49
groups and people enjoy the internet
05:51
we believe that obviously on the internet and in
05:55
this multistakeholder area and the
05:56
importance of the private sector for
05:58
development of the internet is undoubted and in
06:00
that framework have emerged different
06:02
initiatives to facilitate this access or
06:05
which to play the same among them is the
06:09
called a zero rating plan that have
06:13
somehow generated some kind of
06:15
controversy over the possibility that
06:17
would be facilitating access to
06:19
internet on the one hand but it would be
06:20
restricted to a part of the internet or
06:23
some applications especially the
06:25
report will address this and other
06:26
topics in this next report we will
06:29
make it known
06:30
maybe 15-20 days already approved by the
06:33
inter-american commission on rights
06:34
humans and this one we are going to address some
06:37
of these issues because we believe that all
06:39
the sectors should contribute to a
06:41
let's say wide and complete access to
06:44
internet and these are these let's say plans
06:47
maybe partials that also have
06:50
let's say some kind of
06:53
promotion also of the products of
06:57
the companies
06:58
let's say they are not incompatible with the
07:00
universal internet access but no
07:02
can replace the obligations of the
07:04
states regarding internet access
07:08
and to facilitate this right and these
07:10
things also had to do with him
07:12
access and that's why I wanted to mention
07:13
this to close this intervention well
07:16
I want to thank you for these minutes
07:19
Attention dispensed I'm sorry
07:22
been virtually in this
07:23
opportunity as we have been in other
07:26
opportunities I like to participate in
07:29
these events and reflections and
07:31
debates that the school takes place like this
07:34
that at least this way we are
07:35
present and we promise to stay in
07:38
contact and participate in upcoming
07:40
editions of these courses a hug and
07:43
thank you
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AUTOMATIC REPRODUÇÃO
7: 33TOCANDO AGORA
Freedom of expression and the internet
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
9,6 thousand views for 6 years
32: 42TOCANDO AGORA
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SEE ALSO:
SOURCE / LINK: https://revistaoeste.com/inquerito-das-fake-news-alexandre-de-moraes-e-denunciado-a-orgao-internacional/
•
Anderson Scardoelli
Highlight | Matches | STF
To 19 Aug 2020, 17:20
Fake news Brazilian Supreme Court: Alexandre de Moraes is denounced to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Working Brazilian Party (PTB) accuses STF Minister of committing violations against fundamental and human rights
Moraes: denounced internationally by political party | Photo: CARLOS MOURA / STF
Party chaired by ex-federal deputy Roberto Jefferson, or PTB denounced internationally or Minister Alexandre de Moraes, of the Supreme Federal Court (STF). According to the document presented on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of the American States (OAS), or the magistrate has committed irregularities.
Leia mais: "Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) dates back and decides to limit Abin's power"
Among other points, or PTB affirms that Moraes is responsible for violating fundamental and human directives. On this sense, a legend pede a suspension of the concern of fake news. The document is assigned by the first legal secretary of the national executive of the party, Luiz Gustavo Pereira da Cunha.
Before becoming an international issue, this case had never been criticized by Brazilian specialists. As reported by Oeste em maio, jurists affirmed that the STF would not be able to carry out a criminal investigation.
"You damage caused us são irreparáveis"
“Damages caused by these determinations of the Supreme Federal Court and, especially, Minister Alexandre de Moraes, rapporteur of 'inquérito das fake news' and 'inquérito dos atos undemocratic', são irreparáveis, generating prejudices not only investigated years, but to all societies that fight for the construction of a fair, democratic State, governed by legal norms approved through the legislative process, which guarantees direct persons, within them, the directives of freedom ”, defends, likewise, or the PTB a complaint addressed to the OEA .
TAGS
Alexandre de Moraes, Denounce, Fake News, inquérito das fake news, Luiz Gustavo Pereira da Cunha, Moraes, OEA, PTB, Roberto Jefferson, STF
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==//==
HISTORICAL LIVE
SOURCE/LINK: https://youtu.be/V8YXY_cTLTk
# constitution #SERGS #debate
#SERGS - The Balance of Powers in 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution CF
==//==
SOURCE/LINK: https://youtu.be/1UmAAqZcS7A
Relator Especial Edison Lanza habla sobre Libertad de Expresión en Internet
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•12 de mai. de 2017
10COMPARTILHARSALVAR
Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión
13 inscritos
INSCRITO
Exposición en el marco de la Novena Escuela del Sur de Gobernanza de Internet (SSIG 2017) en Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.
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GILBERTO MARTINS BORGES1 segundo atrás
HISTORICAL LIVE SOURCE/LINK: https://youtu.be/V8YXY_cTLTk # constitution #SERGS #debate #SERGS - The Balance of Powers in 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution CF
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Transcrição
00:00
buenos días a todos ya todos quiero
00:01
saludar a la escuela del sur de
00:04
gobernanza internet en particular a su
00:06
directora olga cavalli y a la fundación
00:09
getúlio vargas por esta invitación a
00:12
este noveno curso sobre una internet
00:14
abierta y accesible en el marco del
00:18
importante trabajo que hace la escuela
00:20
para difundir y promover el ejercicio de
00:23
derechos fundamentales a través de
00:25
internet y el desarrollo internet y la
00:27
posibilidad de que todos
00:29
las personas y los sectores de la
00:31
sociedad puedan disfrutar de esta
00:33
maravillosa herramienta para el
00:35
conocimiento para el acceso a derechos y
00:38
para el ejercicio de las libertades
00:40
fundamentales
00:42
voy a referirme hoy brevemente a cuáles
00:45
son los estándares interamericanos en
00:46
materia de principios rectores de una
00:49
internet abierta y en particular cómo
00:52
mejorar la accesibilidad o mejor dicho
00:55
cuáles son las obligaciones del estado
00:56
en materia de facilitar el acceso de la
01:00
población a internet los derechos
01:03
humanos y en particular el derecho a la
01:05
libertad de expresión encuentran en
01:07
internet un instrumento único para
01:09
desplegar el enorme potencial de esta
01:11
herramienta en distintos sectores de la
01:14
población por eso decimos que los
01:16
derechos humanos también deben ser
01:17
protegidos en internet y en especial
01:21
digamos el potencial de esta herramienta
01:23
de internet tiene que ver con su
01:25
estructura multidireccional interactiva
01:27
su velocidad el relativo bajo un costo y
01:30
el diseño descentralizado precisamente
01:33
por estas características es que estamos
01:35
convencidos de que cuando se adoptan
01:37
políticas públicas se adoptan
01:39
legislaciones deben conservarse estas
01:41
características fundamentales de
01:43
internet los principios rectores tienen
01:46
que ver con la apertura con la
01:47
descentralización con
01:48
privacidad y la neutralidad y también la
01:52
forma de gobierno multisectorial en
01:55
especial quiero referirme al principio
01:56
de neutralidad de la red siempre los
01:59
relatores de libertad de expresión y la
02:01
propia comisión interamericana lo ha
02:03
considerado una condición necesaria para
02:05
ejercer la libertad de expresión y es un
02:08
principio digamos transversal a los
02:10
restantes principios rectores porque es
02:13
lo que percibe la neutralidad de la red
02:15
bueno justamente facilitaba libertad de
02:17
acceso y de elección de los usuarios
02:19
tanto de contenidos de aplicaciones la
02:22
facultad de subir por cualquier
02:23
plataforma y de recibir información sin
02:26
bloqueo filtraciones o interferencias
02:29
por parte de ningún actor varios países
02:31
de la región por suerte vienen adoptando
02:33
este principio de neutralidad de la red
02:34
y hay que vigilar los posibles
02:36
retrocesos en momentos donde se esté
02:39
habla de bloquear o de adoptar medidas
02:41
en nombre de la seguridad nacional o
02:43
maximizar este beneficios desde algunos
02:46
sectores o compañías recién mencionaba
02:49
acerca de los principios rectores de
02:52
internet
02:53
acceso abierto obviamente y amplio
02:59
descentralización privacidad y
03:01
neutralidad como principio transversal a
03:04
los restantes en esta oportunidad por
03:06
razones de tiempo me voy a referir
03:08
únicamente al principio de acceso como
03:11
un elemento fundamental para justamente
03:13
garantizar que la población en su
03:16
conjunto y todos los sectores se vean
03:18
beneficiados por proponente red el
03:21
acceso a internet constituye en
03:23
definitiva una condición sine qua non
03:25
para el ejercicio efectivo de los
03:27
derechos humanos en la actualidad
03:29
incluyendo obviamente y especialmente el
03:32
derecho a la libertad de expresión y
03:33
opinión pero no sólo este también el
03:35
derecho de asociación de reunión de
03:37
educación de salud del acceso a la
03:39
cultura la falta de acceso a internet
03:42
incrementa en definitiva la
03:43
vulnerabilidad y profundiza la
03:45
desigualdad perpetúa la exclusión de las
03:48
personas vulnerables es por todo ello
03:50
que la relatoría ha destacado que los
03:52
estados deben garantizar la conectividad
03:54
y el acceso universal ubicuo equitativo
03:58
y asequible
04:00
de calidad adecuada a las tecnologías de
04:03
la información a la infraestructura y
04:05
esto extenderlo en la medida de lo
04:07
posible en todo el territorio para ello
04:09
deben desarrollarse políticas públicas
04:11
desarrollar la infraestructura a pesar
04:14
del compromiso asumido por los países de
04:16
la región en diversas oportunidades en
04:19
américa un tercio de la población aún se
04:21
encuentra sin conexión a internet y esto
04:24
obviamente es un problema importante
04:26
para culminar quiero mencionar cuáles
04:29
son algunos elementos que digamos
04:31
constituyen este principio de acceso
04:34
universal y no es sólo digamos
04:37
obviamente facilitar el acceso a las
04:39
tecnologías de información y a la
04:41
conectividad necesaria para acceder a
04:43
internet también este tiene que ver con
04:46
lo que se ha denominado la
04:47
alfabetización digital el acceso a
04:49
internet no se satisface únicamente con
04:52
conectarse a internet también es
04:54
necesario que las personas de algún modo
04:56
cuenten con la información y los
04:59
conocimientos técnicos necesarios para
05:01
poder digamos sacarle el mayor provecho
05:03
a la tecnología
05:06
disfrutar de hacer el uso de ella en
05:08
nuestra región también es importante la
05:10
pluralidad lingüística para lograr el
05:13
acceso a internet en igualdad de
05:14
condiciones y sin discriminación
05:17
esto está intrínsecamente vinculado con
05:19
algo que es también importante en
05:21
internet y tiene que ver con la creación
05:23
de contenidos locales con este
05:25
contemplar las lenguas de los pueblos
05:28
indígenas y afrodescendientes que
05:30
también forman parte de la diversidad de
05:33
nuestro continente
05:35
para cerrar también mencionar en
05:37
brevemente cuál es el rol del sector
05:39
privado en justamente la posibilidad de
05:42
llevar acceso y conectividad a todo el
05:45
territorio de los estados de nuestra
05:46
américa y poder facilitar que todos los
05:49
grupos y personas disfruten de internet
05:51
creemos que obviamente en internet y en
05:55
este ámbito multistakeholder y la
05:56
importancia del sector privado para el
05:58
desarrollo de internet es indudable y en
06:00
ese marco han surgido distintas
06:02
iniciativas para facilitar este acceso o
06:05
cual jugar al mismo entre ellas está el
06:09
denominado plan de cero rating que han
06:13
generado de algún modo algún tipo de
06:15
polémica por la posibilidad de que
06:17
estarían facilitando el acceso a
06:19
internet por un lado pero sería
06:20
restringido a una parte de internet o
06:23
algunas aplicaciones en especial la
06:25
relatoría va a abordar este y otros
06:26
temas en este próximo informe le vamos a
06:29
darlo a conocer
06:30
tal vez 15 a 20 días ya aprobado por la
06:33
comisión interamericana de derechos
06:34
humanos y este vamos a abordar algunos
06:37
de estos temas porque creemos que todos
06:39
los sectores deben coadyuvar a un
06:41
acceso digamos amplio y completo a la
06:44
internet y esto son estos digamos planes
06:47
tal vez parciales que tienen también
06:50
digamos algún tipo de
06:53
de promoción también de los productos de
06:57
las empresas
06:58
digamos no son incompatibles con el
07:00
acceso universal a internet pero no
07:02
pueden sustituir las obligaciones de los
07:04
estados en materia de acceso al internet
07:08
y de facilitar este derecho y estas
07:10
cosas también tenían que ver con el
07:12
acceso y por eso les quería mencionar
07:13
este para cerrar esta intervención bueno
07:16
que quiero agradecerles estos minutos la
07:19
atención dispensada lamento que haya
07:22
sido de manera virtual en esta
07:23
oportunidad como hemos estado en otras
07:26
oportunidades me gusta participar de
07:29
estos eventos y de las reflexiones y
07:31
debates que se produce la escuela así
07:34
que al menos de esta forma estamos
07:35
presentes y prometemos mantenernos en
07:38
contacto y participar de próximas
07:40
ediciones de estos cursos un abrazo y
07:43
muchas gracias
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REPRODUÇÃO AUTOMÁTICA
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SOURCE/LINK: https://revistaoeste.com/inquerito-das-fake-news-alexandre-de-moraes-e-denunciado-a-orgao-internacional/
•
Anderson Scardoelli
Destaque | Partidos | STF
Em 19 ago 2020, 17:20
Inquérito das ‘fake news’: Alexandre de Moraes é denunciado a órgão internacional
PTB acusa ministro do STF de cometer violações contra os direitos fundamentais e humanos
Moraes: denunciado internacionalmente por partido político | Foto: CARLOS MOURA/STF
Partido presidido pelo ex-deputado federal Roberto Jefferson, o PTB denunciou internacionalmente o ministro Alexandre de Moraes, do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). De acordo com o documento apresentado ontem à Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA), o magistrado tem cometido irregularidades.
Leia mais: “STF fecha com a esquerda e decide limitar poder da Abin”
Entre outros pontos, o PTB afirma que Moraes é responsável por violar direitos fundamentais e humanos. Nesse sentido, a legenda pede a suspensão do inquérito da fake news. O documento é assinado pelo advogado e primeiro-secretário jurídico da executiva nacional do partido, Luiz Gustavo Pereira da Cunha.
Antes de se transformar em assunto internacional, o caso já havia sido criticado por especialistas brasileiros. Conforme noticiado por Oeste em maio, juristas afirmaram que o STF não teria direito de realizar uma investigação criminal.
“Os danos causados são irreparáveis”
“Os danos causados por essas determinações do Supremo Tribunal Federal e, em especial, do ministro Alexandre de Moraes, relator do ‘inquérito das fake news’ e do ‘inquérito dos atos antidemocráticos’, são irreparáveis, gerando prejuízos não só aos investigados, mas a toda a sociedade que luta pela construção de um Estado justo, democrático, regido por normas jurídicas aprovadas via processo legislativo, que garanta às pessoas direitos, dentre eles, os direitos de liberdade”, defende, assim, o PTB na denúncia encaminhada à OEA.
TAGS
Alexandre de Moraes, Denúncia, Fake News, inquérito das fake news, Luiz Gustavo Pereira da Cunha, Moraes, OEA, PTB, Roberto Jefferson, STF
*O espaço para comentários é destinado ao debate saudável de ideias. Não serão aceitas postagens com expressões inapropriadas ou agressões pessoais à equipe da publicação, a outro usuário ou a qualquer grupo ou indivíduo identificado. Caso isso ocorra, nos reservamos o direito de apagar o comentário para manter um ambiente respeitoso para a discussão.
23 Comentários
© Revista Oeste – Todos os direitos reservados.
THE END
==//==
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc. 5
24 February 2020
Original: Spanish
Annual Report of the
Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 2019
VOLUME II
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Edison Lanza
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
2
OAS Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression.
Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression: Annual Report
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2018, vol.2 : Approved by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights on February 24, 2020 / Edison Lanza, Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression.
v. ; cm. (OAS. Official records ; OEA/Ser.L/V/II)
ISBN 978-0-8270-6924-4 (v.2)
1. Freedom of information--America. 2. Freedom of Speech--America.
3. Civil rights--America. 4. Human rights--America.
I. Lanza, Edison. II. Title. III. Series.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.30/19 v.2
Document prepared and printed thanks to the financial support of Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency, and the governments of Costa Rica, France, Switzerland,
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Canada, United States, United Kingdom and Uruguay.
3
Approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 24, 2020
4
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
2019
INDEX
CHARPTER I: GENERAL INFORMATION..........................................................................................7
CHAPTER II: EVALUATION OF THE STATES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE
HEMISPHERE...........................................................................................................................................41
1. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA...................................................................................................................42
2. ARGENTINA.............................................................................................................................................45
3. BAHAMAS.................................................................................................................................................53
4. BARBADOS...............................................................................................................................................55
5. BELIZE .......................................................................................................................................................56
6. BOLIVIA.....................................................................................................................................................57
7. BRAZIL.......................................................................................................................................................73
8. CANADA ....................................................................................................................................................87
9. CHILE .........................................................................................................................................................92
10.COLOMBIA.............................................................................................................................................101
11.COSTA RICA...........................................................................................................................................113
12.CUBA........................................................................................................................................................117
13.DOMINICA..............................................................................................................................................128
14.ECUADOR...............................................................................................................................................130
15.EL SALVADOR.......................................................................................................................................143
16.UNITED STATES...................................................................................................................................150
17.GRENADA...............................................................................................................................................163
18.GUATEMALA.........................................................................................................................................166
19.GUYANA..................................................................................................................................................175
20.HAITI.......................................................................................................................................................177
21.HONDURAS............................................................................................................................................181
22.JAMAICA.................................................................................................................................................191
23.MÉXICO...................................................................................................................................................194
24.NICARAGUA...........................................................................................................................................206
25.PANAMA.................................................................................................................................................216
26.PARAGUAY ............................................................................................................................................221
27.PERU........................................................................................................................................................228
28.DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.....................................................................................................................234
29.SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS..................................................................................................................237
30.SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES ....................................................................................239
31.SAINT LUCIA.........................................................................................................................................240
32.SURINAME .............................................................................................................................................242
5
33.TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO..................................................................................................................243
34.URUGUAY...............................................................................................................................................245
35.VENEZUELA...........................................................................................................................................247
CHAPTER III: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................259
ANNEXES...................................................................................................................................................266
6
TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND REFERENCES
ACHPR: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
American Convention: American Convention on Human Rights
American Declaration: American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Declaration of Principles: Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
European Convention: European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
European Court: European Court of Human Rights
IACHR: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ILO: International Labor Organization
Inter-American Court: Inter-American Court of Human Rights
OAS: Organization of American States
OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Office of the Special Rapporteur: Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression
UN: United Nations
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
7
CHAPTER I: GENERAL INFORMATION
A. Creation of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and Institutional
Support
1. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, by the unanimous decision of its members, created
the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression during its 97thperiod of sessions, held in October
1997. This office was created by the Commission as a permanent, independent office that acts within the
framework and with the support of the IACHR. Through the Office of the Special Rapporteur, the Commission
sought to encourage the defense of the right to freedom of thought and expression in the hemisphere, given the
fundamental role this right plays in consolidating and developing the democratic system and in protecting,
guaranteeing, and promoting other human rights. During its 98th period of sessions, held in March 1998, the
IACHR defined in general terms the characteristics and functions of the Office of the Special Rapporteur and
decided to create a voluntary fund to provide it with economic assistance.
2. The Commission’s initiative to create a permanent Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression found full support among the OAS Member States. Indeed, during the Second Summit of the
Americas, the hemisphere’s Heads of State and Government recognized the fundamental role of freedom of
thought and expression, and noted their satisfaction over the creation of the Office of the Special Rapporteur.
Since then, both the Summit of the Americas and the OAS General Assembly have shown their support to the
Office of the Special Rapporteur, and have entrusted it with follow-up or analysis of some of the rights that
comprise freedom of expression, as well as the monitoring and promotion of the right to access public
information.1 During the last years, the OAS General Assembly has expanded its objectives’ agenda to the Office
of the Special Rapporteur pursuant to the situation of the right to freedom of expression in the region.
3. In the framework of the VIII Summit of the Americas, held on April 13 and 14, 2018 in Lima, Peru, the
“Democratic Governance against Corruption” commitment was adopted, through which the representatives of
participating States expressed their commitment to keep on strengthening different anti-corruption measures,
such as the strengthening of the transparency and access to public information bodies, the protection to
plaintiffs and journalists regarding threats and reprisal for investigating or informing on corruption acts2.
4. In 2018, the IACHR adopted resolution 1/18 on “Corruption and Human Rights,” through which it
recommends the States to adopt a series of measures strengthening the access to public information as a key
factor in the fight regarding corruption, protection to journalists and the media, amongothers3.
5. The General Assembly of the OAS, by means of resolution 2928 (XLVIII-O/18) on “Human Rights
Promotion and Protection,” requested the Office of the Special Rapporteur, together with other bodies, to
prepare "practical guidelines in the form of recommendations for guaranteeing freedom of expression and
access to information from a variety of the Internet sources during electoral processes without improper
interference."4 In 2017, the OAS General Assembly adopted resolution AG/RES. 2908 (XLVII-O / 17) regarding
the right to freedom of thought and expression and the safety of journalists and media workers in the
hemisphere. The proposal was presented by the delegation of Uruguay and co-sponsored by the delegations of
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The Office of the Special
Rapporteur joins the commitment that the States make in this resolution to implement strategies and resources
that end with the prevailing impunity in crimes againstjournalists.
1 With regard to freedom of expression, the General Assembly of the OAS has adopted resolutions in different years through which it restated the rightto freedom of expression and acknowledged the important contributions ofthe Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression; Moreover, it urged the States to follow the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations indicated in the annual reports. In 2005,
it passed resolution 2149 (XXXV-O/05); In 2006, resolution 2237 (XXXVI-O/06); In 2007, resolution 2287 (XXXVII-O/07); In 2008,
resolution 2434 (XXXVIII-O/08); resolution 2523 (XXXIX-O/09); In 2011, resolution 2679 (XLI-O/11).
On the subject of access to public information, the General Assembly has also made several statements supporting the work of the Office of
the Special Rapporteur and urging the adoption of its recommendations. In 2003, it passed resolution 1932 (XXXIII-O/03); In 2004,
resolution 2057 (XXXIV-O/04); In 2006, resolution 2252 (XXVI-O/06); In 2007, resolution 2288 (XXXVII-O/07); In 2008, resolution 2418
(XXXVIII-O/08); In 2009, resolution 2514 (XXXIX- O/09). In that same resolution, the General Assembly entrusted the Department of
International Law, with the collaborationof the Office ofthe Special Rapporteur, the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Department
of State Modernization and Governance, as well as the cooperation of Member States and civil society, with drafting a Model Law on Access
to Public Information and a guide for its implementation, in keeping with the Inter-American standards on the issue. In addition, in 2011, it
approved resolution 2661 (XLI-O/11); In 2012, resolution AG/RES. 2727 (XLII-O/12); In 2013, resolution AG/RES 2811 (XLIII-0/13); In
2014, resolution AG/RES. 2842 (XLIV-O/14); In 2016, resolution AG/RES was approved. 2885 (XLVI-O/16). In this resolution, the General
Assembly of the OAS instructs the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression to develop and disseminate the content of the
inter-American legal framework on access to information, including the inter-American Model Law on Access to Public Information, through
the preparation of reports on the scope of the law and the application of its principles. Additionally, it also instructed the Office of the Special
Rapporteur to assist Member States and to organize and participate in capacity building programs for public officials of national authorities
on access to information and justice operators.
2 Summit of the Americas. Lima Commitment. “Democratic Governance against Corruption”. April 14, 2018.
3 IACHR. Resolution 1/18. Corruption and Human Rights. March 16, 2018.
4 OEA. Resolution AG/RES. 2928 (XLVIII-O/18). Human Rights Promotion and Protection
8
6. Since its creation, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has also had the support of civil society
organizations, the media, journalists and, most importantly, individuals who have been victims of violations of
the right to freedom of thought and expression, along with their familymembers.
7. In the framework of its 163rd Period of Sessions, the IACHR renewed the mandate of Special
Rapporteur Edison Lanza for a newperiod ofthree years,in accordance withArticle 15 ofits Rules of Procedure5.
8. In the framework of the 173rd Period of Sessions in Washington D.C., the IACHRapproved the document
Directive on the performance of the IACHR’s Special Rapporteurships concerning the activities and roles held in
their mandates. For the first time the Special Rapporteurships have a protocolized framework for action.
B. Main Activities of the Office of the SpecialRapporteur
9. During its twenty-two years of existence, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has carried out each of the
tasks assigned to it by the IACHRand by otherOAS bodies such as the General Assembly in a timely and dedicated
manner.
10. This section of the report summarizes very generally the tasks that have been accomplished, with
particular emphasis on the activities carried out in2019:
1) Individual Case System
11. One of the most important functions of the Office of the Special Rapporteur is to advise the IACHR in the
evaluation of individual petitions and prepare the corresponding reports.
12. The appropriate advancement of individual petitions not only provides justice in the specific case, but
also helps call attention to paradigmatic situations that affect freedom of thought and expression, and creates
important case law that can be applied in the inter-American human rights system itself as well as in courts in
countries throughout the region. The individual case system also constitutes an essential factor within the broad
strategy of promoting and defending the right to freedom of thought and expression in the region, a strategy
that the Office of the Special Rapporteur carries out through various mechanisms offered by the inter-American
human rights system.
13. Likewise, since its creation, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has advised the IACHR in the
presentation of important cases involving freedom of expression to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(hereinafter, the “Court” or the “Inter-American Court”)6.
14. The cases solved by the IAHR Court in 2018 are as follows:
A. Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela. Judgment of August 30, 2019. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
handed down the judgment by which it declared the international responsibility of the State of Venezuela for
the violation of the right to freedom of expression, the right toparticipate in government, freedom of movement,
the right to a fair trial, and right to judicial protection to the detriment of Mr. Tulio Álvarez Ramos. These
violations arose from the criminal proceedings against Mr. Tulio Álvarez Ramos for the crime of continued
aggravated defamation, and the consequent conviction, due to the publication of an opinion article on alleged
irregularities in the financial management of the Savings Bank of the National Assembly of Venezuela. Mr. Tulio
Álvarez was sentenced to 2 years and 3 months in prison and to a penalty of political disqualification. Regarding
the right to freedom of expression, in the present case, the Court recognized for the first time that the punitive
response of the State through criminal law is not “conventionally appropriate” toprotect the honor of an official,
in cases where the speech is protected for being of public interest, as are the behaviors of public officials in the
exercise of their functions. The Court considered that the note published in the newspaper “Así es la Noticia” i)
referred to the actions of a public official; ii) referred to the exercise of the functions of a public official, which
was even subject to pronouncements by other State bodies; and that iii) the management of money or public
resources was a matter of public interest. The Court highlighted that, in relation to matters of public interest,
5 IACHR. Periods of Sessions. Available at http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/actividades/sesiones.asp
6 Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Judgment of February 5, 2001; Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru.
Judgment of February 6, 2001; Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004; Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment
of August 31, 2004; Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Judgment of November 22, 2005; Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Judgment of
September 19, 2006; Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008; Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Judgment of January 27,
2009; Case of Ríos et al. v. Venezuela. Judgment of January 28, 2009; Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela. Judgment of January 28, 2009; Case
of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Judgment of November 20, 2009; Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Judgment of May 26, 2010;
Case of Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil. Judgment of November 24, 2010; Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina. Judgment of
November 29, 2011; Case of González Medina and Family v. Dominican Republic. Judgment of February 27, 2012; Case of Vélez Restrepo
and Family v. Colombia. Judgment of September 3, 2012; Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela. Judgment of September 3, 2012; Case of
Norín Catrimán et al. (leaders, members and activists of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile. Judgment of May 29, 2014; Case of
Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela. Judgment of June 22, 2015; Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Judgment of
October 5, 2015; Case of I.V v. Bolivia. Judgment of November 30, 2016; Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru. Judgment of August 31, 2017.
9
not only the issuance of harmless or well-received expressions by public opinion is protected, but also those
expressions that clash, irritate, or disturb public officials or any sector of the population. Likewise, the Court
reiterated that the use of the criminal sanction for disseminating news of public interest couldproduce, directly
or indirectly, a chilling effect that, in short, would limit freedom of expression and prevent public conduct of
interest from being publicly scrutinized, thus weakening public control over the powers of the State, with
noticeable damage to democratic pluralism.
2) Precautionary Measures
15. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has worked, within its mandate, with the IACHR Protection Group
with regard to recommendations on the adoption of precautionary measures in the area of freedom of
expression. In this regard, the IACHR has requested on multiple occasions that OAS Member States adopt
precautionary measures to protect the right to freedom of expression.
16. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur collaborated in the study of 14 requests for
precautionary measures, among which were granted the extension of measures CM 873-18 (Nicaragua) Lucía
Pineda Ubau and her family nucleus, on February 11; MC 75-19 (Honduras) José David Ellner Romero, on March
21; MC 250-19 (Venezuela), on March 29; MC 1025-18 (Cuba), April 4; and MC 399-19 (Nicaragua) Sergio
Warren León Correa and members of his family (GeneralDirector of “La Costeñísima” in the Autonomous Region
of the South Caribbean), on June 15. On the other hand,in May, the IACHR presented to the Inter-American Court
a request for provisional measures of protection for 17persons deprived of liberty at extreme risk inNicaragua.
Among the beneficiaries were the Director and the Head of Press of Canal 100%, Miguel Mora and Lucía Pineda
Ubau, respectively. Said request was granted by the Inter-American Court on May 21,2019.
17. The granting of the precautionary measures does not constitute a prejudgment on the merits in
question. Rather, these measures are adopted out of a need to avert grave, imminent, and irremediable harm to
one of the rights protected in the American Convention of Human Rights, or to maintain jurisdiction in the case
and so the subject of the action does not disappear.
3) Public Hearings
18. The IACHR received various requests for hearings and working meetings on matters involving freedom
of expression during its most recent periods of sessions. The Office of the Special Rapporteur participates
actively in the hearings on freedom of expression, preparing the reports and handling the corresponding
interventions and follow-up.
19. Below is a summary of the hearings in which the Office of the Special Rapporteur participated during
2019:
State / Region Period of Sessions Tittle of the hearing Date/ Place
Regional 171 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Maintenance and
upkeep of sites, memorials,
archives, museums, and
remembrance spaces in the
region
13 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Mexico 171 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Constitutional reform
in Mexico
13 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Venezuela 171 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: General human rights
situation in Venezuela
13 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Nicaragua 171 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: General human rights
situation in Nicaragua
14 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
10
Regional 171 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Ex-Officio Hearing: Good
Practices on Prevention,
Investigation and Protection of
Human Rights Defenders in the
Region
15 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Cuba 171 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Constitutional Reform
and Human Rights in Cuba.
15 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Regional 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Human rights,
development, and
freedom of association.
May 8, Kingston
Jamaica
United States 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Criminalization of
human rights defenders of
indigenous peoples and the
extractive industry in the
United States.
May 9, Kingston
Jamaica
Venezuela 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing RFOE: Freedom of
Expression in Venezuela.
May 9, Kingston
Jamaica
Venezuela 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Political crisis, the
National Assembly, and justice
in Venezuela
May 9, Kingston
Jamaica
Cuba 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Complaints of
criminalization of social
activists and journalists in Cuba
9 de Mayo,
Kingston Jamaica
Brazil 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Criminal System and
violations allegations of the
rights of African descendant
people in Brazil
May 9, Kingston
Jamaica
Colombia 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Special Jurisdiction for
Peace in
Colombia
May 9, Kingston
Jamaica
Guatemala 172 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Complaints of threats
to judicial independence in
Guatemala
May 10, Kingston
Jamaica
Cuba 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Serious Human Rights
Violations in Cuba
September 23rd,
2019,
Washington D.C.
11
Haiti 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Violence and Security
in the Context of the Social
Protests in Haiti
September 23rd,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Regional 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Limitations on Access
to Asylum and
Refuge in the United States for
Citizens of the Northern
Triangle Countries
September 24th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Venezuela 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Political Persecution
in Venezuela
September 25th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Nicaragua 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Ex-Officio Hearing:
Implementation of Protective
Precautionary Measures in
Favor of Independent
Journalists in Nicaragua
September 25th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Honduras 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Violence and Security
in the context of social protests
in Honduras
September 25th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Colombia 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Threats Against and
Murders of Social Leaders in
Colombia
September 25th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
El Salvador 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Right to Truth and
Historical Impunity in the
Context of the Internal Armed
Conflict in El Salvador
September 26th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Mexico 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing RFOE: Judicial
protection of victims of
terrorist acts inspired by hate
speech
September 26th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Regional 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Misuse of Criminal
Justice Systems to Retaliate
Against Environmental Human
Rights Defenders
September 27th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
Brazil 173 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Social Participation
and Control in Human Rights
Policies in Brazil
September 27th,
2019,
Washington D.C.
12
Nicaragua 174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Amnesty Law in
Nicaragua
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
Nicaragua 174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Challenges to the
autonomy and independence of
the judicial system in Nicaragua
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
Uruguay 174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Challenges in the
search for truth and justice in
Uruguay
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
El Salvador 174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Violence and citizen
security in El Salvador
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
Chile 174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Human rights
situation in the context of social
protests in Chile
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
Venezuela
174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Torture, extrajudicial
execution, and gross human
rights violence due to State
repression in Venezuela
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
Guatemala 174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Human rights
violations of defenders in
Guatemala
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
Colombia 174 Period of
Sessions of the InterAmerican
Commission on
Human Rights
Hearing: Freedom of
expression and access to
information in criminal trials in
Colombia
November 11,
2019
Quito, Ecuador
4) Seminars and workshops with strategic actors in the region
20. Seminars, workshops, and training are a critical tool the Office of the Special Rapporteur uses to
promote the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights and the right to freedom of expression.
In the last twenty two (22) years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has organized seminars throughout the
region, in many cases with the cooperation of universities, government institutions, and nongovernmental
organizations.
21. Hundreds of journalists, attorneys, members of the Public Prosecutor's Office, university professors,
judges, and journalism, and law students among others, have attended the training sessions. These are offered
by staff members of the Office of the Special Rapporteur both in country capitals and in more remote regions
where there is often no access to information on the guarantees that can be sought toprotectthe right to freedom
of thought and expression.
22. The meetings with those involved open the door for more people to be able to use the Inter-American
human rights system to present their problems and complaints. The seminars also enable the Office of the
Special Rapporteur to expand its network of contacts. In addition, the workshops and working meetings have
13
allowed the Office of the Special Rapporteur to work closely with strategic actors to advance the application of
international standards in domestic legal systems.
23. The following is a summary of the principal seminars and workshops held by the Office of the Special
Rapporteur during 2019.
Date / Place Event Organizers Summary
January 30, 2019,
San Jose, Costa
Rica
University of Costa
Rica
Workshop:
Update of the
hemispheric
agenda on
Internet and
digital rights:
The
phenomenon of
misinformation
in electoral
contexts.
Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression
of the IACHR
With the support of the
University of Costa Rica
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression held an expert
consultation with civil society
organizations on freedom of
expression in the digital age.
This meeting was held at the facilities
of the University of Costa Rica and
aimed to serve as a forum for the
exchange of information regarding the
proposal being made by the Office of
the Special Rapporteur to fulfill the
mandate assigned to it by the OAS
General Assembly in its 48th. Period of
Session, Resolution AG/RES. 2928
(XLVIII-O/18), which consists of
coordinating the preparation of a guide
of recommendations to address the
problem of deliberate misinformation
in electoral contexts.
January 30, 2019,
San Jose, Costa
Rica
University of Costa
Rica
Regional
Conference:
“Misinformation
in the digital age
and its impact on
freedom of
expression and
electoral
processes”
IACHR RFOE
Observacom
Article19
Proledi
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
held a regional conference in which the
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated as a speaker. This
conference was held together with
Observacom, Art. 19 Mexico and
Proledi of the University of Costa Rica
and had a panel of experts and
representatives of civil society from
Central America and Mexico where the
topic of misinformation in the digital
era and its impact on freedom of
expression and electoralprocesses was
discussed.
14 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Public
Consultation on
Article 19 Brazil Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to participate in this public
the right to consultation to present his general
protest considerations and impressions on the
outcome of it.
14 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Regional
Conversation:
Right of Access
to Information:
progress and
perspectives
Foundation Construir
DPLF
Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated as a speaker in the
discussion within the panel: Access to
Public Information in Latin America:
Status of Situation, Good Practices, and
Challenges and was responsible for
presenting the Inter-American Model
Law on Access to Public Information
and IACHR standards in the field.
14
15 February 2019
Sucre, Bolivia
Event: Situation
of Situation of
Freedom of
Expression in
Latin America:
Challenges and
set backs
Foundation
Observatory of Human
Rights and Justice
Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung – Rule of Law
Program for Latin
America
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated as a speaker at this event
andpresented the guiding principles of
Freedom of Expression.
18 February
Mexico City
International
Meeting of
Human Rights
Defenders and
Journalists: To
Defend is not
forgetting.
CMDPDH - Mexican
Commission for the
Defense and Promotion
of Human Rights.
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to participate in this meeting as
a panelist in the keynote conference
that aimed to address the situation of
human rights defenders and
journalists belonging to indigenous
peoples who have been forcibly
displaced for their journalistic
26 February 2019
Washington D.C.
Session: Global
State of the Press
Freedom -
Venezuela
(Video
conference)
Subcommittee on
International Human
Rights of the Standing
Committee on Foreign
Affairs and
International
Development of the
House of Commons of
Canada.
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
appeared as a witness before the
International Human Rights
Subcommittee of the Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Development of the
House of Commons of Canada.
In that session, the Rapporteur
presented information regarding the
serious situation of Freedom of
Expression facing Venezuela and the
monitoring work that the Office of the
Special Rapporteur has been
developing on this issue.
27 February 2019
Washington D.C.
Event
Can the use of
social networks
be regulated?
A. (Video
conference)
Law School
Universidad de los
Andes - Bogotá,
Colombia
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated via video conference from
Washington D.C.
In this event, he presented the work
that the Office of the Special
Rapporteur has been developing with
respect to the issue of how the use of
social networks and the Internet
should be regulated and their impact
on Freedom of Expression.
February 28, 2019,
Bogotá Colombia
“Colombian
Constitutional
Court Hearing on
Social Networks
and Freedom of
Expression.
Colombian
Constitutional Court
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
present during the hearing in the
Constitutional Court of Colombia on
the topic of social networks and
freedom of expression, which
addressed issues such as how far
should freedom of expression reach in
social networks, taking into account
that they are platforms for practices
such as injury, slander, phishing, and
spreading fake news, among others.
15
March 1, 2019,
Bogotá Colombia
Talk on freedom
of expression in
the interAmerican sphere
Colombian
Constitutional Court.
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
delivered a training and preparation
talk to the staff of the Colombian
Constitutional Court on the subject of
Freedom of expression in the interAmerican sphere.
6 March 2019
Washington D.C.
Photo Exhibition Fundamedios
IACHR RFOE
Embassy and
Permanent Mission of
Ecuador to the OAS
On March 6 2019, a photographic
exhibition of the Ecuadorian
photojournalist Paul Rivas, who was
one of the three journalists of El
Comercio killed on the Ecuadorian
Colombo border in April 2018, was
held at the IACHR's premises, which
resulted in the creation of the Special
Monitoring Team for the precautionary
measures granted for theirprotection –
ESE
7 March 2019
Washington D.C.
Open meeting
Media and
Democracy in the
Americas
Fundamedios
Inter-American
Dialogue
IACHR RFOE
The Special Rapporteur, Edison Lanza
participated during the inauguration of
the event Media and Democracy in the
Americas II.
During this same event he also
participated as a panelist in the
segment “The state and future of
protection mechanisms forJournalists”
7 March 2019
Washington D.C.
Closed
discussion table:
National
Protection
Mechanisms,
exchange of
experiences and
lessons learned.
IACHR RFOE
Inter-American
Dialogue
This activity carried out by the Office of
the Special Rapporteur was attended
by the Special Rapporteur Edison
Lanza and Melissa Cabrera, a
consultant for RFOE, to present the
recommendations and standards
produced by the office in relation to
protection of journalists and the
obligations of prevention, protection,
andprosecution.
This activity was attended by the
Director of the mechanism to protect
journalists in Colombia, Pablo
Gonzalez, who explained the operation
of the mechanism and implementation
of measures to protect journalists in
Colombia. Civil society organizations
such as CPJ, FLIP, Article 19 Mexico,
Trade Union of Journalists of Paraguay
among other organizations and
academics for the protection of
journalists also participated in an
information exchange exercise.
16
8 March 2019
Washington D.C.
Presentation of
the thematic
report "Women
journalists and
freedom of
expression.
Discrimination
and genderbased violence
against women
journalists for
the exercise of
their profession"
IACHR RFOE
George Washington
University - Law
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression of the InterAmerican Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) presented the thematic
report "Women journalists and
freedom of expression. Discrimination
and gender-based violence against
women journalists for the exercise of
their profession"
In the framework of the presentation of
this report, three discussion panels
were developed
Panel I - Journalist Security: A gender
perspective
Panel II - The digital environment and
the special risks for women journalists
Panel III - Recommendations for the
prevention of violence and
discrimination against women
journalists
13 March 2019
Mexico City
Workshop with
Civil Society
Organizations
and Journalists of
Cuba
Participants
Edison Lanza,
Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression
The lawyer of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur, Tatiana Teubner,
imparted a closed workshop for
journalists and civil society in Cuba, to
inform about the findings of the report
made by the Office of the Special
Rapporteur in which it analyzes the
situation on freedom of expression in
Cuba through the standards of InterAmerican System and from that, offers
recommendations to the State that
contribute to the effective enforcement
of this right in the country.
The workshop also allowed to hear
experiences of Cuban journalists, who
have used the mechanisms of the
IACHR, such as public hearings and
precautionary measures and provided
the opportunity for the office to know
first-hand the most recent challenges
and obstacles that they have
confronted to exercise their right to
freedom of expression in the country.
Antonia Urrejola -
Commissioner
Rapporteur Country
Cuba
Tatiana Teubner -
RFOE
IWPR
Melissa Cabrera - RFOE
Journalists and
organizations of Cuban
civil society
13 March 2019
Mexico City Presentation of
the special
report of the
IACHR RFOE on
the situation of
freedom of
expression in
Cuba.
IWPR
Participation:
David Kaye - United
Nations Freedom of
Expression Rapporteur
(via videoconference)
Antonia Urrejola -
Commissioner, Country
Rapporteur
Edison Lanza, Special
Rapporteur IACHR
RFOE
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression of the InterAmerican Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) presented in Mexico
City the special report on the situation
of freedom of expression in Cuba. The
event was convened in conjunction
with the IWPR organization and was
attended by prominent members of the
independent media of Cuba, as well as
representatives of civil society
organizations working to promote the
right to freedom of expression in the
mentioned country.
17
15 March 2019
Mexico City
Event: Social
networks and
democracy:
between
regulation and
freedom of
expression.
Institute for democracy
and electoral assistance
- IDEA
The Rapporteur Edison Lanza,
participated as a speaker in the event
social networks and democracy,within
the working table "between regulation
and freedom of expression"
19 March 2019
Palais des Nations
Geneva,
Switzerland
Human Rights
Council - 40th
Session
Event: Human
rights abuses in
Venezuela
Freedom House
U.S. Mission in Geneva
United Nations
Canada
UK
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated as a panelist at the
meeting held at the Palais de Nationsin
Geneva to address the issue of human
rights abuses in Venezuela.
After that session, the ER was invited to
participate as a speaker at the press
conference on the same topic.
Germany
Other allies
28 March 2019,
Bogotá Colombia
Inter-American
Standards and
national
legislation
workshop on
access to
environmental
information in
the context of
extractive
industries
IACHR RFOE
University of the Andes
MASP - Legal
Environment and
Public Health Clinic
Network for the rights
of access, information,
participation, and
justice in
environmental matters
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
conducted the Inter-American
Standards and National Legislation
Workshop on access to environmental
information in the context of extractive
industries - Colombia. This workshop
was aimed at officials, representatives
of civil society and other relevant
actors; and aimed to disseminate the
inter-American standards regarding
access to public information applied to
environmental information in the
context of the reinforced protection
that the inter-American instruments
grant to this fundamental right.
March 29,
Cartagena
Colombia
Mid-year
meeting
IAPA InterAmerican Press
Society
Inter-American Press
Society IAPA
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited by the IAPA toparticipate in the
public act of acknowledgment of
international responsibility (State of
Colombia) in the framework of the
Carvajal vs. Colombia case.
18
Mexico City,
Mexico
23, 24 April, UNAM
Panel of Experts
on
Misinformation
in Electoral
Contexts
Office of the Special
Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression
of the IACHR
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression of the IACHR
carried out a panel made up of 28
experts on Disinformation in electoral
contexts.
National Electoral
Institute of Mexico, INE
UNAM
This panel aimed to promote a
multidisciplinary and multisectoral
debate to address the issue of
misinformation in the digital era and
the challenges that the phenomenon
presents for electoral processes.
Thematic axes related to the causes,
impacts and responses to the
phenomenon of misinformation and
elections in the hemisphere were
analyzed, with the objective of making
contributions for the elaboration ofthe
"Practical guide of recommendations
to guarantee freedom of expression,
access to information from various
sources on the Internet during the
development of electoral processes,
without undue interference" in
compliance with the mandate
requested to this office by the OAS.
Mexico City,
Mexico
25 April, UNAM
INE event
internet and
social networks
in electoral
contexts.
National Electoral
Institute of Mexico, INE
The Special Rapporteur, Edison Lanza
was invited to participate as an expert
speaker at the panel organized by the
INE, ¨The impact of the internet and
social networks on political culture and
political - electoral behavior¨
Mexico City,
Mexico
April 25th
Congress of the
State of Mexico
Presentation of
the Special
Report of the
RFOE ¨Women
Journalists and
Freedom of
Expression,
Discrimination
and genderbased violence
against women
journalists in the
exercise of their
profession¨
Congress of the State of
Mexico
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
presented in the Senate of theRepublic
the Special report of the RFOE "Women
Journalists and Freedom of Expression,
Discrimination and gender-based
violence against women journalists in
the exercise of their profession" in
coordination with the Equality
Commission of Gender and the Human
Rights Commission
19
May 3, 2019
San Jose, Costa
Rica
Inter-American
Court of Human
Rights,
Regional
celebration of
World Press
Freedom Day.
Office of the Special
Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression
of the IACHR
UNESCO
The Special Rapporteur, Edison Lanza
participated as an organizer and
panelist in the international
celebration of World Press Freedom
Day in Latin America.
The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
During the celebration, a series of
panels open to the public were
developed at the headquarters of the
Inter-American Court, with the
participation of renowned journalists,
jurists, and international activists.
Topics such as the operation of the
Internet and its impact on the right to
seek, receive, and disseminate
information were addressed during the
presentations
Mexico City
May 14 - 16 2019
Facebook
Oversight Board
Facebook Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to participate in the Facebook
Oversight Event, where the current
plans for the conformation of the
Facebook Oversight Board were
discussed.
In this event, issues such as decisionmaking regarding what content
violates or not the Facebook
community norms and how those
decisions ultimately affect the global
policy development process were
addressed.
Similarly, group conversations and
activities were conducted, specially
designed to request contributions on
the structure, objectives, and design of
the Oversight board.
Lima, Peru
May 20-22, 2019
Training Course
Freedom of
Expression and
Access to
Information at
the Academy of
the Magistracy of
Peru
Office of the Special
Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression
of the IACHR
UNESCO
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
participated together with UNESCO
and the Universidad de los Andes in the
training course for Judges in Peru.
Attorney Cecilia La Hoz presented the
session on the inter-American system
and standards of freedom of
expression.
Meetings with
civil society and
journalists
In addition, the lawyer held meetings
with members of civil society and
journalists in order to monitor priority
issues and current issues regardingthe
right to freedom of expression in Peru.
20
Panama City,
Panama
22-24 May 2019
Workshop
Community
Content -
Facebook LatinAmerica
Facebook
Regional Office of the
United Nations
Development Program
(UNDP)
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
participated in the Workshop for
Community Content of Facebook for
civil society and defenders of Central
America, and international
organizations with a presence in the
region.
Tunisia, Tunisia
June 12, 2019
Rightscon 2019 Article 19 Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited by the organization Article 19
Brazil to participate as speaker of the
Panel: What(went)’sApp at the
Brazilian elections? Held during the
framework of the Righstcon 2019
human rights convention in Tunisia.
Tunisia, Tunisia
June 13, 2019
Rightscon 2019 Article 19 Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited by the organization Article 19
to participate as a panel member:
Returning protest to the people: A
campaign to destigmatize protesters.
carried out during the framework of
the Righstcon 2019 human rights
convention in Tunisia.
Lima, Peru
17 June 2019
Meeting with
SCO Peru
RFOE
Pacific University
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
convened a meeting with members of
civil society and journalists from Peru
with the aim of providing a space to
share information on priority issues
and current issues regarding the right
to freedom of expression in Peru. The
meeting also served as a forum to
advance the implementation of interAmerican standards in the country
through the discussion of joint
strategies and the use of the
mechanisms of the system.
Lima, Peru
18 June 2019
Talk
Should crimes
against honor be
decriminalized in
Peru?
RFOE
Pacific University
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
and the University of the Pacific
convened the Talk: Should crimes
against honor be decriminalized in
Peru?
20-21 June 2019
Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Defending the
Integrity of the
Latin American
Information
Space
Forum
Cadal
National Endowment
for Democracy
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
participated in the event Defending the
Integrity of the Information Space in
LAC together with more than 15
organizations specialized in freedom of
expression and digital rights in the
region. During the event, the project
coordinator Melissa Cabrera,
presented the current process of
developing the guide to address online
misinformation in electoral contexts
and participated in discussions on
regional priorities in the field.
21
Monday, 24 June
2019
Geneva,
Switzerland
Presentation of
the Report on
Freedom of
Expression in
Cuba
41st United Nations
Human Rights Council
United Nations Special
Rapporteur for
Freedom of Opinion
and Expression
IWPR
CPJ
The Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
and the Special Rapporteur for the
promotion and protection of the rights
to Freedom of opinion and expression
of the UN, David Kaye, presented the
Report on Freedom of Expression in
Cuba at the Palais des Nations. The
Panel was also made up of
representatives from IWPR, CPJ and
three Cuban activists who traveled
from the island and from Miami: Hugo
Landa, Luis Manuel Alcántara, and
Maikel Gonzalez.
Wednesday, 26
June 2019
Medellin, Colombia
Presentation of
Progress of the
“Guide to
address online
Misinformation
in electoral
contexts”
48th OAS
General
Assembly
RFOE
Secretariat for
Strengthening
Democracy, OAS
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
organized a parallel event to the OAS
General Assembly to present the
progress in the guide for online
misinformation in electoral contexts
that is being developed based on the
mandate given by the OAS General
Assembly in 2018.
The panel consisted of the National
Electoral Institute of Mexico,Facebook,
the Secretariat for Strengthening
Democracy of the OAS, and the Green
Lantern organization.
The audience, consisting of permanent
missions and observers to the OAS, had
the opportunity to ask questions and
provide comments based on the
experience of their countries and the
needs that have been identified in this
topic.
Wednesday, 26
June 2019
Medellin, Colombia
Presentation of
Progress of the
“Guide to
address online
Misinformation
in electoral
contexts”
48th OAS
General
Assembly
CEJIL
WOLA
FLIP
IACHR
Office of the United
Nations High
Commissioner for
Human Rights in
Colombia
Rapporteur Edison Lanza was invited
to participate in the Defenders Under
Attack event within the framework of
the OAS General Assembly in Medellin.
The Rapporteur shared with the
audience the work carried out by the
Office of the Special Rapporteur on the
protection of journalists and defenders
through the protection mechanisms
and reiterated in this regard the
obligations of the States. The panel was
accompanied by Cecilia Lozano,
Mapiripan leader, Isabel Zuleta of Rios
Vivos Movement, Sebastian Escobar of
CAJAR, and Paulo Abrao, Secretary of
the IACHR
22
Monday 8 July
2019
New York, United
States
High Level
Meeting to
discuss the Role
of the Judicial
Sector in SDG16 -
Strengthening
the Rule of Law
and Human
Rights to achieve
Peaceful, Fair
and Inclusive
Societies
Iberoamerican Judicial
Summit
UNESCO
UNDP
AIAMP
The Project Coordinator Melissa
Cabrera participated in the high-level
forum to advance SDG16
Strengthening the Rule of Law and
Human Rights to achieve Peaceful, Fair
and Inclusive Societies, held at the
United Nations headquarters in New
York.
This event aimed to present regional
justice systems as key actors for the
promotion of peace, justice, and strong
institutions, and discuss future joint
activities.
Tuesday 9 July
2019
New York, United
States
Closed Meeting
Strengthening
the Rule of Law
and Human
Rights to achieve
Peaceful, Fair
and Inclusive
Societies
I/A Court
Iberoamerican Judicial
Summit
UNDP COMJIB
The Project Coordinator Melissa
Cabrera attended the closed meeting
following the Forum on Strengthening
the Rule of Law and Human Rights
where issueswere discussed regarding
the next steps to be taken regarding
SDG 16 and potential donors for the
project.
AIAMP
July 9th, 2019
Washington D.C.
Regulation and
Telecommunicati
ons Summit,
Freedom of
Expression,
Media, and Press:
Meeting of
Regulatory
Bodies of Latin
America
OAS
CITEL
CERTAL
The lawyer of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur Cecilia la Hoz was invited
to participate in the Summit
Regulation and Telecommunications,
Freedom of Expression, Media and
Press where she was in charge of
presenting the situation of freedom of
expression in the region and the
challenges of this right in the next
decade, in accordance with the
provisions of the Joint Declaration of
the Twentieth Anniversary of the
Rapporteurs for Freedom of
Expression of the OAS, UN, ACHPR, and
OSCE.
10 July 2019
London, England
“MEDIA
FREEDOM
CONFERENCE
2019”
Article 19
Centre for Law and
Democracy, CLD
Global Campaign for
Free Expression
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated and signed together with
the United Nations Special Rapporteur
(UN) for Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, the Representative of the
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for
Freedom of Media, and the Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
and Access to Information of the
African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), at the launch
of the joint Declaration of the 20th
anniversary: “Challenges for Freedom
of Expression in the next decade ”
23
11 July 2019
London, England
“MEDIA
FREEDOM
CONFERENCE
2019”
UK Government
Canada Government
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to participate as a panelist in
the event in the following panels:
Delegation Leaders Dinner
Navigating misinformation organized
by the Government of Canada.
Safety of Women Journalists
Monday 29 July
2019
El Salvador, San
Salvador
Inauguration V
edition of the
diploma:
“General aspects
of political
systems and
public
management” -
ECADE
Salvadoran Foundation
for Economic and Social
Development -
FUSADES
ECADE Central
American School of
Government and
Democracy
Hanns Seidel
Foundation
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited by the Salvadoran Foundation
for Economic and Social Development
to participate in the Inauguration of
the fifth edition of the diploma
"General aspects of political systems
and public management" held at the
Central American School of
Government and Democracy in thecity
of El Salvador where he was in charge
of giving the keynote conference
"Misinformation in times of social
networks" risk for democracy?
Monday 29 July
2019
El Salvador, San
Salvador
Lunch Salvadoran Foundation
for Economic and Social
Development -
FUSADES
Rapporteur Edison Lanza was invited
to participate in a lunch to address
issues related to the state of Freedom
of expression in the region.
ECADE Central
American School of
Government and
Democracy
Hanns Seidel
Foundation
Netherlands Institute
for Multiparty
Democracy
Tuesday, 30 July
2019
Mexico City,
Mexico
Inter-American
Standards and
national
legislation
workshop on
access to
environmental
information in
the context of
extractive
industries
IACHR RFOE The Office of the Special Rapporteur
held the Inter-American Standards and
National Legislation Workshop on
access to environmentalinformation in
the context of extractive industries -
Mexico. This workshop was for
officials, representatives of civil
society, and other relevant actors; and
aimed to disseminate the interAmerican standards regarding access
to public information applied to
environmental information in the
context of the reinforced protection
that the inter-American instruments
grant to this fundamental right.
24
Tuesday, 20
August 2019
Tegucigalpa,
Honduras
Closed
Event
C-LIBRE The Special Rapporteur attended a
dinner organized by C-Libre which was
attended by around 80people linked to
the fight for freedom of expression in
the country, including journalists, Civil
Society Organizations in the field of
Freedom of Expression, and Directors
of media.
Tuesday, 20
August 2019
Tegucigalpa,
Honduras
Wednesday, 21
August 2019
Tegucigalpa,
Honduras
Closed
Event
Frente a Frente Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to participate in the television
program conducted by the journalist
Renato Álvarez Frente a Frente where
he spoke about the situation of
Freedom of Expression in the
Hemisphere, during which the
program also participated in the
debate table journalists from
Honduras and the C-Libre
Organization
Event:
Forum Violence
against
journalists
within the
framework of
covering social
protest.
C-Libre Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited toparticipate as in the Violence
against journalists forum in the
framework of the covering social
protest, within which he was in charge
of giving a keynote lecture on “The
obligations of the states in relation to
journalists covering social protest
situations ”.
Wednesday, 21
August 2019
Tegucigalpa,
Honduras
Event: Dinner
with Women's
Human Rights
Organizations
Women's Civil Society
Organizations
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
attended a dinner organized by
different Women's Organizations to
discuss issues of access and
dissemination of information
regarding issues concerning women's
rights and freedom of expression in
Honduras.
Wednesday, 21
August 2019
Tegucigalpa,
Honduras
Inter-American
Standards and
national
legislation
workshop on
access to
environmental
information in
the context of
extractive
industries
IACHR RFOE
Institute of Access to
Public Information IAIP
Honduras
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
held the Inter-American Standards and
National Legislation Workshop on
access to environmentalinformation in
the context of extractive industries -
Honduras. This workshop was for
officials, representatives of civil
society, and other relevant actors; and
aimed to disseminate the interAmerican standards regarding access
to public information applied to
environmental information in the
context of the reinforced protection
that the inter-American instruments
grant to this fundamental right.
25
Friday 23 August
2019
Tegucigalpa,
Honduras
Talk with
Honduran
journalists
C-Libre Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
attended a talk attended by around 35
journalists, this space was an
opportunity for journalists from
different states of the region topresent
their cases and discuss their
experience regarding the challenges
they face during the exercise of their
profession in the country.
Monday, 26 August
2019
Buenos Aires,
Argentina
“Launch of the
Cybersecurity
Campaign”
Center for Global
Impact
International
Republican Institute
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited by the International Republican
Institute to participate as a panelist in
the launch of the Cybersecurity
Campaign in Argentina within the
Panel:
Why is cybersecurity important for the
Argentine elections?
Tuesday 10
September 2019
Sao Paulo, Brazil
Seminar on
intermediary
responsibility
and freedom of
expression:
Brazilian Institute of
Consumer Defense
IDEC
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited by the Brazilian Institute of
Consumer Defense IDEC to participate
as a panelist in the Seminar on
intermediary responsibility and
freedom of expression in Sao Paulo,
Brazil.
Tuesday 17
September, Mexico
City
Training diploma
in the InterAmerican Human
Rights system
“Hector Fix
Samudio 2019”
UNAM Legal Research
Institute
IACHR
UNAM General
Advocacy Office
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the training diploma in
the Inter-American Human Rights
system "Hector Fix Samudio 2019" in
which he was in charge of giving the
class on "Violence against journalists
and media"
IDH Court
Thursday 19
September 2019,
Buenos Aires,
Argentina
Celebration of
the tenth
anniversary of
the Center for
Studies on
Freedom of
Expression and
Access to
Information
CELE
University of Palermo
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the celebration of the
tenth anniversary of the Center for
Studies on Freedom of Expression and
Access to Information, in which he
delivered the keynote lecture:
"Perspectives on freedom of
expression in Latin America."
Saturday,
September 21,
2019, Washington
D.C.
Expert Dialogue
on Secularism
and Religious
Freedom
IACHR The Special Rapporteur participated in
the Dialogue of Experts on Secularism
and Religious Freedom event
organized by the IACHR during the173
Period of Sessions.
26
Monday,
September 23,
2019, Washington
D.C.
Event: Victims of
the Dictatorship
in Venezuela
Freedom House
Defend Venezuela
A world without gag
Criminal Forum
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to participate in the Victims of
the Dictatorship event in Venezuela,
organized by different organizations of
Human Rights Defenders of the
mentioned country. The Rapporteur
was in charge ofpresenting the Threats
to Freedom of Expression segment in
Venezuela.
September 25-27,
2019, Lima, Peru
Training course
for trainers for
Directors and
Directors of
Schools of Public
Ministries of
Latin America
UNESCO
The Office of the
Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression
The lawyer, Cecilia LaHoz,participated
as a speaker in the course in order to
raise awareness of the standards,
jurisprudence andwork of the Office of
the Special Rapporteur in relation to
violence against freedom of expression
and the role of the judiciary to counter
it and fight impunity
September 25-27,
2019, Washington
D.C.
International
Course on Public
Policies in
human rights of
the IPPDH.
IACHR - IPPDH On September 25 and 27, in
Washington-DC, Tatiana Guasti,lawyer
of the RFOE, gave the workshop on the
right of access to information in the
Inter-American System of Human
Rights, to the participants of the
International Public Policy Course in
human rights of the IPPDH.
2 de octubre de
2019, Washington
D.C.
Course on the
Inter-American
System for the
Protection of
Human Rights
for agents of the
State, IACHRIIDH
-Robert F. Kennedy
Human Rights
-Washington College of
Law, American
University
The lawyers Tatiana Teubner and
Cecilia La Hoz,participated as speakers
in the course in order to publicize the
mandate of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur, its creation, its functions
and work methodology. They also
presented the situation of freedom of
expression in the region, the work
areas of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur and the challenges of this
right in the future.
October 4, 2019,
Aguascalientes,
Mexico
XXVI
International
Law Workshop.
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Mexico
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to give a talk on Freedom of
Expression and Violent Extremism in
the framework of the International
Law Workshop offered by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Mexico and
organized by the Pan American
University of Aguas Calientes.
Pan American
University of
Aguascalientes
October 6, 2019,
Miami United
States
75th General
Assembly of the
Inter-American
Press Society
Inter-American Press
Society
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the 75th General
Assembly of the Inter-American Press
Association within the panel, Freedom
of Expression and Violent Extremism in
International Law
27
2-4 October 2019,
Panama
UNESCO
Regional Forum
of Allies for Latin
America and the
Caribbean
UNESCO The Project Coordinator Melissa
Cabrera participated in the Plenary
Panel “Access to Information and
Freedom of Expression” during the
Forum that brought together more
than 300 UNESCO allies in the region.
The presentation focused on the
challenges for freedom of expression in
the digital age.
1 November 2019,
Caracas Venezuela
Conference:
Media and
Freedom of
Expression in
Venezuela
RFOE - IACHR
Embassy of the United
Kingdom in Caracas
Public space
On the occasion of the international
day against impunity for crimes against
journalists, the Office of the Special
Rapporteur organized this in
coordination with the Public Space
Foundation, the Media and Freedom
Conference (Creativity, Innovation and
communication tools) in Caracas,
Venezuela.
More than 70 journalists from all
regions of the country attended, who
were able to access and participate
interactively in different panels and
activities focused on addressing the
problem of the exercise of journalism
in Venezuela according to the current
context of the country showing the
challenges and opportunities
presented to carry out the same.
November 2, 2019,
Caracas Venezuela
Workshops:
Protection
Mechanisms of
the InterAmerican Human
Rights System to
exercise freedom
of expression in
Venezuela.
RFOE - IACHR
Embassy of the United
Kingdom in Caracas
Public space
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression organized, in
coordination with the Public Space
Foundation, two workshops attended
by more than 75 Venezuelan
journalists from different regions of
the country and Civil Society
Organizations of Venezuela focused on
defending Freedom of Expression.
These workshops aimed to provide
tools and inform these groups on how
to access and use the different
protection mechanisms by dynamically
offering them various materials and
information that allow them to exercise
journalism more safely.
28
7 November 2019
Quito, Ecuador
Forum of the
Inter-American
Human Rights
System
Panel: Impunity
as a factor of
violence against
journalists and
media workers.
Proposals for the
use of the SDG
16.10 indicator
reporting system
Voices of the South
IACHR
OAS
Inter-American Court
of
Human rights
The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression of the IACHR, Edison Lanza
participated in the IACHR Forum in the
Impunity panel as a factor of violence
against journalists which aimed to
formulate proposals for the use of the
Sustainable Development Goal
Indicator Reporting System SDG 16.10
that measure the level of press
freedom, access to information and the
security of journalists, in order to be
used by the Inter-American Human
Rights System in the reports of the
IACHR RFOE with the ultimate goal of
reducing impunity in crimes against
the press.
During the panel he also carried out a
comparative analysis of the national
mechanisms of journalists' security in
the region and of the common
solutions to the problem of violence
against the press.
Participants: Dr. Frank LaRue, in his
capacity as Former UN Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression, Fundamedios,
Voces del Sur and RFOE.
10 November 2019
Mexico City
RFOE AWARD
2019
Colpin 2019
IPYS - COLPIN
RFOE IACHR
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
traveled to Mexico City to present and
deliver the prize to the winners of the
second edition of the RFOE AWARD
ceremony that took place within the
framework of the Latin American
conference of investigative journalism
COLPIN 2019.
13th November
Quito, Ecuador
Workshop on
protection of
communication
workers in
Ecuador
Council for Regulation,
Development and
Promotion of
Information and
Communication
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated as a speaker in the forum:
Freedom of expression, responsibility
and diversity in the face of new
communication scenarios; which had
the assistance and participation of
communication workers, media,
unions, social organizations and
academic institutions.
This was a space for reflection on the
challenges that Ecuadorian society has
with regard to the protection of
communication workers, as
fundamental actors to strengthen
democracy.
14 November 2019
Panama City
XIV InterAmerican
Meeting of
Electoral
Authorities
Electoral Tribunal -
Panama
OAS - DECO
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the XIV Inter-American
Meeting of Electoral Authorities,
organized by the Electoral Tribunal of
Panama and the Department of
Electoral Cooperation and Observation
of the OAS within the Social Media
Laboratory Segment: Political
strategies in digital media.
29
15 November 2019 Freedom of
Expression, Law
and Justice
conference
National Journalism
Council
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
delivered the conference Freedom of
Expression, Law and Justice organized
by the National Journalism Council of
Panama.
21-22 November
2019 Bogotá,
Colombia
Event:
Digital Security
and Journalism
in Restrictive
Societies
RFOE - IACHR
United Kingdom
FLIP Press Freedom
Foundation
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza and
Project Manager Melissa Cabrera
participated in Bogotá's workshop on
Digital Security and Journalism in
Restrictive Societies: Protection tools
for the exercise of investigative
journalism in Venezuela - Organized by
RFOE - IACHR.
This workshop was attended by
journalists from several regions of
Venezuela and Colombian journalists,
who participated in digital security
panels, among which the following
stand out: online violence against
women journalists dictated by Amalia
Toledo of the Karisma Foundation,
Introduction to Digital Security and
Digital Security workshop dictated by
Pablo Arcuri of Internews, interAmerican standards related to
investigative journalism and digital
rights dictated by Luisa Isaza of FLIP,
and surveillance and blockades in Latin
America dictated by Daniela Alvarado
of IPYS Venezuela.
25th November Event Digital Rights Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the IGF as a panelist in
the forum organized by Digital Rights
on Technology and Surveillance in
Latin America: Towards human rights
standards
Berlin, Germany
Internet
Governance
Forum - 14th
Annual Meeting
of the Internet
Governance
Forum - IGF
26th November
Berlin, Germany
Event Facebook:
Encryption
Facebook Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was
invited to participate in a closed
meeting organized by Facebook where
he was responsible for addressing the
issue of encryption threats and the
effect it has on freedom of expression.
26th November
Berlin, Germany
Roundtable:
Panel: 5G, IoT
and Zero Rating
Challenges for
Net Neutrality
FGV Law School Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the IGF as a panelist in
the forum organized by FGV law school
on 5G, IoT and Zero Rating Challenges
for Net Neutrality.
27th November
Berlin, Germany
Forum How to
deal with
terrorist content
and extreme
violence online
FGV Law School Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the IGF as a panelist in
the forum How to address terrorist
content and extreme violence online.
30
28th November
Berlin, Germany
Forum:
Community
Networks: Policy
and Regulations
FGV Law School Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza
participated in the IGF as a panelist in
the forum organized by FGV law
school: on Community Networks:
Policy and Regulations.
5) Working visits and meetings
24. Below is a summary of the working visits and meetings carried out by the Office of the Special
Rapporteur in 2019:
Working visits
Country Date/
Place
Institution Description
Costa Rica 22 to 29
January
2019, San
José
129 Regular Period
of Sessions I/A
Court HR
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Edison
Lanza attended the 129 Regular Period of Sessions of the
Inter-American Court related to the alleged violation of the
right to freedom of expression, political rights and freedom
of movement of Mr. Tulio Álvarez Ramos, for a criminal
proceedings against him due to the alleged commission of
the crime of aggravated defamation.
Guatemala 20 - 22
May,
2019.
Office of the United
Nations High
Commissioner -
Guatemala
The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression made an academic visit to Guatemala to discuss
issues regarding the situation of freedom of expression in
that country.
The following activities were carried out within the agenda
of the visit:
-Public launch of the joint OHCHR-PDH report on human
rights defenders and journalists.
Quito,
Ecuador
October
28 to 31,
2019
IACHR Work Visit to
Ecuador
The Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza was part of the
IACHR delegation during the Work Visit to Ecuador, to
address the human rights situation in the context of the
protests.
During the visit, the Rapporteur attended three meetings
with journalists and representatives of different media
from all regions of the country, one of them in the company
of Commissioner Luis Ernesto Vargas.
Similarly, the rapporteur had the opportunity to visit
several media directly affected during the protests such as
the newspaper "El Comercio", Radio Pichincha, and
Teleamazonas.
Finally, the Rapporteur met with authorities of the
Municipality of Quito and members of the forensic team of
legal medicine.
Bolivia November
22nd -
25th
Work visit of the
IACHR to Bolivia
The lawyer of the Office of the Special Rapporteur Tatiana
Guasti traveled to Bolivia as a representative of the Office
in the IACHR delegation during this work visit that the
Commission carried out to address the serious situation of
human rights violations that had been occurring since the
beginning of the month of November in the mentioned
country.
31
El Salvador 2-4
December
2019
On-site visit of the
IACHR to El
Salvador
The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression was
part of the IACHR delegation during the on-site visit in El
Salvador to discuss issues regarding the situation of
freedom of expression in that country.
The following activities were carried out within the agenda
of the visit:
Meeting organized and convened by the Office of the
Special Rapporteur attended by more than 30 Civil Society
organizations on freedom of expression and journalists
from different regions of the country, to collect inputs and
get a current perspective on the situation of freedom of
expression and safety of journalists in El Salvador.
Similarly, Rapporteur Edison Lanza and Commissioner
Antonia Urrejola held a meeting with the board of
commissioners of the Institute of Access to Information
where it was possible to obtain inputs regarding the
progress and projects the Institute has been carrying out
regarding access.
Finally, the Rapporteur met with authorities such as the DA
of Human Rights, and the President of the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal.
Finally, Rapporteur Edison Lanza attended,in the company
of Commissioner Antonia Urrejola, multiple meetings with
state authorities, MFA, Attorney General's Office, Ministry
of Defense, Supreme Court of Justice, Public Defender,
among others. Similarly, visits to communities and
different meetings with victims and civil society were
made.
Work Meetings
Country Date/
Place
Institution Description
Bolivia 171
Period of
Sessions
of the
InterAmerican
Commissi
on on
Human
Rights.
Press Freedom and
Expression
Monitoring and
Surveillance Unit in
Bolivia - ANP
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the Board of the
ANP to discuss the situation of freedom of expression in
Bolivia.
Bolivia 171
Period of
Sessions
of the
InterAmerican
Commissi
on on
Human
Rights.
Presentation
Thematic report of
the RFOE to the
IACHR
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza presented the report on
children and media of the RFOE during the internal session
of the IACHR.
32
Bolivia 171
Period of
Sessions
of the
InterAmerican
Commissi
on on
Human
Rights.
Presentation of the
ESE Final Report to
the IACHR
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza presented in the internal
session of the IACHR final report of the Special Follow-up
Team to the precautionary measure 309/18 (ESE)
February
11, 2019
Mexico March
14th,
2019
IACHR RFOE Melissa Cabrera, a RFOE consultant, met with more than 15
civil society organizations that make up the CSO Space in
Mexico and work for the protection of human rights and
journalists in that country. The organizations presented to
the IACHR / RFOE and the Swedish Cooperation, the
challenges they identified for the next sexennial in relation
to freedom of expression and civic space.
Mexico March
14th,
2019
IACHR RFOE Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza, together with Melissa
Cabrera, a consultant for RFOE and Swedish Cooperation,
met with 7 Mexican journalists from different States,
currently beneficiaries of the protection mechanism of the
Protection Mechanism of that country. The journalists
presented to the Special Rapporteur the challenges they
faced as journalists both in their home cities and in Mexico
City.
Jamaica May 7,
2019
Kingston
172 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
Article 19 Brazil and
other organizations
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the organization
Article 19 Brazil, Civil Society Organizations on Freedom of
Expression of Brazil, the Conectas Organization, and the
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association of the UN , M. Clément Voule,
to follow up and discuss issues of joint interest regarding
violations of freedom of expression in the context of public
protests.
Jamaica May 7,
2019
Kingston
Meeting with the
Special Rapporteur
on the rights to
freedom of peaceful
assembly and of
association of the
UN, Mr. Clément
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the UN Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly
and of association, Mr. Clément Voule, to follow up and
discuss issues of joint interest regarding violations of
freedom of expression in the framework of public protests.
Jamaica May 7,
2019
Kingston
Work meeting:
Precautionary
measure David
Romero
The Special Rapporteur attended the working meeting held
by the IACHR, headed by the Country Rapporteur, Joel
Hernández, regarding the precautionary measure of David
Romero - Honduras
172 Periodo de
Sesiones
Extraordinario de la
Comisión
Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos.
33
Jamaica May 9,
2019
Kingston
Meeting with
Jamaican Civil
Society
Organizations on
Freedom of
Expression
172 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with Civil Society
Organizations and Journalists from Jamaica and the
Caribbean to discuss and collect inputs regarding the
situation of Freedom of Expression in the region.
Colombia June 26,
2019,
Medellín
48 OAS General
Assembly
Meeting and Press
Conference with
Nicaraguan
journalist Lucía
Pineda
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the journalist
Lucía Pineda of 100% Noticias, after her release after 6
months detained since December 2018. The meeting was
followed the morning after a press conference organized by
Race and Equality, with the participation of national and
international media.
Geneva 24 June
2019
Geneva
Meeting with civil
society
41st United Nations
Human Rights
Council
The Special Rapporteur and Commissioner Joel Hernandez
held a meeting with 25 representatives of civil society
organizations in Geneva in which they presented the
greatest concerns regarding human rights and freedom of
expression in the region. The meeting was attended by 3
Cuban activists who traveled to the event of the launch of
the Report on freedom of expression in Cuba.
Honduras 21 August
2019
Tegucigal
pa
Meeting with the
Institute of Access to
Public Information
(IAIP) of Honduras
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza attended a meeting with
the Institute of Access to Public Information (IAIP) of
Honduras in which the following topics were discussed:
The renewal of the information reserve agreement of the
Ministry of Defense.
Reserve information on the financing of political parties.
Reserve decree of environmental information, My
Environment.
Honduras 23 August
2019
Tegucigal
pa
Meeting Secretariat
of Human Rights
Honduras
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the Secretary of
Human Rights of Honduras Judge Karla Cuevas to discuss
issues related to the serious situation of Freedom of
Expression in Honduras.
Honduras 23 August
2019
Tegucigal
pa
Meeting with Center
for Research and
Promotion of
Human RightsCIPRODEH
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with Ariel Diaz
Director of the Center for Research and Promotion of
Human Rights - CIPRODEH to discuss issues related to the
case of the precautionary measure granted to Honduran
journalist David Ellner
Honduras 23 August
2019
Tegucigal
pa
Meeting with
Journalists Coalition
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with Dina Meza and
other members of the Coalition of journalists, media and
civil society organizations in Honduras to discuss issues of
specific cases of journalists who have suffered violations to
their rights of free exercise of journalistic work, as well as
other issues that affect the exercise of Freedom of
Expression in the country.
34
Brazil Tuesday
10
Septembe
r 2019
Sao Paulo
Meeting with Civil
Society
Organizations of
Brazil Organized by
IDEC
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with Civil Society
Organizations and Journalists of Brazil to discuss and
collect inputs regarding the situation of freedom of
expression in the country.
Brazil Tuesday
10
Septembe
r 2019
Sao Paulo
Meeting with Civil
Society
Organizations of
Brazil Organized by
Article 19
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with different Civil
Society Organizations and Journalists from Brazil where
the following topics of interest were discussed.
Criminalization and protests
Civic Space Reduction
Misinformation
Mexico Tuesday
17
Septembe
r, Mexico
City
Meeting with the
Office of the
Specialized
Prosecutor for
Human Rights
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the Minister.
Sara Irene Herrerías Guerra, Prosecutor Specialized in
Human Rights Matters to discuss issues related to the
safety of journalists in Mexico among other threats to the
free exercise of freedom of expression in Mexico.
United
States
Tuesday,
Septembe
r 24, 2019,
Washingto
n D.C.
173 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with Gustavo Gómez
- Director of Observacom, Uruguay to discuss different
topics of interest and upcoming projects and events to be
carried out together regarding freedom of expression in the
region.
United
States
Tuesday,
Septembe
r 24, 2019,
Washingto
n D.C.
173 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
The Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza and the Office’s team
met with the IFEX Network to follow up on issues of
common interest and discuss upcoming opportunities for
development and joint work regarding activities in defense
of Freedom of Expression.
United
States
Tuesday,
Septembe
r 24, 2019,
Washingto
n D.C.
173 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
The Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza and the Office’s team
met with several Cuban journalists and representatives of
civil society to exchange information and receive inputs
regarding the situation and challenges to exercise Freedom
of Expression.in that country.
United
States
Tuesday,
Septembe
r 24, 2019,
Washingto
n D.C.
173 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the Pro Bono
Network of the Americas where opportunities for
collaboration and joint work between both parties were
discussed.
United
States
Thursday,
Septembe
r 26, 2019,
Washingto
n D.C.
173 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza and Attorney Tatiana
Guasti met with representatives of the Race and Equality
organization and Nicaraguan journalists Carlos Fernando
Chamorro, Aníbal Toruño, Sergio León and Lucía Pineda to
discuss the issue of the serious safety situation and
restrictions on the exercise of journalism and freedom of
expression in Nicaragua.
United
States
Thursday,
Septembe
r 26, 2019,
Washingto
n D.C.
173 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
Special Rapporteur Edison met with the Regional Human
Rights Advisory Foundation - INREDH to discuss issues,
exchange information and receive inputs regarding the
situation of Freedom of Expression and communicators
and journalists in Ecuador.
35
United
States
Friday,
Septembe
r 27, 2019,
Washingto
n D.C.
173 Period of
Sessions of the
Inter-American
Commission on
Human Rights.
The Office’s team met with Carlos Correa, director of
Venezuela Public Space to review the situation of freedom
of expression in Venezuela and discuss possiblepromotion
and training events that will take place during the month of
November in Caracas regarding to the issue of journalist’s
safety.
United Friday, 173 Period of Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza met with the Minister.
Luis Raúl González Pérez, President of the National Human
Rights Commission of Mexico to discuss issues related to
the safety situation of journalists and threats to the free
exercise of freedom of expression in Mexico.
States Septembe Sessions of the
r 27, 2019, Inter-American
Washingto Commission on
n D.C. Human Rights.
6) Annual Report and Development of ExpertKnowledge
25. One of the main tasks of the Office of the Special Rapporteur is the preparation of the annual report on
the state of freedom of expression in the hemisphere. Every year, this report analyzes the state of enjoyment of
the right to freedom of expression in the States of the hemisphere, which includes noting the main threats to the
exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the progress that has been made in thisarea.
26. Besides its annual reports, the Office of the Special Rapporteur periodically produces specific reports
on particular countries. For example, it has prepared and published special reports on the situation regarding
the right to freedom of expression in Paraguay (2001), Panama (2003), Haiti (2003), Guatemala (2004),
Venezuela (2004), Colombia (2005), Honduras (2009, 2010 and 2015), Venezuela (2009 and 2010), Mexico
(2010 and 2015), Chile (2017), Cuba (2018) and Ecuador (2019)
27. In 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur published on March 8 the special report “Women
Journalists and Freedom of Expression: Discrimination and gender-based violence against women journalists
for the exercise of their profession”,7 then on March 13 it was presented to the public in Mexico City the Special
Report on Freedom of Expression in Cuba.8 Also, during 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur also
completed the special reports: “Report on Protest and Human Rights”; “Final Report of the Special Follow-up
Team (ESE) Designated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Follow-up of the component to
investigate the facts that resulted in the kidnapping and murder of Javier Ortega, Paúl Rivas, and Efraín Segarra,
members of the newspaper's ("El Comercio") journalistic team and; “Report on the Rights of Children and the
Media in the Americas”.9
28. Likewise, in October 2019, the office presented to the OAS Permanent Council a "Practical guide of
recommendations to guarantee freedom of expression and access to information from various sources on the
Internet in electoral contexts, without undue interference"
10, culminating thus, the elaboration process led by
this Office in coordination with the Department of Electoral Cooperation (DECO) of the OAS, and in response to
the mandate granted by the General Assembly through the AG/RES. 2928-XLVIII-O/18. The Guide complements
the efforts of this Office to address this issue and which began with the Joint Declaration on Freedom of
Expression and "Fake News", disinformation, andpropaganda, together with the other Rapporteurs on freedom
of expression in 2017. Other actions within this initiative include the advice of the RFOE to the electoral
observation mission of the OAS during the presidential elections in Brazil, Bolivia, and Panama. The process of
preparing the guide managed to reach a thematic, geographical, and sectorial balance. Multilateral organizations
-such as UNESCO-, civil society organizations, electoral organizations in the region, representatives of theprivate
sector, and academia participated in theprocess.
7) Special Statements and Declarations
29. Through the daily monitoring of the state of freedom of expression in the region—conducted by means
of an extensive network of contacts and sources—the Office of the Special Rapporteur issues statements such as
press releases, reports, and opinions on specific cases or situations that are relevant to the exercise of this
fundamental right. Press releases issued by the Office of the Special Rapporteur receive wide coverage and
constitute one of its most important work mechanisms.
30. The Office of the Special Rapporteur receives many emails, which mainly refer to alerts, press releases,
requests for information, and queries on freedom of expression in the region. Likewise, a small group of the
7 Available at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/docs/informes/MujeresPeriodistas.pdf
8 Available at: https://cidhoea.wixsite.com/cuba/english
9 Available at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/expresion/informes/Informe_Final_ESE_MC_Dicc2019.pdf
10 Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/publications/Guia_Desinformacion_VF%20ENG.pdf
36
emails refers to formal requests to the IACHR Individual Case System, and another group refers to topics that
are not within the Office’s jurisdiction. The Office of the Special Rapporteur reviews, filters, and classifies the
information received to establish the actions to be taken.
31. In addition, since its creation the Office of the Special Rapporteur hasparticipated in the drafting of joint
declarations with the other regional rapporteurs and the UN rapporteur for freedom of expression. These joint
statements are generally signed by the UN Special Rapporteur; the Representative on Freedom of the Media of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); the Special Rapporteur of the OAS, and the
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights. When the issues are regional in nature, the declarations are signed by the Rapporteurs for
the UN and the OAS.
32. Joint statements constitute an important tool for the work of the Office of the Special Rapporteur. In
previous years, these statements have covered different topics related to freedom of expression, according to
context and time11.
33. On July 10, experts for the freedom of expression of the UN, OSCE, IACHR, and the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights issued their 2019 Joint Declaration12 at an event that took place in London,
England. The Declaration addresses the various current threats to the freedom of the press, including threats to
their safety and threats of a legal, political, technological, and economic nature, and the measures that States
must take to address them.
34. The Declaration was signed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, the Representative for Freedom of the Press of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Harlem Desir, the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression of the Organization of American States (OAS), Edison Lanza, and the Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR), Lawrence Mute.
35. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur issued different press releases to raise awareness on
facts related to freedom of thought and expression. These statements highlight especially worrying facts and the
best local practices, and explain the respective regional standards. Press releases issued during 2018 can be
seen in the webpage of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR13.
Country Topic Number Tittle Place /
Date
Mexico Violence against
journalists
R16/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression of the
Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) condemns the
murder of José Rafael Murúa
Manríquez and observes withconcern
the continuity of violence against
journalists in México.
Washingto
n, D.C.
January
25, 2019
Venezuela Violence against
journalists – Restrictions
to freedom of expression
R23/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur
demands the immediate release of
journalists detained in Venezuela and
refrain from expelling foreign
correspondents
Washingto
n, D.C.
February
1st, 2019
Venezuela Restrictions to freedom of
expression
R62/19 Freedom of Expression experts of the
UN and the IACHR express alarm over
expansion of censorship measures in
Venezuela
Washingto
n, D.C.
March 8,
2019
11 Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docListCat.asp?catID=16&lID=
12 Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=1146&lID=1
13 Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/artListCat.asp?year=&countryID=&lID=1&catID=1
37
Regional Announcement R60/19 On the occasion of 2019 international
women’s day, The Office of the
Especial Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression presents the report
“Women Journalists and Freedom of
Expression: Discrimination and
Gender-Based violence faced by
women journalist in the exercise of
their profession”.
Washingto
n, D.C
March 8,
2019
Cuba Announcement R63/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur
presents Special Report on the
Situation of Freedom of Expression in
Cuba
Washingto
n, D.C.
March 13,
2019
Honduras Violence against
journalists
R71/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
Condemns the Murder of Journalist in
Honduras and Urges to Investigate
Connection to Journalistic Activity
Washingto
n, D.C.
March 20,
2019
Regional Situation of FoE in the
Region
R73/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression of the IACHR
presents its 2018 Annual Report
Washingto
n, D.C.
March 21,
2019
Regional Announcement N/A The Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression presents
the list of members of the Expert
Group on disinformation in electoral
contexts that will meet April 23-24
Washingto
n D.C.
April 16,
2019
Regional
Venezuela
Freedom of Expression R107/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression, UNESCO,
and the Inter- American Court of
Human Rights celebrate World Press
Freedom Day with a Panel on the
protection of freedom of expression
and the Internet.
Montevide
o, San Jose,
Washingto
n A
pril 30,
2019
Restrictions to Freedom of
Expression
R116/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns closure of Radio Caracas
Radio 750 AM, the censorship of
television channels, restrictions on the
Internet, and the arrest of journalists
in Venezuela.
Washingto
n, D.C.
May 15,
2019
Mexico Violence against
journalists
R120/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns the continuance of murders
of journalists and communicators in
Mexico and urges the State to
implement decisive measures to
protect and combat impunity.
Washingto
n, D.C.
May 17,
2019
Guatemal
a
Elections and FOE R147/19 Guatemala: Freedom of Expression
and the media’s role are crucial to
guaranteeing free and transparent
elections this June 16.
Washingto
n D.C.
June 12,
2019
38
Haiti Violence against
journalists
R151/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns the murder of journalist
Petión Rospide and expresses its
concern over the ongoing violence
against journalists in the framework
of the public demonstrations’
coverage in Haiti
Washingto
n D.C.
June 14,
2019
Mexico Violence against
journalists
R153/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns the murder of journalist
Norma Sarabia in Mexico and notes
with concern the ongoing attacks
against journalists.
Washingto
n D.C.
June 17,
2019
Brazil Violence against
journalists
R164/19 Experts on freedom of expression of
the UN and the IACHR express their
concern over death threats against
journalist Glenn Greenwald, director
of The Intercept Brasil, and his family
Washingto
n D.C.
July 1,
2019
Regional Freedom of Expression R173/19 Twentieth Anniversary of the Joint
Declaration: Challenges to Freedom of
Expression in the Next Decade.
Washingto
n D.C.
July 10,
2019
Colombia Violence against
journalists
R177/19 On July 16, the IACHR presented
before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights the case Jineth Bedoya
Lima and other, regarding Colombia.
Washingto
n D.C.
July 19,
2019
Mexico Violence against
journalists
R189/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns increased violence against
journalists and the media in Mexico
and urges the State to strengthen
strategies for prevention, protection,
and fight against impunity at federal
and state levels.
Washingto
n, D.C.
August 5,
2019
Regional Access to public
information
Anuncio Apply for the RELE 2019 Award:
"Access to Public Information and
Investigative Journalism.
Washingto
n, D.C.,
August 8,
2019
Cuba Violence against
journalists
R206/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns prison sentence against
journalist Roberto Quiñones and
expresses concern about the
persistence of criminalization and
harassment against communicators
and human rights defenders in Cuba.
Washingto
n, D.C. 20
August
2019
Nicaragua Violence against
journalists
R212/19 Nicaragua: Nicaragua: Must stop
reprisals against journalists, say
human rights experts
Washingto
n, D.C. 26
August
2019
39
Mexico Violence against
journalists
R213/19 Special Rapporteur condemns the
murder of journalist Nevith Condes in
Mexico; urges the State to review and
strengthen protection measures and
the prosecutor's office action in the
face of the serious situation of
violence against communicators.
Washingto
n, D.C.
29 of
August
2019
Venezuela Violence against
journalists / Detentions
R232/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns that communicators Pedro
Jaimes and Jesús Medina have served
one year in prison in Venezuela
without being convicted.
Washingto
n, D.C
September
18th 2019
Chile Social Protest No.
270/19
IACHR condemns excessive use of
force and rejects all forms of violence
in the context of social protests in
Chile.
Washingto
n, D.C
23rd
September
2019
Ecuador Violence against
journalists
No.
252/19
IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship
express concern about the excessive
use of police force against
demonstrators and attacks on
journalists in protests in Ecuador.
Washingto
n D.C. 9
October
2019
Haiti Violence against
journalists
No.
258/19
IACHR and its Special Rapporteur’s
Office express concern about acts of
violence and increased political
tension in Haiti.
Washingto
n D.C.
October
11, 2019
Regional Missinformation N/A Office of the Special Rapporteur of the
IACHR presents a Guide to guarantee
freedom of expression regarding
deliberate disinformation in electoral
contexts.
Washingto
n D.C.,
October
18, 2019
Mexico Violence against
journalists
R295/19 Freedom of expression experts
concerned by slow progress into
investigation and prosecution for
murder of Mexican journalist Javier
Valdez .
Washingto
n D.C., 19
November
2019
Honduras Violence against
journalists
R316/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns murder of journalist José
Arita in Honduras and urges to
investigate relation to his journalistic
activity.
Washingto
n D.C.,
December
4, 2019
C. Funding
36. The Office of the Special Rapporteur would like to express very special thanks for the contributions it
has received from OAS Member States, observer countries, and international cooperation agencies. In 2019, the
Office of the Rapporteur calls attention to the projects that have been carried out satisfactorily thanks to the
financial contributions made by the States of Costa Rica, France, Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United States
of America, Uruguay, United Kingdom as well as the Swedish Agency for International Development
Cooperation, the Swiss Confederation, Open Society Foundations, and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), Ford Foundation, Freedom House and Google Inc. This funding has allowed the Office of the Special
Rapporteur to fulfill its mandate and continue its work of promoting and defending the right to freedom of
40
expression. Once the OAS has released the official figures on the resources received and executed by this office,
they will be published in the audited financial statements available on the webpage of the organization14.
D. Staff
37. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has worked under the coordination of the Special Rapporteur, with
a team of two or three lawyers who are experts in subjects related to freedom of expression, a journalist in
charge of monitoring the situation of freedom of expression in the region, and a person who performs
administrative assistance tasks. Since July of 2009, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has had a person in
charge of managing projects and mobilizing resources. Any additional resources that have been obtained have
served toprovide greater stability and better working conditions for the members of this team. The Office of the
Special Rapporteur has also benefited from the presence of interns who have been an essential part of the team.
During 2019, in the capacity of interns Sol Bensadon (Argentina), Augusta Saravia (Brazil) and Jessica Montes
(Mexico) collaborated in a constructive and enthusiastic manner to their work at the Office of the Special
Rapporteur. In 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has also counted on the participation of Fellow María
José Ferrel (Bolivia) (Fellowship Orlando Sierra, 2019).
14All the financial information is available for consultation at OAS web page, section External Audit Reports: OAS Board of External Auditors.
Report to the Permanent Council 2013. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2013 and
2012. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 62-64; OAS Board of External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council 2012. Annual Audit of Accounts
and Financial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2012 and 2011. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 75-77; OAS Board of External
Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council 2011. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2011
and 2010. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 79-81; OAS Board of External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council 2010. Annual Audit of
Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 79-81; OAS Board of
External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council 2009. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December
31, 2009 and 2008. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 71-73;OAS Board of External Auditors. Reportto the Permanent Council 2008. Annual Audit
of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2008 and 2007. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 73-74; OAS Board of
External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council 2007. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December
31, 2007 and 2006. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 85-86;OAS Board of External Auditors. Reportto the Permanent Council 2006. Annual Audit
of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2006 and 2005. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 73; OAS Board of
External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council 2005. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December
31, 2005 and 2004. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 63-64;OAS Board of External Auditors. Reportto the Permanent Council 2004. Annual Audit
ofAccounts andFinancial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2004 and 2003. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 41-42;Board ofExternal
Auditors. General Secretariat OAS. Report to the Permanent Council 2003. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years
ended December 31, 2003 and 2002. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 41-42; OAS Board of External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council
2002. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements for the years ended December 31, 2002 and 2001. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 53;
OAS Board of External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council 2001. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statement s for the years
ended December 31, 2001 and 2000. Section II. Specific funds. Pp 52; OAS Board of External Auditors. Report to the Permanent Council
2000. Annual Audit of Accounts and Financial Statements December 31, 2000 and 1999. Section II. Specific funds. Annex 4. Page4.
41
CHAPTER II: EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE
HEMISPHERE
Introduction and Methodology
1. This chapter describes some of the most important aspects of the situation of freedom of expression in
the hemisphere during 2018. Its objective is to foster a constructive dialogue with the Member States of the OAS,
calling attention to the reported advances as well as the problems and challenges that have required action
during this year. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has confidence in the will of the OAS Member States to
promote resolutely the right to freedom of expression and, to that end, publicizes their best practices, reports
some serious problems observed, and offers viable and practical recommendations rooted in the Declaration of
Principles.
2. As in previous annual reports, this chapter notes those aspects of the right to freedom of expression that
most merit attention and that have been reported to the Office of the Special Rapporteur during the year.
Following the methodology of previous annual reports, this chapter is based on information received by the
Office of the Special Rapporteur from various States, intergovernmental and non-governmental sources. The
Office of the Special Rapporteur takesparticular interest in the information provided by States,presented during
the hearings held by the IACHR, submitted by non-governmental organizations in the region and contained in
alerts sent by media outlets and media workers. In all cases, the information is contrasted and verified. The
Office presents only that information which it thinks will help the States identify worrisome problems or
tendencies that could eventually cause irreparable effects if not addressed.
3. The information in this report is presented in an orderly and systematic manner that takes note of the
advances, setbacks, and challenges regarding various aspects of the exercise of the right to freedom of
expression. Thus, this chapter includes progress made in legal, administrative or legislative matters, as well as
the most serious problems that arose throughout the year. The latter include murders, threats and attacks
against journalists exercising their profession; subsequent findings of disproportionate liability; and progress
toward as well as challenges to the right of access to information, among others.
4. The cases selected in each topic serve as examples in relation to the respect and exercise of freedom of
expression. Sources are cited in all cases. In the majority of cases, the Office of the Special Rapporteur identifies
the direct source, citing the address of the corresponding Web site. When the information is not published
directly by the source, the report cites the date the Office of the Special Rapporteur received the information in
its electronic mailbox. This report does not include information submitted to the Office of the Special Rapporteur
through requests for precautionary measures, or other information which has not yet beenmade public.
5. In preparing this chapter of its 2018 Annual Report, the Office of the Special Rapporteur generally took
into account information received until December 15, 2018. Information regarding incidents that occurred after
the date the 2018 Annual Report went to press is available in the press release section of the websites of the
Office of the Special Rapporteur ( http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/index.asp ) and the IACHR
(http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/index.asp ).
6. Finally, the Office of the Special Rapporteur acknowledges the collaboration of the OAS Member States
and the civil society organizations that, following existing practice, contributed information about the situation
of the exercise of freedom of expression in the hemisphere. As it does every year, the Office of the Special
Rapporteur encourages the continuation of suchpractice, which are indispensable to the value of future reports.
42
1. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
7. During 2019 in Antigua and Barbuda there were allegations of deliberate dissemination of
disinformation in connection with the Barbuda local government elections. In August 2019, the Senate approved
a new amendment to the Electronic Crimes Bill [2013], which incorporated the possibility of applying for a
search warrant to obtain data from electronic devices, so that they can be used as evidence in possible legal
proceedings. Recent amendments to the Act have made it clearer what offenses are covered by the Act, such as
sending offensive messages through communication services, violation of privacy and child pornography, so as
to avoid restrictions on freedom of expression.
A. Freedom of expression in electoral contexts
8. During 2019 in Antigua and Barbuda there were allegations of deliberate dissemination of
disinformation in connection with the Barbuda local government elections. In August 2019, the Senate approved
a new amendment to the Electronic Crimes Bill [2013], which incorporated the possibility of applying for a
search warrant to obtain data from electronic devices, so that they can be used as evidence in possible legal
proceedings. Recent amendments to the Act have made it clearer what offenses are covered by the Act, such as
sending offensive messages through communication services, violation of privacy and child pornography, so as
to avoid restrictions on freedom of expression. The Barbuda Council Elections were held on March 27, with the
Barbuda People’s Movement (BPM) winning all four contested seats.15The election monitoring group “Free and
Fair Elections Inc.” was designated an official observer.16
9. Faced with thissetback for the Labour Party, Prime Minister Gaston Browne claimed that the BPM had
disseminated false information and that this information had taken root among thepublic.17
10. The Office of the Special Rapporteurrecalls that,“Elections are tightly linked to freedom of expression
and information as it is essential for citizens to have as much information as possible to make a decision in
casting their votes. Accordingly, free circulation of facts, ideas, and opinions is crucial. Unquestionably, the most
common way for citizens currently to inform themselves is through the media.”18
11. In 2019, at the request of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Office
of the Special Rapporteurpresented aguide to guarantee freedom of expression regarding
deliberatedisinformation in electoral contexts. In that report, this Office underscored that disinformation “is of
particular concern in electoral contexts since—if effective—it could affect the legitimacy of a process that is
critical to the functioning and very existence of a democratic society.”19
B. Subsequent liability
12. According to available information, former Barbados MP Wilmoth Daniel is said to have sued Prime
Minister Gaston Brown for civil defamation under the Defamation Act, based on events that occurred in January
2018 when the latter accused Daniel, during a parliamentary recess, of setting fire to buildings in order to obtain
insurance money.20The court of first instance ruled in favor of Wilmoth Daniel, stating that parliamentary
immunity only applies when parliament is in session. However, on September 19, the Court of Appeals found for
the Prime Minister, stating that immunity extends to all words spoken inparliament.21
13. This Office recalls that Principle 10 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
states that “privacy laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and dissemination of information of public
interest.” On this point, the Inter-American Court has held, with regard to potential civil liability, thatcivil
judgments in matters concerning freedom of expression must be strictly proportionate, so as to not have a
chilling effect on freedom of expression, since “the fear of a civil penalty, considering the claim […] for a very
steepcivil reparation, may be,in any case, equally or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom
of expression than a criminal punishment, since it has the potential to attain the personal and family life of an
individual who accuses a public official, with the evident and very negative result of self-censorship both in the
affectedparty and in other potential critics of the actions taken by a public official.”22
15The Daily Observer. March 29, 2019. Politicians react to Barbuda Council elections; Antigua News Room. March 27, 2019. BPM Dominates
Barbuda Council Elections.
16 The Daily Observer. March 25, 2019. Free and Fairs Elections League to monitor BarbudaElections.
17 Antigua News Room. March 31, 2019. PM Says ABLP Should Not Have Contested BarbudaElections.
18 IACHR. Annual Report 2005. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI Freedom of
Expression and the Electoral Process: The Case of Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 77 February, 2006. Para. 2.
19 IACHR. Guide to guarantee freedom of expression regarding deliberate disinformation in electoral contexts. October 17, 2019.
20IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of the State
of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019. Para. 8.
21 Antigua News Room. September 23, 2019. PM Warns those who plan to sue him for defamation to come good; ABS TV Radio. September 19,
2019. PM winschallenge in defamation case.
22I/A CourtH. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objections,Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Serie
C No. 193, Para.129.
43
C. Legal reforms
14. In its2018 Annual Report, the Office of the Special Rapporteurnoted that a draft amendment to the 2013
Electronic Crimes Act was under discussion, the objectives of which included protecting freedom of expression
and clarifying the offenses provided for in the law.23This amendment was passed and published in the official
gazette on December 20, 2018.24
15. In addition,in August 2019 the Senate passed a newamendment to the Act, making itpossible to request
a search warrant to obtain data from electronic devices, for use as evidence in judicial proceedings.25The
offensesprovided for in that law include, inter alia, sending offensive message through communication services,
violation of privacy, and childpornography.
16. During the debate of this most recent amendment,Minister of Social Transformation and Gender Affairs
Samantha Marshallasserted thatpolice should arrestpeople who deliberately circulate sexualimages and videos
using cell phones and other electronic devices.26
17. The Office of the Special Rapporteurreiterates that it is important for any legislation regulating the
Internet not to contain vague and general definitions and not to disproportionately affect the free flow of
information and legitimate websites and services.27
18. This Office further recalls that,“In exceptional cases of clearly illegal content or speech that is not
covered by the right to freedom of expression (such as war propaganda and hate speech inciting violence, direct
and public incitement to genocide, and child pornography) the adoption of mandatory measures to block and
filter specific content is admissible. In these cases, the measure must be subjected to a strict balance of
proportionality and be carefully designed and clearly limited so as to not affect legitimate speech that deserves
protection. In other words, [filtering] or blockingshould be designed and applied so as to exclusively impact the
illegal content without affecting other content.”28
D. Pluralism and media diversity
19. During 2019 a dispute arose between the government of Antigua and Barbuda and the Irish-based
telecommunications company Digicel. The dispute began in May, when the government ordered the company to
return part of its spectrum to the state-owned Antigua Public Utilities Authority (APUA) for a more equitable
distribution of the band.29In response, Digicel obtained a court order to prevent the government from
confiscating the spectrum and turning it over to APUA, stating that its intention was “to protect its customers
and services from the administration’s anti-competitive and protectionistdecision.”30
20. In August, the government announced an agreement with Digicel for the redistribution of the spectrum,
whereby the company would transferpart of its spectrum in the 850MHz and 900MHz bands to the State-owned
competitor APUA. According to publicly available information, the government agreedas part of the settlement
to renew the company’s operating licenses in 2021. Finally, a hearing was held in which the court was informed
of the agreement reached, ending the legal dispute.31
21. The “Observer Goodwill” Project was also organized in 2019 in order to raise funds to support NEWSCO
Limited as an independent media entity, thus ensuring the sustainability of free and independent media in the
country. The organizers expressed the need for Antigua to have an independent radio station.32According to the
information gathered, NEWSCO Limited reportedly acquired the assets of the Observer media group, which
ceased operations in November 2018.
22. The Office of the Special Rapporteur reiterates that the allocation of radio and television licenses should
be guided by democratic criteria andpreestablished, public, and transparent procedures that will act as a brake
23 IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of the State
of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019. Para. 14
24 Antigua and Barbuda. Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs.Electronic Crimes Amendment Act 2018. December 20, 2018.
25Antigua and Barbuda. Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs.Electronic Crimes Amendment Bill, 2019; The Daily Observer. August 2, 2019.
Electronic Crimes Amendment Bill gets Senate approval.
26 The Daily Observer. July 25, 2019. MP Marshall advocates for arrest of those responsible for circulating inappropriate videos; 268 Today.
July 25, 2019. Marshall upset at use of pictures of young women on internet.
27UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression and the IACHR-OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. January
20, 2012. Joint Declaration.
28 IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Freedom of Expression and the Internet. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
IACHR/RELE/INF. 11/13. December 31, 2013. Para. 85.
29The Daily Observer. August 30, 2019. Government brags about spectrum sharing deal, Digicel refuses to confirm; B N Americas. September
2, 2019. Digicel settles spectrum dispute with Antigua & Barbuda govt.
30 Dominica News Online. June 25, 2019.Antigua & Barbuda government proposesto buyoutDigicel as dispute over spectrum sharing continues;
The Daily Observer. August 30, 2019.Government brags about spectrum sharing deal, Digicel refuses to confirm.
31The Daily Observer. August 30, 2019. Government brags about spectrum sharing deal, Digicel refuses to confirm; Dominica News Online.
September 1, 2019. Digicelendsbattlewith Antigua& Barbuda; BN Americas. September 2, 2019. Digicel settlesspectrum dispute with Antigua
& Barbuda govt; The Daily Observer. September 25, 2019. Digicel and gov’t settle spectrum-sharing dispute.
32The Daily Observer. May 10, 2019. Call to support Observer Goodwill Project; The Daily Observer.May 15, 2019. Observer Goodwill Day
Launches Fight for Independent Media; The Daily Observer. May 16, 2019. A success story: NEWSCO Limited says thanks
44
on the potential arbitrariness of the State and guarantee equal opportunities for all persons and sectors
concerned. Principle 12 of the Declaration of Principles has stressed that, “the concession of radio and television
broadcast frequencies should take into account democratic criteria that provide equal opportunity of access for
allindividuals.”
23. Article 13.3 of the American Convention establishes that “the right of expression may not be restricted
by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending
to impede the communication and circulation of ideas andopinions.”
24. Similarly, Principle 13 of the Inter-American Commission’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression indicates that, “the exercise ofpower and the use ofpublic funds by the state, the granting of customs
duty privileges, the arbitrary and discriminatory placement of official advertising and government loans; the
concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies, among others, with the intent to put pressure on and
punish or reward and provide privileges to social communicators and communications media because of the
opinions they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited by law.”
45
2. ANGERTINA
25. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur monitored with special concern various attacks,
threats, and intimidation of journalists and communicators, perpetrated by both individuals and public
authorities and officials. There are also continuing reports of the use of police force in the context of protests
and arrests of demonstrators. This Office was also informed about the criminal complaint filed by the
government against the organization Greenpeace due to a demonstration held during an official event. On the
other side, the Special Rapporteur received worrying information about a request by a prosecutor's office to a
news program to report the names of journalists involved in a story, judicial decisions prohibiting media from
reporting on certain subjects, and the conviction by the Supreme Court of a former trade union leader for her
criticism of a public official. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur’s office follows with particular concern the
prosecution of journalist Daniel Santoro for the alleged crimes of "coercion and extortion in the form of an
attempt", linked to information he received from a confidential source. Finally, the Rapporteur highlights
progress in the allocation of definitive licenses to community radio stations in various provinces of the country.
Similarly, it highlights the respect for freedom of expression and the free circulation of ideas and information
during the electoral process, which took place without any minor incidents.
A. Progress
26. On February 14, the criminal, contravention, and offenses Prosecutor of Buenos Aires, Federico Tropea,
would have archived all the proceedings that were initiated against 17 people detained by the Buenos Aires
Police in October 2018,in the framework of a mobilization in front of the National Congress Against the approval
of the budget. The Prosecutor's Office would have concluded that there was no evidence that the accused
individuals had thrown stones or resisted authority. Theprosecutor would have dismissed the police statements
because they were considered vague and inaccurate and ordered their possible criminal responsibilities to be
investigated33.
27. The National Communications Agency (Enacom) awarded in July definitive licenses for FM radios to
stations that had Provisional Precarious Permits [PermisosPrecariosProvisorios] (PPP). Among the stations
benefiting from the licenses, from different provinces of the country, there was FM Sur of Córdoba, FM En
Tránsito of Buenos Aires, FM AireLibre of Rosario, and FM La Tribu of the City of Buenos Aires34.
28. On August 21, the Senate would have unanimously approved a bill that protects the reserve of
journalistic sources. The project, which obtained half sanctions and must be analyzed by Congress Deputies,
amends article 64 of the Constitutional Procedures Law and corrects a wording that had raised questions of
interpretation. Faced withpossible ambiguities that could affect the right of journalists to reserve their sources,
the new wording reaffirms the will of the Legislature to preserve freedom of the press. The Entrerriano Union
of Press and Communication Workers [SindicatoEntrerriano de Trabajadores de la Prensa y la Comunicación]
(Setpyc) highlighted the half sanction of the bill35.
B. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
29. The graphic reporters Bernardino Ávila, of the newspaper Página 12, and Juan Pablo Barrientos, of the
magazine Cítrica, would have been arrested on February 21 with two other people when they covered the
incidents during a demonstration in front of the National Congress for the closure of a
cooperative. Both photographers, who would have been released hours later, reported receiving blows and
ill-treatment by the police36.
30. The director and owner of the newspaper and portal Semanario of Junín, Javier Orellano, would have
been the victim of at least three attacks and threats during July; one from a prison officer, another from a
municipal official, and on a third occasion he received a death threat froma stranger37.
33CELS. March 6, 2019. Protestas en caba: más pruebas de que las detenciones policiales son arbitrarias; Pagina 12. February 20, 2019. Al
Gobierno se le derrumbó el montaje; El Tribuno. February 19, 2019. Revés para el Gobierno: archivan la causa de los extranjeros detenidos en
una protesta.
34Observacom. July 22, 2019. Adjudican licencias definitivas a radios comunitarias en Argentina. FM La Tribu y otras radios históricas entre
ellas; Ente Nacional de Comunicaciones (Enacom). July 18, 2019. Nuevaslicencias FM para mayor pluralidad de voces; La Tribu. July 15, 2019.
Licencia FM La Tribu 88.7mhz | Una larga lucha y un triunfo colectivo.
35 AIM. August 21, 2019. Media sanción al proyecto que preserva el derecho a las fuentes periodísticas; Análisis. August 21, 2019. Senado:
ingresó el Juicio por Jurados y se aprobó la protección de la fuente periodística.
36Twitter account of Asociación de Entidades Periodísticas Argentinas (@Adepaargentina). February 20, 2019; Fundación Led. February 21,
2019. Incidentes con reporteros gráficos en la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires; Perfil. February 21, 2019. Liberaron al fotógrafo de
Página/12 detenido:"Recibí golpes de todo tipo"; Sumario. February 20, 2019. La Policía de la Ciudad reprimió violentamente a fotógrafos que
cubrían el #Cuadernazo; Revista Cítrica. Bajen las armas, no nos vamos a callar.
37 Semanario. July 22, 2019. Amenazan de muerte al director de Semanario de Junín; Foro de Periodismo Argentino (FOPEA). August 7, 2019.
FOPEA repudia las repetidas amenazas contra el director del diario Semanario de Junín; Diputados Bonaerenses. August 9, 2019. Miedo a la
palabra: en un mes, amenazaron tres veces al director de un medio de Junín.
46
31. Photographer Nicolás Ramos, who took pictures of how security personnel from the Coto supermarket
chain beat a 68-year-old man who had stolen food until he was dead, said he received threats from strangers so
he wouldn't talk to the press about the incident38.
32. The Prosecutor of Complex Investigations of the province of Jujuy, Marcelo Cuellar, would have ordered
the authorities of Canal Siete“under warning” to deliver information on the full payroll of the staff that writes
for the Jujuy Investiga program, after the program issued a report on complaints involving the Attorney General
of the Superior Court of Justice, Alejandro Ficoseco, and three members of the Court of Auditors. The prosecutor,
who depends on the Public Prosecutor's Office, whose head is Sergio Lello Sánchez, also requested details on the
production and editing of the report, and the complete list of the show’s hosts. Several trade, judicial, and
journalistic associations repudiated the action of the Prosecutor, which they described as a maneuver that seeks
to intimidate journalistic work. Among them, the Council of Procurators, Prosecutors, Defenders, and General
Advisers of the Argentine Republic issued a statement questioning “the attack on the freedom of the press
suffered by the Jujuy Investiga” and expressing its repudiation of the prosecutor’sactions39.
33. In August the company ParexKlaukol would have sent a letter document to the journalist Andrés
Masotto, of Radio Presente, intimidating him to delete a series of tweets in which he reported an alleged
contamination caused by the plant, located in La Matanza, Buenos Aires. The company would have warned him
that if he did not do so, and publicly recanted, they would initiate legal action againsthim40.
34. Cameraman Mariano Simes, of El Doce, would have been attacked and threatened by a group of people
with covered faces, while covering the detention of one of the leaders of the Single Union of Waste and Sweepers
Collectors of Córdoba [SindicatoÚnico de Recolectores de Residuos y Barrido de Córdoba]
41. The journalist Daniel
Gómez Perri, of the radio program “Bajo la Lupa”, of CNR, would have been physically assaulted and threatened
by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Services of the Municipality of San Pedro de Jujuy, Mariano Solsona,
due to the opinions he disseminates in his program42. The journalist filed a complaint with the Justice system,
and the Public Prosecutor's Office would have charged the official with the crime of"minor damages" and issued
a restraint order43.
35. The Office of the Special Rapporteur reiterates that principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to
social communicators, as well as the material destruction of communications media violate the fundamental
rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and
investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators, and to ensure that victims receive due
compensation.”
C. Social Protes
36. Four former workers of the Eastern Line of La Plata collectives were arrested in April on charges of
“aggravated coercion” for a traffic cut on March 16, 2017, in the context of a protest for labor claims44.
37. The Ministry of Security, led by Minister Patricia Bullrich, filed a criminal complaint for the crime of
“public intimidation” against the Greenpeace environmental organization, after it deployed, during the opening
ceremony of the 133rd edition of the Palermo Rural Exhibition, in Buenos Aires, two banners with the legends
"Cattle Ranchers: enough clearing" and "Destroying forests is a crime", in protest against the environmental
effects of livestock. According to the information available, the posters were quickly removed by members of
the property's security. President Mauricio Macri and members of the government were at the event, and the
Ministry of Security would have questioned the protest for violating the security of the president and his team.
The complaint was filed in the federal court under Judge María Eugenia Capuchetti. The coordinator of the
38Twitter account of Radio Realpolitik FM (@RealpolitikFM). August 22, 2019; Mendoza Post. August 27, 2019. El video de los empleados de
Coto forcejeando con el jubilado que murió; Real Politik FM. August 24, 2019. Asesinato en Coto: El fotógrafo que registró al jubilado muerto,
aseguró que lo amenazaron.
39La Política Online. September 19, 2019. El procurador de Gerardo Morales intimidó a periodistas; Perfil. September 19, 2019. Repudio a la
intimación a periodistas de Jujuy por una investigación que involucra al Poder Judicial; El Tribuno. September 19, 2019. Lamentable actitud
de amedrentamiento del MPA;Todo Jujuy. September 19, 2019. El Colegio de Abogados y ATA rechazaron el accionar del MPA contra lalibertad
de expresión.
40 Notas. August 27, 2019. Klaukol busca ocultar sus crímenes persiguiendo periodistas; Tiempo. August 28, 2019. ParexKlaukol, la empresa
contaminante que amenaza la vida y la libertad de expresión; Twitter account of Andrés Masotto (@andresmasotto). August 22, 2019.
41 Foro de Periodismo Argentino (FOPEA). August 27, 2019. FOPEA repudia la agresión a un camarógrafo de El Doce; La Voz. August 27, 2019.
Un video registró a los agresores del camarógrafo de El Doce cuando filmaba la casa de Catrambone.
42 Foro de Periodismo Argentino (FOPEA). October 12, 2019. FOPEA repudia la agresión física y las amenazas que recibió el periodista Daniel
Gomez Perri; El Tribuno. October 2, 2019. Un concejal electo de San Pedro le pegó y dejó tirado a un periodista en plena calle.
43Agencia NOVA. October 4, 2019. Imputan a un funcionario jujeño que agredió físicamente a un periodista en la vía pública; Jujuy es Noticia.
No date. Inadmisible violencia contra la prensa en San Pedro.
44 CELS. April 15, 2019. ex choferes criminalizados por una protesta de hace dos años en la plata; ANRed. April 6, 2019. La Plata: detienen de
manera arbitraria a 4 choferes de la Línea Este; Contexto. April 6, 2019. La Línea Este de nuevo en lucha: detuvieron a cuatro choferes por las
protestas de 2017.
47
Greenpeace Forest campaign, HernánGiardini, declared publicly that the complaint was "ridiculous" because it
was a "completely peaceful activity" and that "the right to protest" should be respected45.
38. In accordance with the powers established in Article 41 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
on August 20, the Office of the Special Rapporteur sent a letter requesting information on the basis of the alleged
criminal complaint filed by the Ministry of Security against Greenpeace and its procedural status. In a note
signed on September 24, the State informed the Office of the Special Rapporteur that proceedings were initiated
under the title of “public intimidation investigation” in the Department of Intelligence Against Organized Crime
of the General Directorate of Criminal Intelligence of the Federal Police, which were referred to the Federal
Criminal and Correctional Court No. 5. The State did notprovide further details on the status of the investigation
or the grounds of the investigation.
39. Journalists of the C5N news channel would have been attacked and insulted by people participating in
a march in support of President Mauricio Macri in the Plaza de Mayo in BuenosAires46.
40. On October 21, while individuals protested in front of the Chilean Consulate in Buenos Aires due to the
social crisis in that country, violent groups would have insulted and assaulted several journalists; among them,
chroniclers and cameramen of Crónica TV, LN +, A24 and TN. The most serious cases were that of Crónica TV
cameraman Ernesto Medina, who would have been assaulted with beatings and kicks and had to be hospitalized,
and that of cameraman Fabio Soria, LN +, who would have received four stitches in the head due to the blows.
Protesters who assaulted the press would also have burned down and destroyed urbanfurniture, and the City
Police would have arrested sixpeople, who were reportedlyprosecuted for resistance to authority,injuries, and
damages47. Among the detainees was a worker in the Communication area of the Center for Legal and Social
Studies (Cels), MyriamSelhi, who was recording the demonstration and the police operation deployed. The
organization reported that the police tried to break Selhi's phone, in which she had recorded violent arrests of
protesters. The organization also reported that the detainees were held for about 20 hours, without receiving
water or food, and that it took several hours for them to communicate with their lawyers. It also questioned that
the arrests were “arbitrary” and that they reproduce “practices of repression and criminalization of protest”48.
41. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical, political, and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of
assembly”49 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly through social protest must not be subject to
authorization by the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its realization”50.
D. Stigmatizing statements
42. The councilor of the city of Córdoba Tomás Méndez would have aggravated and disqualified the
journalist Sergio Carreras after he published a news in La Voz del Interior about a conviction against him of the
Chamber of Civil and Commercial Appeals 2 °. The ruling would order the councilor, also a C5N host, to rectify
information disclosed in his program in201151.
43. Congress Deputy Elisa Carrió, leader of the Civic Coalition, warned in a newspaper interview that
individuals who "through the newspapers communicate false meetings and pretend to also make the president
wobble" would be convicted52.
44. The IACHR recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that with their statements they are not
damaging the rights of those who contribute topublic deliberation through the expression and dissemination of
their thoughts, such as journalists, the media, and human rights organizations, and they must pay attention to
the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their expressions do not constitute, in the words of
45Perfil. August 3, 2019. Patricia Bullrich denunció a Greenpeace por la protesta en La Rural; Clarín. August 3, 2019. La ministra Patricia
Bullrich presentó una denuncia penal contra Greenpeace; Página 12. August 3, 2019. Bullrich denunció a Greenpeace por colocar dos carteles;
La Nación. August 3, 2019. Greenpeace, tras la denuncia de Patricia Bullrich por la protesta en La Rural: "Nos parece ridículo".
46 Twitter account of C5N (@C5N). August 24, 2019; Clarín. August 24, 2019. Repudio del Gobierno a la agresión a periodistas de C5N durante
la masiva marcha de apoyo a Mauricio Macri.
47Infobae. October 21, 2019. Grupos de izquierda atacaron salvajemente a periodistasfrente al consulado de Chile en Buenos Aires: 6 detenidos;
Asociación de Entidades Periodísticas Argentinas (ADEPA). October 21, 2019. Adepa repudia las agresiones a periodistas frente al Consulado
de Chile en Buenos Aires; Infobae. October 21, 2019. Para Patricia Bullrich, los ataques a la prensa frente al consulado de Chile son
"responsabilidad de grupos vinculados al kirchnerismo, la izquierda y el anarquismo”
48 Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS). October 22, 2019. protestar no es delito, registrar detenciones tampoco.
49 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197
50 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
51 La Voz. December 20, 2018. Nueva condena contra Tomás Méndez
52 The deputy’s exact words were:“We will condemn those who, through the newspapers, communicate false meetings and seek at the same
time to make the president falter”. Todo Noticias. August 19, 2019. Carrió: "Estoy segura de que ganamos en octubre" | DESDE EL LLANO
(Entrevista completa).
48
the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or damaging pressure on the rights of those who intend to
contribute to public deliberation through expression and dissemination of their thought”53.
E. Subsequent Liabilities
45. On October 17, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, by a majority made up of Judges Juan Carlos
Maqueda, Ricardo Lorenzetti, and HoracioRosatti, confirmed a judgment that resulted from a lawsuit for
damages initiated by Guillermo Horacio De Sanctis against the teacher and former unionist, Ana MaríaLópez de
Herrera. The plaintiff, current president of the Court of Justice of San Juan, considered that critical statements
made by López de Herrera in 2006, when he was Secretary General of the Union of Provincial Unionized
Teachers, in different media outlets in the province of San Juan on the governor's proposal to appoint him
Minister of Education, were detrimental to his honor and personal reputation. The Supreme Court of Justice
considered that while freedom of expression occupies a pre-eminent place in a republican regime, the unionist's
expressions that were not linked to De Sanctis' performance as a public official and referred to other aspects of
his life, as those who described him as "a maximum representative" of drug-generated violence and "a person
who beats his family", exceeded the framework of constitutional protection of the right to criticism and it was
appropriate to safeguard the right to honor of the plaintiff. "Such terms exceeded a harsh or irritating criticism
and were unnecessary for the purpose of giving an opinion regarding the way in which he served the public
function or his possible appointment asprovincial minister," Judge Maqueda said in the ruling. As a result of the
conviction, the teacher must indemnify De Sanctis with the payment of 90,000 Argentine pesos, plus interest.
46. Judges Carlos Rosenkrantz and Elena Highton de Nolasco, who voted to revoke the sentence and reject
the lawsuit, considered that the defendant's expressions were inserted within the framework of a public debate
that arose around the appointment of De Sanctis as Minister of Education of the province of San Juan, they were
not “strictly and undoubtedly insulting”, they were related to the ideas or opinions contained in them and they
did not constitute insult or free and unjustified vexation. Therefore, they argued that the defendant's statements
"did not exceed the constitutional framework that, for thepurpose of promoting a robustpublic debate,protects
the expression of opinions in matters of public interest”54.
47. The IACHR has argued that “[the] type of political debate that gives rise to the right to freedom of
expression will inevitably generate certain critical or even offensive speeches for those who hold public office
or are closely linked to the formulation of public policy”55. Therefore, as stated in principle 10 of the Declaration
of Principles, "[t]he protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in
those cases in which the person offended is a public official." Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: [p]ublic officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws
that penalize offensive expressions directed at public officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict
freedom of expression and the right to information.” In addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the
application of criminal law to sanction expressions related to public officials is disproportionate when it comes
to protected speech, such as information or expression on matters of public interest, and violates the right to
freedom of expression56.
F. Criminalization and source confidentiality
48. According to the information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, on August 7 the federal
judge of Dolores, Alejo Ramos Padilla, ordered the prosecution of the journalist Daniel Santoro of Clarín for the
alleged crimes of “coercion and extortion in the degree of attempt”. The journalist would be investigated in the
context of a case that looks into alleged cases of illegal espionage and extortion that would have been
perpetrated by a criminal organization led by Marcelo D'Alessio, who is currently detained and being
prosecuted. The investigation would have been initiated following a complaint filed by an agricultural producer
against D'Alessio and the prosecutor Carlos Stornelli, who the plaintiff would have accused of extorting him to
not involve him in the judicialinvestigation known as the "case of the notebooks," which investigates an alleged
network of bribery between businesspersons and members of the previous government.
49. According to the order of prosecution, Santoro was a “necessary participant” of the crimes committed
by the organization led by D'Alessio. “Daniel Santoro was aware that his actions and contributions were linked
to a prior, concomitant, and/or subsequent illegal maneuver of espionage, extortion or coercion,” says the
sentence. “It has become clear that Santoro knew that D´Alessio carried out intelligence, espionage, and criminal
53 I/A Court H. R. Case of Perozo et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie
C No. 195. Para. 151. See I/A CourtH. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections,Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January
28, 2009. Serie C No.194. Para. 139.
54 Centro de Información Judicial. October 17, 2019. La Corte Suprema confirmó condena a una gremialista por declaraciones lesivas al honor
de un funcionario público; Diario de Cuyo. October 17, 2019. La Corte Suprema ratificó una condena contra Ana María López por daño moral
a De Sanctis.
55 IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato" Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
56 IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report ofthe Office ofthe Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions and
Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015.
49
investigation work without possessing any type of legal power for it and, in what regards the specific case, he
used them despite the notorious knowledge of its illicit origin,” says Judge Ramos Padilla. The judge did not
orderpre-trial detention for the journalist, although he imposed a restriction on leaving the country and ordered
a hold of his property for 3 million Argentine pesos. On the other hand, the magistrate did not grant the
accusation of “illicit association” that fell on Santoro. In the development of his investigation, the magistrate
obtained the detail of “all incoming and outgoing calls” from Santoro's phone between January 2016 and April
2019,whose deliverywas ordered tothe telecommunications companyTelefónicaMóviles Argentina (Movistar).
50. Santoro appealed his prosecution before the Federal Chamber of Mar del Plata. The journalist publicly
denied the judge’s accusations and described his citation as "a step towards the criminalization of journalism."
Likewise, local organizations such as the National Academy of Journalism, the Association of Argentine
Journalistic Entities (Adepa), and the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA) warned about the seriousness of the
judge's decision, which compromises freedom of the press and expression. FOPEA also expressed concern about
the possibility that the judge of the case "tries to force Santoro to reveal information about his confidential
communications with sources of information and the identity of those people", since that would represent "a
significant break in the respect for professional secrecy”of journalists. In the same vein, the international
organization Committee for the Protection of Journalists said that by obtaining the list of calls from Santoro," the
Argentine authorities are sending an alarming message to the national journalistic guild," and questioned that
these actions "endanger the principle of the confidentiality of journalistic sources, one of the pillars of freedom
of the press”57.
51. In accordance with the powers established in Article 41 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
on July 12, the Office of the Special Rapporteur sent a letter to the State of Argentina requesting information on
the investigative process carried out regarding journalist Daniel Santoro and on the respect of his right to source
confidentiality, guaranteed in principle 8 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. In response
to the request, on August 6, the Secretariat of Human Rights and Cultural Pluralism of the Nation sent to the
Special Rapporteur a report produced by the judge responsible for the case, Alejo Ramos Padilla. In it, the
magistrate said that in the process “no measure that could affect source confidentiality was taken”, and that
during the interrogation the journalist was not required “to reveal his sources of information”. According to the
judge, no information was requested from other journalists who were interrogated in the context of the
investigation, although some made their cell phones “freely” available to the headquarters, allowing access to
emails and conversations via the messaging platform Whatsapp. He also explained that there were no "tasks of
investigation, intelligence, raids, confiscation, or any other invasive measures on any journalist." However, in
the specific case of Santoro, the judge indicated that a “single measure of proof was provided, at the request of
the representative of the Federal Public Prosecutor involved, who requested that cell phone companies be
requested to inform the ownership of the telephone line and incoming and outgoing calls from one of his
phones.” In the case, the judge informed that because it is sensitive information “access to such information was
limited, and at the time the investigation took place, the journalist and his defense lawyer were consulted if that
information could compromise his work in any way as a journalist or his professional secret”58.
52. In the context of the judicial investigation, Judge Ramos Padilla would also have requested an expert
analysis from the Provincial Commission for the Memory (CPM) of Buenos Aires to examine part of the evidence
proving the cause for the purpose of establishing whether there were actions related to illegal espionage. In its
analysis, the CPM, an organization dedicated to the promotion of public policies of memory and human rights,
would have mentioned some journalists who appeared in the documentation due to their interaction with those
close to D'Alessio - among them, Santoro - and would have concluded that "the media constituted a necessary
element for the development and carrying outof intelligence operations" of the criminal group59.
53. The Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA) and the Association of Argentine Journalistic Entities
(ADEPA) expressed their rejection of the judge's decision and the content of the Commission's report.
“Pretending that a government agency audits the journalistic task contradicts the very essence of freedom of the
press, violates the National Constitution, and ignores international treaties. Indeed, both the request for said
57 Página 12. August 7, 2019. Daniel Santoro fue procesado por coacción y extorsión; Perfil. August 23, 2019. Caso D'Alessio: el periodista Daniel
Santoro apeló su procesamiento; Clarín. June 10, 2019. Caso D'Alessio: citan a indagatoria al periodista Daniel Santoro; Télam. June 23,
2019. FOPEA advirtió sobre la "gravedad institucional" de la citación al periodista Daniel Santoro; Página 12. March 17, 2019. Caso D’Alessio:
cronología del escándalo que sacude a lamafia; Perfil. June 21, 2019. Caso D'Alessio: los argumentos para la defensa de Daniel Santoro;Infobae.
June 24, 2019. Postergaron la indagatoria del periodista Daniel Santoro en la causa D'Alessio; Perfil. June 21, 2019. La Academia Nacional de
Periodismo emitió una declaración en defensa de Daniel Santoro; Clarín. June 28, 2019. Daniel Sabsay: “En el caso de Daniel Santoro se corre el
riesgo de la criminalización del periodismo”; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). July 16, 2019. Argentine journalist Daniel Santoro
summoned, phone records seized in extortion investigation; Foro de Periodismo Argentino (FOPEA). March 1, 2019. Los periodistas no son
sus fuentes y la entrevista no es un acto criminal; Foro de Periodismo Argentino (FOPEA). July 15, 2019. Más de 400 periodistas y docentes de
periodismo firmaron un petitorio contra la criminalización del periodismo profesional; Perfil. August 7, 2019. Adepa expresó su "preocupación"
por el procesamiento de Daniel Santoro.
58 Letter from the Argentine State sent to the Office of the Special Rapporteur in response to a request for information. August 6, 2019.
Available at: Archive of the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression.
59 Comisión Provincial por la Memoria. October 8, 2019. La CPM entregó al juez Ramos Padilla un nuevo informe sobre espionaje ilegal.
50
report by Judge Alejo Ramos Padilla and its drafting by the Commission constitute dangerousprecedents against
the free expression and professional practice of journalism,” Adepa wrote in a statement60.
54. After the negative reactions of these and other local journalistic organizations, the Commission
indicated that the expert analysis carried out “does not associate the information with criminal offenses or make
accusations: it only describes and interprets the documentation provided following the requirements of the
judge, who is the one who must decide whether a crime is configured or not by evaluating all the evidence
collected in the case. The journalists mentioned in the reports previously delivered to the Federal Court, as well
as in this fourth report, refer to the appearance of their names in telephone communications, screenshots,
photographs or mails from D’Alessio. It is not true - as stated - that we accuse journalists of any crime; that is
not the function of the agency. We only describe and analyze documents”61.
55. This Office reiterates the important role played by the media for democracy, especially when it comes
to active investigative journalism. Consequently, journalists investigating cases of corruption or improper
actions by public authorities should not be subjected to judicial harassment or other harassment in retaliation
for their work. Similarly, the protection of journalistic sources constitutes a principle that is part of the right to
freedom of expression, given its invaluable value for society to access information ofpublic interest that, without
this protection, would hardly take on public status62. Principle 8 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression of the IACHR establishes that "every social communicator has the right to keep his/her source of
information, notes, personal and professional archives confidential". Likewise, at international level, the
confidentiality of the sources derives from the guarantees of the right to seek, receive, and disseminate
information, which is enshrined in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
G. Prior censorship / Direct and indirect censorship
56. The judge of Guarantees Nº 7 of the province of Salta, María Edith Rodríguez, would have ordered the
digital newspapers VerNoticias and Aerom the immediate cessation of any publication that could be considered
aggravating, disrespectful, or damaging to the honor and dignity of the mayor of the City de Salta, Gustavo Sáenz,
and his collaborators NicolásDemitrópulos and Pablo Outescon. The judge would have thus granted an amparo
writ initiated by the three officials and would have ordered that all existing publications that referred to the
officials in their "personal character" be removed from these sites, as well as those that "exceed the purpose of
criticism of public management”. In her sentence, the judge would have argued that although freedom of
expression is guaranteed for all citizens, “when a rational, limited, and respectful use of a right has already
stopped, directly damaging the personal rights of human beings, such as the right to honor, personal dignity, and
freedom of work, that should be guaranteed in peace without constant harassment, and are principles that are
above any other by the sole condition of being human, the use of a misused and misrepresented pressshould be
limited.” The media owner, Víctor Hugo Elías, would have appealed the decision63.
57. In another similar ruling, Judge Rodríguez would have granted a precautionary measure requested by
the defense lawyers of the members of Los Nocheros, and would have ordered the media to refrain from
publishing images or information about the musical group and its members in the framework of the
informational coverage of a judicial case for alleged sexual abuse for which LautaroTeruel, the son of one of the
group members, is detained. The judge would have also ordered the elimination of “all computer records of
images, videos, data, comments, stories, sites, links, or search engines” linked to the case and containing images
or the name of any of the members of the musical group, and would have communicated her decision to the
National Communications Agency (Enacom)64. On July 12, the Second Nomination Guarantees judge, Ignacio
Colombo, would have granted the appeal filed by the prosecutor Cecilia Flores Toranzos against the judge's
decision, and would have ordered the nullity of the precautionary measure65.
58. On April 17, the Federal Administrative Contentious Court No. 10 would have partially granted a
precautionary measure requested by a Catholic groupand ordered to transfer a work of art on display to a closed
room, with the prohibition of the entry of children and adolescents. The Secretariat of Human Rights and Cultural
Pluralism would not have appealed the decision and subsequently ordered that the work be permanently
60Clarín. October 15, 2019. Fopea advierte que la Comisión Provincial de la Memoria considera “ilegal” las técnicas del periodismo de
investigación; La Voz. October 14, 2019. Adepa y Fopea advirtieron sobre la criminalización del periodismo
61 Perfil. October 15, 2019. Caso D'Alessio: la Comisión por la Memoria denunció una campaña sucia contra Pérez Esquivel; Pagina 12. October
16, 2019. El informe que la Comisión Provincial de la Memoria le entregó al juez Ramos Padilla.
62IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. July 1, 2019. Press Release R164/19. Experts on freedom of expression of the
UN and the IACHR express their concern over death threats against journalist Glenn Greenwald, director of The Intercept Brasil, and his
family.
63Adepa. February 1, 2019. Preocupa a Adepa un fallo que impone censura a medios digitales en Salta; Voces Críticas. January 30, 2019. Fallo
a favor del intendente Gustavo Sáenz: el revés es para dos diarios digitales; El Destape. February 1, 2019. Salta: Saenz presentó un polémico
amparo que habilita la censura previa para periodistas; Nuevo Diario. February 1, 2019. El amparo mediático a favor de Sáenz fue apelado y
pasó a la Corte; Noticias Iruya. January 30, 2019. Una jueza de Salta prohíbe a dos medios digitales propalar injurias contra Sáenz y dos de sus
funcionarios. .
64Adepa. June 29, 2019. Claro intento judicial de censura en Salta; El Tribuno. June 29, 2019. La jueza Rodríguez dictó un nuevo fallo de censura
a los medios; Salta Noticias 247. July 1, 2019. Jueza salteña prohibió a los medios hablar del caso Teruel.
65 El Tribuno. July 13, 2019. Golpe de gracia al fallo de censura de la jueza Rodríguez.
51
removed. The work, made by the artist Silvia Lucera and named "MaríaFeminista", consists of a statuette of the
Virgin Mary intervened with the drawing of a handkerchief symbol of the activists in favor of the legalization of
abortion. It was exhibited from March 9 in the exhibition "Para todes, tode - Plan de Lucha",in the Cultural Center
of Memory Haroldo Conti66.
59. Article 13.2 of the American Convention explicitly states that the exercise of freedom of expression
cannot be subject to prior censorship. Additionally, principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression enshrines that “[p]rior censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any
expression, opinion, or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic
communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as
the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate
the right to freedom of expression”.
H. Community broadcasting
60. The community television channel Barricada TV, of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, winner of a
license to broadcast on digital television, would face a judicialprocess because its director, Natalia Vinelli, would
be indicted for a protest held in 2018 to demand the integration of their signal within the grid of the Telecentro
and Cablevision cable operators. In addition to Vinelli, there would be an indictment against the political leader
Juan Grabois, the referent of the Argentine Community Radio Forum, Pablo Antonini, the delegate of the Press
Union of Buenos Aires (Sipreba), TomásEliaschev, Omar Zanarini, of Radio Gráfica, and the leader José María Di
Bello. The defendants would have been summoned to testify in the 12th Criminal and Prosecution Prosecutor's
Office of the City of Buenos Aires under the title of “right of admission”. The case would have been opened ex
officio by the City Police after community and social communication organizations protested in the parking lot
of the Canal 13 building to demand a meeting with the directors of the mediagroup67.
I. Impunity
61. The Correctional and Criminal Judge No. 3 of the city of Bahía Blanca, Susana González, would have
acquitted an individual accused of threatening and intimidating journalist GermánSasso, director of La Brújula
24, and other media reporters. The threats, made over the phone and in writing, would have occurred in 2017
with the aim of preventing the media from continuing to report on drug trafficking activities in the area. Some
of the phrases used to intimidate reporters would have been: “the streets are messed up and we all have a
family,” “either cut it with the topic or you are going to see black,” and “you have to be careful who you report
on.” The judge would have valued that the sayings "do not meet the requirements of the announcement of a
serious and suitable evil", that no "intimidating tone" would have been noticed in the message, and that the
accused had clarified in the call that it was not "a threat, but a warning." Prosecutor AgustinaOlguín, who had
requested three years in prison for the crime of “aggravated coercion,” announced that she would appeal the
decision68.
J. Other relevant situations
62. Chamber V of the National Chamber of Labor Appeals would have ordered the reinstatement of 68
workers from the state news agency Télam who had been laid off in 2018 in the framework of a restructuring
process initiated by the new Board of the media that let go of a total of 357 employees, approximately 40% of
the workforce69. According to the court ruling, the authorities would have acted “illegally, illegitimately, and
unreasonably” by firing hundreds of workers, failing to comply with the Crisis Preventive Procedure provided
by law 24.013 to enable mass layoffs70.
63. According to a survey of the Press Union of Buenos Aires (Sipreba) on the employment situation ofpress
workers, since 2016 at least 3,127 jobs would have been lost, only in the City of Buenos Aires. Of those, 990
would have occurred during 2018 and 288 between January and May 2019. Across the country the figure would
exceed 4,500 jobs. As detailed by the guild, at the beginning of the year the AM750 radio of GrupoOctubre would
have fired the journalist Paula "Poli" Sabatés due to her union duties. Editorial Atlántida would have laid off
66 CELS. May 10, 2019. Censura a la virgen abortera; Página 12. April 18, 2019. La censura celeste de la virgen abortera; 24 CON. May 6, 2019.
Polémica y censura con una virgen María "abortera"; TN. April 27, 2019. Las cosas por su nombre: la censura a María Feminista; La Otra Voz.
May 6, 2019. CENSURA DEFINITIVA DEL GOBIERNO A LA OBRA DE ARTE LA VIRGEN FEMINISTA
67 Contexto. May 28, 2019. Persiguen a medios comunitarios por protestar contra la concentración de voces; Página 12. May 27, 2019. Una
amenaza a la libertad de expresión.
68 La Brújula 24. Para una jueza, la frase "tienen que tener cuidado, todos tenemosfamilia" no es una amenaza; Fundación Led. April 17, 2019.
Preocupación por la absolución a un acusado de amenazas a periodistas; Infobae. April 16, 2019. Para la Justicia, las amenazas que recibió un
periodista que denunciaba a bandas de narcos "no constituyen delito".
69 IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Volume II. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Oea/ser.l/v/ii. Doc. 30.
March 17, 2019. Para. 88-91.
70Twitter account of Somos Télam (@somostelam). June 27, 2019; Sindicato de Prensa de Buenos Aires. June 27, 2019. La Justicia ordenó la
reincorporación definitiva de 68 trabajadoras y trabajadores de Télam; RT. June 28, 2019. Justicia argentina ordena la reincorporación de 68
trabajadores de la agencia Télam.
52
more than 60 workers, the Clarín-AGEA company, which publishes the Clarín and Olé newspapers, would have
laid off 65 employees, and Publiexpress three others71.
71 Sindicato de Prensa de Buenos Aires. June 10, 2019. Relevamiento de situación laboral en los medios de CABA durante 2018-2019, SiPreBA.
53
3. BAHAMAS
64. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information with concern about the lack of
progress in implementing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which was passed in 2017. There have also
been several cases in which the authorities have criminally denounced journalists or threatened to do so under
the guise of defamation [libel] as a mean to limit freedom ofexpression
A. Stigmatizing statements
65. Speaker of theHouse HalsonMoultrie delivered a speech criticizing the work of the media in the country.
According to public information, Molutrie said that the media had reduced the quality and accuracy of
information by trying to compete with social networks, and that they had presented false or out-of-context
information. He also stated that the Legislative Assembly must be protected from these violations, accusing
journalists of being “unscrupulous persons.”72
66. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that their
statements do not undermine the rights of those who contribute to the public discourse through the expression
and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media outlets, and human rights organizations, and
should be sensitive to the context in which they speak, so as to ensure that their statements do not constitute, in
the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who
seek to contribute with public deliberation through the expression and [dissemination] of theirthoughts.”73
B. Subsequent liability
67. Social networking commentator Gorman Bannister was reportedly sent to prison on July 8 on charges
of using the Internet to spread false accusations about former Cabinet Minister Tennyson Wells and his wife in
a series of voice notes posted on Facebook and Whatsapp. At his arraignment before Judge Derence Rolle-Davis,
Bannisterpleaded not guilty. The judge denied release on bond based on lack of jurisdiction and referred him to
the Bahamas Department of Correctional Services. Subsequently, on Bannister’s appeal, High Court Judge
Gregory Hilton ordered his release on bond.74
68. ThisOffice of the Special Rapporteur has also documented several cases in recent years in which public
servants have responded to criticism by threatening to file criminal complaints alleging defamation.For
instance,Water and Sewerage Corporation executive chairmanAdrian Gibson announced on April 2 that he
would file a criminal defamation action against union leader Dwayne Woods after he claimed that promotions
were given to female staff. Gibson attacked these statements, claiming that the union leader’s assertions were
unfounded, implausible, and totally false.75In another case,Deputy Police Commissioner Paul Rolle threatened
to take legal action against John McAfee, after McAfee published several messages on Twitter accusing the
deputy police commissioner of corruption. Rolle stated that the messages were harmful to his reputation.76
69. The groupRights Bahamascalled for an end to “archaic” criminal defamation laws, stating that they are
unconstitutional and have no place in a modern democracy.77
70. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Principle 10 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression establishes that, “Privacy laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and
dissemination of information of public interest. The protection of a person’s reputation should only be
guaranteed through civil sanctions in those cases inwhichthe person offended is apublic official, apublic person
or a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters ofpublic interest. In addition,in these cases,
it must be proven that in disseminating the news, the social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm,
was fully aware that false news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the
truth or falsity of such news.”
71. Furthermore, this Office has repeatedly maintained that the use of criminal law to punish speech
referring topublic officials is disproportionate when it concernsprotected speech, suchas information or speech
on matters of public interest, and violates the right to freedom of expression.78
72 Eyewitness News. October 24, 2019. House speaker attacks media; The Tribune. October 31, 2019. Do It again and Ingraham would fire
Speaker.
73 I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C No.
194. Para. 139.
74TheTribune. July 9, 2019. Social media commentatorremanded; Jamaica Observer. July 12, 2019. Social media commentator released on bail
on charges of misusing internet; The Nassau Guardian. July 9, 2019. Internet publisher bailed on libel charges.
75 Tribune. April 3, 2019. Water Wars: Gibson threatensto sue and blastssupply saboteurs; Eye Witness News. April 4, 2019. Sabotage – Water
service cut to majority of New Providence.
76TheTribune. June 11, 2019. Rolle blastscorruptionclaims; CCNMarkets. June 12, 2019. Bitcoin agitator John McAfee runs afoul of Bahamas
anti-corruption czar.
77 Eyewitness News. July 11, 2019. Rights Bahamas: Abolish archaic criminal libel laws; The Tribune. July 11, 2019. Smith Leads calls to end
archaic criminal libel laws.
78 IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions and
Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015.
54
C. Access to information
72. During 2019 several civil society organizations have called on the government to give priority to the full
enactment of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 2017in order to deliver “this fundamental right
to the people of The Bahamas.”79
73. The Bahamian government said that the full implementation of the law would take until 2020 because
of the need for extensive training within government departments and agencies. They would also be looking for
a professional to serve in the position of Information Commissioner.80
74. On January 30, a resolution was approved in the House of Assembly on the $30 million loan from the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to continue the digitization of government services.According to the
resolution, the loan should be used to support the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act by
developing a plan for its rollout, “providing technical support for the set-up and operation of the office of the
information commissioner and conducting training to information managers to enhance transparency in public
sector entities and enhancing inter-institutional co-ordination to effectively implement FOIA provisions.”81On April
8, at the signing ceremony for the IDB loan agreement, Bahamian Prime Minister Hubert A. Minnis noted that its
objectives include strengthening institutional capacity and improving government transparency and integrity.82
75. Principle 4 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression states that,“Access to
information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to guarantee
the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only exceptional limitations that must be previously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.”
79 Eyewitness News. May 14, 2019. Civil Society calls attention to urgency of FOIA; The Nassau Guardian. May 15, 2019. Civil society groups
urge FOIA enactment.
80The Nassau Guardian. May 7, 2019. Bethel: Full FOIA by May 2020.Eyewitness News. May 14, 2019. Civil Society calls attention to urgency
of FOIA; The Nassau Guardian. May 15, 2019. Civil society groups urge FOIA enactment
81 81 The Tribune. January 31, 2019. Minnis Aiming of a single window for digital services; The Bahamas Investor. February 1, 2019. House
approves $30m IDB loan for tech upgrades; ZNS Network. January 31, 2019. House of Assembly approve $30 million IDB loan for digital
government services..
82 The Government of The Bahamas. April 9, 2019. Press Release. Government secures IDB loans for e-services; and for stabilization in the
event of natural disaster; The Bahamas Investor. April 9, 2019. IDB backs Bahamas digital transformation; The Nassau Guardian. April 9,
2019. IDB working on $25M credit facility to support Bahamian SMEs; Eye Witness News. April 9, 2019. $30 million loan from IDB to digitize
the public service.
55
4. BARBADOS
76. In the context of the 2018 general elections, the elected Prime Minister Mia Mottley is said to have
proposed the introduction of a bill to ensure access to public information, to achieve greater transparency and
accountability.During 2019, different officials have stated thatthe government will focus on making the freedom
of information legislation effective, indicating that a complete transformation of the way the country's public
administration is managed is needed. They indicated that several measures have already been taken to achieve
more openness and transparency, such as press briefings after the Council of Ministers meeting. It is only at the
time of the finalization of this Annual Report that this preliminary draft was approved.
A. Access to information
77. In recent years, Barbados has discussed the possibility of introducing legislation to guarantee access to
public information. During the 2018 general election campaign, Prime Minister Mia Mottley had proposed the
introduction of such a law in the interest of greater transparency andaccountability.83
78. On May 3, World Press Freedom Day, the Barbados Association of Journalists and Media Workers
(BARJAM) urged the Mottley administration to introduce a law on freedom ofinformation.84
79. Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs Dale Marshall said on August 11 that the government
would focus on the possibility of a freedom of information bill in the country over the next 12 months. However,
he clarified that this would first require a complete transformation of the waypublic administration is currently
handled. He noted that, as a first step, the government of Barbados has taken several measures to achieve more
openness and transparency, such as holding post-Cabinet pressbriefings.85
80. At the same time, on November 12,Minister of Economic Affairs and InvestmentMarsha Caddlegave
assurances that the freedom of information legislation would be enacted, and that the government was in the
process of putting in place a number of systems, “building a culture of sharing, integrity and trust.”86As of the
close of this Annual Report, that bill had not been passed.
81. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Principle 4 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expressionestablishes that, “Access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every
individual. States have the obligation to guarantee the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only
exceptional limitations that must be previously established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that
threatens national security in democratic societies.”
83 IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of the State
of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019. Para. 98
84 Barbados Today. May 3, 2019. BARJAM callsfor Freedom of Information legislation; NationNews.May 3, 2019. Bring freedom of information
laws.
85 Loop. August 14, 2019. AG: Freedom of Information Act still on cards; Bajan Reporter.August 18, 2019.Attorney General of Barbados, Dale
Marshall speaks to freedom of information.
86 Barbados Today. November 13, 2019. Country rapped for legislation lag.
56
5. BELIZE
A. Freedom of expression in electoral contexts
82. On May 8, 2019, a referendum was held to decide whether to take Belize’s border dispute with
Guatemala to the International Court of Justice.87To this end, the government invited election observation
groups from both the Caribbean Community (CARICOM-CEOM) and the Commonwealth [Commonwealth
Observer Group].88The latterissued a statement containing an initial assessment of the process, affirming that
the referendum was “credible, transparent and inclusive,”and that it “reflect[ed] the view of the majority of
Belizeans who voted.”It also congratulated the organizers, civil society, observers, the media, and the police for
their respective roles in ensuring the success of the referendum.89The Commonwealth Secretary General also
congratulated the people of Belize on the successful referendum, stressing that it was “a historic and watershed
national step.”90In addition, the chair of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Hubert Ingraham, highlighted the
high voter turnout and civic engagement of Belizeans.91Nevertheless, the Commonwealth Observer Groupraised
several concerns about the “the adequacy and sufficiency of voter education,”and the fact that some potential
voters were reportedly denied the franchise as a result of their inability to produce required voter reregistration documents from the Office of Vital Statistics.92
83. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, “Elections are tightly linked to freedom of expression
and information as it is essential for citizens to have as much information as possible to make a decision in
casting their votes. Accordingly, free circulation of facts, ideas, and opinions is crucial. Unquestionably, the most
common way for citizens currently to inform themselves is through the media.”93
B. Censorship of journalistic material
84. Prime Minister Dean Barrowwarned the media, in a letter from the law firm Barrow & Williams LLP,
that if the charges brought by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) were re-broadcast or repeated, they
could be sued in a civil action. On June 10, the FTCfiledchargeswith theU.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Florida against the Prime Minister and several of his Cabinet members for their alleged involvement
in the Sanctuary Bay Belizefraud.94Barrow’s letter states that any defamation or libel of him wouldpose a “special
risk” to the media, since, if they are held liable, “a court will be obligated to take account of Barrow's position
and reputation,” and that any damages awarded against the media could be increased as a result. [“We are to
therefore notify you that any re-broadcast, re-publication, or repeating in any form of this information and/or
of unjustifiable commentary related to it may subject you to civil action…any defamation or slander of our client
poses a special risk to you since if you are proven liable, a court will be obliged to take our client’s standing and
reputation into account with the result that any award of damages against you maybe increased.”]95
85. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Article 13.2 of the American Convention explicitly states
that the exercise of freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship. In addition, Principle 5 of the
IACHR’sDeclaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression establishes that “Prior censorship, direct or indirect
interference in orpressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information transmitted through any means
of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free
circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of
obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of expression.”
87Reuters. May 9, 2019. Belizeans vote to ask UN court to settle Guatemala border dispute;Amandala. May 11, 2019. Belizeans vote “yes” to the
ICJ; Antigua News Room. May 9, 2019. Belize votes “yes” in national referendum to take border dispute to ICJ.
88 Antigua News Room. May 9, 2019. Belize votes “yes” in national referendum to take border dispute to ICJ; Caricom. May 9, 2019. CARICOM
Election Observer Mission in Belize for Referendum.
89The Commonwealth. May 11, 2019. Observer group describes Belize vote as credible, transparent and inclusive
90The Commonwealth. May 15, 2019. Secretary-General congratulates Belize on successful referendum..
91Breaking Belize News. May 10, 2019. Commonwealth observers praise referendum management and give initial certification.
92The Commonwealth.May 9, 2019. Interim Statement of the Commonwealth Observer Group.Belize Referendum; Amandala. May 11, 2019.
Belizeans vote “yes” to the ICJ.
93 IACHR. Annual Report 2005. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI Freedom of
Expression and the Electoral Process: The Case of Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 77 February, 2006. Para. 2.
94Amandala. July 13, 2019. Sanctuary Belize fraud – FTC fingers Barrow-led government in bankruptcy court; Reporter. July 13, 2019. Bombed
by the FTC PM Barrow says `It wasn’t me!´
95News 5. July 12, 2019. F.T.C. attacks Belize’s justice system; Reporter. July 17, 2019. Arresting our fourth estate;Breaking Belize News. July
18, 2019. Belize – A shrinking democracy?; Reporter. July 12, 2019. Barrow & Williams does legal ballet – After FTC findings.
57
6. BOLIVIA
86. During 2019 Bolivia was marked by a political crisis that led to the resignation of former President Evo
Morales and then led to the interim presidency of former Senator Jeanine Añez. For more than 20 days the
country experienced an escalation of violence that took the lives of 35 people96 in the so-called massacres of
Sacaba (Cochabamba) and Senkata (La Paz), owing to joint tasks between the Armed Forces (FFAA) and the
Bolivian Police. Similarly, clashes between protesters and human rights violations97 by groups of citizens
mobilized during a civic strike in different cities of the country were reported98. As a result, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) conducted an observation visit to Bolivia from November 22 to 2599. In
this context, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has noted the lack of guarantees and security in the work of
journalists, popular communicators, and the media. Along these lines, a complaint was made100 regarding the
death and possible murder of the Argentine journalist, Sebastián Moro, occurred in a scenario of generalized
crisis after the national elections and the power vacancy that resulted from the resignation of former president
Morales. Likewise, this Office has expressed its concern about the persecution and harassment of independent
journalists and popular communicators, such as the correspondent of La Izquierda Diario, Carlos Cornejo, the
artist Leonel Jurado, the collaborator of La Jornada de México, Juan Trujillo, the student from the Universidad
Mayor de San Simón (UMSA), Alexander Fernández, and the social media managers, Orestes Sotomayor and
Alejandra Salinas, through the use of criminal figures such as “terrorism” and “sedition” 101.
87. In addition, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has called on the interim government authorities102
given the announcements to change the existing legal framework through laws that are not compatible with the
recommendations on freedom of expression of the inter-American human rights system. Among them stands
out the draft supreme decree S/N, stipulating, among other things, the reassignment of the radios of the Original
Peoples (RPOs) in Bolivia.] 103.
A. Freedom of expression in the context of post-electoral social crisis inBolivia
88. The conflict in Bolivia began prior to the general election on October 21 and increased when the Fast
and Secure Record Transmission [Transmisión Rápida y Segura de Actas] (TREP) count was interrupted to
resume 24 hours later announcing the victory to former President Evo Morales and canceling a possible second
round of elections where the ruling party could have faced the opposition leader, Carlos Mesa. The socialprotest
was promoted by the movement called “21 F Bolivia said No” [21 F Bolivia dijo No], which called for respect for
the constitutional referendum of February 21, 2016, in which the draft constitutional amendment was rejected
to allow the president or vice president of the Bolivian State to run to be reelected more than once. To these
protests were added sectors of environmental activists that demanded the State coherence in their
environmental policies on land, territory, and respect for prior consultation on extractive projects. The
demonstrations were enhanced after preliminary statements by auditors of the electoral process in Bolivia of
the Organization of American States (OAS), which indicated a possible "intentional fraud" in the national
elections. The social protest, formed mostly by mobilized sectors of the urban cone, denounced the lack of
transparency in the elections. In this way, in different regions of the country a civic strike “for the defense of
democracy” started, led by the Civic Committee of the city of Santa Cruz (Pro Santa Cruz Committee), which
96 Defensoría del Pueblo. December 2019. Afectación a derechos en conflictos elecciones 2019; Chaski Clandestina. November 16, 2019.
Denunciamos el estado de terror; Chaski Clandestina. No hemos nacido para morir así; Chaski Clandestina. November 17, 2019. Represión en
Sacaba: seguimos de luto; Chaski Clandestina. November 19, 2019. Senkata: continua la represión; Chaski Clandestina. November 20, 2019.
Somos nosotrxs los que cargamos lxs muertxs. Senkata y el luto amplificado; Chaski Clandestina. November 29, 2019. Bolivia en estado de
‘shock’: a una semana de la masacre de Senkata; BBC Mundo. November 17, 2019. Crisis en Bolivia: el "uso desproporcionado de la fuerza"
contra seguidores de Evo Morales en Bolivia recibe el repudio de organizaciones internacionales; EFE. November 17, 2019. La CIDH eleva a 23
los muertos y a 715 los heridos en la crisis de Bolivia; Página 12. December 1, 2019. Bolivia duele por sus muertes y sus heridas; La Razón.
November 29, 2019. Relator de laCIDH plantea investigación externa sobre violencia en Bolivia y habla de dos 'masacres.
97 OHCHR, November 16, 2019, Bachelet says repression as well as unnecessary and disproportionate use of force risk inflaming situation in
Bolivia.
98 IACHR, Official Twitter account. “IACHR condemns the disproportionate use of police and military forces in Cochabamba #Bolivia that have
already resulted in 5 people killed and (sic) multiple injuries. Firearms must be excluded from the devices used to control social protests”.
November 15, 2019. 7.15 P.M.; Reuters. November 26, 2019. Human rights violations in Bolivia merit outside probe: Americas commission
head. CNN. November 28, 2019. “La situación es alarmante”, dijo relator de la CIDH para Bolivia. Página 12. November 30, 2019. Para la CIDH
no hay garantías en Bolivia.
99 IACHR, December 10, 2019. The IACHR presentsits preliminary observationsfollowing its visit to Bolivia and requests an urgentinternational
investigation take place into the serious human rights violations that have occurred in the country since the October 2019 elections.
100 IACHR, Observation visit to Bolivia. Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
101 HRW. November 19, 2019, Bolivia: Interim Government Adopts Abusive Measures; Los Tiempos. November 17, 2019. Gobierno creará un
“aparato especial de la Fiscalía” para detener a legisladores que hagan subversiónUNITEL/Youtube November 14, 2019. Published by Jhon
and Gaby Villegas. Murillo Habla Vamos a cazar a Juan Ramón Quintana Que se cuiden todos los que hacen vandalismo.
102 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression. Ref: Request for information on draft Supreme Decree S/N on
“Recovery of freedom of expression in Bolivia” and situation of the Radios of the Original Peoples (RPOs). December 30, 2019. Available at:
Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
103 La Razón. December 17, 2019. Las 53 radios comunitarias suspenden informativos.
58
lasted about 20 days and included the blockade of the main roads, avenues, and the occupation of public
institutions104.
89. According to public information, these protests escalated in the use of violence105 after both political
fronts asked their supporters to defend their vote, which would have led to clashes that violated the exercise of
human rights106, among them freedom of movement, freedom of association, and of expression.
90. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur in different press releases107 identified that since the
departure of former President Morales on November 10 -during the power vacancy generated by the uprising
of the National Police, the request for resignation by the armed forces, and with the self-proclamation of Senator
Áñez108 as Interim President of Bolivia, aprocess backed by the Constitutional Court in the country- there would
be a strong repressive response by the security forces against protesters and social movements of long historical
tradition, with the use of firearms and chemical agents that would have generated an increase in the number of
people killed, injured, and detained109. Specifically, it observed the lack of guarantees and permanent
aggressions during the coverage of such protests towards journalists, popular communicators, activists, and
anyone who tried to document the excessive use of force.
91. During its observation visit to the country, the IACHR110 received information from civil society
organizations and the Ombudsman's Office, the latter issued a statement on October 28111 demanding that the
mobilized social sectors, the State, and the police guarantee the security and physical integrity of journalists in
the exercise of their work. Along these lines, this Office has also received complaints from the National Press
Association of Bolivia (ANP) and the Cochabamba Press Workers Federation(FSTPC)112.
92. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has registered attacks against around 70 journalists and popular
communicators from some 25 national and international media outlets. The attacks would have been originated
both by some violent protesters who supported the civic strike from the movement called "Pititas", as well as
by violent groups of supporters of the former Morales government, and also by the excessive use of force in joint
tasks of the National Police and the Armed Forces113. Among the main violations of the exercise of freedom of
expression and the right to access to public information recorded regarding the death and possible murder of
journalist Sebastián Moro, attacks such as insults, and beatings, in addition to the use of dynamite, confiscation
of work equipment, stigmatizing statements, censorship, obstruction of coverage and doxing114 campaigns,
deliberate misinformation, and the use of the legal framework under criminal offense such as ‘sedition’ and
104 ANF. October 22, 2019. Contra la falta de transparencia en el TSE y en Defensa de la Democracia; Página Siete. October 23, 2019. No nos
maten por una silla; El Día. October 21, 2019. Pary invita a embajadores y organismos internacionales al conteo; OAS, October 23, 2019.
Informe Preliminar de la Misión de Observación Electoral en Bolivia; Fundación UNIR. October 24, 2019. Monitoreo de episodios de conflicto
post- electorales; DW. November 14, 2019. Prensa en alemán: Morales provocó las condiciones para un golpe en Bolivia.
105 Los Tiempos. November 6, 2019. Enfrentamientos en Quillacollo dejan a una persona con muerte cerebral y más de 60 heridos;
“#ParoEnBolivia‘Motoqueros’ of the ‘Cochala Resistance’ that reached #Quillacollo hit a person”. Twitter account Los Tiempos. November 6,
2019. 1.28 P.M.; “#LTahora #Cochabamba #ParoEnBolivia Members of the Cochala Youth Resistance citizen group go to the Huayculi Bridge
where clashes with groups related to the MAS are reported”. November 6, 2019. 1:24. P.M.
106Infobae. October 21, 2019. Carlos Mesa acusó al Tribunal Electoral de ocultar los resultados y convocó a una gran vigilia nacional; BBC
Mundo. October 23, 2019. Evo Morales asegura que hay en marcha un golpe de Estado en Bolivia e insta a sus seguidores a "defender la
democracia"; CNN. November 8, 2019. “Tenemos que defender el voto del pueblo”: Luis Camacho se separa del opositor Carlos Mesa en Bolivia;
CNN. November 4, 2019. Luis Fernando Camacho anuncia radicalización del paro cívico nacional indefinido en Bolivia; El Comercio. November
4, 2019. Bolivia denuncia ‘golpe de Estado en camino’ sin descartar una segunda vuelta.
107 IACHR, October 23, 2019. IACHR Concerned about Violence during Electoral Process in Bolivia; IACHR, November 11, 2019. IACHR
Concerned about Political Crisis and Situation of Human Rightsin Bolivia; IACHR, November 19, 2019. IACHR Warns about the Risk of Impunity
for Human Rights Violations in Bolivia, Calls for a National Dialogue to Reach a Constitutional Solution to the Crisis.
108 Página 12, November 13, 2019. Sin quórum, Jeanine Añez se autoproclamó presidenta en La Paz. BBC Mundo. November 13, 2019. Evo
Morales: ¿hubo un golpe de Estado en Bolivia? BBC Mundo consultó a 6 expertos; The Intercept. November 15, 2019. The Coup that ousted
Bolivia’s Evo Moralesis another setback for Latin American Socialism;The Guardian. December 5, 2019. The Guardian view on Bolivia: respect
the people; The New York Times. December 9, 2019. Restore Bolivian Democracy and Break Its History ofCoups.
109 EFE, December 10, 2019. Al menos 27 personas murieron por armas de fuego en 'conflictos' en Bolivia; Los Tiempos. November 17, 2019.
CIDH y Defensoría: En casi un mes de protestas en Bolivia se registraron 23 muertos.
110 EFE, November 19 2019. La CIDH visitará Bolivia para vigilar el respeto a los derechos humanos; IACHR, Official Twitter account. "IACHR
sent a formal communication to Bolivia for an immediate visit." November 20, 2019. 1:10 P.M.; "Our team arrives to #Bolivia for the visit to
observe the human rights situation from November 22 to 26". November 21, 2019. 11:07 P.M.; El Ciudadano. November 25, 2019. CIDH:
“Bolivianos demandan verdad, justicia y reparación”; Infobae. November 25, 2019. CIDH investiga muertes durante las protestas en Bolivia.
111 Office of the Ombudsman. December 10, 2019. Defensora del pueblo demanda garantías para el trabajo de periodistas.
112 ANP. November 8, 2019. Asociación de Periodistas de Cochabamba exige identificar a agresores de reporteros; ANP. November 18, 2019.
76 periodistas y 14 medios fueron afectados en 29 días de conflicto; Los Tiempos. November 25, 2019. La Fstpc denuncia ante la CIDH las
agresiones a la prensa. Recuerdan las marchas "pacificas" de las pititas? Medicos gritando "guerra civil".
113 IACHR, Observation visit to Bolivia. Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression. IACHR,
December 10, 2019. The IACHR presents its preliminary observations following its visit to Bolivia and requests an urgent international
investigation take place into the serious human rights violations that have occurred in the country since the October 2019 elections. CPJ.
November 11, 2019. Atacan y amenazan a medios bolivianos en el convulso panorama que sigue a la renuncia del presidente Evo Morales. RSF.
November 15, 2019. Bolivia: periodistas locales y extranjerxs sufren amenazas por parte del gobierno de facto. November 21, 2019. Caos en
Bolivia: los medios de comunicación, blanco de agresiones y desamparados.
114 It is the practice on the Internet of research and publication of private or identifying information (especially personal information) about an
individual or an organization. The methods used to acquire this information include searches in publicly accessible databases and social
networks (such as Facebook), hacking, and social engineering methods. It is closely related to Internet surveillance and hacktivism.
59
‘terrorism’, used not only to prosecute but to silence journalists and popular communicators who denounced
violations to the exercise of their fundamental rights. Different media reported that they stopped covering
certain manifestations and topics arguing lack of protection, security, and guarantees for the exercise of their
journalistic activity by the State
115.
B. Attacks, Threats, Intimidations
93. During the civic strike carried out between October 21 and November 10, this Office received
complaints about attacks on reporters of the newspapers El Deber, La Razón, Página Siete, Los Tiempos, Opinión,
Prensa Rural, and Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF), the TV channels ATB, UNITEL, Gigavisión, Red Uno, Bolivisión,
PAT, Tele C, and Abya Yala, and the radio stations Pio XII, Erbol, Radio Patria Nueva, Kawsachun Coca Radio, San
Simón Radio, and Ichilo Radio, among others116.
94. Among the relevant attacks due to the high degree of violence are the attack on photojournalist Miguel
Carrasco of La Razón117, who was hit with a stone in the head when he was covering the confrontations between
protesters, which left him with nine stitches. Something similar would have happened to journalist Crisólogo
Alemán who accompanied the caravan of protesters from the department of Potosí that were heading towards
La Paz to demand the resignation of Morales118. Alemán denounced that they were ambushed and attacked by
supporters of the former president in the Vila Vila region, where he would have received a blow that caused a
wound on his forehead. Popular communicators also denounced attacks by mobilized violent protesters, who
would have hindered the free mobility of journalists and popular communicators119, among other citizens. Juan
Carlos Rocha, former president of the ANP and content director of the El Deber Group, denounced he received
blows while trying to cover a blockade -within the civic strike- in Santa Cruz120. On November 5, agressions
againts several journalists in El Alto were reported, when protesters surrounded the airport preventing the
departure of the president of the Pro Santa Cruz Civic Committee, Luis Fernando Camacho, who was heading to
La Paz to deliver a letter to the then president requesting his resignation121.
95. The attacks against women journalists are also relevant. For example, the Red Uno reporter, María José
Mollinedo, was threatened with being burned and was intimidated through insults based on her gender when
she covered some mobilized groups: “Evo’s Prostitute”,“sell out”122, were the insults expressed and documented.
Journalist Carla Pabón, also of Red Uno, was held, threatened, and beaten by a group of mobilized doctors, and
journalist Raiza Cruz, from the same media, and her cameraman, were assaulted by protesters in El Alto, who
would have beaten and insulted them. Along the same lines is what happened to UNITEL journalist, Helga
Velasco, and Red Uno television presenter, Ximena Zalzer, who would have been attacked by neighbors who
supported civic strike in the Las Palmas neighborhood of Santa Cruz. Also, the journalist of the Guardiana site,
Miriam Jemio, would have been intimidated and insulted, while she was covering the civic strike in La Paz123. On
the other hand, according topublic knowledge information, the ANP and the Association of Journalists of La Paz
115 IACHR, Observation visit to Bolivia. Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression. IACHR,
December 10, 2019. The IACHR presents its preliminary observations following its visit to Bolivia and requests an urgent international
investigation take place into the serious human rights violations that have occurred in the country since the October 2019 elections. CPJ.
November 11, 2019. Atacan y amenazan a medios bolivianos en el convulso panorama que sigue a la renuncia del presidente Evo Morales. RSF.
November 15, 2019. Bolivia: periodistas locales y extranjerxs sufren amenazas por parte del gobierno de facto.
116 “¡UNITEL masista the defenders of the vote chanted to one of the media in the country.” Twitter account of Radio APLP. October 30, 2019.
9.11 P.M.; El Día. November 3, 2019. Santa Cruz: Ocho periodistas y un medio sufrieron agresiones durante bloqueos; El Deber. November 6,
2019. Una cruceña fue retenida momentáneamente en El Alto por manifestantes.
117 La Razón. October 28, 2019. Periodista de La Razón es herido al cubrir los conflictos en La Paz; Página Siete. 28 de Octubre de 2019.
Reportero de La Razón fue agredido en manifestaciones y Defensoría pide garantías; El Día. October 28, 2019. Fotoperiodista de La Razón fue
herido en la cabeza.
118ANP. November 9, 2019. Atacan a periodistas en La Paz y Oruro Guardiana. November 18, 2019. Más de 70 periodistas agredidos en un mes
por opositores y afines a Evo.
119 IACHR, Observation visit to Bolivia. Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression; IACHR
December 10, 2019. Floha de São Paulo. December 25, 2019. En serie con autores latinos, Maximiliano Barrientos escribe sobre una Bolivia
dividida.. Cuenta de Twitter de Lia Libertad. Octubre de 2019. Noticias Bolivia/Youtube. 2 de noviembre de 2019. Santa Cruz CÍVICOS
OBLIGAN ARRODILLARSE A MUJER LA AMENAZAN CON QUEMARLA VIVA
120 Opinión. November 6, 2019. ANP denuncia agresión a su exvicepresidente Juan Carlos Rocha; November 4, 2019. Santa Cruz: Ocho
periodistas y dos medios sufrieron agresiones durante bloqueos. El Deber. November 6, 2019. Agreden a director de contenidos del grupo El
Deber.
121 Página Siete. November 5, 2019. Página Siete repliega a sus periodistas de la cobertura en El Alto; ANP. November 7, 2019. Equipos de
Bolivisión Tv sufren ataques en La Paz. November 9, 2019. Atacan a periodistas en La Paz y Oruro.; Los Tiempos. November 6, 2019. Cercan y
amenazan a Camacho en El Alto, pero él dice que hoy volverá.
122 CIDH. Relatoría Especial. 28 de Octubre de 2019. Denuncia. Disponible en: Archivo de la Relatoría para la Libertad de Expresión. EJU.TV.
29 de Octubre de 2019. Canelas se solidariza con periodistas que sufrieron agresiones en movilizaciones. Primera Linea Info. 28 de Octubre de
2019. Bloqueadores violentos en La Paz amenzan de muerte a periodista.
123 Office of the Special Rapporteur October 2019. Interviews with journalists María José Mollinedo and Helga Velasco; “#LaPaz
#APLPRadioInforma "¡UNITEL masista!", the defenders of the vote chanted to one of the country'smedia”. APLPRadio Twitter account. October
26, 2019. 9.11. P.M.; ANP. November 9, 2019. Atacan a periodistas en La Paz y Oruro; Los Tiempos. November 20, 2019. Mujeres periodistas
de Red Uno fueron golpeadas y amenazadas; ANP. November 8, 2019. Vecinos golpean a presentadora de televisión en SantaCruz.
60
(APLP) demanded, through a joint statement, guarantees for the work of the journalist of Televisión Universitaria
of Canal 13, Ximena Galarza, reporting that she would have been threatened after an interview124.
96. According topublic information, onNovember 6, one of the most violent days of the post-election crisis,
members of the Cochala Youth Resistance (RJC) group attacked, on motorcycles and while armed, people of
indigenous social movements and rural individuals, who were on vigil in the town of Vinto (on the outskirts of
Cochabamba). The mayor of this town, Patricia Arce, was harassed with a series of humiliating treatments; for
example, her hair was cut, she was sprayed with paint, she was hit while on the ground, and forced to walk
barefoot. Along the same lines, the group hit and humiliated the rural leader and former vice minister of
interculturality, Feliciano Vegamonte. In both cases, the aggressors would have been identified aspart of various
violent groups part of the civic strike in that city, including RJC, who also filmed and spread the attacks on social
networks. This Office also received complaints that would indicate that the violent group would be promoted by
regional civic authorities, who allegedly with the support of the Police, would intimidate followers, leaders, and
authorities of the Moralesparty, the Movement To Socialism [Movimiento Al Socialismo] (MAS) 125.
97. In this same line, there were attacks on the journalist of Los Tiempos, Cristina Cotari, who was forced to
stop recording while covering the aforementioned confrontations126. A day later, on November 7, the La Razón
correspondent, Angélica Melgarejo, denounced threats and intimidation when she tried to get an interview with
the leaders of the RJC group, one day after the episodes of violence in Vinto. During the days of civic blockade,
this group was the only one that would have been allowed by protesters to mobilize on motorcycles during the
strike127.
98. This Office has taken note of the persistence of threats and intimidation towards journalists andpopular
communicators by the RJC128 group in Cochabamba. Journalists have reported that intimidation intensifies
during certain coverage, such as when indigenous groups or rural peoplemobilize.
99. Likewise, according topublic information, also on November 6, alleged officials of the Ministry of Health
would have shot firecrackers from the roof of the institution against protesters mobilized around the place. In
addition, civic leaders in La Paz denounced that mining organizations would continue using dynamite, which
would have jeopardized the safety of the civilian population at the government headquarters129.
100. On November 8, the photographer of the newspaper Página Siete, Gastón Brito, was arrested by the
police and taken to the facilities of the Special Force Against Crime [Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Crimen]
(FELCC) of La Paz, where he remained detained for 30 minutes. According topublic information, the Commander
in charge would have explained that they never issued an arrest warrant against him and that it would be a
misunderstanding. For hispart, the journalist argued that it could have been pressures to give information about
other foreign journalists doing coverage130.
101. This Office has identified a second time frame where human rights violations developed. November 9
marked a break in the demonstrations and protests within the civic strike in Bolivia, due to the aforementioned
uprising by the Police, who, together with the armed forces, requested the resignation of then President
Morales131.
102. As reported in the observation visitto Bolivia of the IACHR, due to the absence of thepublic force, looting
and fires would have been recorded at the headquarters ofpoliticalparties,private homes ofpoliticians, leaders
124 ANF. October 26, 2019. Asociaciones de periodistas piden garantías para el periodismo, en especial para Galarza.
125 CNN. November 6, 2019. Alcaldesa en Bolivia es agredida, humillada y obligada a caminar descalza; La Razón. November 6, 2019. Agreden
y humillan a la Alcaldesa de Vinto; jornada de violencia en Cochabamba deja 95 herido; BBC. November 7, 2019. Bolivia mayor has hair forcibly
cut by crowd of protesters; DW. November 7, 2019. Bolivia: alcaldesa vejada en la jornada más violenta hasta hoy, "The president of the
Women's Civic Committee of #Cochabamba, Claudia Flores, warned about fencing houses of MAS authorities" The Times Twitter account.
November 9, 2019. 7.42 P.M.; Página 12. February 10, 2020. ¿Qué es la Resistencia Juvenil Cochala?.
126 “Los Tiempos journalist Cristina Cotari was forced to stop recording while reporting what was happening at the point of confrontation in
Huayculi, with the arrival of the "Cochala Resistance". The Times Twitter account. November 6, 2019. 1.33 P.M.; "Motoqueros" of the "Cochala
Resistance" who came to #Quillacollo hit a person”. November 6, 2019. 1.28. P.M.; “How #Bolivia hurts ... A MAS supporter receives an impact
on the face in clashes in Huayculi. Shocking images”. November 6, 2019. 1.24 P.M.; “An angry mob forces the mayor of Vinto, Patricia Arce, to
walk barefoot, after setting fire to the building of that commune #Cochabamba ”. Twitter account of La Razón. November 6, 2019. 4:27 P.M.;
“Making humble women and men kneel!!! They deserve jail time!!” Twitter account of the former Minister of Health, Gabriela Montaño.
November 6, 2019. 1.59. P.M.
127 IACHR, Observation visit to Bolivia. Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression; La Razón.
November 7, 2019. La Razón denuncia amedrentamiento de parte del grupo Resistencia K’ochala.
128 ChaskiClandestina. December 12, 2019. La CIDH cita en su informe al grupo paramilitar Resistencia Juvenil Cochala y cataloga de masacre
los hechos suscitados en Sacaba y Senkata.
129 Los Tiempos. November 6, 2019. Lanzan petardos alosmanifestantes desde el techo del Ministerio de Salud; La Vanguardia/EFE. November
1, 2019. La Defensora del Pueblo denuncia el uso de dinamita en disturbios en La Paz.
130 IACHR, Observation visit to Bolivia. Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Página Siete.
November 8, 2019. Liberan a "Soyelgas", fotoperiodista de Página Siete, tras ser retenido en la Felcc.
131 BBC Mundo. November 9, 2019. Motín de policías en Bolivia: agentes de varias ciudades se declaran en rebeldía contra el gobierno de
Morales, quien denuncia un "golpe de Estado"; El País. November 11, 2019. El Ejército obliga a Evo Morales a renunciar como presidente de
Bolivia; ANF. November 10, 2019. Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía piden la renuncia del presidente Morales; “Thus, Javier Triguero, president
of the association of non-commissioned officers, sergeants, capes and police officers of the Santa Cruz police garrison, announced the police
uprising”. November 8, 2019. 8.28 P.M.
61
and journalists, as well as attacks against private media antennas such as TVU, Red Uno, UNITEL, as well as
attacks and harassment against their officials132.
103. Among them were recorded: the burning of the headquarters of the Six Federations of the Tropic of
Chapare and the MAS where the facilities of the Kawsachun Coca Community Radio133 and the installation of
facilities of different state media were located134.
104. It is of relevance due to the degree of violence, the fire caused in the house of TVU journalist, Casimira
Lema, located in Chasquipampa, in the southern part of La Paz. According to public information, the
communicator was not at home when a violent grouparrived to set the building on fire135.
105. Along the same lines, on November 9, violent groups also set fire to the house of the governor of the
Department of Oruro, Víctor Hugo Vásquez136, who resigned publicly, as well as that of the municipal mayor of
Oruro, Saúl Aguilar. Likewise, residences and other properties were burned, destroyed, or looted, like that of the
then President, Evo Morales, that of his sister, Esther Morales, that of the governor of Chuquisaca, Esteban
Urquizu137, that of the former president of the Chamber of Deputies Víctor Borda -whose brother was taken as
a hostage,- that of the MAS Senator Omar Aguilar, that of the departmental congresswoman of the MAS Sandra
Siñani, that of the congress deputy David Ramos, that of the Minister of Mining and Metallurgy César Navarro -
as well as his mother's house in the city of Potosí,- that of the Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana138,
that of the mayor of El Alto, Soledad Chapetón139, and that of the indigenous leader Nelson Condori,
representative of the Single Trade Union Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSTUCB)140, in the
municipality of Guaqui; also, that of the rector of the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA) and leader of
the National Committee for the Defense of Democracy (CONADE), Waldo Albarracín141, who during previous
mobilizations would also have been violently attacked.
106. On November 9, groups of violent mobilized people requesting the resignation of former President
Morales took over the premises of the Single Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
(CSUTCB), and would have vexed and tied a post to the director of Radio Comunidad y from the Prensa Rural
newspaper, José Aramayo142.
107. According to complaints received by the IACHR, the correspondent of the Argentine Página 12
newspaper, Sebastián Moro, also a contributor to Prensa Rural, would have been covering the attacks against
Aramayo. A day later, on November 10, and after having sent the last article to the Argentine media about the
situation in Bolivia, the journalist was found unconscious at his home and died six days later in a private clinic,
according to the medical report due to a ACV, although his family has denounced the possibility that he had been
murdered for his journalistic work143.
108. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have received information on the unclear
circumstances surrounding the death of the journalist,including the medical record that registered the existence
of polytrauma in his body and the lack of work equipment at his home, such as his recorder, vest, and notebook.
132 El Deber/Facebook, November 10, 2019. Alteños movilizados atacan y destruyen antena de Unitel, causando pánico en Ciudad Satélite
“#Breaking The signals of @unitelbolivia, Televisión Universitaria and @RedUnoBolivia were cut off. They denounce that a choque group caused
destruction and burned their antennasin the area of the Satellite City of #ElAlto”. ANF Twitter account. November 9, 2019. 9:39 P.M.;“#Urgent
University Television Journalists (TVU) denounce that they received threats and that they are forced to close their broadcast”. ANF Twitter
account. November 10, 2019. 7:36 P.M.
133 La Razón, November 8, 2019. Incendian sede de las Seis Federaciones cocaleras y del MAS en Cochabamba. #NationalStrike| They burn and
loot the facilities of the #Cochabamba Tropic Federation, where Kausachun Coca radio also worked. Twitter account of El Día. November 9,
2019. 11.12. PM.
134 “#Breaking Report that protesters facilitate evacuation of journalists from Bolivia TV and radio Patria Nueva." ANF Twitter account.
November 9, 2019. 4.45 P.M.; La Razón. November 9, 2019. Bloqueadores cercan Bolivia TV y radio Patria Nueva en La Paz y amenazan para
que deje de transmitir; La Prensa. November 9, 2019. Manifestantes ocupan medios estatales y desalojan a empleados en Bolivia.
135 ANF, November 10, 2019. Una turba quema la casa de la periodista Lema y Página Siete suspende su edición impresa.
136 Opinión, November 9, 2019. Oruro: Queman la casa del gobernador Víctor Hugo Vásquez; “Fire in the house of the governor of #Oruro,
Víctor Hugo Vásquez”. Twitter account of La Razón. November 9, 2019. 6.41. P.M.; El Deber, No date. Renuncia Víctor Hugo Vásquez,
gobernador de Oruro.
137 El Mundo, November 10, 2019. Incendian la casa de una hermana de Evo Morales y de dos gobernadores; La Razón, November 10, 2019.
Oruro vive una jornada tensa; renuncia su alcalde y queman su casa.; Aristegui, November 11, 2019. Saquean y vandalizan la casa de Evo
Morales luego de su renuncia | Video.
138 El Potosí, November 10, 2019. Prenden fuego en la casa de Víctor Borda; Urgente, November 10, 2019. Queman la casa del diputado Borda
y la de César Navarro en Potosí; ANF. 10 de noviembre de 2019. Víctor Borda suplica que liberen a su hermano tomado como rehén y renuncia
a su curul; El País/EFE. November 11, 2019. Saquearon y dañaron casa de Evo Morales en Cochabamba e incendiaron otras residencias;
Aristegui. November 10, 2019. Saquean y vandalizan la casa de Evo Moralesluego de su renuncia | Video; Correo del Sur, November 10, 2019.
Gobernador de Chuquisaca anuncia su renuncia al cargo; Notimerica, 10 de noviembre de 2019. Bolivia.- El presidente de la Cámara de
Diputados de Bolivia dimite y denuncia que su hermano ha sido secuestrado; W Radio, November 11, 2019. Quemaron mi casa y trataron de
ahorcar a mi sobrino: ministro que renunció con Evo Morales.
139 Red Uno, November 19, 2019. Vándalos queman la casa de los padres de Soledad Chapetón en El Alto.
140 Los Tiempos, November 14, 2019. Queman la casa de Nelson Condori, el indígena que reprochó a Morales el fraude electoral.
141 Bolivisión, November 10, 2019. Saquean y queman casa de Waldo Albarracín; La Razón. November 11, 2019. Albarracín: La instrucción
era quemar la casa con las personas dentro.
142 Urgente November 9, 2019. Toman oficinas de la CSUTCB y amarran a un poste al director de Radio Comunidad; TeleSur/Youtube Official
Channel, November 9, 2019. TeleSUR denuncia acoso a periodistas en Bolivia.
143 Tiempo, December 8, 2019. El periodista argentino muerto en Bolivia: ¿ACV o brutal agresión?.
62
Also, there would have been audios erased from his phone and according to complaints filed by the family, the
private clinic would have confiscated the journalist's medical documents, a confiscation that wouldpersist until
the closing date of this 2019 Annual Report144.
109. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has repeatedly indicated that the murder of journalists constitutes
the most extreme form of censorship and that States have a positive obligation to identify and punish the
perpetrators of these crimes. For this Office, it is essential that the State investigate, in a complete, effective, and
impartial manner, the murders of journalists and clarify their motives and judicially determine the relationship
they may have with journalistic activity and freedom of expression. The authorities should not rule out the
exercise of journalism as a motive for murder and/or aggression before the investigation is completed. The
omission of logical lines of investigation or the lack of diligence in the collection of evidence in this regard can
have serious repercussions in the development of the processes in stages of indictment or trial. Not having
completely exhausted the logical lines of research results in, above all, that intellectual authors cannot be
identified.
110. Along these lines, the IACHR received with concern the information on the approval of Supreme Decree
No. 4078 on November 14, regarding the actions of the Armed Forces in the country. According to the
information received, the Decree intends to exempt from criminal responsibility the personnel of the Armed
Forces that participate in the operations for the restoration of internal order and public stability145.
111. On November 14, the Minister of Communication, Roxana Lizárraga, appointed by the proclaimed
President Jeanine Áñez, threatened national and international journalists with criminalproceedings for sedition,
stating that “those journalists or pseudo journalists who are committing sedition, we will proceed according to
the law, because what some journalists who are Bolivians or foreigners who are committing sedition in our
country do have to respond to Bolivian law”(sic). In addition, she indicated that these journalists are already
identified and that the Minister of Government"will take the relevant actions"146, which would have contributed
to creating a climate of silencing in thepress.
112. On November 12, the newspapers Página Siete in La Paz, Los Tiempos and Opinion of Cochabamba,
suspended the circulation of their respective printed editions, given the climate of insecurity and intimidation
to journalists and their media. The newspaper El Día de Santa Cruz reported that it stopped circulating in print
format since October 23 due to the indefinite strike in the region147.
113. In this context, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has registered attacks on foreign journalists of
Página 12, TN, Crónica, América, Telefé, TeleSur, and Aljazeera, among others148. On this last medium, Aljazeera,
it was informed that their reporter Teresa Bo was intentionally gassed by members of the Police while
broadcasting live protests. According to the information collected, the majority offoreign correspondents left
144 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Complaints Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression; Página 12, November 17, 2019. Murió el periodista Sebastián Moro; Página 12, November 13, 2019.
Bandas fascistas contra reporteros; Tiempo, December 8, 2019. El periodista argentino muerto en Bolivia: ¿ACV o brutal agresión?; Resumen
Latinoamericano, December 15, 2019. Bolivia. Sebastián Moro: El periodista argentino hallado con golpes, pudo haber sido asesinado; Diario
Uno, December 29, 2019. Reclaman que se investigue la muerte en Bolivia del periodista Sebastián Moro.
145 Ministry of Justice of Bolivia, Decree, Decreto Supremo 4078. Supreme Decree No. 4078. Available for consultation at:
https://www.nodal.am/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/sample1.pdf; La Razón. November 23, 2019. El Decreto.; Página 12. November 16,
2019. Carta blanca para la represión y la impunidad en Bolivia; IACHR, November 19, 2019. IACHR Warns about the Risk of Impunity for
Human Rights Violations in Bolivia, Calls for a National Dialogue to Reach a Constitutional Solution to the Crisis.
146 Clarín. November 14, 2019. Video: la nueva ministra de Comunicaciones de Bolivia amenazó con aplicar la ley de sedición a periodistas;
Infobae. November 14, 2019. Bolivia: la nueva ministra de Comunicación amenazó a periodistas locales y extranjeros por cometer presunta
“sedición”.
147IACHR,Office ofthe Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Complaints Available at: Archive ofthe Office ofthe Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression. "#ANF Cochabambinos newspapers @LosTiemposBol and @Opinion_Bolivia reported that in the face of insecurity
and threats they resolved to withdraw their journalists and therefore their print editions will not circulate on Tuesday." ANF Twitter account.
November 11, 2019. 9.41. P.M.; Página Siete. November 12, 2019. Por inseguridad, tres medios suspenden su edición impresa y canales
transmiten por cable.
148 Telefe Noticias. November 12, 2019. El testimonio del opositor Luis Fernando Camacho; Infobae. November 13, 2019. Violenta agresión al
equipo de AméricaNoticias que cubre la crisis en Bolivia.;“‘Ihate to be the story because we are here to reporton whatis happening.’ Al Jazeera’s
correspondent @TeresaBo has tear gas fired at her while reporting on protests in Bolivia”. Al Jazeera's Twitter account. November 17, 2019
11:21 A.M.; El País. November 15, 2019. Evacuados varios periodistas argentinos de Bolivia tras ser agredidos y amenazados; SIP. November
15, 2019. La SIP condena agresiones contra periodistas extranjeros en Bolivia; Folha de S. Paulo. November 17, 2019. Jornalistas argentinos
decidem deixar Bolívia após receberem ameaças; Telam. November 15, 2019. Bullrich: “Los periodistas argentinos ya están en el aeropuerto
para regresar”; IFEX. November 14, 2019. IFEX-ALC condena agresiones a periodistas en Bolivia; "#Bolivia Minister of communication,
appointed by the currentself-proclaimed government,stigmatizes and threatensjournalists, jeopardizing the freedom of expression and security
of the press workers who are covering the conflict in that country." FIP Regional Twitter account. November 15, 2019. 5.09 AM.; Telesur.
November 15, 2019. Gobierno de facto de Bolivia amenaza a periodistas; América TV. November 14, 2019. Echan al equipo de AméricaNoticas
y A24 de Bolivia; José Viñuela #Ciberperiodismo/Youtube. November 14, 2019. Bolivia. Periodistas en peligro. Camarógrafo de Telefe espera
ser rescatado;“Argentine activists use past videos of protests against Evo to say that it is a current protest in favor of Evo. Let us denounce these
accounts that misrepresent the truth and only contribute to generate greater upheaval in our country.” Andrés Guzmán Escobari's Twitter
account. November 16, 2019. 10:42 A.M.
63
the country due to the attacks, the lack of guarantees, the alleged pressure from protesters, and also due to
defamation campaigns149.
114. Also, on November 29, the correspondent for La Jornada and Desinformemonos de México, Juan Trujillo,
reported having been detained without justification by the Police, who transferred him on a patrol without a
license plate to Immigration offices. Trujillo also explained that they refused to call his diplomatic
representation, collected his personal data and his fingerprints, and forced him to sign a “ultimatum” in which
he promised to regularize his employment situation150.
115. On November 23, Pando Department Senator Carmen Gonzales, an alliance candidate between
Leopoldo Fernández and Carlos Mesa in the October 2019 elections, made statements against Argentine
journalists, who denounced that this would boost harassment151 for their work in the country.
116. According to information provided to this Office, on December 12 during the conversation conducted
by the NGO The Dialogue inWashington D.C. with the civic leader, Luis Fernando Camacho, different groups that
supported him, verbally and physically attacked journalists and activists demonstrating against Camacho's
presence in the country, denouncing he was one of the facilitators of an alleged coup in Bolivia . The activists
were evicted from the scene and would have been exposed to attacks by supporters of Camacho, who threatened
to call immigration agents to detain them152.
117. During the interim government of Áñez153, due to the strong repressive response by the security forces,
with the use of firearms,it was ofparticular concern for the IACHR the fact that there were combined operations
of the National Police and of the Armed Forces for the control of public order, without adequate legal support.
Likewise, the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur expressed concern about the participation of the
Armed Forces in operations to control public order and, in particular, to promote citizen security in the context
of socialprotests154.
118. The Office of the Special Rapporteur urges the State of Bolivia to investigate, in a complete, effective and
impartial manner, these crimes that affect the entire society, clarify their motives, and judicially determine the
relationship they might have with their activity as communicators. In this sense, it is essential that the
authorities investigate these facts without ruling out the hypothesis of the link with journalistic activity and
freedom of expression.
119. Additionally, principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states
that "[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material
destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict
freedom of expression. It is the duty of the state to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their
perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation." Particularly, in the case of crimes against
journalists and social communicators, the IACHR has indicated that impunity contributes to self-censorship of
the press.
120. In turn, regarding violence against women journalists, the Office of the Special Rapporteur stressed that
“women journalists disproportionately and routinely face gender-based violence in the workplace and on the
ground,” and they face differentiated forms of violence by state and non-state actors, as well as lack ofprotection
and obstacles in access to justice also differentiated from their male partners. In this regard, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur has highlighted the importance of integrating a gender perspective to ensure that women
journalists are adequately protected and can exercise their right to freedom of expression without undue
restrictions.
121. Likewise, the Joint Declaration on crimes against freedom of expression of 2012 states that “[w]hen
there is evidence that a crime committed may be a crime againstfreedom of expression, the investigation should
149 Ciberperiodismo / Youtube. 14 de Noviembre de 2019. Bolivia. Periodistas en peligro. Camarógrafo de Telefe espera ser rescatado.
Infobae. 13 de Noviembre de 2019. Violenta agresión al equipo de América Noticias que cubre la crisis en Bolivia. “Activistas argentinos
usan videos pasados de protestas contra Evo para decir que es una protesta actual en favor de Evo. Denunciemos estas cuentas que
tergiversan la verdad y sólo contribuyen a generar mayor convulsión en nuestro país”. Cuenta de Twitter del comentarista e
internacionalista Andrés Gúzman Escobari. 16 de Noviembre de 2019.
150 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Complaints December 17, 2019. Available at: Archive of the Office of
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
151 “Two communist and insufferable Argentines put their dirty nose in #Bolivia the ‘journalist’ expelled from @ CNNEE @ CMonteroOficial and
the nosy @jmkarg Both must receive money or gift from the former dictator. They speak without knowing. Pair of dirty and ignorant.
#EvoNoEresBienvenidoEnMexico”. Carmen Gonzale’s Twitter account. November 23, 2019. 8.14 PM.
152 The Dialogue. December 12, 2019. A Conversation with Luis Fernando Camacho; The Grayzone/YouTube. December 17, 2019. Fascist
Bolivian coup leader fails in DC charm offensive; Erbol. December 12, 2019. Camacho es increpado en evento en EEUU en medio de protesta e
incidentes.
153 BBC Mundo. November 13, 2019. Renuncia de Evo Morales: la senadora Jeanine Áñez asume la presidencia de Bolivia y el expresidente la
acusa de "autoproclamarse".
154 ANF. November 10, 2019. Alto Mando Militar ordena operaciones militares para neutralizar a grupos armados; IACHR.November 19, 2019.
IACHR Warns about the Risk of Impunity for Human Rights Violationsin Bolivia, Callsfor a National Dialogue to Reach a Constitutional Solution
to the Crisis.
64
proceed with the assumption that it is a crime of such nature until proven otherwise, and all relevant
investigative avenues linked to the acts of expression of the victims should be exhausted”155.
122. During its observation visit to Bolivia, the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur received
information on attacks that occurred during the coverage of the repression of the mobilizations at the Huallani
bridge in Cochabamba, called the Sacaba massacre. On November 15, journalist and cameraman of the ATB
television network, Sergio Figueroa, would have been assaulted by protesters, who attacked him based on the
alleged silence of the national press. As reported, in that same episode, unknown individuals would have
launched a firecracker towards journalists and military officers allegedly causing injuries to four reporters:
Fernando Bustamante, César Baldelomar, Ronald Aguilar, and Sergio Figueroa. In addition, protesters would
have thrown rocks at six other journalists156.
123. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that "the protection of the right to freedom of expression
requires that the authorities ensure the necessary conditions for journalists to cover facts of notorious public
interest such as those related to social protests." Likewise, the 2013 Joint Declaration on violence against
journalists in the framework of social demonstrations indicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of
expression “are fundamental and their guarantee is a necessary condition for existence and functioning of a
democratic society. A State may impose reasonable limitations on demonstrations in order to ensure their
peaceful development or disperse those that become violent, provided that such limits are governed by the
principles of legality, necessity, andproportionality. In addition, dispersing a demonstration must be justified in
the duty of protection of people, and the safest and least harmful measures for protesters should be used. The
use of force in public demonstrations must be exceptional and in strictly necessary circumstances in accordance
with internationally recognizedprinciples”157.
124. In the 2013 Joint Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social demonstrations
indicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and their guarantee is a
necessary condition for existence and functioning of a democratic society. A State may impose reasonable
limitations on demonstrations in order to ensure their peaceful development or disperse those that become
violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. In
addition, dispersing a demonstration must be justified in the duty of protection of people, and the safest and
least harmful measures for protesters should be used. The use of force in public demonstrations must be
exceptional and in strictly necessary circumstances in accordance with internationally recognizedprinciples”158.
C. Legal Reforms
125. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur received information that during Áñez’s interim
government, during the so-called conciliation of the country, a “special entitty of the Prosecutor's Office” was
created to arrest those who, according to their perception, would be encouraging subversion. To do this, the
State would have used article 123 of the Criminal Code to criminalize protesters who demanded justice for the
deaths that occurred in the massacres of Sacaba and Senkata and also against rural and social movement leaders
who complained about Morales's resignation and an alleged coupd'etat159. Also, after repealing Supreme Decree
No. 4078, the Minister of Government, Arturo Murillo, used the term "hunt" several times to refer to the
persecution of alleged subversive groups, describing the protesters as "narco-terrorists." According to public
knowledge information, as a result, he announced the creation of an anti-terrorismgroup160.
126. In this regard, human rights defenders, staff of the Ombudsman's Office in La Paz and Cochabamba, and
popular communicators have denounced attacks, threats, and intimidation161 by Police and Youth Resistance
Cochala (RJC) groups.
155 IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. June 25, 2012. Joint Declaration on Crimes Against Freedom of
Expression.
156 Opinión. November 25, 2019. Periodista Figueroa: Me asusté tanto que tuve que pedir perdón.
157United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
158United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
159 Los Tiempos. November 17, 2019. Gobierno creará un “aparato especial de la Fiscalía” para detener a legisladores que hagan subversión;
HRW. November 19, 2019. Bolivia: Gobierno interino adopta medidas abusivas; Telesur. December 18, 2019. Bolivia: detenciones arbitrarias
contra opositores a gobierno de facto.
160 HRW. November 19, 2019. Bolivia: Gobierno interino adopta medidas abusivas; Telesur. December 18, 2019. Bolivia: detenciones
arbitrarias contra opositores a gobierno de facto; “And whoever has any doubt about his performance with impunity take a look at this”. Alex
Anfruns’ Twitter Account. Video Telesur. November 24, 20199. 5.53 A.M.; América Economía. December 3, 2019. Gobierno de Bolivia crea
unidad especial para combatir actividades narcoterroristas.
161 Los Tiempos. November 29, 2019. Cox presenta una denuncia penal contra personas que bloquean la Defensoría del Pueblo; “We ask the
@MindeGovernment @MinPresidencia to provide guarantees so that the @DPBoliviaOf continues with its activities and does not harm its work
that mainly benefits vulnerable populations. A group of people prevents the entry of staff”. Ombudsman’s Office Twitter account. November
7, 2019. 11.50 A.M.; La Razón. December 3, 2019. Murillo anuncia que los narcoterroristas 'están escapando del país’.
65
127. It’s important to note the detention of university students on November 21, within the framework of
the funeral procession of the victims of the so-called Senkata massacre in La Paz, where the police made
excessive use of force with the indiscriminate use of chemical agents and blows, to suppress the demonstration
that carried the coffins of the victims. Among the several detainees was Alexandro Fernández, a student of the
UMSA University Film and Audiovisual Production career. The incident happened while he was recording the
march and was reprimanded by television reporters who handed him over to the Police162. The students would
have been insulted, psychologically intimidated, and physically assaulted in detention, as well as threatened
with being charged for sedition and terrorism.
128. This Office has received information about death threats and harassment against popular
communicators, independent journalists, and activists who were documenting and covering the police
repression situation in the country since November 15163.
129. On December 16, the correspondent of La Izquierda Diario of Argentina and Brazil, Carlos Cornejo, the
plastic artist, Leonel Jurado, and the activist, Andrea Mamani were arrested when they placed posters for a
Kermesse for the benefit of the wounded in Senkata. The arrest would have beencarried out without dueprocess
and theywould have been harassed by the Police. Mamani was released a few hours later and Cornejo and Jurado
were detained for more than 24 hours on charges of alleged sedition and instigation to commit crimes 164.
130. On December 19, journalists from Los Tiempos and Opinión denounced attacks by the Cochala Youth
Resistance (RJC) group, who would have threatenedwith firearms anyone who filmed their attacks against social
activists and movements while on vigilin the Cochabamba Departmental Assembly (ADC)that was preparing to
elect its members. The RJC group would have surrounded those whoparticipated in the vigil and threw eggs and
water at them, expressing, among other qualifications, "go bathe, smelly", and would have psychologically
assaulted those present. Journalists denounced physical aggressions and threats of a sexual nature, such as:
"That ass is mine", "we are going to rape you", "the motel is already paid", "we are going to put a stick in you",
"we know where you live", "we are going to kill you"165.
131. According to public information, on December 31, social network managers part of the Agency for
Electronic Government and Information and Communication Technologies [Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y
Tecnologías de Información y Comunicación] (AGETIC) and hosts of the radio program “La Resistencia Radio”,
Orestes Sotomayor and Alejandra Salinas, were arrested and charged on charges of"improper use of influences"
and "sedition." At that time the Bolivian Police announced that it was carrying out a "cyberpatrol”166.
132. This Office has received complaints about the investigative decision proposed by Senator Oscar Ortiz
regarding the the ATB and PAT television channels, the morning show La Razón, and the Gravetal and ProVida
companies, by which he asked the State Attorney General's Office the configuration of a commission of
prosecutors, claiming that these companies would be linked to former President Morales and former Vice
President Álvaro García Linera167.
133. On the other hand, on December 10, the interim Minister of Communication, Roxana Lizárraga,
presented a bill with ambiguous and unclear articles on freedom of expression. This Office has noted that one of
its articles establishes that the Ministry of Communication “will assume the necessary measures for the
assignment and/or reallocation for “assigning or reallocating the radios of the original peoples - RPO's, within
the framework of socialinclusion to extend the right of access to information”168. Along these lines, the leader of
the rural movement in the country, Roberto Rodolfo Machaca, informed that the 53 radios managed by native
peoples and social organizations, would have suspended their newscasts until the interim government decided
162 ANF. November 21, 2019. Arrestan a estudiante de Cine de la UMSA que registraba la marcha de vecinos de Senkata; Red Uno. November
22, 2019. Joven arrestado por documentar la marcha de vecinos de Senkata; La Razón. November 21, 2019. Periodistas entregan a la Policía a
un estudiante de Cine.
163 Los Tiempos. December 2, 2019. Una persona porta un arma presuntamente de fuego durante la salida de Pumari de la UMSS; Opinión.
December 20, 2019. Intimidan con arma a periodista durante vigilia por vocalías al TED; Chaski Clandestina. December 20, 2019. De vigilias,
agresiones y amenazas: Las calles de Cochabamba durante la elección de vocales departamentales.
164 La Izquierda Diario. December 17, 2019. Bolivia: corresponsal de La Izquierda Diario y artista de El Alto son acusados de sedición sin
pruebas; Página Siete. December 16, 2019. Jóvenes que colocaban afiches recordando hechos de Senkata, fueron aprehendidos.
165 Los Tiempos. December 19, 2019. Varios periodistas son víctimas de agresiones; Opinión. December 19, 2019. Intimidan con arma a
periodista durante vigilia por vocalías al TED; ChaskiClandestina. December 20, 2019. De vigilias, agresiones y amenazas: Las calles de
Cochabamba durante la elección de vocales departamentales.
166 La Izquierda Diario. January 1, 2020. Detienen a integrantes del programa de radio y la red de prensa digital “La Resistencia Bolivia”; El
Deber. January 1, 2020.Envían a la cárcel a ‘guerrero digital’ y Agetic encara auditorías internas; Los Tiempos. January 3, 2020. Detención de
funcionarios de Agetic abre auditorías a contratos en redes.
167 Opinión. December 15, 2019. Ortiz abre investigación sobre tres medios de comunicación; La Razón. December 14, 2019. Denuncian
conglomerado de empresas vinculadas a Morales; afirman que hay orden de apremio contra ejecutivo de ATB.
168 ANF. December 10, 2019. Gobierno presenta proyecto de ley para "recuperar" la libertad de expresión en Bolivia; Prensa Latina. December
14, 2019. Cuestionan proyectos para cerrar radios comunitarias en Bolivia; Jubileo. December 18, 2019. FCINA: Denunciamos intento de
régimen golpista de acallar a radios comunitarias indígenas en Bolivia. La Razón. December 17, 2019. Las 53 radios comunitarias suspenden
informativos.
66
their future. The executive of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), Juan Carlos Huarachi, expressed his concern
in this regard and stressed that these radios inform sectoral and regional issues169.
134. Principle 13 of the Declaration of Principles states that“the exercise ofpower and the use ofpublic funds
by the state, the granting of customs duty privileges, the arbitrary and discriminatory placement of official
advertising and government loans; the concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies, among others,
with the intent to put pressure on and punish or reward and provide privileges to social communicators and
communications media because of the opinions they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be
explicitlyprohibited by law. The means of communication have the right to carry out their role in an independent
manner. Direct or indirect pressures exerted upon journalists or other social communicators to stifle the
dissemination of information are incompatible with freedom of expression”.
135. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has indicated that “the use of criminal law for the conduct of
participants in a demonstration constitutes a serious restriction and with serious consequences for freedom of
expression, and the rights of assembly, association, andpoliticalparticipation that [… ] can only be used in a very
exceptional way and is subject to a higher level of scrutiny”170.
136. It has also indicated that “the criminalization of persons who participate in public demonstrations, or
who lead them, not only has an impact on the right to freedom of expression and assembly, but also serious and
systemic effects on the exercise of the rights of freedom of association and political participation. In particular,
criminalization generates a series of impacts on the free functioning and articulation of organizations, political
parties, unions, networks, movements, or other groups to which the accused persons belong”171.
D. Prior censorship, direct or indirect
137. This Office has received complaints aboutpressures that newspaper staff in Bolivia would have received
to condition certain coverage in favor of regional civic groups claiming that their editorial line is in "defense of
democracy and a peaceful transition." The communicators asked to keeptheir names in reserve to protect their
sources, which would be threatened172.
138. According to publicly available information, the Vice Minister of Communication of former President
Evo Morales, Leyla Medinacelli, would have communicated via telephone call with an editor of the newspaper
El Deber to "ask for a headline." The call came after the TSE announced the results of the 95% quick count, which
would have suggested that there would be no second round in Bolivia. As reported by the same newspaper,
among the allegations made by the former minister to change the headline, she would have indicated: “that the
headline that spoke of a 'second round', had caused people to mobilize in the streets, thus she was ‘asking’ for
"a headline that ‘demobilizes’ sectors"173.
139. On November 14, journalist and political analyst Carlos Valverde denounced intimidation by members
of the Civic Committee of Santa Cruz, who allegedly would defend the interests of their President, Luis Fernando
Camacho. Valverde said they would seek to intimidate him because of his criticism of the transitional
government and his complaints against Camacho174.
140. On November 21, the Telesur television network denounced the blocking of its signal and on November
27, the same would happen with the Russian channel, Actualidad RT. These restrictions were made by private
companies, such as Cotas, and also by the state company Entel. The above, presumably without any
justification175.
141. On December 3, it was informed that the cartoonist of the newspaper La Razón, Alejandro Salazar,
informed the directive of the media that given the harassment and intimidation of which he was being a victim,
he had decided to stoppublishing his cartoons, arguing that he did not have the conditions to continue doing his
job176.
142. The Office of the Special Rapporteur reminds that Article 13.2 of the American Convention explicitly
states that the exercise of freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship. Additionally, principle 5
of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression enshrines that “[p]rior censorship, direct or indirect
interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or information transmitted through any
means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to
169 Proyecto Decreto Supremo S//N. Available at: Archive of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.La Razón. 17
de Diciembre de 2019. Las 53 radios comunitarias suspenden informativos.
170IACHR. Protest and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF.22/19. September 2019. Para. 185.
171IACHR. Protest and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF.22/19. September 2019. Para. 193.
172 IACHR, Observation visit to Bolivia. Available in: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
173 El Deber. October 25, 2019. Viceministra pide un titular de portada en EL DEBER.
174 Carlos Valverde en la Red/Youtube. November 14, 2019. Carlos Valverde en la red/1 14 de noviembre de 2019.
175 Telesur. November 21, 2019. Cablera estatal Entel de Bolivia saca del aire a teleSUR; RT. November 27, 2019. El operador Cotas anuncia
el cese de la emisión de RT en Español en Bolivia; “From La Paz, Honor Court of the Federation of press workers, denounces silencing the
@teleSURtv signal. Read the statement, we appreciate”. Patricia Villegas’s Twitter account. November 22, 2019. 7:28 P.M.; Prensa Latina.
November 30, 2019. Bolivia: después del golpe, el cerco mediático..
176 La Razón. December 3, 2019. Al-Azar; Los Tiempos. December 3, 2019. Al-Azar deja de publicar caricaturas en La Razón tras sufrir asedio.
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the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition
of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of expression”.
E. Deliberated misinformation campaigns
143. On the other hand, according to information provided to the IACHR, during the post-electoral political
crisis in Bolivia, different violations of freedom of expression would have been identified through the
dissemination of deliberate misinformation both during the national elections and after. Among them, the
Bolivian Information Agency (ABI) would have disseminatedphotographs of armed groups and "paramilitaries"
of Venezuela, to show the conflict and clashes inBolivia177.
144. According to information received by this Office, fake Twitter accounts would have been used to
position different political agendas, as well as on the statement of a Spanish researcher who published a report
on the use of bots in support of the civic leader Luis Fernando Camacho and to the interim government of Añez.
According to what he denounced, in different media, there would be around 68 thousand accounts created,
which would have shared 14 hashtags such as: #BoliviaLibreyDemocratica, #NoHayGolpeEnBolivia,
#EvoEsFraude, #BoliviaUnida, among others178.
145. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Article 13.2 of the American Convention provides for
the possibility of establishing restrictions on freedom of thought and expression through the application of
subsequent liabilities for the abusive exercise of this right. In this sense, although whoever spreads the false
information knowing that it is false and causes damage may be subject to reprimand, it should preferably be
through the exercise of the right of rectification or response or,in the eventthat the damage was serious, through
civil liability remediesprovided. Likewise, the Inter-American Court has indicated that Criminal Law is the most
restrictive and severe means of establishing responsibilities regarding an unlawful conduct.
F. Internet and freedom of expression
146. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received complaints about violations of freedom of expression
through the use of technologies during the post-electoral political crisis in Bolivia. According to the Bolivia
Internet Foundation, 19 incidents of temporary restriction and blocking of media pages on Facebook and Twitter
would have been identified. In addition, cases of Internet and calls outages by the state company Entel were
reported after the Senkata massacres, among others179.
G. Acces to information
147. Finally, journalists, relatives of victims, and wounded individuals have denounced the lack of access to
public information during the transition of governments. In this regard, it was informed that the relatives of
those injured in the Sacaba massacre would have been denied information at the Viedma Hospital in
Cochabamba. In this line, it should be noted that the Official Gazette has stopped uploading the draft bills and
decrees since November 14, making access to information on issues of public interest difficult180.
148. Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR establishes that
“access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies”. Taking into account theprinciple of maximum disclosure, the law should guarantee the most effective
and widest possible access topublic information, and exceptions should not become the general rule in practice.
In addition, the exceptions regime must be interpreted restrictively, and any doubt must be resolved by
transparency and access.
H. Progress
149. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has welcomed the enactment, on July 8, by former President
Morales, of Law No. 1197, which would abolish the obligation of the media to disseminate, free of charge, the
content of laws, as well as electoral propaganda in the country. In addition, it established that the free
dissemination of informational, educational, preventive, and social content that is defined by the State should
be a voluntary activity by the media, without any obligation. In this way, the norm would adhere to the
177 ANF. November 6, 2019. Patria Nueva y ABI publican fotos de Venezuela como si fueran del conflicto en Bolivia.
178 Investigation by Julián Macías Tovar. November 22, 2019. Golpe de Estado en RRSS. El Diario. November 21, 2019. Una campaña
coordinada con miles de nuevas cuentas de Twitter y bulos contra Morales lava la imagen internacional del golpe en Bolivia. El Desconcierto.
November 21, 2019. Uso de bots en redes sociales une las campañas comunicacionales de la derecha en Bolivia y Brasil.
179 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Reports. Available in: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression. Fundación Internet Bolivia. November, 2019. Documento de denuncias de abusos y violaciones de Derechos
Humanos a través del uso de tecnologías durante la crisis política en Bolivia, octubre-noviembre 2019.
180 Chaskiclandestina. November 21, 2019. Niegan información a familiares de heridos. IACHR, Office ofthe Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression. Reports. Available in: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
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international standards on freedom of expression recommended to the State of Bolivia by the Office of the
Special Rapporteur of the IACHR181, on several occasions.
I. Attacks
150. From January to October 2019, in Bolivia the tendency of the last years was maintained, which showed
that the majority of attacks on the press came from the State. On May 20, the journalist of El Deber, Guider
Arancibia denounced intimidation by the Minister of Government, Carlos Romero, in the framework of the
investigation of the case involving the former police chief, Gonzalo Medina and other former senior police
officers with the alleged drug trafficker Pedro Montenegro Paz. After the reporting this government
intimidation, the Ministry of Government attacked El Deber and asked the Prosecutor's Office to investigate the
journalists of that newspaper for alleged links with MontenegroPaz182.
151. A report prepared for the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) by civil society organizations, released in
May, documented 92 cases of attacks on freedom of expression in the country during 2018, and noted that 66%
of such attacks would be "endorsed" by the State183.
152. According to publicly available information, the journalist of the ATB channel, Johana Tapia, was
attacked on April 30 when she made a journalistic coverage of conflicts in the population of Tiquipaya between
two neighborhood factions. A neighbor would have attacked Tapia with a stone and the alleged aggressor was
arrested and brought before the Special Crime Fight Force (FELCC) of Tiquipaya, where he made his declaration
and was later released184.
153. On May 12, the Technical Director of the Oriente Petrolero football club, Mauricio Soria, verbally
assaulted a Sport Tv Rights television team and disconnected the cable from one of the cameras authorized to
broadcast live the game in a tournament of the first division of Bolivian football, which his team lost185.
154. On May 18, the editor of the Extra newspaper, Yolanda Limpias, denounced an unjustified aggression
and retention on the orders of the prosecutor José Fernando Riojas, during the coverage of the judicial process
against police chiefs accused of being accomplices of Pedro Montenegro Paz, prosecuted for laundering of illicit
profits and drug trafficking. On May 21, representatives of the Departmental Prosecutor's Office of Santa Cruz
met with journalists covering the topic and members of the Cruceña Press Federation to discuss the incident
and apologize to the journalist186.
155. On June 20, Radio San Miguel denounced that due to its journalistic and defense work in the less favored
sectors of the Amazon region of Bolivia, it would be threatened by government authorities, especially after
reporting irregular events in the voter registration in the municipalities of Beni and Pando187.
156. On June 28, the director of theprivate television network ATB-Cochabamba, Angélica Lazarte, requested
protection to carry out journalistic work and denounced threats and intimidation from the national head of the
Special Force for the Fight against Drug Trafficking (FELCN) , Maximiliano Dávila, against the ATB Network for
an alleged interest in distorting investigations againsta businessman in Cochabamba188.
157. On July 15, the journalist of the newspaper La Razón, Guadalupe Tapia was attacked by public
transportation drivers in La Paz while she was covering a protest. Tapia made the video recording of the
aggressions that municipal guards endured after immobilizing protesters' vehicles due to the use of
unauthorized spaces189.
158. On September 4, the Vice Minister of Internal Affairs, José Luis Quiroga, anticipated that the policeman
who filmed the governor of Oruro, Víctor Hugo Vásquez, while intoxicated, would be subjected to a disciplinary
process, for violating the internal regulations of the institution. Vásquez was filmed by a police officer on August
181 Asamblea Legislativa. Ley Nº 1197. July 8, 2019; Página Siete. July 8, 2019. Evo promulga la ley 1197 y pide a dueños de los mediosser más
responsables con la verdad; Opinión. June 12, 2019. Senado sanciona ley para suprimir difusión gratuita de normas y propaganda electoral;
Correo del Sur. June 7, 2019. Aprueban ley que suprime publicidad gratuita en leyes; Los Tiempos. June 9, 2019. Evo promulga ley que elimina
la propaganda gratuita para medios.
182Los Tiempos. 20 de Mayo de 2019. Periodista denuncia amedrentamiento de Romero por investigar caso "narcopolicías".ANF. 20 de Mayo
de 2019.Gobierno arremete contra periodistas de El Deber, pide investigación por nexos con Montenegro. El Deber. 20 de Mayo de 2019.
Denuncian amedrentamiento y exigen respeto a la prensa.
183 Página Siete. May 22, 2019. Informe: 66% de agresiones ala prensa provienen del Estado; El Día. May 20, 2019. ANP registra 631 agresiones
a la prensa.
184 Opinión. May 2, 2019. Periodista de ATB está grave y agresor es liberado; ATB Digital/YouTube. May 1, 2019. La periodista de ATB, Joana
Tapia, pide justicia por la agresión que sufrió en Tiquipaya.
185 El Deber. May 14, 2019. Mauricio Soria se desquitó con un camarógrafo tras la derrota de Oriente; Los Tiempos. May 13, 2019. Mauricio
Soria se molesta con un camarógrafo tras la derrota de Oriente.
186 El Diario. May 22, 2019. Fiscal Riojas agrede y retiene a periodista; La Razón. May 22, 2019. Fiscalía pide disculpas y considera resuelto el
‘impasse’ con periodista de Extra.
187 El Potosí. June 21, 2019. ANP y APLP rechazan las amenazas en contra de Radio SanMiguel;Brújula Digital. June 20, 2019. Radio SanMiguel
de Riberalta denuncia amenaza del Gobierno a su “labor periodística”.
188 ANP. June 28, 2019. Canal de Tv pide garantías para el trabajo periodístico; Los Tiempos. June 28, 2019. Canal de televisión pide garantías
para el trabajo periodístico.
189 La Razón. July 15, 2019. Choferes agreden a guardias municipales y a una periodista de La Razón; Urgente. July 15, 2019. La intolerancia
marca la media jornada de protesta de los choferes.
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24 in the city of Tarija, from the images the governor seemed to be in a drunken state, in an official vehicle that
was driven by a chauffeur190.
159. On August 1, the journalist of the newspaper El Deber, Marco Chuquimia, reported having been
threatened with a beating and intimidated by coca leaf growers related to the MAS official party, while carrying
out journalistic coverage on a vigil started by the farmers191.
160. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that "[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the state to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation."
J. Stigmatizing statements
161. According to information received by this Office, on January 3, at the inauguration of the judicial year,
the president of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), justice Antonio Revilla, accused journalists and media of
misrepresenting and manipulating the information to do activism on certain projects. Civil society organizations
denounced the fact, but the highest justice maintained his position and indicated that he would not apologize to
journalists for exercising his right to freedom ofexpression192.
162. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that with their
statements they are not damaging the rights of those who contribute to public deliberation through the
expression and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, the media, and human rights organizations,
and must pay attention to the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their expressions do not
constitute, in the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights
of those who intend to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and diffusion of their
thought”.193
K. Subsequent Liabilities
163. On January 3, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones SA (Entel) announced that it would initiate a
criminal proceeding against the director of Brújula Digital, journalist Raúl Peñaranda, for the publication of a
note on the hiring of security companies by the telephone company. On December 21, 2018, the media reported
that Entelis bidding to make purchases and installation of equipment with security companieswithout requiring
them to be legally recognized or have an operating license, as established by the law. Through a statement, the
state company said the complaints would arise from the alleged lies and damage to the image of the company,
not to mention the falsehood incurred in by the journalist. In response, civil society organizations rejected said
statement and noted to the directors of the company, that the Printing Law is in full force in Bolivia, which
establishes that alleged crimes committed by journalists are to be prosecuted by a special court, and not through
the ordinary criminal instance194.
164. On April 17, the mayor of Bermejo, Delfor Burgos (MAS), publicly threatened to initiate a criminal
proceeding against the journalist of Radio Bermejo, Gonzalo Rodríguez, for having revealed to the population a
case of corruption for which he was formally charged and prosecuted. Mayor Burgos warned the journalist “to
be careful”195.
165. According to public information, the head of news at Radio San Miguel in the town of Riberalta (Beni),
Carmen Ruelas, was sued by the senator of the ruling party, Argene Simoni, for the alleged crime of "political
harassment" after the dissemination of complaints on the allocation of municipal advertising to officials of an
audiovisual media that transmits from the house of said legislator196.
166. On June 6, organizations of local and national press workers denounced that journalists Humberto
Vacaflor and Douglas Romay would have been harassed and intimidated by public officials of the MAS party,
who threatened them with criminal trials without taking into account the Printing Law in force in the country.
Likewise, the National Press Association (ANP) of Bolivia questioned that judge Rubén Alavia started criminal
190 ANF. September 6, 2019. Viceministro afirma que amerita sanción disciplinaria al policía que filmó a Vásquez; Los Tiempos. September 6,
2019. Viceministro considera que amerita sanción disciplinaria para policía que filmó al gobernador de Oruro en estado de ebriedad.
191 ANP. August 1, 2019. Cultivadores de hoja de coca amenazan a periodista; El Deber. No date. Periodista de EL DEBER es agredido por
cocaleros en el hospital de Adepoca.
192 ANP. January 3, 2019. Presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia acusa a la prensa de manipular y tergiversar; Urgente. January 3, 2019.
El Presidente de la Suprema dice que no se disculpará y que criticó a la mala prensa.
193 I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
194 Brújula Digital. January 5, 2019. ENTEL anuncia proceso penal contra periodista Raúl Peñaranda, director de Brújula Digital; ANP. January
15, 2019. Exigen cese de juicio penal a periodista; Los Tiempos. January 3, 2019. Entel anuncia proceso contra el periodista Raúl Peñaranda
por nota de prensa.
195 El País. April 18, 2019. Delfor Burgos amenaza procesar a periodista que reveló su acusación penal; ANP. April 20, 2019. ANP rechaza
amenazas contra periodista.
196 ANP. June 27, 2019 Senadora oficialista demanda a jefa de noticias; Los Tiempos. June 22, 2019. Senadora que acusa a radio tiene el
patrimonio más alto.
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proceedings against Romay for the alleged crimes of insult and slander against a Facebook user, when the
Printing Law establishes that these facts are not to be prosecuted through the ordinary criminal instance, rather
by a special court197.
167. The Inter-American Court has established, as regards the possible civil liability, that civil sentences
regarding freedom of expression must be strictly proportioned so as not to cause a chilling effect on this
freedom, since “the fear of a civil sanction, given the demand [...] of an extremely high civil reparation, can clearly
be as or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression as a criminal sanction, as
long as it has the potential to compromise the personal and family life of who denounces a public official, with
the obvious and disvaluable result of self-censorship, both for the affected individual and for other potential
critics of the performance of a public servant”198.
L. Source Confidentiality
168. According to public information, the former general commander of the Police in Bolivia, Rómulo
Delgado, demanded that the newspaper Los Tiempos disclose the source that delivered a recording that, after
being disseminated in the media, resulted in the opening of an investigation to senior police officers for their
alleged link to drug trafficking. Delgado's request would violate article 8 of the country's Printing Law, which
states that " secrecy regarding printing is inviolable”199.
169. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that principle 8 of the Declaration of Principles establishes
that “every social communicator has the right to keep his/her source of information, notes, personal, and
professional archives confidential.” Likewise, remember that Article 13.3 of the American Convention
establishes that “the right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse
of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the
dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of
ideas and opinions.”. Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states
that “prior censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or
information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic communication must
beprohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, aswell as the arbitrary imposition
of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
M. Censorship of journalistic material / Prior or indirect censorship
170. On May 1, journalist Juan Pablo Guzmán left Bolivisión's “Hora 23” night program, after hosting it for a
year and a half, denouncing government pressures in the journalistic exercise. Gúzman with 16 years in national
journalism published a letter arguing that the informative agenda of some media in the country would be
conditioned to give preference to the declarations of official authorities and not to journalistic equity, or the
relevance of the information200.
171. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Article 13.2 of the American Convention states that the
exercise of freedom of expression cannot be subject to prior censorship. In the same sense, Principle 5 of the
Declaration of Principlesprovides that,“[p]rior censorship, direct or indirect interference in orpressure exerted
upon any expression, opinion or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or
electronic communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions,
as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information
violate the right to freedom of expression.”
N. Diversity and pluralism / Media concentration / Communitybroadcasting
172. On May 1, journalist Erwin Valda announced the suspension of hisprogram “Pares opuestos” which was
broadcasted by Imperial Radio Tv, and attributed the decision to the pressures of the Municipal Government of
Potosí, who he accused of conditioning advertising allocation to the media in exchange for an editorial line
without criticism201.
197 Hoy Bolivia. June 6, 2019. Periodistas denuncian amedrentamiento; Página Siete. June 5, 2019. ANPB rechaza decisión de un juez de iniciar
juicio penal a periodista.
198 I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009.
Serie C No. 193, Para.129
199 Los Tiempos. May 3, 2019. Delgado exige que Los Tiempos revele fuente del audio; ANP. May 3, 2019. ANP rechaza exigencia de vulnerar el
secreto de imprenta; El Deber. May 3, 2019. Excomandante Delgado exige a Los Tiempos revelar su fuente que filtró audio.
200 Página Siete. 1 de mayo de 2019. Juan Pablo Guzmán deja Bolivisión y denuncia que al oficialismo hay que “dejar hablar”. ANF. 2 de Mayo
de 2019. El periodista Guzmán deja Bolivisión y denuncia presiones del Gobierno.
201 “@Erwin Valda is a journalist leaving Imperial radio station in Potosí due to government pressure. He denounced that due to his critical
position to the administration of Mayor William Cervantes, the media does not receive political publicity. Read Valda's statement”. ANF’s
Facebook account. May 2, 2019. Infobae. May 3, 2019. La guerra de Evo Morales contra la prensa: periodistas dejan su trabajo por presiones
del Gobierno.
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173. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, in accordance with Article 13.3 of the American
Convention, the right to freedom of expression “may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the
abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in
the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation
of ideas and opinions”. In this regard, also the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, in principle 13 indicates that “the exercise of power and the use of
public funds by the state, the granting of customs dutyprivileges, the arbitrary and discriminatory placement of
official advertising and government loans; the concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies, among
others, with the intent to put pressure on and punish or reward and provide privileges to social communicators
and the media because of the opinions they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly
prohibited by law".
O. Freedom of Expression in Electoral Context
174. In electoral processes, freedom of expression acquires a particular relevance, since in order for citizens
to make a free and rational decision to choose between the different proposals of government, political parties,
and candidates, it is essential they have as much information as possible, as well as with the freest circulation of
ideas and opinionspossible.
175. This Office has identified that, during the electoral process in Bolivia, there was not an existence of
systematic episodes of direct prior censorship, notwithstanding the worrying the ban on the dissemination of
the UMSA-Jubilee survey202. There was plurality of media both in the written press and in audiovisual services
with diverse editorial and information lines. There was also legal recognition in the field of audiovisual
communication services of the different sectors and methods of communication, existing in this sense state
media, private commercial media, social community media, and ruralindigenous peoples’ media. The EOM/OAS
Mission indicated that it would have confirmed the existence of independent or opposition media to government
policies. In the same way, the circulation of ideas and information was generally free, highlighting that, in the
mainstream media, whether in the written press or on radio or television, there is room for dissenting and
oppositional voices to the government, informing without limits on the performance of acts of protest and
opinions contrary to the management of the authorities. Also,it should be noted aspositive measures topromote
freedom of information in the electoralprocess and equal opportunities in media access, the norm that regulates
the “Public Strengthening for Political Parties and Alliances” and free advertising.
176. Likewise, different media outlets reportedproblems in obtainingpresspermits and safe conducttopass
freely during election day203.
177. However, the EOM/OAS has observed certain problematic issues in the exercise of freedom of
expression that are not new in the country but could have influenced the electoral process because they are
potentially restrictive of the free movement of ideas, opinions, and information.
178. Among them are repeated threats and pressures on journalists and the media by government
authorities, as well as stigmatizing statements. The repression of peaceful demonstrations and acts of protest.
The absence of a clear legal framework that establishes objective criteria and equal opportunities in the
distribution of government advertising. The abusive use by public authorities of advertising on government
works, thereby conditioning the editorial and informative independence of the media. Difficulties in accessing
public information caused by the lack of a legal norm that guarantees this right.
179. From the analysis on the state of the situation of freedom of expression and information in Bolivia
carried out in the days prior to the electoral act, as well as the reception of opinions from actors linked to the
government as well as to the opposition, as well as others that were independent from especially from the media
and social organizations, the EOM / OAS concluded that these factors have influenced the electoral process by
promoting a climate of disruption that inhibits the free movement of ideas and opinions as well as the right to
seek, receive, and provide information. Factors that have the risk of altering the free decision of eachcitizen204.
202 OAS. Report by the EOM. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
203 ANF. 19 de Obctubre de 2019. ANP reporta problemas que tuvieron 3 medios en obtener permisos de circulación en elecciones.
204 OAS. Report by the EOM. Preliminary Report of the Electoral Observation Mission in Bolivia.
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7. BRAZIL
180. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has documented during 2019 a context of hostility toward the
exercise of journalism and the free functioning of the media in Brazil. Repeat statements by high authorities
aimed at smearing journalists and the media undermine the role of the press. In a context of polarization of the
media scene and the narrative in social networks, a stigmatizing discourse is reproduced towards media outlets
and communicators who have disseminated information on his administration, accusing them of taking an
oppositional role or of political bias. The statements and attacks against the press are particularly serious
because they can heighten the risk of threats and violence against these professionals and impact the
population’s trust in journalism as an institution of democracy.
181. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also observes a variety of situations of threats against journalists
in response to their work, and some of these episodes have involved the participation of individuals who say
they are aligned with the government. Likewise, two murders and acts of violence against journalists for reasons
presumably linked to their work have been documented. Also, the excessive use of force by the police in the
context of demonstrations andprotestspersists in Brazil. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of
acts of censorship, especially regarding artistic expression and productions on sexual identity, orientation, and
diversity.
A. Progress
182. In December 2018, the Cartilla Aristeu Guida da Silva International Standards for the Protection of the
Human Rights of Journalists and Other Communicators were presented during the Third National Meeting of
Technical Teams of the Program to Protect Human Rights Defenders, Communicators, and Environmentalists,
in compliance with one of the IACHR's recommendations in the framework of the case of the May 1995 murder
of journalist Aristeu Guida da Silva in the city of São Fidélis, Río de Janeiro. The document was published by the
Ministry of Human Rights in place at the time. Despite this important step forward, the Office of the Special
Repertory takes note that according to the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), this document has not been
adequately disseminated among journalists andcommunicators subsequent to its publication.205
183. On May 8, the 12th Criminal Court of Justice of the State of São Paulo [Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo]
(TJSP) rejected an appeal seeking review of the acquittal of journalists Tatiana Merlino, Debora Prado, and Pedro
Pomar in a process brought against them by the former secretary of health of São Paulo, Giovanni Guido Cerri,
for the crime of defamation. According to the information available, the former secretary had brought the action
over an article published in the magazine Associação dos Docentes da USP (Adusp), where Pedro Pomar is the
editor, in May 2013. The article was bylined by Merlino and Prado. According to reports, the article described a
situation in which the former secretary was involved that constituted a conflict of interest. The journalists have
also been sued civilly by the former secretary, but that suit was rejected by the lower court and on appeal.206
184. On June 20, in response to a special appeal filed by the defense of photographer Alexandre Wagner—
whose left eye was injured by the military police while he was covering a demonstration in 2000 in São Paulo—
Supreme Federal Court Magistrate Marco Aurelio Mello recognized the general repercussion of the case,
meaning that the decision in this trial will serve as a precedent for the cases currently pending on journalists
injured during demonstrations and social protests. The Magistrate stated that "this is an issue that requires a
ruling by the Supreme Court. It must be determined whether a case seeking redress of damages violates the right
to exercise theprofession of reporter in which the victim was found guilty solely […] for covering a clash between
the police and demonstrators [and] was struck by a rubber bullet fired by soldiers, resulting in permanent loss
of sight.”207
185. On July 25, Decree 9,937 was issued establishing the Program for the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders, Social Communicators, and Environmentalists and revoking Decree 8,724 of April 27, 2016,
establishing the program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Its Deliberative Council208.
Additionally, the new decree established the program’s Deliberative Council within the Ministry of Women,
Family, and Human Rights. The program’s change had been announced previously, in September 2018, and
individuals seeking protection under it no longer had to prove their activities had a human rights impact.209On
205 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Impunity Brazil. 75th General Assembly. October 4 - 7. October 7, 2019; Inter American Press
Association (IAPA). December 21, 2018. IAPA pleased at document in Brazil on international standards for protection of journalists;
Ministerio dos Direitos Humanos. Cartilha Aristeu Guida da Silva - Padrões Internacionais de Proteção deDireitos Humanos de Jornalistas e
deOutros Comunicadores e Comunicadoras. 2018. Available at:
https://media.sipiapa.org/adjuntos/185/documentos/001/825/0001825035.pdf
206 Artigo 19. May 9, 2019. TJSP nega recurso e mantém absolvição de jornalistas em ação criminal..
207 Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). Plenário. Repercussão Geral no Recurso Extraordinário 1.209.429 São Paulo. June 20, 2019; Artigo 19.
11 de julio. Comunicadores feridos em manifestações: direitos e violações em jogo nas decisões dos casos de Sérgio Silva e Alex Silveira.
208 Presidencia da República. Secretaría General. Decreto N° 9.937. July, 24 2019.
209 Portal Comunique-se. August 5, 2019. Comunicadores e ambientalistas entram para programa de proteção do governo; Gazeta do Povo.
July 25, 2019. Bolsonaro cria programa de proteção a defensores de direitos humanos; Diário Oficial da União. Decreto No. 9.937. July 24,
2019.
73
this point, this Office of the Special Rapporteur praises the Brazilian State for having included social
communicators as a group protected specifically under the Protection Program and reminds the State that this
mechanism must meet the needs of journalists and be broadly disseminated among media workers in order to
provide those facing risk over their journalism activities with effective guarantees.
186. According to publicly available information, one of the individuals involved in the murder of radio host
Jefferson Pureza on January 17, 2018, in the city of Edeia, Goiás, was convicted on October 4. According to
reports, Leandro Cintra da Silva was sentenced to 14 years in prison for the crimes of corrupting minors and
murder. Cintra da Silva was the owner of the space where the radio host’s murder was allegedly negotiated. Also,
one of the perpetrators used his cellphone to coordinate the murder with other individuals. Regarding the trials
of the mastermind, a city council member, and the individual who introduced the perpetrators to the council
member, they have not yet been scheduled but could take place in December 2019.210
B. Murders
187. This year, the Office of the Special Rapporteur documented the murder of two journalists in Brazil.
According to publicly-available information, journalist Romário Barros was murdered on June 18, shot three
times as he was driving his car in the city of Maricá, Río de Janeiro. Barros was the owner of a newsportal called
“Lei Seca Maricá.” In a public statement, the Office of the Mayor of Maricá repudiated the journalist’s murder and
stated that the crime “[w]as an attack on freedom of expression." He stated that “an immediate investigation to
identify and punish those responsible is urgently needed by the population of Maricá," reinforcing his
commitment to freedom of the press and expression.211 According to available information, this is the second
murder of a journalist in the city. Earlier, on May 25, journalist Robson Giorno was murdered when he was
gunned down in the doorway of his home,in the Boqueirão neighborhood, also in Maricá. The journalist was the
founder and owner of the newspaper O Maricá, which focused on covering local political news. He had also
expressed his intention to run for mayor of the municipality in the 2020 elections. According to reports, the
police are investigating his murder and believe it was premeditated. They are working on two lines of
investigation, one being political retaliation, and the other alleged retaliation for reports he published in his
newspaper.212
188. Additionally, in April, the National Council of the Public Prosecution Service [Conselho Nacional do
Ministério Público] (CNMP) published the report "Violência contra comunicadores no Brasil: um retrato da
apuração nos últimos 20 anos,” drafted for the Estratégia Nacional de Justiça e Segurança Pública (ENASP). It
included data on violence against communicators in Brazil. The report documented 64 cases of journalists
murdered between 1995 and 2018 for reasons allegedly related to their journalism work. According to the
ENASP, “by providing analytical data, the document makes it possible to identify errors and omissions in the
criminal prosecution of these crimes. Exposing the errors also enables the office of the prosecutor and other
institutions—along with organized civil society—to correctthem”.213
189. Principle 9 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression states: “[t]he murder,
kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction of
communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrictfreedom of expression.
It is the duty of the state toprevent and investigate such occurrences, topunish their perpetrators and to ensure
that victims receive due compensation.” Particularly in the case of crimes against journalists and social
communicators, the IACHR has indicated that impunity contributes to self-censorship of thepress.
C. Attacks, arrests,threats, harassment, and stigmatizing statements perpetrated against journalists
and media outlets.
190. In 2019, this Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed of the tendency of President Jair Bolsonaro
and other public officials to issue statements stigmatizing of certain media outlets and journalists in order to
discredit them. According to the Federação Nacional dos Jornalistas (FENAJ), 111 attacks on the media by
210 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). October 5, 2019.. Júri condena a 14 anos um dos envolvidos na morte de
radialista no interior de Goiás; Associação Nacional de Jornais (ANJ). October 7, 2019. Júri condena um dos envolvidos na morte do radialista
Jefferson Pureza, no interior de Goiás; IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. January 26, 2018. Press Release R10/18
Office of the Special Rapporteur Condemns Murder of Two Journalists in Brazil and Urges the State to Investigate Connection to Journalistic
Activity.
211 G1. June 19, 2019. Jornalista é morto a tiros en Maricá, no RJ; Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). June 19, 2019.
Maricá: dois assassinatos de comunicadores em menos de 1 mês.
212212 G1. May 26, 2019. Jornalista é morto na porta de casa em Maricá, RJ; Artigo 19. May 31, 2019. #Alerta: Jornalista Robson Giorno é
assassinado em Maricá (RJ); UNESCO. June 4, 2019. Director-General condemns murder of online journalist Robson Giorno in Brazil; Extra. May
27, 2019. Dono de jornal em Maricá foi morto em emboscada, afirma delegada.
213Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público (CNMP). April 29, 2019. CNMP lança relatório com o retrato da violência contra comunicadores
no Brasil;Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público (CNMP) and Estratégia Nacional de Justiça e Segurança Pública (Enasp).Violência contra
comunicadores no Brasil: um retrato da apuração nos últimos 20 anos. April 2019.
74
President Bolsonaro were documented between January 1 and November 30. According to this federation, the
attacks are a way for the president to "incite his followers to not trust the journalism work of the majority of
outlets andprofessionals, mainly when they disseminate news that is critical of the government or that involves
the Bolsonaro family.”214 The following are some of the cases reported to this Office of the Special Rapporteur
during this year.
191. It was reported by media that journalistic work has faced restrictions during the presidential
inauguration on January 1. On this specific point, Mônica Bergamo, a journalist with Folha de São Paulo, stated
that “[c]onfined in the Congress for almost 6 hours, the journalists even had apples confiscated on suspicion they
might throw them at Bolsonaro’s head."215 Additionally, on February 2, Luciano Ramos, a communicator with
radio station Caaporã FM,in the state of Paraíba, was beaten as he was on his way to file a complaint at the police
station for social media attacks on him. According to the information provided, the incident was the result of the
communicator’s criticism of and allegations against the administration of the city of Caaporã. Previously, in
November 2018, Édouard França, also a communicator with this radio station, was subject to a similar attack.216
It was also reported that journalist Leonardo Sakamoto of UOL/Reporter Brazil, reporter Natália Portinari of
Época, and Isabela Palhares of Estado de São Paulo have also been subject to attacks on social media. According
to the Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (ABRAJI), a number of journalists were accused of
"producing and disseminating fake news, insults, threats of physical violence, invitations to exile, and even
expressing wishes of death […]. The catalysts could be the publication of a piece of reporting bylined by the
professional, a question in a press conference, or contact with a source."217
192. On March 11, a journalist with O Estado de São Paulo, Constança Rezende, was accused by President Jair
Bolsonaro of seeking his impeachment and of wanting to "ruin" the life of his son, Flávio Bolsonaro. On his
Twitter account, the President alleged that the journalist "says she wants to ruin the life of Flávio Bolsonaro and
seek the impeachment of President Jair Bolsonaro. She is the daughter of Chico Otavio, a professional with ‘O
Globo.’ They want to take down the Administration with blackmail, disinformation, and leaks.”218 The message
was accompanied by the audio of a conversation between the journalist and an unidentified individual.
According to the information provided, the audio had truncated sentences and pauses, only select portions of it
were published, and it contained no mention by the journalist of an "intent" to ruin the administration or the
president.219 The original publication for which the journalist was accused was posted in a blog produced by
readers of French website Mediapart and was published on Brazilian website TerçaLivre,220 which, according to
publicly available information,is run by activists close to the Bolsonaro family.221 On March 11, Mediapart stated
on its Twitter account that the news published in the “Mediapart club” that was the basis for the president's
tweet was false.222
193. On March 16, the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo reported that there was a "defamation machine"
operating in the country on social media, run "by bolsonarista and olavista groups on the most radical and
dogmatic side of the so-called ‘new right.’” The newspaper stated that as a result of these virtual attacks, a
number of victims had locked their profiles or fallen silent regarding the issue originating the attacks against
them. For example, it cited the case of journalist Constança Rezende, who had experienced virtual attacks on
March 10, as well as the case of the newspaper itself, which had been the target of these "virtual militias" after
publishing a report on the Rezende case showing that the statements had been doctored. O Estado de SãoPaulo
214Revista Forum. December 2, 2019. Bolsonaro acumula 111 ataques à imprensa em seu primeiro ano de governo; Federação Nacional dos
Jornalistas (FENAJ). December 2, 2019. Ataques de Bolsonaro à imprensa já somam 111 ocorrências.
215 ¨[c]onfined in Congress for almost six hours, even apples are confiscated from journalists suspected of potentially throwing them at
Bolsonaro's head.¨. Twitter account of Monica Bergamo. @monicabergamo. January 1, 2019; Exame. January 1, 2019. Sem banheiro ou água,
jornalistas relatam restrições em posse de Bolsonaro; Folha de São Paulo. January 1, 2019. Um dia de cão; Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo
Investigativo (Abraji).January 1, 2019. Abraji protesta contra limitações ao trabalho de jornalistas na cobertura da posse presidencial
216 Artigo 19. February 25, 2019. Comunicadores da rádio Caaporã FM são alvo de ameaças, intimidações e violências na Paraíba.
217 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). October 9, 2019. Ao tentar desqualificar repórter, ministro da Educação abre
portas para ataques à profissional; Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). February 7, 2019. Jornalistas relatam agressões
em redes sociais após publicar trabalhos.
218“ Estadão. March 10, 2019. Site bolsonarista distorce ‘entrevista’ de repórter do Estadão e promove desinformação; Folha de São Paulo.
March 10, 2018. Bolsonaro divulga relato deturpado de conversa de jornalista; Lupa. March 10, 2019. #Verificamos: É falso que repórter do
Estadão tenha dito que pretende ‘arruinar Flávio Bolsonaro e o governo’; The Guardian. March 11, 2019. Bolsonaro under fire for smearing
reporter who covered scandal involving his son.
219 Estadão. March 10, 2019. Site bolsonarista distorce ‘entrevista’ de repórter do Estadão e promove desinformação; Folha de São Paulo. March
10, 2018. Bolsonaro divulga relato deturpado de conversa de jornalista; Lupa. March 10, 2019. #Verificamos: É falso que repórter do Estadão
tenha dito que pretende ‘arruinar Flávio Bolsonaro e o governo’; The Guardian. March 11, 2019. Bolsonaro under fire for smearing reporter
who covered scandal involving his son.
220Terça Livre. No Date. Jornalista do Estadão: a intenção é arruinar Flávio Bolsonaro e o governo.
221Lupa. March 10, 2019. #Verificamos: É falso que repórter do Estadão tenha dito que pretende ‘arruinar Flávio Bolsonaro e o governo’;
Estadão.March 10, 2019. Bolsonaro usa declaração falsa para atacar imprensa.
222Estadão. March 11, 2019. Site francês que originou ataques contra repórter do 'Estado' diz que informações são falsas; The Intercept Brasil.
March 11, 2019. Jornal francês desmente Jair Bolsonaro e artigo de leitor que ataca jornalista do Estadão; “Mediapart sympathizes with
journalist @constancarezend, a victim of threats. The information published in the ‘Club de Mediapart’, which served as the basis for the
tweet of @jairbolsonaro, is false. The article is the author's responsibility and the blog is independent from the newspaper”. Twitter account
of Mediapart @Mediapart. March 11, 2019.
75
said these "virtual militias" had tried to smear the newspaper with the hashtag #EstadaoMentiu on Twitter. It
also indicated that according to social media experts, the digital attacks were supported by robots.223
194. According to the information available, on April 22, the head of Brazilian website Terça Livre, Allan dos
Santos, reported having received death threats. Fernanda Salles, who works for the website, was threatened
with rape. According to the information available, journalists with The Intercept Brazil had also received
offensive comments and threats from the same email that sent the threats to Terça Livre224. Other journalists
who were allegedly threatened over their journalism work included: Adécio Piran, reporter and owner of Folha
do Progresso, in the state of Pará, who was threatened and sent offensive comments following the publication
on August 5 of a report entitled "Day of fire: Producers set the date for burning the region "225; radio host Ilton
Santos de Morrinhos, in the state of Ceará, who has since 2017 has been subject to intimidation and threats in
connection with his work on "É de Lascar," a program on community radio station Freedom FM, which aired
complaints from the population and discussed issues related topublic administration226; Carlos de Lannoy of TV
Globo, who was threatened on social media after airing a report on an incident in which the Río de Janeiro
security forces fired more than 80 times into a family car, causing the death of one individual;227 Juliana Dal Piva,
reporter with magazine Época, who received a death threat following publication of her report on a movie
supporting the dictatorship established in 1964 in Brazil.228.
195. Also, on June 9, The Intercept Brasil began publishing a series of leaks exposing alleged irregularities in
the Lava Jato anticorruption oppression. Immediately following the publication, journalist Glenn Greenwald
began to receive insults, defamatory comments, and death threats. Also, with the hashtag #DeportaGreenwald,
a viral campaign of harassment was conducted against the journalist, as well as against the media outlet he funds
and edits, against his husband—federal congressman David Miranda—and against their children. Public
authorities highlighted the allegedly illegal nature of the leaked material received by The Intercept Brasil from
an anonymous source with the aim of disparaging or restricting freedom of thepress.229
196. In the framework of the acts of harassment against journalist Glenn Greenwald, on June 9, Carlos
Bolsonaro (councilmember for Río de Janeiro) wrote on his Twitter account: "is it just me or is it only in Brazil
that the media uses an illegalincursion into something private, ignoring the judicialinvalidity and illegality, and
doesn't mind sharing it with the only goal of burning down the Bolsonaro administration and benefiting the
system? I think I've seen this one before."230 The next day, his brother Eduardo Bolsonaro (Federal Deputy – São
Paulo) stated: “Glenn Greenwald, formerly of CNN, was the spokesperson for Snowden for leaking everything he
knew about confidential US data in the case known as WikiLeaks. Glenn also sold the idea abroad that the Dilma
impeachment was a coup.”231
197. Later, on June 13, deputy Carlos Jordy, of the governing party (PSL), said on his Twitter account that it
would be ideal to call Glenn Greenwald to testify before Congress, but that it would only be possible through a
CPI (Parliamentary Investigation Committee). “Independent of whether he comes before Congress, his case is
already being investigated by the justice system. Mr. @ggreenwald, do not think you are an immortal beyond
good and evil. You did activist journalism through a criminal act, making you an accomplice,” he wrote. “Respect
the country that hosts you, you cannot vilify our institutions and authorities by committing crimes against
national security and think you won’t be held criminally liable andDEPORTED,” he added. On the same day, Jody,
who is also a federal deputy (PSL – Minas Gerais) posted a photo of Greenwald on Facebook titled “Enemy of
Brazil” and accused him of “destroying Lavajato.” He also included David Miranda and said both “are old
acquaintances of the justice system.”232
198. On June 25, Glenn Greenwald took part in a hearing of the Human Rights and Minorities Committee of
the Chamber of Deputies in Brasília on the invitation of two of the committee's deputies. There, he stated that
223 Estadão. March 16, 2019. Rede bolsonarista ‘jacobina’ promove linchamento virtual até de aliados.
224 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). April 22, 2019. Ameaças contra Terça Livre são graves e devem ser investigadas;
225 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). August 30, 2019. Jornalista é alvo de ofensas e ameaças após publicar
reportagem sobre Dia do Fogo; O Globo. September 1, 2019. ABI pede proteção a jornalista alvo de ameaças após reportar 'Dia do Fogo' no
Pará.
226Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). May 9, 2019. Radialista do Ceará volta a receber ameaças de morte.
227Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). April 8, 2019. Jornalistas são ameaçados após veiculação de reportagens; O
Estado de São Paulo. April 8, 2019. Repórter da Globo recebe ameaça após reportagem: 'sua família vai pagar'.
228 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). April 8, 2019. Jornalistas são ameaçados após veiculação de reportagens.
229IACHR. July 1, 2019. Press Release R164/19 Experts on freedom of expression of the UN and the IACHR express their concern over death
threats against journalist Glenn Greenwald, director of The Intercept Brasil, and his family; Artigo 19. June 25, 2019. ARTIGO 19 repudia
ataques contra comunicadores do The Intercept Brasil; Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). June 19, 2019. Abraji
repudia ataques a Glenn Greenwald e equipe do Intercept.
230 “Is it my impression, or is it only in Brazil, that the press uses an illegal invasion of something private, ignoring judicial invalidity and
illegality, but it does not mind to disclose, with the sole intention of burning the Bolsonaro government and favoring the system? I think I've
seen this before!”. Twitter account of Carlos Bolsonaro @CarlosBolsonaro. June 9, 2019.
231 Glenn Greenwald, former CNN, was Snowden's spokesman to leak everything he knew about sensitive US data in the case known
as Wiki Leaks. In addition, Glenn sold abroad the thesis that Dilma's impeachment was a coup”. Twitter account of Eduardo Bolsonaro
@BolsonaroSP. June 10, 2019.
232 Pragmatismo Político. June 17, 2019. Vice-líder de Bolsonaro pede deportação de Greenwald e fechamento do Intercept; Twitter account of
Carlos Jordy @carlosjordy. June 13, 2019; Brasil 247. June 13, 2019. Deputado do PSL ameaça Glenn Greenwald: não pense que você é imortal.
76
Minister Sergio Moro tried to intimidate and criminally pursue The Intercept Brasil.233 During the hearing,
Congresswoman Katia Sastre said "the one who should be tried, convicted, and imprisoned is the journalist."234
Likewise, on July 11, Greenwald said during a public hearing in the Senate on the reporting on the conversations
between a former judge and Minister Moro that the later creates a climate of fear among the media.235
Additionally, on November 7, Greenwald was physically attacked by an extreme-right critic and sympathizer
with President Jair Bolsonaro in a radio and television studio in São Paulo while on the air, presumably over
personal disagreements.236
199. According to the information provided, on July 19, when questioned by foreign journalists about the
protests against the participation of journalist Miriam Leitão of Globo in a book fair in the south of Brazil,
President Jair Bolsonaro allegedly accused her of wanting to impose a dictatorshipin Brazil through armed fight,
indicating that she had been detained while joining the Araguaia Guerrillas, and that her stories on the abuse
and torture she was subjected to during the military dictatorship were “lying drama.” In a note, TV Globo
expressed its support for the journalist and condemned the attacks on her. According to the information
provided, the participation of Miriam and her husband, sociologist Sergio Abranches, in the fair was cancelled
due to—among other things—a lack of security guarantees following the mobilization of protests against their
participation by supporters of the president.237 Additionally, according to the information provided, on July 20,
when journalist Isadora Peron asked President Bolsonaro “[i]f the conflict with the northeast could stop the
Social Security vote,” he answered “For the love of God. If I called you ugly now, the world would come to an end.
All the women would turn against me.”238
200. Additionally, the Office of the Rapporteur was informed of an attack against communicator Elvis Xavier,
who was tortured and shot three times in the city of Guarujá, São Paulo. According to the information, on
September 16, the communicator had gone to the town of Vila Baiana,where he was beaten and shotthree times.
His father found him in agony after receiving a phone call telling him that Xavier had been murdered
there.According to the information available, the communicator ran social media accounts through which he
reported on irregularities in the municipality, and the attack could be related with the reports he was issuing.239
201. According to the information, on October 29, President Jair Bolsonaro threatened not to renew TV
Globo’s public concession, which expires in 2022. He did this after the station broadcast a report linking the
president to the investigation of the murder of Marielle Franco, a councilmember assassinated in Rio de Janeiro
in 2018. The president later said he had made no threats.240 According to the information available, President
Bolsonaro also threatened the advertisers of newspaper Folha de São Paulo and announced the federal
government would cancelits subscriptions to that newspaper, saying it was “poisoning his government.”241 Also
in October, Federal Deputy Daniel Silveira attacked journalist Guga Noblat in the Chamber of Deputies.
According to the information provided, Silveira had thrown the journalist’s cell phone to the ground, breaking
it, and also threatened him after being asked by the journalist about certain of his actions242.
202. This Office recalls that, according to principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression of the IACHR, “[t]he murder, kidnapping,intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators, as
233 Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. June 26, 2019. Journalist Glenn Greenwald tells congress that Minister Sergio Moro tries to
intimidate and criminalize The Intercept Brasil; Câmara dos Deputados/YouTube.June 25, 2019. Comissão de Direitos Humanos e Minorias -
Audiência Pública - Convidado: - Sr. GLENN GREENWALD, jornalista fundador do jornal The Intercept. Requerimento nº 81/2019, de iniciativa
dos Deputados Camilo Capiberibe, Carlos Veras, Márcio Jerry e Túlio Gadelha
234234The Washington Post. July 12, 2019. Glenn Greenwald becomes focus of Brazil fress freedom debate; Diario de Goias. June 25, 2019.
Deputada pede prisão de Glenn Greenwald que rebate: "Falta evidências no seu discurso"; Telemundo Delmarva. July 12, 2019. Libertad de
prensa bajo la lupa en Brasil.
235Folha de São Paulo. July 11, 2019. Glenn Greenwalddiz no Senado que Moro cria clima de ameaça a imprensa; La Red 21. July 12, 2019.
Periodista de TheIntercept reafirma su acusación a Sergio Moro en el Senado brasileño; Senado Noticias. July 11, 2019.Moro está criando um
clima de ameaça à imprensa, diz Glenn Greenwald.
236 New York Times. November 25, 2019. Glenn Greenwald: I Was Assaulted Live On Air. This Is Bolsonaro’s Brazil; TheGuardian. November
7, 2019. Rightwing columnist smacks journalist Glenn Greenwald on Brazil radio show.
237New York Times. November 25, 2019. Glenn Greenwald: I Was Assaulted Live On Air. This Is Bolsonaro’s Brazil; Associação Brasileira de
Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). July 19, 2019. Presidente usa desinformação para atacar jornalista; Folha de São Paulo. July 16, 2019. Após
protestos, feira do livro em SC cancela presença de Miriam Leitão; Artigo 19. July 23, 2019. ARTIGO 19 repudia ataques às jornalistas Miriam
Leitão e Isadora Peron; O Globo. July 19, 2019. Bolsonaro usa informações falsas para atacar a jornalista Míriam Leitão.
238 “I asked President Jair Bolsonaro if the controversy with the Northeast could not hinder the Social Security vote, since the Northeast caucus
is strong. I heard this: “For God's sake, sure. If I call you ugly now, the world is over. All women will be against me”. Twitter account of Isadora
Peron @Isaperon. July 20, 2019.
239 G1. September 18, 2019. Comunicador famoso por denúncias na web é torturado e baleado em SP; estado é gravíssimo; A Tribuna.
September 17, 2019. Pai socorre filho baleado após ligação anônima em morro de Guarujá; Metrópoles. September 18, 2019. Comunicador
famoso por denúncias na internet é torturado e baleado.
240 BCC News. November 1, 2019. 4 ataques (e recuos) da família Bolsonaro a instituições democráticas; UOL. October 31, 2019. Bolsonaro diz
que pode não renovar concessão da Globo, mas não é bem assim.
241O Globo. October 31, 2019. Bolsonaro manda governo cancelar assinaturas do jornal ‘Folha de S. Paulo’; BBC Brasil. November 1, 2019. 4
ataques (e recuos) da família Bolsonaro a instituições democráticas; Folha de São Paulo. October 31, 2019. Leia a nota da Folha sobre o
cancelamento de assinaturas anunciado por Bolsonaro.
242 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). October 17, 2019. Deputado federal ataca jornalista na Câmara dos Deputados;
Portal dos Jornalistas. No date. Deputado Daniel Silveira (PSL-RJ) quebra celular de Guga Noblat.
77
well as the material destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and
strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the state to prevent and investigate such occurrences,
to punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
203. The IACHR recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that their decisions are not damaging the
rights of those who contribute topublic deliberation through the expression and dissemination of their thoughts,
such as journalists, the media, and organizations that defend human rights, and should address the context in
which they are expressed to ensure that their expressions do not constitute, in the words of the Court, "forms of
direct or indirect interference or injurious pressure on the rights of those who intend to contribute to public
deliberation through the expression and dissemination of their thoughts243.
D. Social protest
204. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observed that there continued to be alleged cases of the use of force
by police during social protests in the country. The following are some of the cases reported to this Office of the
Special Rapporteur during this year.
205. According to reports, on January 10, 16, and 22, protests organized by the Movimento Passe Livre where
held against the increase in transportation fares in the state of São Paulo. In the protest on January 11, the use
of surveillance tools by the Military Police—such as drones—was documented. Likewise, the Military Police who
accompanied the demonstrators during the march launch teargas canisters at them.244 Also, the organizations
indicated that during the January 16protest,in addition to the surveillance, the use of rubber bullets and teargas
canisters to disperse the demonstrators was documented.245 At least 14 people were detained, and the
photojournalist Daniel Arroyo of Ponte Jornalismo was injured by a rubber bullet.246 According to the
information provided, the authorities did not provide medical assistance.247 With regard to the protest held on
January 22, at least two people were detained, one of them for using a mask during theprotest.248
206. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was also informed that on January 19, the government of the state
of São Paulopublished Decree 64,074/2019249 regulating Law 15,556, adopted in 2014, which, according to civil
society organizations, included a series of unconstitutional provisions that were not compatible with the
democratic process. These provisions include a requirement to give five days prior notice and the
criminalization of the use of masks.250 On the requirement to give five days prior notice, civil society
organizations indicated that the Brazilian Constitution establishes that the right of assembly does not require
authorization, requiring only that a competent authority be notified. In addition, regarding the criminalization
of the use of masks, they argued that "using a mask is constitutional, as prohibiting anonymity should not be
applied to the use of masks and protests, as doing so does not prevent identification of someone who has
engaged in an illegal act. According to the decree, even individuals using gas masks and scarves to protect
themselves from teargas could be arrested for the crime of disorderly conduct."251 Civil society organizations
also noted that “[t]he decree also equates legal objects with arms, banning the possession of objects such as
sharp objects, sticks, and stones, equating them with firearms and bladed weapons." On March 25, this Office
joined the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on the rights to freedom ofpeaceful assembly and of association;
243 I/A Court H. R. Case of Perozo et al Vs. Venezuela. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie
C No. 195. Para. 151. See I/A CourtH. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections,Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January
28, 2009. Serie C No.194. Para. 139.
244 Communication on alleged acts of violence stemming from social protests held in January 2019 in São Paulo. Document dated on January
23, 2019, sent byArtigo 19 Brasil, Núcleo Especializado de Situação Carcerária da Defensoria Pública do Estado de São Paulo, Instituto Terra,
Trabalho e Cidadania, Conectas Direitos Humanos, Instituto Brasileiro de Ciências Criminais, Conselho Estadual de Direitos da Pessoa
Humana, Movimento Passe Livre. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion; Ponte Jornalismo.
January 20, 2019. Contra os 30 centavos de aumento da tarifa do transporte de SP, milhares vão as ruas; G1. January 10, 2018. Grupo protesta
contra aumento da tarifa dos transportes em SP.
245Ibid. Footnote 19.
246G1. January 16, 2019. Protesto contra aumento da tarifa dos transportes em SP tem violência e detidos; Porte Jornalismo. January 17, 2019.
Após PM balear repórter da Ponte, Doria diz que apoia liberdade de imprensa.
247 Porte Jornalismo. January 17, 2019. Após PM balear repórter da Ponte, Doria diz que apoia liberdade de imprensa. .
248Ponte Jornalismo. January 23, 2019. Em protesto contra aumento da tarifa em SP, PM segue à risca o que chefe decretou.
249 Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo. Decreto No. 64.074. January 18, 2019. Published in the Official Gazette of the State of São
Paulo on January 19, 2019.
250“ Article 2 and 5: Assembléia Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo. Decreto No. 64.074. January 18, 2019. Published in the Official Gazette
of the State of São Paulo on January 19, 2019.Artigo 19. January 24, 2018. Organizaçõesdenunciam decreto de São Paulo sobre protestos e
atuação violenta das forças de segurançaem organismos internacionais Artigo 19 y otras organizaciones. Carta dirigida a Mr. Clement Voule,
UM Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association. 23 de enero de 2019.
251 Comunicación sobre presuntos hechos de violencia en el marco de las protestas sociales realizadas en enero de 2019 en São Paulo.
Documento de fecha 23 de enero de 2019, enviado por Artigo 19 Brasil, Núcleo Especializado de Situação Carcerária da Defensoria Pública
do Estado de São Paulo, Instituto Terra, Trabalho e Cidadania, Conectas Direitos Humanos, Instituto Brasileiro de Ciências Cr iminais,
Conselho Estadual de Direitos da Pessoa Humana, Movimento Passe Livre. Disponible para consulta en: Archivos de la Relatoría Especial
para la Libertad de Expresión.
78
and the situation of human rights defenders in sending a communication to the Brazilian State expressing his
concerns over this decree.252
207. Additionally, in February, Congressman Célio Studart submitted a bill seeking to expand the concept of
terrorist acts and amend the 2016 Antiterrorist Act. According to the information available, the proposed text
would define the following as an act of terrorism: “orchestrating or organizing, from within the penitentiary
system, or participating in, an attack, sabotage, attack on physical infrastructure and the functioning of means
of communication or transportation, ports, airports, bus stations, hospitals, schools, etc.” According to the
information available, the proposal was in response to the attacks on the state of Ceará toward the beginning of
this year, organized by members of criminal gangs.253
208. Also, in May, in the framework of pro-government demonstrations, at least 12 press workers were
attacked and harassed, according to information from the ABRAJI. The incidents took place in the cities of
Curitiba, BeloHorizonte, Porto Alegre, Fortaleza, and São Paulo.254 Meanwhile, during the demonstrations called
for the general strike held on June 14 in São Paulo, indiscriminate use of less-lethal weapons was documented,
along with the detention of at least 14 individuals.255 More recently, on December 1, photographer Daniel
Arroyo, of Ponte, was intimidated by military police officers, who tried to seize the photographs he had taken of
a demonstration in São Paulo.256
209. Additionally, on June 12, the Supreme Court of Justice [Superior Tribunal de Justiça] (STJ) denied a
motion filed by the defense of Sérgio Silva, finding that the basic requirements for the Court to consider the case
were not met. Silva is a photographer and was shot in the left eye with a rubber bullet, causing him to lose his
eye. According to available information, the rubber bullet was fired by the São Paulo Military Police during a
demonstration held in June 2013. In response to this decision, in November, his defense filed for remedy before
the Supreme Federal Court (STF).257
210. On July 18, during a demonstration of the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) in the city of
Valinhos, São Paulo, several demonstrators were hit by a car traveling at high speed. One of those injured, an
older adult named Luiz Ferreira da Costa, died of his injuries. Journalist Carlos Filipe, of Radio Noroeste and the
Coletivo Socializando Saberes, was among the injured.258
211. According to publicly available information, in October, in response to the protests in Chile, President
Jair Bolsonaro activated the Ministry of Defense to monitor for possible protests in Brazil similar to the ones
happening in Chile. According to the information provided, he stated that should it be necessary, the Brazilian
government would call on the country’s Armed Forces. In response, 30 civil society organizations asked for an
explanation from President Bolsonaro through a letter sent to the Office of the Citizens Rights Ombudsperson
[“Procuradoria dos Direitos do Cidadão”].259 Elsewhere, his son, Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, answered a question
related to the protests taking place in Chile during interview by saying that a “new AI-5” could be a possibility
in the event of the "radicalization of the left" in Brazil. According to the information provided, President Jair
Bolsonaro and a series of civil society organizations rejected that statement. Eduardo Bolsonaro then allegedly
apologized for his statement and said there would not be a return of the AI-5.260 In 1968, the AI-5 was used by
the military dictatorship in Brazil to suspend constitutional guarantees, expand censorship of the arts and
journalism, discredit the dictatorship’s opposition, and oppress society.261
212. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for the work of defending human
rights and is essential for critical political and social expression regarding the activities of the authorities. The
252 United Nations.Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of Association; the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; and the Special Rapporteur for freedom of expression of the Inter -American
Commission on Human Rights. March 25, 2019.
253 Câmara dos Deputados. February 15, 2019.Deputado propõe mudança na atual Lei Antiterrorismo para ampliar conceito de atos
terroristas.
254Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). May 27, 2019. Jornalistas são hostilizados e agredidos em manifestações prógoverno.
255 Artigo 19. June 19, 2019. ARTIGO 19 repudia violações ao direito de protesto e criminalização de manifestantes em greve geral; Brasil de
Fato. June 14, 2019. Greve Geral termina com mobilizações em 380 cidades contra a reforma da Previdência; Brasil de Fato. June 14, 2019. Em
São Paulo, 15 manifestantes são presos em ato pró-Greve Geral; El País. June 15, 2019. Greve geral: acompanhe ao vivo as paralisações; UOL.
June 15, 2019. Polícia detém defensor público e mais 19 em ato contra a reforma em SP.
256Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). December 2, 2019. PM paulista intimida fotógrafo e tenta apreender imagens;
Ponte Jornalismo. December 2, 2019. Policiais tentam apreender imagens de fotógrafo da Ponte.
257 Artigo 19. July 11, 2019. Comunicadores feridos em manifestações: direitos e violações em jogo nas decisões dos casos de Sérgio Silva e Alex
Silveira; Jota. December 10, 2019. STF possui a ultima chance de reparação a Sergio Silva, fotografo atingido pela PM em 2013.
258Artigo 19. July 18, 2019. #ALERTA: Atropelamento e morte de integrantes do MST em Valinhos é grave e demanda resposta urgente;
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST). July 18, 2019. Homem atropela e mata Sem Terra em Valinhos (SP).
259 Estadão. October 23, 2019. Bolsonaro pede monitoramente para evitar protestos semelhantes aos do Chile; BCC News. October 28, 2019.
'Devemos sempre nos preparar para o pior', diz Bolsonaro sobre reflexos dos protestos do Chile no Brasil; Intervozes. October 29, 2019.
Organizações solicitam explicações de Bolsonaro sobre monitoramento de protestos.
260 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). October 31, 2019. Abraji repudia defesa de "novo AI-5" por Eduardo Bolsonaro;
BBC Brasil. October 31, 2019. Eduardo Bolsonaro pode ser cassado por fala sobre AI-5? Entenda o que acontece agora; Veja. October 31, 2019.
Eduardo Bolsonaro pede desculpas por declaração sobre volta do AI-5.
261 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). October 31, 2019. Abraji repudia defesa de "novo AI-5" por Eduardo Bolsonaro.
79
Commission has stated that “in principle, criminalization per se of demonstrations in public thoroughfares is
inadmissible when they are carried out in exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of
assembly”262 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly through social protest must not be subject to
authorization on the part of the authorities or to excessive requirements that make such protests difficult to
carry out.”263Likewise, the Joint Declaration on Violence against Journalists and Media Workers in the Context
of Protests, adopted in 2013, states that the rights of freedom of assembly and expression “are fundamental, and
guaranteeing them is a vital condition to the existence and proper functioning of a democratic society. A State
may impose reasonable limitations on demonstrations for purposes of ensuring that they are conducted
peacefully, or to disperse those that turn violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of
legality, necessity, and proportionality. In addition, the breaking-up of a demonstration must be warranted by
the duty to protect individuals, and authorities must use the measures that are safest and least harmful to the
demonstrators. The use of force at public demonstrations must be an exception, used under strictly necessary
circumstances consistent with internationally recognizedprinciples.”264
E. Direct and indirect censorship
213. This year, the Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed of alleged measures of censorship carried
out in Brazil, especially with regard to diversity. Reports indicate that measures were taken with regard topublic
information, teaching materials in schools, books, and cultural activities like those carried out by the Agência
Nacional do Cinema (ANCINE), whichwas established in 2001 and is responsible for supervising, promoting, and
regulating the audiovisual and cinematographic market in Brazil. The following are some of the cases reported
to this Office.
214. According to publicly available information, on January 29, 2019, journalist Ancelmo Gois, with the
newspaper O Globo, published a column on the alleged censorship of a series of videos posted in the online
channel of the National Institute of Education for the Deaf (INES). The complaint was filed by a student
representative on the INES Board of Directors265. According to the information provided, the episodes do with
issues considered "left-wing" or "progressive."266 In response, on January 30, Brazil's Ministry of Education
published a communiqué informing that the INES “[o]pened an investigation to collect all information on the
unauthorized removal of some videos from its webpage and identify those responsible”. The INES director also
made the decision to repost the videos that had been taken down on thewebsite.267
215. It likewise stated that a preliminary investigation had found that the videos were removed from the
website in April and November 2018, "Demonstrating that the column published by Anselmo Gois in the
newspaper O Globo on January 29, 2019, is both false and malicious in attributing responsibility to Minister of
Education Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, who became the minister in January of this year.”268 The communiqué also
suggested that the journalist had been a KGB agent.269 In response to the MEC communiqué, on January 30, the
journalist published data demonstrating that the videos remained up until at least January 2, 2019. To prove it,
he check the Google cache, which shows previous versions of a page. It showed that, for example, as of January
2, the video on Marx was still up, and as of January 1, the video on Nietzsche was stillup.270
216. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed that journalists and radio hosts with the Empresa
Brasileira de Comunicação (EBC), a public federal entity, had protested on March 20, 2019, against the stance of
Agência Brasil managers seeking to reduce coverage of the murder of Marielle Franco, a Rio de Janeiro Council
262 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
263IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
264United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
265O Globo. January 29, 2019. Sob a aba de Vélez Rodríguez, Ines tira do ar vídeos sobre Marx, Engels e Nietzche; Brasil 247. January 29, 2019.
Instituto para surdos vinculado ao MEC 'some' com vídeos ligados a esquerda.
266 Ponte Jornalismo. 30 de enero de 2019. Alunos denunciam censura no Instituto Nacional de Educação de Surdos
267“ The Instituto Nacional de Educação de Surdos (INES) has launched an investigation to obtain all information related to the unauthorized
removal of some videos from its website and to assign the necessary responsibilities. The INES board also made the decision to re-insert the
videos that were deleted on the website”. Twitter account of Ministry of Education @MEC_Comunicacao. January 30, 2019; Agencia Brasil.
January 31, 2019. Instituto de Educação de Surdos apura retirada de vídeos de site; Folha de S. Paulo. January 30, 2019. TV pública para surdos
exclui vídeos sobre esquerda e filósofos.
268 “[w] hich shows that the note published in the column by Ancelmo Gois, in the newspaper O Globo on January 29, 2019, is both false and
malicious, when it attributes responsibility to the Minister of Education, professor Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, who only took over the Ministry.
in January of this year”. Twitter account of Ministry of Education @MEC_Comunicacao. January 30,2019;
269 Twitter account of Ministry of Education @MEC_Comunicacao. January 30, 2019; Revista Forum. January 30, 2018. Em nota oficial,
Ministério da Educação chama jornalista d’O Globo de agente da KGB
270 O Globo. January 30, 2019. MEC confirma censura e erra ao dizer que vídeos saíram do ar na gestão passada; Revista Forum. January 31,
2019. Classificado como agente da KGB, Ancelmo Gois mostra dados que confirmam censura no MEC de Bolsonaro.
80
member assassinated in March 2018.271 According to the information provided, the EBC said this stance “runs
contrary to the editorial command of the enterprise to always take the path of journalistic best practices. Its
professionals must cover all issues on the national agenda, including the Marielle case, reporting the facts of the
news day by day.”272 Likewise, in March, in an open letter, the entities comprising the National Human Rights
Council rejected the alleged decision by EBC leadership to prohibit the use of the words "dictatorship" and
"coup" to describe the military coup of 1964 and the civilian-military dictatorship that followed. According to
the letter, it was affecting the news items written by the media outlet’s journalists, whose writing was being
censored by their bosses.273
217. This Office was also informed that on April 25, the president of financial institution Banco do Brasil(BB)
fired its marketing director andpulled an advertisement that showed racial and sexual diversity, allegedly at the
request of President Jair Bolsonaro.274 According to the information available, the bank’s media advisor said that
"after evaluating the video, thepresident of Banco do Brasil concluded that it was missing otherprofiles of young
people that the Bank seeks to reach with its advertisements.”275 Regarding this, President Bolsonaro said “Who
selects and appoints the president of the BB,isn’t it me? I don't need to say anything else then. The approach has
changed, the masseswant respect for family, nobody's going after any minority. And we don't wantpublic money
to be used this way. It isn't my approach. You all know it isn't my approach.”276 In response, on May 9, the Federal
Public Prosecutor of Rio Grande do Sul brought a civil action seeking for the advertisement to be put back on the
air.277
218. In addition, according to publicly available information, in June, the anthropologist, teacher, and
university researcher Debora Diniz was blocked on Twitter by Education Minister Abraham Weintraub
following three tweets she issued about the minister. According to the information provided, as a result, Diniz
filed suit in July before the Superior Court of Justice [Superior Tribunal de Justiça], asking to be unblocked. The
request was dismissed on September 18 by the presiding magistrate, who found that a public authority blocking
someone on Twitter is not an “act of authority." According to the available information, she appealed this
ruling.278 Previously, in February, it was reported that a number of environmentalist NGOs—including the
profile of the head of Greenpeace and the profile of the NGO Observatório do Clima—had been blocked on
Twitter by the Minister of the Environment, Ricardo Salles.279
219. Also, regarding ANCINE, on July 19, President Bolsonaro declared that ANCINE “will have a filter.
Because it is a federal agency, if it cannot have a filter, we will shut it down. We will privatize it, transfer it, or
shut it down.” According to the report, when asked what “filter” he wanted to put in place, he answered
“cultural.”280 This was criticized by professionals in this area, who said such a “filter” could amount to
censorship.281 Additionally, on August 20, the program for providing public financing for series addressing
gender and sexual diversity on public television channels was suspended with Decree 1,576282. According to the
order, the measure was the result of a need to change the members of the Sectoral Fund Management Committee
271Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. March 21, 2018. Journalists from Brazilian public media protest against restriction of
coverage of Marielle Franco’s murder; O Globo. March 20, 2019. Jornalistas da EBC são orientados para reduzir cobertura da morte de
Marielle; Sindicato dos Jornalistas do Distrito Federal. March 20, 2019. Nota: o jornalismo sequestrado na EBC.
272Portal Comunique-se. March 20, 2019. Censura? Sindicato denuncia veto da EBC na cobertura do caso Marielle Franco; O Globo. March 20,
2019. Jornalistas da EBC são orientados para reduzir cobertura da morte de Marielle.
273Instituto Vladimir Herzog. March 29, 2019. Nota pública: Contra a censura na EBC: por memória, verdade e justiça; Intervozes. March 29,
2019. Na tentativa de reescrever a história, EBC censura “ditadura” e “golpe” em reportagens; Sindicato dos Jornalistas do DF. September 26,
2019. Sindicato divulga minimanual para combater a censura na EBC; Actualidad. October 7, 2019. Así operan la censura y los recortes de
Bolsonaro contra la producción audiovisual en Brasil.
274El Espectador. April 26, 2019. Discriminación: retiran anuncio que mostraba diversidad racial y sexual por orden de Jair Bolsonaro; Folha
de São Paulo. April 25, 2019. Presidente do BB atende Bolsonaro, demite diretor e tira do ar comercial com jovens ‘descolados’; G1. April 25,
2019. BB tira do ar propaganda com jovem negra careca, homens de cabelo rosa e no salão de beleza; El Observador. May 6, 2019. Bolsonaro
censuró comercial que mostraba diversidad racial y sexual.
275G1. April 25, 2019. BB tira do ar propaganda com jovem negra careca, homens de cabelo rosa e no salão de beleza; BBC News. April 27,
2019. Esquerda tentou empoderar minorias e caracterizar cidadão ‘normal’ como exceção, diz presidente do BB.
276BBC News. April 27, 2019. Esquerda tentou empoderar minorias e caracterizar cidadão ‘normal’ como exceção, diz presidente do BB; Folha
de São Paulo. April 27, 2019. Bolsonaro diz que não permitirá propaganda de estatal que não siga sua linha.
277 G1. May 9, 2019. MPF do RS ajuíza ação para que comercial do BB seja novamente veiculado; Consultor Jurídico (Conjur). May 9, 2019. MPF
ajuíza ação para que comercial censurado do BB seja novamente veiculado.
278 “Education Minister Abraham Weint censored my voice. Censorship does not go well with education: either he would report me to Twitter for
bad manners (not the case), or he would face a debate. His chickening out is proof of his discomfort. I promise that as of today I will comment
on each of the minister's ridiculous posts”. Twitter account of Debora Diniz @Debora_D_Diniz. June 28, 2019; Época. June 28, 2019. Opinião |
Weintraub mostra em Twitter que desconhece liturgia do cargo; El País. July 6, 2019. Coluna - Por que contestar um bloqueio de Twitter na
Justiça?; Artigo 19. October 18,2019. Debora Diniz recorre na justiça contra Weintraub para suspender bloqueio no Twitter; Época. July 4,
2019. Advogadas vão à Justiça para que Weintraub desbloqueie professora no Twitter.
279O Sul. February 4, 2019. O ministro do Meio Ambiente bloqueou ONGs do setor em sua conta oficial no Twitter; Terra. February 4, 2019.
Ministro do Meio Ambiente bloqueia ONGs ambientais nas redes.
280El País. July 25, 2019. Bolsonaro propone un filtro moral para el cine brasileño; G1. July 19, 2019. 'Se não puder ter filtro, nós extinguiremos
a Ancine', diz Bolsonaro.
281 G1. July 19, 2019. 'Se não puder ter filtro, nós extinguiremos a Ancine', diz Bolsonaro; Folha de São Paulo. August 29, 2019. Existe censura
as producoes culturais no Brasil?; O Povo online. July 21, 2019. Cinema brasileiro em risco?.
282 Diario Oficial Da União. Portaria n° 1.576. August 20, 2019.
81
(CGFSA). It also indicated that after doing so, the criteria and guidelines for application of these resources would
be revised.283 The works affected included “Afronte”, “Transversais,” “Religare queer,” and “Reverse Sex,” which
are on the preliminary list of public beneficiaries published on March 19 and were criticized by President
Bolsonaro on August 15.284. At that time, President Bolsonaro said “Look at the names of some of these, there
are dozens of them. A movie called Trasverse. Look what it’s about: dreams and realizations of five transgender
persons living in (the state of) Ceará. We were able to abort this mission.” He likewise stated that this was not
censorship, and "if anyone else wants to pay for it, if the private sector would like to make the movie Bruna
Surfistinha [2011 movie telling the real story of a middle-class teen girl who decided to become a prostitute],
feel free. We will not interfere.”
285
220. According to the information available, Culture Secretary José Henrique Pires quit after the call for
submissions was suspended and said “[i]t was clear that I part ways with the administration on freedom of
expression. I don’t agree that culture can be filtered. Therefore, because of this clash, I prefer to step
down.”286The measure was also rejected by the directors of audiovisual works who saw the suspension as an act
of censorship by the government.287Also, the Ministry of the Citizenry—which the Secretary of Culture was
under after the administration's decision to eliminate the Ministry of Culture—issued a communiqué stating
that Pires had never held opinions conflicting with the administration’s directives.288 This Office takes note that
inOctober,in response to a civilpublic action filed by the Federal Public Prosecutor in Rio de Janeiro, the Federal
System of Justice granted an injunction [liminar] ordering the ANCINE to relaunch the call for submissions
[edital] of the financing program. This decision was later upheld by the Regional Federal Tribunal of the Second
Region.289
221. In September, during the Bienal do Livro held in Rio de Janeiro, its mayor tried to remove the comic
“Vengadores: La cruzada de los niños,” in which two male superheroes are lovers and kiss. According to the
information provided, the mayor concluded that the content was "inappropriate," and therefore, ordered it
removed, and also ordered a groupof municipalinspectors to seek out and report back on other titles addressing
LGBTI and sexual issues. According to the information provided, as of September 6, the book had sold out. That
same day, municipalinspectors went to the Bienal, but said they could not find any book that was inappropriate
or violated the law. According to the information provided, following the filing of judicial remedies by both
sides—the Bienal and the Office of the Mayor—the Supreme Federal Tribunal (SFT) put an end to the dispute
with a decision on September 8 in which its president, José Dias Toffoli, granted the request of the
Ombudsperson General of the Republic and struck down the injunction of the President of the Court of Justice
of Rio de Janeiro allowing the measures carried out by the Office of the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro.290
222. Also during September, in Porto Alegre, an exhibit with 36 cartoons critical of President Jair Bolsonaro
and Justice Minister Sérgio Moro was removed from the Municipal Chamber. The removal took place the day
after the exhibit was installed and was justified on the grounds that it was “offensive.” According to the
information provided, the council memberwho hadproposed the exhibit viewed this as a measure of censorship.
On September 16, the exhibit was reopened following an injunction [liminar] granted by courts on September
12 ordering the comics be replaced at the same location for the 12 days the exhibit was to have lasted. In his
283 El Diario. October 10, 2019. Los Tribunales bloquean el intento de censura de Bolsonaro a la cultura LGTBI; CNN Chile. August 21, 2019.
Gobierno de Bolsonaro suspendió apoyo financiero estatal a contenidos LGTBIQ+ en la TV pública; Twitter account of Jair M. Bolsonaro
@jairbolsonaro. August 21, 2019.
284 Actualidad. October 7, 2019. Así operan la censura y los recortes de Bolsonaro contra la producción audiovisual en Brasil; Infobae. August
21, 2019. Jair Bolsonaro suspendió el financiamiento público para series de TV con temática LGBT; El Confidencial. August 22, 2019. Bolsonaro
suspende los fondos públicos estatales destinados a películas LGTBI; Correio Braziliense. August 21, 2019. Diretores criticam a suspensão de
edital da Ancine: ''Censura''; G1. August 21, 2019. Governo Bolsonaro suspende edital com séries de temas LGBT, após críticas do presidente; El
Diario. October 10, 2019. Los Tribunales bloquean el intento de censura de Bolsonaro a la cultura LGTBI; Empresa Brasil de Comunicação
(EBC). Resultado Preliminar da Fase dos classificados para fase de decisão de investimento. March 19, 2019. Available at:
http://www.brde.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Resultado-Preliminar-dos-Classificados-para-Decis%C3%A3o-deInvestimento_versao-atual-EBC.pdf
285Folha de São Paulo. August 16, 2019. Bolsonaro diz que 'garimpou' e vetou filmes com temática LGBT; Huffpost Brasil. August 20, 2019
(updated on September 4, 2019). Estas são as séries com temática LGBT que Bolsonaro 'garimpou' de edital da Ancine.
286 Infobae. August 21, 2019. Jair Bolsonaro suspendió el financiamiento público para series de TV con temática LGBT; Folha de São Paulo.
August 21, 2019. Secretário especial da Cultura deixa cargo e diz que governo tenta impor censura; Clarín. August 21, 2019. Brasil: renunció
el Secretario de Cultura y criticó duramente las “políticas de censura” de Jair Bolsonaro.
287Huffpost Brasil. August 20, 2019. Estas são as séries com temática LGBT que Bolsonaro 'garimpou' de edital da Ancine; Actualidad. October
7, 2019. Así operan la censura y los recortes de Bolsonaro contra la producción audiovisual enBrasil.
288 Fórum Permanente. No date. Nota à Imprensa do Ministério da Cidadania sobre a demissão de Henrique Pires, ex-Secretário de Cultura; G1.
August 21, 2019. Secretário de Cultura deixa cargo após governo suspender edital com séries sobre temas LGBT.
289 BBC. November 2, 2019. Como o cancelamento de peças, filmes e mostras deve opor artistas e governo na Justiça; G1. October 7, 2019.
Justiça Federal no RJ suspende portaria do governo Bolsonaro que impedia conclusão de edital da Ancine para produções LGBT; Consultor
Jurídico (Conjur) October 11, 2019. TRF-2 nega recurso da União e mantém edital da Ancine com projetos LGBT; Tribunal Regional Federal
da 2ª Região. Agravo de Instrumento No. 5009199-02.2019.4.02.0000/RJ. October 11, 2019. Available at:
https://www.conjur.com.br/dl/trf-nega-recurso-uniao-mantem-edital.pdf
290France 24. October 7, 2019. La cultura en Brasil resiste a la censura de la era Bolsonaro; G1. September 5, 2019. Crivella pede para recolher
livro dos Vingadores vendido na Bienal; El País. September 9, 2019. STF proíbe censura de livros no Rio e dá recado contra discriminação; BBC
News. September 10, 2019. 'Deveria contratar prefeito do Rio para promover meu próximo livro', diz ilustrador de HQ censurada por Crivella.
82
decision, the judge stated that"in the specific case of the comics, although theyare of course humorous in nature,
their political and ideological subject matters are essential and can never be regulated by a legal or ethical
provision, as interpretation thereof will always be biased, political, or ideological, and thereforesubjective."291
223. Additionally, on October 5, President Jair Bolsonaro rejected the idea that he was promoting a type of
cultural“censorship.” According to the information provided, he stated that"we won't go after anyone, but Brazil
has changed. We will no longer see public money supporting certain types of works. This is not censorship. It is
the preservation of Christian values, treating our youth with respect, recognizing the family as a unit that must
be healthy for the good of all. This is our stance.”292 On October 4, newspaper Folha de São Paulo published that
financial institution Caixa Econômica Federal, which includes the Caixa Cultural, had established a system of
"prior restraint" of cultural projects. Regarding this, it was reported that internal reports were required to
describe the conduct of the producer and the artist on social media, possible points of conflict with the Caixa’s
image, etc. These reports were to be analyzed by the Secretary of Communication and the Bank Superintendency
in Brasília. The newspaper indicated that it was in this context that at least three stage plays, a lecture series,
and a movie screening had been suspended. Regarding these allegations, Folha de São Paulo reported that the
financialinstitution said, among other things, thatthe system for selecting projects "considered technical aspects
such as the quality of the project and the counterparty funding offered in sponsorship, without restrictions as to
subject.”293
224. Through its Proyecto Ctrl+X, which monitors legal attempts to remove online content, ABRAJI
documented in November three attempts at prior restraint through judicial decisions. For example, it reported
that a judge of the Second Criminal Court of Varginha (MG) ordered communicator Juliano Rodriguez to remove
videos from his social media accounts mentioning a judge from that city. Accord to the information received, in
his decision granting the injunction [liminar], dated November 5, the judge prohibited the communicator from
"committing new crimes hidden (...) from public authorities and individuals through any medium, either written
or on video.”294 Previously, in July, civil society organizations reported that journalist Ricardo Antunes, who was
writing about a family conflict involving Restaurante Leite, known as the oldest in Brazil, was prohibited in May
by the Court of Justice of Pernambuco [Tribunal de Justiça] (TJPE) from mentioning the future of the case on the
grounds that the publications would affect "the honor, good name, and reputation [of the family members
involved in the conflict] before society and would offend the right topreservation of family image." The decision
also awarded the journalist to take down the posts on the case he hadpublished on social media and on his blog.
The injunction [liminar] was granted in the framework of a lawsuit brought against the journalist by the family
members who currently own a restaurant and are involved in the conflict that was the subject of the posts.295
225. Principle 5 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression indicates that, “Prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic communication must be prohibited
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
F. Subsequent liability
226. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed that Brazilian comedian Danilo Gentili was convicted
of the crime of defamation against federal deputy Maria do Rosarío for having offended her and sentenced to six
months and 28 days in a minimum security prison. Appeal of this decision is pending.296 Regarding this case,
President Jair Bolsonaro stated on his Twitter account: “I stand in solidarity with host and comedian
@DaniloGentilial and his exercise of his right to freedom of expression and his profession of which I myself am
sometimes the target, but I understand that he tells jokes and this is part of the game, something that
291 Folha de São Paulo. September 4, 2019. Câmara dos Vereadores censura exposição de charges críticas a Bolsonaro em Porto Alegre; Sul 21.
September 16, 2019. Após sofrer censura, exposição com cartuns sobre Bolsonaro é reinaugurada na Câmara; Jornal do Comércio. September
12, 2019. Justiça determina volta de exposição de charges na Câmara de Vereadores; Tribunal de Justiça do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul. 3ª
Vara da Fazenda Pública – Porto Alegre. Proceso No. 9065657-04.2019.8.21.0001. September 12, 2019. Available at:
https://migalhas.com.br/arquivos/2019/9/art20190913-05.pdf
292Folha de São Paulo. October 5, 2019. Bolsonaro nega praticar censura, mas defende valores cristãos na cultura; France 24. October 7, 2019.
La cultura en Brasil resiste a la censura de la era Bolsonaro.
293Folha de São Paulo. October 4, 2019. Caixa Econômica cria sistema de censura prévia a projetos de seus centros culturales..
294Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). December 2, 2019. Censura prévia aparece em pelo menostrês decisõesjudiciais
só em novembro.
295Artigo 19.July 16, 2019.Organizações repudiam decisão do TJPE que determinou remoção de conteúdo de blog e proibiu publicaçõesfuturas;
Portal de Prefeitura. May 28, 2019. Associação de Imprensa de Pernambuco divulga nota contra censura ao Blog do Ricardo Antunes y nota
oficial.
296 Folha de São Paulo. April 10, 2019. Danilo Gentil é condenado por injúria contra deputada Maria do Rosário; Ponte. April 10, 2019. Danilo
Gentili é condenado por injúria machista à deputada Maria do Rosário; The Guardian. April 11, 2019. Brazilian comedian gets jail sentence for
video attacking leftwing politician;Justiça Federal. 1a Subseção Judiciária de São Paulo. Ação Penal Privada No. 0008725-44.2017.403.6181.
April 10, 2019. Available at: https://www.conjur.com.br/dl/danilo-gentili-condenado-prisao-injuria.pdf
83
unfortunately is true for some but not others.”297 The day after his conviction, the comedian was also ordered to
pay compensation of 20,000 reais (about US$5,000) to federal deputy Marcelo Freixo for offense, defamation,
and nonpecuniary damages.298
G. Access to public information
227. Since Jair Bolsonaro became president of the Republic of Brazil on January 1, 2019, the country’s civil
society has reported setbacks on the right to access to public information. The following are some of the cases
reported to this Office of the Special Rapporteur.
228. According to the information provided, on January 1, President Bolsonaro signed decree 9,663,
approving the Statute of the Council of Financial Activities Oversight (COAF) and replacing the previous
regulation. Subparagraph III of article 7 of the new decree states that the president of the COAF, the
councilmembers, and the official in charge of execution for this body are prohibited from "expressing opinions
on processes being deliberated in the Plenary through any means of communication.” Additionally,
subparagraph IV of the same article establishes that these individuals are also prohibited from "revealing or
leaking information that is confidential or was obtained in the exercise of their duties, including to their original
agencies.” The measure is related to the fact that in December 2018, O Estado de São Paulo publish that a COAF
report found that the former advisor to Flávio Bolsonaro (the son of President Bolsonaro) in the Legislative
Assembly of Río de Janeiro had suspicious banking transactions of R$1.2 million.299 According to the information
received, the report waspart of an investigation that detained 10 councilmembers of Rio de Janeiro inNovember
2018, and also included information on public servants of the Legislative Assembly with suspicious financial
transactions. Also, based on this report, the Public Prosecutor of the state of Rio de Janeiro opened 22 criminal
investigations300.
229. Additionally, on January 24, 2019, Decree 9,690/2019 was published, changing the rules for applying
the Access to Information in the Federal Executive Act, as set forth in Decree 7,724/2012. The decree, signed by
Vice President Hamilton Mourão, added to the group of public agents authorized to classify public information
at the highest level of secrecy. Civil society organizations indicated that these changes put "the spirit of the LAI
by making secrecy exceptional” at grave risk. They also stated that "there was no dialogue with civil society or
even with the other branches of government, including with the legislative houses that passed the LAI.”301 In a
letter published on January 24, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) stated that "the aim of
the proposed changes is to simplify and streamline the actions of the State," and that "the changes are the result
of intense discussion since 2018 between the CGU and different actors, including the Institutional Security
Cabinet, evidence of the integrated action of the federal government in the efforts to perfect the mechanisms of
public transparency." The IACHR was informed that on February 19, the Plenary of the Chamber of Deputies
approved Draft Legislative Decree 3/19, suspending the effects of Decree 9,690/2019, pending a vote by the
Federal Senate.302 According to reports, in response to this move by the Chamber, President Jair Bolsonaro
signed a decree on February 26 revoking the January 2019 decree changing the rules for applying the LAI.303
230. It was also reported that during the first three months of the year, the government allegedly prohibited
access to some journalists and media outlets to press pools, attacked the credibility of the Instituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), and removed information from the Internet, such as the public data from the Mais
Médicosprograms.304
231. Additionally, in April 2019, it was reported that Brazil's Economy Ministry declared the studies and
technical guidelines on which the Proposta de Emenda à Constituição (PEC) for reforming the pension system
was based to be classified. According to the information available, this decision was expressed in the response
297 “I sympathize with host and comedian@DaniloGentili when exercising his right to free expression and his profession, of which, sometimes, I
am the target, but I understand that they are jokes and part of the game, something that unfortunately holds for some and not for others”.
Twitter account of Jair M. Bolsonaro @jairbolsonaro. April 11, 2019.
298 Folha de São Paulo. April 12, 2019. Danilo Gentili é condenado a indenizar Marcelo Freixo em R$ 20 mil; Migalhas. April 12, 2019. Danilo
Gentili indenizará deputado Marcelo Freixo por ofensas no Twitter; Consultor Jurídico (Conjur). April 12, 2019. Danilo Gentili pagará R$ 20
mil a Marcelo Freixo por chamá-lo de "merda"; Poder Judiciário do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. ApelaçãoNo. 0130354-18.2017.8.19.0001. April
11, 2019. Available at: https://www.conjur.com.br/dl/decisao-danilo-gentili.pdf
299 Revista Forum. January 3, 2019. Bolsonaro impõe censura ao Coaf e proíbe servidores e até presidente do órgão de comentar processos;
Presidência da República do Brasil. Decreto No. 9.663. January 1, 2019; Brasil 247. January 3, 2019. Moro e Bolsonaro impõem censura ao
Coaf; Conversa Afiada. January 3, 2019. Censura: Bolsonaro decreta cala-boca no COAF!.
300 Noticias R7. Dicember 18, 2018. Ministério Público abre 22 apurações com base no Coaf; O tempo. Dicember 18, 2018. Ministério Público
abre 22 investigações com base em relatório do Coaf.
301Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). January 24, 2019. Abraji assina nota conjunta contra retrocesso na aplicação da
LAI no governo federal.
302 Carta Capital. February 19, 2019. Câmara barra decreto contra Lei de Acesso à Informação; Gazetaonline. February 19, 2019. Câmara dos
Deputados derruba decreto que altera a Lei de Acesso.
303Consultor Jurídico (Conjur). February 26, 2019. Bolsonaro revoga decreto que alterou Lei de Acesso a Informação; Migalhas. February 27,
2019.Bolsonaro revoga alteração na lei de acesso à informação sobre sigilo de documentos; Veja. February 27, 2019. Após derrota na Câmara,
governo revoga decreto sobre sigilo de documentos.
304 Época. April 8, 2019. Três alertas: Bolsonaro vem dificultando acesso à informação pública;
84
to a request for public information submitted by Folha de São Paulo after the PEC was sent to Congress.
According to this newspaper, the Special Secretariat for Pensions and Labor responded “it had prepared ‘in the
scope of its regulatory competencies’ technical standards for the proposal being processed. However, it states
that all these files are classified restricted because they are preparatory documents." It likewise states that this
measure of restriction follows the understanding of the Procurator General of the National Treasury. The
newspaper underscores that because of this, only authorized authorities andpublic servants have access to this
information.305 On April 22, the Special Secretary for Pensions and Labor denied that the government had
classified this information on which the pension system reform was based. He stated that the database would
be public. He also said the data would be broken down and cleaned upforpresentation to the Special Committee
where the merits of the new pension system or to be discussed.306 According to the information available, on
April 25, the government presented detailed information on the new pension systemproposal.307
232. According to ABRAJI, over the last 10 years, responses to requests for information have increased.
Despite this, the Association says the quality of the responses has not been satisfactory. The study also assessed
the transparency of nine bodies of the judicial branch: the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the High Military Court,
the Superior Labor Court, the Regional Federal Courts, and the Federal and Territorial District Court. According
to ABRAJI, the majority of the responses were considered unsatisfactory.308
233. On July 9, the Projeto de Lei de Conversão 7/2019 was published in the Official Newspaper, creating the
National Data Protection Authority, amending the General Data Protection Act. According to reports, President
Bolsonaro issued nine vetoes. According to civil society, these vetoes ignored the debate between members of
Congress and civil society over the last two years that produced the final text of Provisional Measure 869/2018,
approved in May 2019. The provisions vetoed by the Presidency of the Republic include the prohibition on
sharing with government institutions or private legal entities the personal information of people seeking public
information through the Access to Public Information Act.309
234. Also, on August 5, civil society organizations published a communication indicating that they are
"following with concern the current trend of the government of challenging, without any scientific basis, the data
produced by well-reputed government agencies and research institutions." Among other things, they indicated
that on August 2, it was reported that the director of the National Spatial Research Institute [Instituto Nacional
de Pesquisas Espaciais] (INPE), Ricardo Galvão, was exonerated after he released data on the deforestation of the
Amazon. Regarding this, the organization stated that “[t]he INPE data that has been question was actively made
public on the Terra Brasilis platform that the Institute launched in 2018 to bring together data from two
important systems for monitoring native vegetation: PRODES and DETER. The publication of these data
indicated increasing deforestation in the country, which made government officials uncomfortable.” In this
regard, they stated that "access to public data is fundamental for civil society to observe the reality, conduct
independent analysis of government actions, and exercise social oversight to defend public interests."310
235. The Commission notes that Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the
IACHR establishes that, “Access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States
have the obligation to guarantee the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only exceptional limitations
that must be previously established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security
in democratic societies.” Taking into account the principle of maximum disclosure, the law must guarantee
access to public information that is effective and as broad as possible, and the exceptions must not, in practice,
become the rule. Additionally, the exceptions regime must be interpreted restrictively, and any questions must
be resolved with transparency and access.
H. Disinformation
236. According to publicly available information, on April 12, the Supreme Federal Court (STF) Judge
Alexandre de Moraes concluded that the O Antagonista and Crusoé websites must remove the articles and
305Folha de São Paulo. April 21, 2019. Governo decreta sigilo sobre estudos que embasam reforma da Previdência.
306Poder 360. April 22, 2019. Marinho nega que governo tenha decretado sigilo sobre estudos da Previdência; Seu dinheiro. April 22, 2019.
Secretário da Previdência diz a Radio que “não há decretação de sigilo, dados são públicos”.
307 Ministério da Economia. April 26, 2019. Apresentação de dados detalhados aumenta a transparência da proposta da Nova Previdência;
Ministério da Economia. Efeitos da Nova Previdência. No date. Available at:
https://download.uol.com.br/files/2019/04/2426805946_25.04.2019-apresentacao-do-governo-sobre-dados-que-embasam-reforma-daprevidencia.pdf
308 Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). December 4, 2019. Em 10 anos, respostas a pedidos de informação aumentam,
mas qualidade deixa a desejar; Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). Mapa de Acesso a Informações Públicas 2019:
Acesso a dados de remunerações 10 anos depois. No date.
309 Artigo 19. July 10, 2019. Entre vetos preocupantes, Presidência tenta derrubar proteção de dados pessoais de requerentes de informação
pública; Medium. July 9, 2019. Coalizão Direitos na Rede repudia os 9 vetos de Bolsonaro à lei que cria a Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de
Dados; Coalizão Direitos na Rede. NOTA AO PARLAMENTO sobre os vetos presidenciais à LGDP e à criação da Autoridade Nacional de
Proteção de Dados. August 6, 2019.
310 Correio do Povo. August 7, 2019. Exoneração de Ricardo Galvão do Inpe é publicada; Artigo 19. August 5, 2019. ‘Apagão’ de dados é risco
para toda a sociedade: queremos mais transparência e respeito à ciência; R7. August 2, 2019. Diretor do INPE, Ricardo Galvão será exonerado
do cargo.
85
reports theypublished in April on an email sent by businessman Marcelo Odebrecht in 2007 that mentioned STF
Judge and President Dias Toffoli.311 According to reports, the report in Crusoé was based on a document released
in the framework of Operation Lava Jato. The judge also established a daily fine of 100,000 reais (about
US$25,650)in the event of failure to comply, and ordered those in charge of the website and magazine topresent
statements within 72 hours. According to the information available, the decision was made in the framework of
an investigation opened by this court in March at the request of Judge Toffoli to look into the dissemination of
“fake news,” offenses, and threats against the STF and its judges. Judge Alexandre de Moraes is the presiding
magistrate.
237. Reports also indicate that on April 16, the Federal Police, operating with the authorization of Judge de
Moraes, executed search and arrest warrants issued against individuals who hadpromotedattacks on the STF.312
The judge also requested that the social media accounts of seven people suspected of issuing messages gravely
offensive to the court be blocked.313 According to reports, the STF applied the National Security Act to those
being investigated, who are also suspected of the crimes of defamation and slander.314 Additionally, reports also
indicate that on April 16, the Procurator General of the Republic sent an official letter to the STF informing it
that the investigation launched in March by the STF should be closed because it is illegal. It indicated that the
adversarial criminal justice system "does not allow the body that judges to be the same one that investigates and
charges."315 Nevertheless, on that same date, Judge de Moraes kept the investigation open, arguing that the PGR’s
declaration was legally groundless.316 The president of the STF also decided topostpone the investigation for 90
days.317 Likewise, on April 18, Judge de Moraes suspended his decision regarding two media outlets, finding that
new information had demonstrated that the document described by the media outlets existed.318 On April 22, in
a meeting with the PGR, the president of the STF stated that once the investigations were concluded, they would
be sent to the Public Prosecutor, and that the STF would not take up functions that legally fall to the Public
Prosecutor—for example, filing charges against theaccused.319
238. According to the information received, on August 28, the Brazilian Congress overrode President Jair
Bolsonaro’s veto of §3 of article 326-A of Law 13,834/2019, establishing harsher penalties for those who
disseminate false news. According to reports, article 326-A defines the criminal offense of slanderous
denunciation with electoral purposes and establishes a penalty of a prison term of two to eight years and a fine.
Specifically, its §3 establishes that "the same sections of this article will apply to those who, having knowledge
of the innocence of the accused and with electoral purposes, divulge orpropagate, through any medium or form,
the act or incident falsely attributed to the accused." On vetoing the paragraph, President Bolsonaro highlighted
that the criminal offense defined under §3 of article 326-A establishes a prison term that is much longer than
the punishment for similar conduct described in §1 of article 324 of the Electoral Code, which establishes a
prison term of six months to two years and a fine for those who commit or disseminate electoral slander. Thus,
he argued that §3 violates the principle of proportionality of the criminal offense described and the punishment
imposed.320 This Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that the article joins the others already in place in
Brazilian Electoral Law codifying the crimes of slander and defamation. Regarding this, in the final report on its
2018 mission to Brazil, the OAS Electoral Mission expressed serious concern that several of the provisions on
the subject prohibited or criminalized criticizing or offending State institutions and authorities, including the
President of the Republic and the national ArmedForces.321
239. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Article 13(2) of the American Convention provides for
the possibility of placing restrictions on freedom of thought and expression through the application of
311Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji). April 15, 2019. Inquérito do STF contra fake news vitima liberdade de imprensa;
UOL. April 15, 2019. Alexandre de Moraes censura site e manda retirar do ar reportagem contra Toffoli.
312 G1. April 16, 2019. PF faz buscas em dois estados e no DF em inquérito que investiga ofensas a ministros do STF; O Globo. April 16, 2019.
Ação da PF cumpre mandados em inquérito que investiga ofensas a ministros do STF e mira general da reserva; UOL. April 16, 2019. General
do Exército é um dos alvos de busca em inquérito que apura ataques ao STF.
313Olhar Digital. April 16, 2019. Alexandre de Moraes manda bloquear redes sociais de 7 suspeitos de atacar o STF; Artigo 19. April 23, 2019.
Revisão de determinação que tirava reportagem do ar pelo STF é fundamental para defesa da liberdade de expressão e de imprensa.
314 O Globo. April 16, 2019. STF usa lei da ditadura para enquadrar investigados sobre ofensas contra a Corte.
315 UOL. April 16, 2019. Raquel Dodge arquiva inquérito aberto por Toffoli para apurar ofensas ao STF; Ministério Público Federal. No.
509/2019 – LJ/PGR. Único No. 107339/2019. Inquérito No. 4.781. April 16, 2019.
316Consultor Jurídico (Conjur). April 16, 2019. Alexandre rejeita arquivamento de inquérito sobre ameaças ao Supremo; G1. April 16, 2019.
Alexandre de Moraes rejeita arquivar inquérito sobre ofensas ao STF; investigação é prorrogada
317Estadão. April 16, 2019. Toffoli ignora PGR e prorroga por 90 dias inquérito da censura; Brasil 247. April 16, 2019. Toffoli ignora PGR e
prorroga inquérito dos ataques ao STF; Veja. April 16, 2019. Toffoli ignora PGR e prorroga por 90 dias inquérito sobre ofensas ao STF.
318O Globo. April 18, 2019. Alexandre de Moraes recua de decisão anterior e suspende censura de reportagem que cita Toffoli; Artigo 19. April
23, 2019. Revisão de determinação que tirava reportagem do ar pelo STF é fundamental para defesa da liberdade de expressão e de imprensa.
319UOL. April 22, 2019. Após reunião com Dodge, Toffoli diz que inquérito do STF irá ao MP; G1/Jornal Nacional. April 22, 2019. Toffoli diz que
vai enviar ao MP resultado do inquérito que apura ofensas ao STF.
320O Globo. August 28, 2019. Congresso derruba veto de Bolsonaro a projeto que torna crime denúncia caluniosa com fim eleitoral; Veja.
November 11, 2019. Lei contra fake news eleitoral é promulgada após Congresso derrubar veto; Consultor Jurídico (Conjur). August 28, 2019.
Congresso derruba veto e retoma punição para divulgação de fake news eleitoral.
321 OAS. Final Report of the Electoral Mission to Brazil in 2018. 2019.
86
subsequent liability for the abusive exercise of this right. In this regard, although those knowingly disseminating
false information that causes harm should be repudiated, this shouldpreferably be done through the exercise of
the right to rectification or reply, or, if the harm caused is serious, through proportional civil responsibility.
240. Likewise, the Inter-American Court has indicated that criminal law is the most restrictive and severe
means of establishing responsibility for illegal conduct.
241. Likewise, the 2017 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News," Disinformation, and
Propaganda indicates that “Criminal defamation laws are unduly restrictive and should be abolished. Civil law
rules on liability for false and defamatory statements are legitimate only if defendants are given a full
opportunity and fail to prove the truth of those statements and also benefit from other defences, such as fair
comment.”
I.. Other relevant situations
242. In March, it was reported that the National Social Security Institute [Instituto Nacional de Seguro Social]
(INSS) issued a circular indicating that its officials are not authorized to give statements to the media on the
pension reform. Requests for interviews or information on the matter must be directed to the Communications
Office. In the circular, the INSS said, among other things, that the objective of this measure was to "standardize
communication on the subject."322
243. According to reports, on April 9, through the Portaria 2016, the Empresa Brasil de Comunicação (EBC),
merged the country's main public television channel, TV Brasil, with government broadcaster NBR (TV Nacional
do Brasil). According to publicly available information, the initiative was rejected by, among others, journalists
and civil society organizations, who argued that "by merging to broadcasters and mixing programming with
different names into a single broadcaster, the government buries a citizen focused communication project
governed by the principles of plurality, diversity, and independence of content.”323Additionally, it was reported
that on November 19, the government included the EBC on a list of 18 enterprises open to private-sector
concessions or possible privatization. Specifically with regard to EBC, it was included for "study" of a total or
partial sale. That is, its status is to be studied by the Partnership Investments Program [“Programa de Parcerias
de Investimentos”] (PPI), and a recommendation will be made to President Jair Bolsonaro on what decision to
take. This was rejected by a joint communication signed by the journalists union of the DF, Río de Janeiro, and
São Paulo, the FederaçãoNacional dos Jornalistas (FENAJ), the radio broadcasters union of theDF, Río de Janeiro,
and São Paulo, and by a committee of EBC workers, who argued that it “[w]as a violation of the Constitution, an
attack on Brazilian society's right to information, and a reduction in transparency of the Executive," because,
among other things, the Constitution of Brazil establishes an article 223 the existence ofpublic,private, and state
systems, and the EBC had been created to fulfill this mandate.324
322 Folha de São Paulo. April 21, 2019. Governo decreta sigilo sobre estudos que embasam reforma daPrevidência;InstitutoNacional do Seguro
Social. Oficio-Circular No. 4/PRES/INSS. March 8, 2019. Available at:
https://twitter.com/mariadorosario/status/1104579135685439489/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ct
wterm%5E1104579135685439489&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.diariodocentrodomundo.com.br%2Fessencial%2Fservidores -doinss-sao-proibidos-de-falar-da-reforma-da-previdencia%2F
323 Observacom. April 12, 2019. Fin de la independencia de la TV pública: gobierno unifica TV Brasil con una televisora gubernamental; Rede
Brasil Atual. April 10, 2019. EBC unifica canais público e estatal e viola Constituição; Câmara dos Deputados. April 23, 2019. Entidades
consideram ilegal fusão da TV Brasil com a NBR.
324Gazeta do Povo. November 19, 2019. Governo inclui leilão do 5G e “TV do Lula” em nova lista de concessões e privatização; Metrópoles.
November 20, 2019. Bolsonaro inclui EBC em programa de privatização do governo; Federação Nacional dos Jornalistas. November 20, 2019.
Nota de repúdio à inclusão da EBC no programa de privatização pelo governo federal.
87
8. CANADA
244. The Special Rapporteur has highlighted Canada's role in promoting and guaranteeing freedom of
expression and the right of access to information. TheOffice has also taken note of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada to overturn the decision of the Superior Court of Quebec to oblige Radio Canada journalist
Marie-Maude Denis to reveal her source of information concerning investigative work of public interest. The
Special Rapporteur received information about the adoption of the Digital Charter by the Government of Canada,
which states that "digital platforms shall not promote or disseminate hatred, violent extremism or criminal
content" and that sanctions will be applied to those who fail to comply with the established principles. This is a
matter of concern to the Special Rapporteur's Office, since it transfers to private platforms the possibility of
censoring content considered to be hate speech.
A. Progress
245. The Office of the Special Rapporteur indicated in its 2018 annual report that, in March, the Superior
Court of Québec would have ordered the journalist of Radio Canada, Marie-Maude Denis, to reveal her source of
information regarding a 2012 investigation addressing alleged acts of collusion in the award of public contracts
in which a former vice minister would have been involved; and that motivated his arrest and subsequent
prosecution.
246. This case was submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada, which, in a historic decision, Denis v. Côté,
decided to revoke the decision of the Quebec Superior Court that force the journalist to reveal her source of
information. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that Denis v. Côté constitutes the first judicial decision in
which the Journalistic Sources Protection Act (JSPA) of 2017 is interpreted and highlights the essential role
played by the press in democracy. The decision indicates that “there is no doubt that the role of the media in our
country is unique. By investigating, questioning, criticizing, and publishing important information, the media
contribute to the existence and maintenance of a free and democratic society ”[…] Freedom of the press
encompasses the ability of the media to gather information, maintain confidential relations with journalistic
sources, and produce and publish news without fear of obstacles to their activities. [...] It is easy to understand
why mobilizing a journalist against their source is incompatible with freedom of the press. Without
whistleblowersand other anonymous sources, it would be very difficult for journalists to carry out their
important mission. As this Court has correctly pointed out, many important controversies have been unearthed
only with the helpof sources that would not agree to speak except with the condition of confidentiality”325.
247. The case was returned to the Quebec Court for reconsideration, however, the decision confirms that, in
accordance with the new rule, there is a strong presumption in favor of preserving confidentiality and the
burden of proof is reversed, since it is the interested party in the disclosure of the source which must
demonstrate that the disclosure is necessary and that the public interest in the administration of justice favors
the disclosure. This criterion means a change in relation to the previous approach to the law of protection of
journalistic sources, which established that journalists bore the burden of demonstrating that the public interest
required maintaining the confidentiality of the source.
248. On the other hand, on November 13, 2019, Bylaw P-6 was repealed, a regulation issued 50 years ago in
Montreal, which established thatprotesters in a socialprotest should keeptheir faces uncovered, without masks,
and had to inform the police beforehand about the itinerary and the route that the march would follow. While
the requirement to previously provide an itinerary was declared “arbitrary” and “unreasonable” and the
prohibition of the use of masks was previously declared unconstitutional by the Quebec Court of Appeals, in
November the mayor of Montreal informed that the rule would be repealed in its entirety326. In this regard, the
Office of the Special Rapporteur has established that “the use of bandanas, masks, hoods, caps, backpacks, and
other types of clothing and accessories in public demonstrations is very common. These elements cannot be
considered as sufficient signs of threat of use of violence, nor can they be used as grounds for dispersion,
detention, or repression of protesters. The IACHR has stressed that, in a democracy, states must act on the basis
of the legality ofpublicprotests or demonstrations and under the assumption that they do not constitute a threat
to public order. This implies an approach focused on strengthening political participation and building higher
levels of citizen participation”327.
325Supreme Court of Canada. Denis v. Côté, 2019 SCC 44. September 27, 2019, para. 45 - 47. CBC News. September 27, 2019. Journalist
applauds 'historic' Supreme Court ruling that shields her confidential source. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). October 3, 2019. Supreme
Court decision upholds shield law protecting journalists’ confidential sources.
326 Montreal Gazette. November 13, 2019.Montrealers will be allowed to protest wearing masks, as bylaw to be scrapped. CBC. November 18,
2019. At long last, Montreal does away with its controversial protest bylaw.
327IACHR. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. Protest and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
CIDH/RELE/INF.22/19. September 2019. Para. 88.
88
B. Attacks, threats and intimidation against journalists and themedia
249. While Canada is one of the safest states topractice journalism, the Office of the Special Rapporteur notes
that according to a survey conducted by the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), it was shown that
female journalists in the United States and Canada are exposed to various risks for the exercise of their
profession, which even follow them home, since online harassment was highlighted by the interviewees as one
of the greatest threats. A large percentage of the journalists interviewed highlighted that they have experienced
securityproblems, threats, verbal harassment, unsolicited sexualproposals, or threatening voice messages, with
the implications that dealing with such attacks means for their mental health, particularly when they perform
coverage and research alone328.
250. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also learned that on October 28, 2019, a truck crashed into the
editorial offices of the Turtle Island Newsindigenous newspaper,in the SixNations Territory in southern Ontario,
and unidentified people sprayed the vehicle and the buildingwith gasoline before setting it on fire. While no
injuries were reported, the fire caused a substantial economic loss to the newspaper, as well as the loss of
cameras, computers, documents, and photo files. According to the fire chief, the attack would have been
deliberate. Although the motives for the attack are still unknown, the newspaper would have received threats
for its coverage of rich local individuals and official misconduct. A police investigation was initiated on the
events329.
251. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation”.
252. In turn, regarding violence against women journalists, the Office of the Special Rapporteur stressed that
“women journalists disproportionately and routinely face gender-based violence in the workplace and on the
field,” and are faced with differentiated forms of violence by state and non-state actors, as well as to the lack of
protection and obstacles in access to justice also differentiated from their male partners. In this regard, the Office
of the Special Rapporteur has highlighted the importance of integrating a gender perspective to ensure that
women journalists are adequatelyprotected and canexercise their rightto freedom of expressionwithout undue
restrictions.
253. In addition, the2012 Joint Declaration on crimes against freedom of expression states that “[w]hen there
is evidence that a crime carried out may be a crime against freedom of expression, the investigation should
proceed with the assumption that it is an offense of such nature until proven otherwise, and all relevant
investigative channels linked to the victims' acts of expression should be exhausted”330.
C. Social protest and restrictions on journalistic coverage
254. On January 7, 2019, Canadian police arrested 14 people in an indigenous protest camp in northern
British Columbia, as part of the intensification of tensions due to a construction project to build a 670km(416
miles) liquefied natural gas pipeline, Coastal GasLink, which would cross the territory of Wet'suwet'en, First
Nations territory. The arrests would have been made while the police were enforcing a court order to remove
barriers that were built along the road, as ordered by a provincial court, since the barriers would be impeding
the access of TransCanada company workers to the zone331.
255. Also, on January 8, 2019, Canadian police prevented access to journalists who wanted to cover the
protest over the construction of a natural gas pipeline in British Columbia, when the police tried to dismantle
the camps established by indigenous activists. Police prevented journalists from the Aboriginal Peoples
Television Network (APTN) and the Canadian Broadcast Corporation from passing a blockade, however, news
teams that were already behind the police barrier were allowed to remain in place. According to APTN, thepolice
continued to deny access to their journalists and would have told them that they were at risk of being arrested
if they tried to get close enough to see the police action. CPJ reported that, according to the police, a "temporary
exclusion zone" would have been created to ensure public safety332.
328Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). September 4, 2019. ‘The threats follow us home’: Survey details risks for female journalists in U.S.,
Canada, and Why going solo is a risk for female reporters in the US and Canada.
329Indian Country Today. November 4, 2019. The Canadian Association of Journalists condemns attack on Turtle Island News. Indian Time.
November 7, 2019. The Canadian Association of Journalists condemns attack on Turtle Island News.
330IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. June 25, 2012. Joint Declaration on Crimes Against Freedom of
Expression.
331 CBC. January 7, 2019. 14 arrested as RCMP break gate at Gidimt'en camp checkpoint set up to stop pipeline company access. The Guardian.
January 8, 2019. Canada: 14 arrested at indigenous anti-pipeline protest camp as tensions rise.
332APTN News. January 8, 2019. RCMP denial of journalists’ access to protest site frightening,’ says press freedom advocate.Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ). January 8, 2019. In Canada, police block media from covering break up of indigenous pipeline protest.
89
256. According to the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, CJFE organization, in October of this year,
the Penitentiary Director of the Department of Justice would have prevented independent journalist Thomas
Rohner from accessing prisoners in any of the Nunavut correctional facilities. Said journalist would have visited
the prison for more than three years in order to publish critical articles regarding the prison conditions of the
Baffin Correctional Center. The refusal would have been based on the journalist not having complied with the
establishedprotocols, but as indicated, he was never informed of the specific protocols established under which
he should conduct his visits, until the journalist himself required them. The aforementioned organization sent a
request to the Minister of Justice to take the necessary measures, considering that the ban of the director to the
journalist to meet with persons deprived of liberty, within the framework of investigations of high public
interest, are disproportionate, being that the journalist expressed his total disposition to act according to the
corresponding protocols333.
257. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of
assembly”334 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly to through social protest must not be subject to
authorization by the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder itsmaterialization”335.
258. Regarding journalistic coverage, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has indicated that “administrative
measures [imposed] should not be used to restrict the mobility of journalists, including the entry of foreign
journalists into a country, or the coverage of demonstrations, or other events of public interest by the media,
unless strictly justifiable by the demands of the situation, in line with the tripartite test [legality, necessity, and
proportionality]”336.
D. Censorship of journalistic material and accreditations of journalists
259. The Office of the Special Rapporteur learned that Canadian Global Affairs officials denied accreditations
to all state media outlets in Russia and Venezuela (ITAR-TASS, Sputnik, Ruptly TV, and RIA Novosti of Russia, and
TeleSUR of Venezuela) who requested to obtain the corresponding authorization to cover the Lima Group
international conference held in Ottawa in February 2019. The letters of denial of accreditation would not have
explained the reasons for the refusal. However, as reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would have noted
that "Global Affairs Canada has a broad accreditation policy to ensure that the media can report on events
organized in Canada. We take this responsibility seriously. Our goal is to provide access to the media that does
not deliberately distort the facts or disseminate propaganda and misinformation. […] We are always evaluating
this accreditation process to ensure that it meets the needs of the Canadian andinternationalmedia"337.
260. In addition, the Office of the Special Rapporteur learned of the dismissal of journalist Frédéric Marcoux,
a reporter for the weekly L'Express on October 2, 2019. The dismissal was allegedly motivated by his
investigation into William Morales, the new local candidate appointed by the Liberal Party for the federal
parliament, and his links to people allegedly associated with Colombian organized crime338. Similarly, the
freelancer and Canadian cartoonist Michael De Adder's contract with Brunswick News Inc. would have been
terminated the day after he posted a drawing of President Trump playing golf on the bodies of two dead
migrants, drowned while trying to cross the border to Texas. Michael de Adder said that, in his opinion, the
termination of his contract was not due to the drawing itself, but in general to his online posture, critic of
President Trump. Brunswick News said in a statement that it was "completely wrong" to suggest that he
canceled the artist's contract due to the image. They added that they had made the decision to cancel his contract
weeks ago, and noted that at that time they had entered into negotiations to work with a different cartoonist
they described as a 'fan favorite'."The statement added that"the opinion pages of BNI remains a balanced debate
place, with a focus on local issues affecting New Brunswickers. We make selections every day based on quality,
impact, and relevance for our local audience”339.
261. Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must be prohibited
333Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE). February 17, 2019. CJFE expresses concern at ban on journalist Thomas Rohner visiting
Nuvavut correctional facilities.
334IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197..
335IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
336 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. May 4, 2015. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to
Conflict Situations.
337Global News. May 14, 2019. Russia threatened retaliation against Canadian media after Sputnik and others barred at Lima Group. CBC. May
14, 2019. Ottawa braced for Russian retaliation after barring state media from Lima Group talks.
338 Reporters Without Borders (RSF). October 7, 2019. Reporter fired over story about politician’s apparent links to organized crime.
339 Fox News. June 30, 2019. Canadian newspaper publisher cuts ties with artist behind controversial Trump cartoon. The London Free Press.
July 3, 2019. Canadian cartoonist behind anti-Trump image feels online presence played role in contract ending.
90
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
262. The Special Rapporteurs of the IACHR, the UN, and the OSCE representative have established in a Joint
Declaration in 2003 that “accreditation schemes for journalists are only appropriate if they are necessary to
provide them with privileged access to some places and/or events; such schemes must be supervised by
independent bodies and decisions on accreditation must be taken following a fair and transparent process,
based on clear and non-discriminatory criteria, published previously. Accreditation should never be subject to
suspension solely based on the content of a journalist's information”340.
263. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also emphasizes the need to ensure informative pluralism,
regardless of editorial lines or positions of the media. As indicated by the Inter-American Court, given "the
importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society and the responsibility that it entails for the social
media and for those who exercise these tasks professionally, the State must minimize the restrictions on
information and balance, to the greatest extent possible, the participation of the different lines in the public
debate, promoting informative pluralism.In these terms, the protection of the human rights of those who face
the power of the media, which must exercise with responsibility the social function that they develop, and the
effort to ensure structural conditions that allow the equitable expression ofideas"341.
E. Source Confidentiality
264. The Office of the Special Rapporteur referred in its 2018 annual report to the adoption of the Supreme
Court of Canada ruling that ruled that the journalist Ben Makuch, of Vice Media, had to deliver the
communications maintained between the journalist and an alleged ISIS fighter, to the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police. This decision did not apply the criteria of the law on the protection of journalistic sources, because in this
case the requirements of the standard were not met (the identity of the source was known). After the adoption
of the Supreme Court ruling, Vice Media and Makuch requested the cancellation of the delivery requirement
because the United States military reported on the death of the source, Mr. Farah Shirdon, in Iraq. The Ontario
Superior Court judge rejected that reasoning on July 4 because the Canadian police could not independently
confirm the American army's statement. After the last attempt to modify the Supreme Court decision, the chat
logs were delivered on July 4, 2019. On the afternoon of July 4, Vice lawyers said they would deliver the chat
logs, according to reports. Makuch confirmed to CPJ on July 10 that the records had been handed over to the
authorities342.
265. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that any measure that seeks to confiscate journalistic
material, which requires relieving sources or citing journalists as witnesses, has a restrictive effect on freedom
of expression. According to Principle 8 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR,
"every social communicator has the right to keep his/her source of information, notes, personal, and
professional archives confidential."
F. Access to public information
266. The Office of the Special Rapporteur learned that the draft bill C-58 presented with the objective of
amending the law on access to public information, received royal consent on June 21, 2019, so it is currently a
valid law. The modifications would have the purpose of “improving the accountability and transparency of
federal institutions in order topromote an open and democratic society and allow public debate on the behavior
of those institutions”. It also provides clearer powers to the Information Commissioner, as well as the Privacy
Commissioner, and seeks to clarify the powers of both commissioners, as well as to establish a new proactive
publication scheme and expand on the obligated subjects343.
267. Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[a]ccess
to information held by the State is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.” Taking into account theprinciple of maximum disclosure, the law should guarantee the most effective
and widest possible access topublic information, and exceptions should not become the general rule in practice.
In addition, the exceptions regime must be interpreted restrictively, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of
transparency and access.
340 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. December 18, 2003. Joint Declaration on Regulation of the Media, Restrictions
on Journalists, and Investigating Corruption.
341I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C No.
194. Para. 106.
342 Global News. July 4, 2019. Vice agrees to give RCMP accused terrorist’s chat logs after judge refuses stay. The Hill Times. December 20,
2019. ‘A complete travesty’: court’s decision against Vice Media sets ‘chill’ for journalists, say media groups.
343 Office of the InformationCommissioner of Canada. June 21, 2019. Information Commissioner’s statement on the passage of Bill C-58.
91
G. Internet, freedom of speech, and hate speech
268. The debate on the measures to be taken to combat hate speech online and on social networks increased
in Canada after the terrorist attacks against two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. The foregoing resulted
in the Prime Minister signing a commitment to combat violent and extremist online content (New Zealand Prime
Minister's pledge to tackle violent, extremist online content)344 and that the government express its
consideration regarding forcing social networks to remove extremist content345. In this context, Canadian Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau noted that "the time for hate speech online without consequences has officially ended,
[as well as] the shameless spreading of fake news," while announcing the new Digital Charter, which would seek
to protect online users of social media platforms and news pages. According to the Prime Minister, the
Charterfocuses specifically on hate speech and fake news, and social media account holders and website
administrators will be questioned about the presence of any of them in their online domains. Similarly, Prime
Minister Trudeau would have said that if social media platforms did not combat hate speech and/or fake news,
they would find that there would be significant financial consequences346.
269. The Digital Charter is composed of 10 principles. It does not constitute a legal document, and its
principles must be implemented through legislation and the corresponding norms or regulations. Principle 9
states the following: "Free from hate and violent extremism:Canadians can expect that digital platforms will not
encourage or spread hate, violent extremism, or criminal content." Principle 10 states: "Firm application and
real responsibility: there will be clear and significant sanctions for violations of laws and regulations that
support these principles”347.
270. The implementation of the previous principles generates concern to this Office of the Special
Rapporteur, since it transfers to private platforms the possibility of censoring content that is considered hate
speech, which in principle should be understood in a limited way and in reference to the most extreme content,
which, in certain cases, is difficult to identify. The complexity of discerning the nature of the content would be
transferred to private companies that own social networks or digital platforms. In addition, it should be noted
that in many countries the rules on this subject are used abusively by the powerful to limit nontraditional,
dissenting, critical, or minority voices, or debates about social challenges. In addition, tensions generated by
cultural or religious differences cannot be resolved through the suppression of the expression of differences, but
through the open debate aboutthem. Freedom of expression is therefore a requirement, and not an impediment,
for tolerance348.
271. The Special Rapporteurs of the IACHR, the UN, the ACPHR, and the representative of the OSCE have
established in a Joint Declaration in 2016, the Joint Declaration on freedom of expression and the fight against
violent extremism, that the “concepts of "violent extremism" and "extremism" should not be used as the basis
for restricting freedom of expression unless they are defined clearly and appropriately narrowly. Any
restrictions drawing upon a countering and preventing violent extremism framework should be demonstrably
necessary and proportionate to protect, in particular, the rights of others, national security or public order.[…]
No person offering only Internet technical services such as access, searches, or preservation of information in
the cache memory should be responsible for content generated by thirdparties and disseminated through these
services, provided that it does not specifically intervene in said content or refuses to comply with a court order
that requires its removal when it is in a position to do so ("principle of mere transmission")349.
272. Regarding the responsibility of intermediaries, the special rapporteurs have indicated that “States
should not subject Internet intermediaries to mandatory orders to withdraw or otherwise limit the content,
except when the content is legally limited according to standards described above. States must refrain from
pressuring, punishing or rewarding intermediaries in order to limit legal content. [...] At a minimum,
intermediaries should not be required to control user-generated content and should not be subject to
extrajudicial rules on content cancellation that do not offer sufficient protection for freedom of expression (as is
the case with many of the rules on "notification and withdrawal" that are currently applied)350.
344 CBC. May 14, 2019. Trudeau set to sign New Zealand PM's pledge to tackle violent, extremist online content.
345 Global News. March 21, 2019. Canada considering forcing social media companies to remove extremist content.The Post Millenial. March
2019. The Trudeau government wants to censor your social media.
346 Vice. May 16, 2019. Canada Plans Fines for Tech Companies That Spread Disinformation. Gaming Post. May 29, 2019. Trudeau Announces
New Digital Charter.
347 Government of Canada. Digital Charter. Available at: https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00108.html
348 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. December 19, 2006. Joint declaration on Publishing Confidential Information,
Openness of National and International Public Bodies, Freedom of Expression and Cultural/Religious Tensions, and Impunity in Cases of
Attacks Against Journalists
349 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. May 4, 2016. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Countering
Violent Extremism.
350 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. June 1, 2011. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet.
92
9. CHILE
273. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) condemned the excessive use of force and
the violation of human rights in Chile in the context of social protests that shook the country, which resulted in
fatalities, thousands of injured, as well as journalists and camera operators assaulted both by police forces and
violent groups.
274. The Office of the Special Rapporteur draws particular attention to the selective attack on camera
operators and journalists during the coverage of protests, in addition to complaints regarding the existence of
pressures or censorship of communicators on state television channels and private media. Also, attacks and
arson attempts were registered against different media facilities in several cities of the country.
275. There were also reports of illegal detentions and torture,inwhich the most vulnerablepopulations such
as children and adolescents were victims, aswell as sexual attacks against women and the LGBTQ population.351.
276. This Office has taken note of the legal initiatives that have emerged to restrict various aspects of the
protests. The Commission received information on the presentation of a package of bills that could criminalize
the exercise of freedom of expression and the right of assembly. The IACHR calls on the State not to develop
criminal types that turn into criminal acts conduct commonly observed in protests that,in and of themselves, do
not affect property such as the life, security, or freedom ofpersons.
A.Freedom of Expression and state of exception
277. On October 6, the government of President Sebastián Piñera announced the increase in the rates of the
public transport system352 by 3.75%, which unleashed a series of protests through a call for mass evasions at
the Metro entrances. Although the demonstrations would have begun on Monday, October 14, on the lines of the
metropolitan train after a call to protest from high school students353, the protests expanded to the rest of the
country, including violent actions, through fires in public institutions and looting.
278. In response to the widespread demonstrations354, the government announced the closure of the entire
Metro network in Santiago and the application of the Internal Security Act of the State. Under the argument of
restoring order and public safety, President Piñeira decreed on Friday, October 18, the State of Constitutional
Exception in Chile355 in the provinces of Santiago and Chacabuco and in the municipalities of San Bernardo and
Puente Alto, and later the measure extended to the entire Metropolitan Region356, Valparaíso (center),
Concepción (south), the communes of Coquimbo and La Serena), and the commune of Rancagua (center) since
the early hours of Sunday, October 20357. Through the measure he entrusted the Army with the control of public
order.
279. On October 19, the Chilean Army General Javier Iturriaga, decreed the curfew358 that remained until
October 27, when President Piñeira raised the State of Emergency, the president also canceled the rise in the
subway fare359, made changes in his cabinet and called a Constituent Congress, but none of the measures
managed to dissuade360 the demonstrations that demanded greater changes in the tax and pension system and
an increase in the budget for health, education, and public housing361. Despite the suspension of the state of
emergency, the police remained on the streets and the Chilean government called on the National Security
Council, and also announced that they would invoke the State Security Law. In that context, President Piñera
made stigmatizing statements against sectors of the protesters: “We are at war against a powerful, implacable
enemy, who does not respect anything or anyone, who is willing to use violence and crime without any limit362”.
351 IACHR. December 6, 2019. Press Release 317 IACHR Condemns the Excessive Use of Force during Social Protests in Chile, Expresses Its
Grave Concern at the High Number of Reported Human Rights Violations, and Rejects All Forms of Violence; Human Rights Watch (HRW).
November 26, 2019. Chile: Police Reforms Needed in the Wake of Protests; DW. November 15, 2019. CIDH denuncia agresiones a periodistas
en protestas de Ecuador, Chile y Bolivia.
352 Ministerio de Transportes y Telecomunicaciones. Ley 20.378; Pauta Chile. October 18, 2019. La irreversible y sistemática alza de precios
en el Metro de Santiago; Cooperativa. October 16, 2019. Así opera el panel de expertos que sube las tarifas del transporte público.
353 CNN. October 18, 2019. Protestas en el metro de Santiago por el incremento del pasaje; El Mostrador. October 15, 2019. Estudiantes
realizaron una "evasión masiva" en la estación Santa Ana del Metro.
354 El País. October 19, 2019. Chile decreta el estado de emergencia por las revueltas contra el precio del metro.
355 Gobierno de Chile. October 18, 2019. Presidente Piñera decreta Estado de Emergencia en las Provincias de Santiago y Chacabuco y en las
comunas de San Bernardo y Puente Alto para normalizar el orden público.
356 La Tercera. October 20, 2019. Estado de emergencia se extiende a toda la Región Metropolitana.
357 In all there are six cities under state of emergency and three of them with full curfew.
358 DW. October 19, 2019. Chile: tres muertos y toque de queda total en tres regiones.
359 BBC Mundo. October 21, 2019. Protestas en Chile: 4 claves para entender la furia y el estallido social en el país sudamericano; The Clinic.
November 14, 2019. Estudiantes secundarios piden participación desde los 14 años en plebiscito municipal: “Fuimos impulsores de la
movilización”.
360 Cooperativa. October 19, 2019. Manifestantes desafían el toque de queda y cantan el Himno Nacional; Infobae. October 21, 2019. Toque de
queda en Chile: el Ejército controla las calles luego de que los manifestantes se resistieran.
361 Página 12. October 23, 2019. El orgullo de resistir copó las calles de Chile.
362 CNN Chile. November 21, 2019. Piñera: “Estamos en guerra contra un enemigo poderoso”; BBC Mundo. October 22, 2019. Protestas en
Chile: "Estamos en guerra", la frase de Piñera que se le volvió en contra en medio de las fuertes manifestaciones.
93
280. After more than a month of protests, President Piñera acknowledged363 the breach of protocols in the
use of force against protesters, but said he would send a bill to the Chilean Congress to use the Armed Forces in
the protection of public infrastructure "without the need to establish a state of constitutional exception"364.
According to the information received by the IACHR, 26 homicides were recorded during the protests in Chile,
more than 20,645 detentions365 -950 of them would still be in pretrial detention at the conclusion of this
Report366- about 12,652 people injured, the National Institute of Human Rights (NHRI) directly verified in
hospitals 2,808 injured in the context of the manifestations of which, the majority, are the result of serious
injuries due to impacts of ballistic projectiles and non-ballistic projectiles, of which 229 would be girls, boys and
adolescents367, 352 eye injuries and mutilations, rib fractures, and lungperforation, among others368. In addition,
torture and arbitrary arrests, beatings, burns, chocking attempts, threats and intimidation, and illegal detentions
were carried out by official agents dressed as civilians in non-institutional vehicles or without license plates or
patents.
281. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have received information on the attacks and
aggressions faced by journalists and communicators from various media, including independent media, when
covering mass protests369. There would have been around 50 cases of attacks on journalists affected by the
violence by state agents, to a greater extent these abuses would have been carried out by police officers and
members of the armed forces during the mobilizations and protests
370. However, also attacks by violent groups
on public and private infrastructure were reported, including the burning of some spaces in the facilities of the
El Mercurio building in Valparaíso, the newspaper La Estrella371 and the Mega channel372. The Bio Bio de
Concepción373 radio and the Pingüino Multimedia communication group in Punta Arenas were alsoattacked374.
282. During the protests, undue pressures would also have been registered so that some journalists and the
media change or moderate their editorial line, as well as restrictions on the right to access information within
the security forces who acted in this context. The information regarding the situation of freedom of expression
during protests is detailed below.
B. Violence and attacks against the press in the context ofprotests
283. The Office of the Special Rapporteur urges the State of Chile to investigate, in a complete, effective, and
impartial manner, these crimes that affect society as a whole, clarify their motives, and judicially determine the
relationshipthey may have with their activity as communicators. In this sense, it is essential that the authorities
investigate these facts without ruling out the hypothesis of the link to journalistic activity and freedom of
expression.According to information received, the effects of ballistic and non-ballistic projectiles would have left
sequels in at least 15 journalists, of which two would have possible eye trauma. In a large number of cases, the
shooting by the police would have been carried out at a very short distance, less than 10 meters. Similarly, civil
society organizations presented testimonies and audiovisual recordings that would show that reporters would
363 HispanTV. November 21, 2019. Piñera admite uso ilegal de fuerza contra manifestantes en Chile; Bio Bio. October 20, 2019. Iturriaga y
disparos contra civiles en Puente Alto: "Es un hecho lamentable, pero un hecho menor".
364 DW. November 24, 2019. Piñeira anuncia proyecto para que militares protejan infraestructura pública.
365 Tele 13 Radio. November 23, 2019. Fiscalía ha formalizado a más de 17 mil personas por saqueos, lesiones, desordenes y otros delitos; El
País. November 18, 2019. Más de 17.000 detenidos en el mes de protestas en Chile; DW. November 15, 2019. Protestas en Chile han dejado 22
muertos y 2.200 heridos
366INDH. November 17, 2019. Información constatada por el INDH DDHH Chile; Noticias ONU. October 21, 2019. Protestas en Chile, migrantes
irregulares y el discurso del odio en internet.
367 BBC Mundo. November 13 2019. Protestas en Chile: "Más de 160 menores recibieron perdigones, balas y maltrato. Es inaceptable,
independientemente de lo que hayan hecho"; Piensa Prensa / Facebook. November 15, 2019. Cientos niños son afectados por el uso
indiscriminado de bombas lacrimógenas lanzados a metros de colegios básicos cercanos a PLAZA ITALIA.
368 Unidad Trauma Ocular a nivel público nacional (UTO). October 19 - November 8, 2019. Informe Trauma Ocular. Resultados preliminares
obtenidos UTO; INDH. November 21, 2019. Información constatada por el INDH DDHH Chile; New York Times. November 10, 2019. ‘It’s
Mutilation’: The Police in Chile Are Blinding Protesters; Colegio de Periodistas. November 10, 2019. Sociedad Chilena de Psicología Comunitaria
rechaza terrorrismo de estado; Meganoticias. December 6, 2019. INDH da cuenta de considerable aumento de lesiones oculares: Sube de 241 a
352.
369 IACHR. 174 Period of Sessions. Audiencias 12A. Situación de derechos humanos en el contexto de la protesta social en Chile. Aristegui
Noticias. October 21, 2019. Decretan tercer toque de queda en Chile; van 11 muertos y más de 2 mil detenidos. Reuters. November 17, 2019.
Policía de Chile evitó que socorristas auxiliaran a manifestante agónico: organismo de DDHH.
370 DW. November 15, 2019. CIDH denuncia agresiones a periodistas en protestas de Ecuador, Chile y Bolivia; Perfil. October 21, 2019. Directora
del ENACOM: "Este clima de agresión a la prensa puede ser muy peligroso"
371 Clarin. October 20, 2019. Protestas en Chile: quemaron la sede del diario El Mercurio en Valparaíso. Diario Libre. October 21, 2019. La SIP
denuncia el 'grave atentado contra la libertad de prensa' en Chile. Periodista Digital. October 22, 2019. La violencia se apodera de Chile:
Manifestaciones delictivas y represión militar en las calles.
372FayerWayer. October 29, 2019. Nuevo intento de ataque incendiario se registra anoche en canal de TV Mega.
373 Sabes. October 26, 2019. Atacan a Radio Bío Bío en Concepción.
374 Consejo Regional Magallanes. Colegio de Periodistas. October 29, 2019. Condena a ataque a medio de comunicación en Punta Arenas.
94
have been the deliberate object of the shooting. Indeed, the reporters attacked by the security forces were
identified and separated from the protesters when they recorded the police action during the protests375.
284. On October 22, in Chiguayante (Bio Bio), MEGA cameraman Alejandro Torres376, was hit by a projectiles
in the eye, the wound caused a retinal detachment, which could lead to loss of vision. In the Metropolitan region,
the cameraman of El Desconcierto, Matias Gamboa, would have received three impacts of pellets on his legs and
feet, a teargas bomb impact on the arm and was sprayed with pepper spray directly in the face. On October 21,
the cameraman of the newspaper El Ciudadano, Juan Rodríguez, would have been shot in the back of the neck
by a Special Forces official, while the communicator ran alongside a group of protesters to avoid the repressive
action of the uniformed. As stated by him, the police would have shot about 30 or 40 meters away377. In
Valparaiso, the photographer of the Reuters Agency, Rodrigo Garrido would have received the impact of a pellet
in the chest and another in his leg, as he indicated: “A policeman moved through Ecuador Street, raised and aimed
his shotgun and proceeded to shoot directly where I was, where no one was throwing objects at him, there were
only other people taking pictures”378.
285. Along these same lines, around seven communicators would have been affected by the indiscriminate
use of chemical agents. On October 20, the photographer of Señal 3 La Victoria, Julio César Gallardo, would have
received the impact of a tear gas bomb on his knee, despite the fact that he was carrying an identifying jacket
and credentials; the shots would have been made seven meters away379. On November 30, the cameraman of the
same channel, Señal 3 La Victoria, Gonzalo Barría received the impact of a tear gas bomb in the face, an event
that was recorded while the live broadcast of the performance "Un Violador en tu camino" in front of the
Tendencia Carlos Valdovinos, municipality of Pedro Aguirre Cerda380.
286. Six journalists would have received blows, threats, and intimidation directly from law enforcement381.
On October 21, Police officers would have beaten and detained the president of the group of independent
photographers of Los Rios, Manuel Gonzáles382. On October 22, the journalist of the radio station Mi Radio of
Coquimbo, Leonardo Silva383, would have been beaten, confined, and held by the police. On November 9, the
TeleSur channel denounced the former governor of the Province of Antarctica, Juan Arcos Srdanovic, for alleged
harassment and defamation of the work of journalists working in the international channel, carried out through
messages through different social media profiles384.
287. Likewise, the 2013 Joint Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social
demonstrations indicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and their
guarantee is a necessary condition for existence and functioning of a democratic society. A State may impose
reasonable limitations on demonstrations in order to ensure their peaceful development or disperse those that
become violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, and
proportionality. In addition, dispersing a demonstration must be justified in the duty of protection of persons,
and the safest and least harmful measures for protesters should be used. The use of force in public
demonstrations must be exceptional and in strictly necessary circumstances in accordance with internationally
recognizedprinciples”385.
C. Detentions of journalists during the state of emergency
288. There were also reports of the detention of around six journalists386 (19 the total number during the
crisis) during the state of emergency. On October 26, journalist Franco Manzo spent the entire night in a
375IACHR. December 6, 2019. CIDH condena el uso excesivo de la fuerza en el contexto de las protestas sociales en Chile, expresa su grave
preocupación por el elevado número de denuncias y rechaza toda forma de violencia; OHCHR. December 13, 2019. Informe ONU sobre la
crisis en Chile describe múltiples violaciones de derechos humanos y hace un llamado a reformas; Human Rights Watch. November 26, 2019.
Chile: Llamado urgente a una reforma policial tras las protestas. INDH Chile. No Date. Informe de DDHH en el contexto de la crisis social.
Amnistia Internacional. November 26, 2019. Chile: Política deliberada para dañar a manifestantes apunta a responsabilidad de mando.
376Bio Bio. October 23, 2019. Camarógrafo recibe disparo de balín de Carabineros en su ojo durante saqueo en Chiguayante.
377 El Ciudadano. October 21, 2019. Carabineros dispara perdigón que impacta cabeza de camarógrafo de El Ciudadano.
378 Colegio de Periodistas deChile. November 11, 2019. Informe sobre situación de agresiones a periodistas y Comunicadores durante Estado
de Emergencia, toque de queda y crisis política en Chile; Reuters. November 19, 2019. Chile's police chiefsuspends use of rubber bullets.
379 El Desconcierto/Facebook, October 20, 2013. Disparan a la prensa en Plaza Italia. Fotógrafo de la Señal 3 La Victoria.
380 Cooperativa. December 2, 2019. Bomba lacrimógena impactó a camarógrafo en el rostro: Fue lanzada desde una tenencia de Carabineros.
Señal 3 La Victoria/Youtube. December 2, 2019. Urgente Camarografo de Señal 3 La Victoria herido por lagrimogena tirada directamente a
su rostro.
381 Colegio de Periodistas deChile. November 11, 2019. Informe sobre situación de agresiones a periodistas y Comunicadores durante Estado
de Emergencia, toque de queda y crisis política en Chile. November 9, 2019. Declaración por la Libertad de Expresión de la Red de Periodistas
y Comunicadores Migrantes.
382 Prensa OPAL Chile/Facebook, October 21, 2019. Si esto no es dictadura, que es.
383 Mi Radio. October 22, 2019. Carabineros golpea a periodista de Mi Radio en medio de reporteo por barricadas.
384 Colegio de Abogados. November 9, 2019. Telesur acusa persecución.
385United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
386 Observatorio del Derecho a la Comunicación. December, 2019. IACHR. Visit in Loco. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.
95
gymnasium specially enabled by police officers in Magallanes, as reported to this Office, he would have been
released without explanation nor presented before a judge387.
289. The Office of the Special Rapporteur draws particular attention to cases of detention and harassment
against women journalists, based on gender stereotypes. On October 23 in Arica, the journalists of the Diario
Estrella, Estefani Carrasco and Patricia Torres were detained along with Alfredo Sanhueza by police officers
during the curfew despite having their credentials, bothwomenwere forced to undress and do squats in apolice
station388.
290. The limitations to deliver safe-conducts to the press, including allegations of denial of safe-conducts
would have contributed to many press workers being subjected to attacks and detentions389. On October 20, the
16th Commissar of La Reina refused to give a safe-conduct to MEGA journalist Andrea Arístegui390, indicating
that journalists should not go to work during the curfew; On October 22, the correspondent of the international
agency Pressenza, Claudia Aranda, who would have a safe-conduct, would have been detained and taken to the
third Police Station in Santiago receiving aggressive and intimidating treatment bypolice391.
291. On October 26, the Investigative Police (PDI) retained three Argentine journalists Nazareno Roviello (La
Retaguardia), Andrés Masotto (Radio Presente), and Leandro Díaz del Campo (ANCAP) at the Santiago
International Airport and would have denied them entry to the country. The police alleged that they would have
reproduced images that "incited to hate" and they would have been informed that they would be deported. In
addition, the PDI said they wanted to enter with tourist visas and in order to do journalistic coverage they
needed a work visa.
292. After different institutions intervened, such as the National Institute of Human Rights (NHRI), the
Chilean Commission of Human Rights, and the Journalists Association of Chile, the PDI allowed them to enter392.
293. The Office of the Special Rapporteur wishes to recall that in the Joint Declaration on the regulation of
the media, restrictions on journalists, and the investigation of corruption, the Special Rapporteurs for freedom
of expression of the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), noted that accreditation schemes for journalists
"are only appropriate if they are necessary to provide them with privileged access to certain places and/or
events; such schemes must be supervised by independent agencies, and accreditation decisions must be taken
following a fair and transparent process, based on previously published, clear, and non-discriminatory criteria.
Accreditation should never be suspended solely based on the content of a journalist's information”393.
D .Government restrictions to editorial line
294. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed and received the supporting documentation on
different types of pressures from state authorities to change or allegedly control the media coverage in Chile at
a November 11 hearing on the human rights situation in the context of the social protest in the framework of
the IACHR's sessions in Ecuador. On that occasion, among the inquiries to the State of Chile by the Special
Rapporteur, there were questions about the reported cases of eye injuries that would point to a pattern in the
shots fired by the police, which were aimed at the same area of the body: the torso and head of the protesters.
Along the same lines, he also inquired on access to the registry of detainees: Why haven’t these records been made
public? Finally, the Special Rapporteur asked the State if it would have information on the possible existence of
a pattern of pressure on journalists that was reportedly evidenced through meetings of Chilean authorities with
media directors in order to change their coverage or interfere with informational content394.
295. On October 26, the directors of La Tercera and El Mercurio would have held a meeting with the
Government in La Moneda. After this meeting, the Government would have provided information from
intelligence agencies to said media to condition its editorial line 395.
387 “We denounce: colleague arbitrarily detained during the peaceful march held yesterday in Punta Arenas. All while recording other citizens
repressed with violence by police. He spends the night in handcuffs and is released without explanation. Account of Periodistas Magallanes”.
@PeriodistasMaga October 27, 2019. 2.55 P.M. CHV Noticias. October 28, 2019. Denuncian detención “arbitraria y violenta” contra
periodista que cubría marcha en Magallanes.
388 CNN Chile. October 20, 2019. INDH anuncia querella contra Carabineros de Arica por caso de violencia sexual hacia periodistas; La Izquierda
Diario. October 25, 2018. ARICA: Periodistas denuncian violencia sexual durante detención policial en toque de queda
389 Observatorio del Derecho a la Comunicación. Circular Núm. 1.832, 2019 published by Diario Oficial de Chile. “In the documented events
there is a systematic breach of the public order protocols of Carabineros”.
390“Captain Sebastián Veloso of the 16th Police Station of La Reina says that journalists cannot go to work during curfew. What does the
@min_interior say?”. Twitter account of journalist Andrea Arístegui. @AndreaAristegui
391TeleSur TV/ Youtube. October 23, 2019. Chile: carabineros detienen ilegalmente a periodista Claudia Aranda;Pressenza International Press
Agency. November 24, 2019. Una segunda periodista de Pressenza agredida por reportear en Chile.
392 El Desconcierto. October 26, 2019. Denuncian que tres periodistas argentinos fueron retenidos en el aeropuerto de Santiago; TELAM.
October 26, 2019. Tres reporteros argentinos de medios alternativos retenidos en el aeropuerto de Santiago.
393Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. Joint Declaration on Regulation of the Media, Restrictions on Journalists, and
Investigating Corruption.December 18, 2003.
394 IACHR. 174 Period of Sessions. Audiencias 12A. Situación de derechos humanos en el contexto de la protesta social en Chile.
395 Interferencia Chile. October 30, 2019. Artículo ‘fake’ sobre agentes venezolanos genera crisis en redacción de La Tercera.
96
296. According to the Federation of Television Channel Workers [Federación de Trabajadores de Canales de
Televisión] (FETRA TV) and the Journalists Association396, the Chilean government would also have tried to
intervene in the information agenda of television channels during a meeting on October 19 with former Interior
Minister Andrés Chadwik397. As a result, lawyer Felipe Ignacio Vega filed a collusion complaint with the National
Economic Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía Nacional Económica] during the last days of October398.
297. On October 31, Canal 13 of Chile announced the replacement of the Press Director, Enrique Mujica, who
argued "personal reasons" for leaving office. According to information from Chilean media, the director was
removed after the release of an interview with the General Director of the Police Department, Mario Rozas, in
the news broadcasted on October 29, in which the journalist in charge of the interview criticized the police
abuses and asked if human rights violations had been verified399. On November 28, the actor and host of a radio
program, reported that he was fired from Radio Play FM, a decision that would be related to the actor's visible
participation in the mobilizations400.
298. On November 5, the journalists' union of the COPESA communications company reported that
journalists from the newspaper La Tercera reported that they would have been forced to publish information
that does not correspond to what they have reported on the field. Sebastián Vedoya, author of the chronicle
"Policía identifica a uno de los autores de incendios en estaciones de Metro", would have received a direct
instruction from the director of the media to prepare the note based on a document given to him form the
director of the media. Vedoya also denounced that this note -widely disseminated- would have caused a smear
campaign against him401.
299. On November 6, journalists Carolina Román and Pablo Manríquez were fired as producers of the
“Buenos Días a Todos”402 program of the state media, Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVC). According to
information provided by the affected journalists, on October 19 the production of the program made a series of
requests for changes in the daily pattern of press releases, among which they mentioned, indications about the
exclusion of interviews of certain political leaders or the elimination of the testimony of the father of a young
man killed by soldiers in Curicó,in the framework of the curfew. The channel's content management would have
also scolded one of the program's commentators, Daniel Stingo, who would have starred in a strong debate with
Congress deputies of the official party. Both journalists maintain that their dismissal from TVC would be due to
telling the truth and not hiding the pressures they experienced as a team.
300. On November 13, the deputy editor of the national section of the newspaper La Tercera, Felipe de Ruyt
Jara, would have been fired from the company after informing the Journalists Association about the editorial
management of the media. The executives of the newspaper would have indicated that the dismissal was due
"to the needs of the company" motivated by the serious economic problems that COPESA wasfacing403.
301. OnNovember 8, businessman Juan Sutil, leader of the National Society of Agriculture [Sociedad Nacional
de Agricultura] (SNA) and president of Empresas Sutil, announced the decision to end the sponsorship he had
with theprogram "Agricultural Agenda", broadcasted by CNN Chile. Through a letter sentto the television media,
the businessman explained that the decision was made due to "the deplorable attitude of CNN and CHV at the
time when Chile needed a serious and objective journalism, free of political bias”404. The Journalists Association of
Chile rejected the fact by calling it an attempt to restrict freedom of expression and opinion of CNN and
Chilevisión405.
396 Colegio de Periodistas de Chile. October 26, 2019. Colegio de Periodista rechaza intento intervención del gobierno en canales de televisión.
397 El Desconcierto. October 27, 2019. Federación de trabajadores de la TV por encuentro del gobierno con canales: “Los directores ejecutivos
corroboraron la reunión”.
398 El Desconcierto. October 30, 2019. Ingresan denuncia ante la Fiscalía Nacional Económica por presunta colusión de canales de televisión
organizada por Chadwick.
399 Cooperativa. October 31, 2019. Canal 13 y TVN anuncian cambios en su estructura organizacional. El Filtrador. October 31, 2019. Las
razones políticas de Canal 13 para remover a Enrique Mujica de la Dirección de Prensa.
400 “Dear auditors of Play V a show I have hosted since Nov. last year on Play radio today Isay goodbye to all of you, with whom we tried to build
a community of sustainability and environmental care”. Twitter account of Héctor Morales. November 28, 2019. 3.04 P.M.
401Radio Paulina. November 5, 2019. Sindicato de COPESA denuncia presiones a periodistas para publicar tésis instruidas por editores. El
Desconcierto. October 28, 2019. La Tercera se retracta de información falsa sobre “venezolanos y cubanos” involucrados en quema de
estaciones de Metro; Open letter from editors and sub-editors of La Tercera. Twitter account of journalist Juan Andrés Quezada.
@QuezoQuezada November 7, 2019. 3.48 P.M.
402 Bio Bio. November 6, 2019. Desvinculan a productor ejecutivo y editora periodística de Buenos Días a Todos; Cambio 21. November 8, 2019.
Sigue la censura en los canales: Despiden al abogado Daniel Stingo del matinal de TVN por ser "muy puntudo" con los invitados especialmente
del Gobierno.
403 “Well, I just got fired from #LaTercera for expressing my disagreement with the information manipulation practices that exist inside the
newspaper”. Twitter account of journalist Felipe De Ruyt. @felipedejara November 13 2019. 3.34 P.M. El Desconcierto. November 20, 2019.
Habla subeditor desvinculado de La Tercera: “En algunassecciones existe un clima intimidatorio”; Colegio de Periodistas. November 14, 2019.
Apoyo y solidaridad con periodista Felipe de Ruyt.
404 Radio Agricultura. November 8, 2019. Empresario Juan Sutil retiró publicidad de CNN Chile por ser "absolutamente parcial": "No han
actuado a la altura del periodismo correcto"; La Tercera. November 8, 2019. Empresas Sutil corta auspicios a programa Agenda Agrícola de
CNN Chile en discrepancia por cobertura a ola de protestas.
405 Colegio de Periodistas. November 8, 2019. Colegio de Periodistas rechaza extorsión económica a CNN y Chilevisión.
97
E. Access to public information
302. In Chile, civil society organizations and international organizations have denounced the lack of
transparency and restrictions on access to information during demonstrations, specifically, on detentions,
injured individuals, and complaints about human rights violations. It was denounced that the information
systematized and published by the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice and the police,
would be incomplete, would not be disaggregated, and during the first days of the crisis would not have been
published in a timely manner.406It was not until October 22 that the Prosecutor's Office offered figures of
detainees and confirmation of the number and identity of deceased persons. On October 30, the first figures on
investigations into alleged human rights violations were published, data that were updated on November 8 and
26, where data were presented in greater detail.
303. Both the National Institute of Human Rights (NHRI) and the Medical Association, and the Chilean
Ophthalmology Society407 denounced that the figures offered by the Government did not match those they were
collecting and reported a lack of transparency by some agencies.
304. On November 18, freelance photographer Diego Ibacache reported having observed, during
demonstrations in Concepcion, the use of false identifications by police, such as "Super Dick", "Destroyer" and
"Raptor"408. This motivated a request by the Comptroller to the Police, so that the institution answered to the
alleged irregularities in the identification in the uniforms of the police. The Police responded that the measure
responded to security reasons and to alleged death threats that the officers would have received; they added
that the eventual imposition of sanctions will depend on the direct superior of each offending officer409. On
November 21, a tweeter posted a video recorded by himself where the Captain of the 18th Ñuñoa police station
appears ordering his subordinates "from now on we are going out without a name, are we clear?" Although the
Police denied the video saying it had been manipulated, the Comptroller General of the Republic said, also
through Twitter, that the video was added to the ongoing investigation410.
305. According to information provided to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, the Council for Transparency,
published a recommendation on October 22 regarding the obligation to deliverpublic information -reliable and
truthful- in exceptional situations, in which it recommended that the availability of official information, easily
accessible and in a centralized and permanently updated way, can avoid the spreading of false and confusing
news, which would in turn increase people's fear and sense of insecurity411. The Council for Transparency issued
these recommendations to be complied with by the PoliceDepartment.
306. Likewise, it was denounced that in press conferences convened by President Piñera during the State of
Emergency, questions from the press would not have been allowed. This same practice occurred with the press
conferences offered by military commanders to announce the establishment of a curfew and the measures
carried out during the State of Emergency, and in the appearances of the Chief of National Defense, General Javier
Iturriaga412.
F. Internet and freedom of expression
307. According to information provided by civil society organizations, there would have been blockages and
the elimination of content related toprotests on various digital platforms, for allegations of alleged violations to
community norms (terms and conditions of their service)413.
308. The organizations indicated that the mechanisms of appeal and review of this type of decisions are not
accessible to those affected. They added that the insufficient information provided to the affected users would
prevent them from fully understanding what the content or suspension of the account was due to, which would
force the intervention of civil society organizations (as reliable third parties intermediating before the
companies) to obtain the missing information, slowing down the recovery of the content, and risking theability
406CIPER. October 22, 2019. Manifestante murió en la Posta Central y gobierno no lo incluyó en la lista oficial de fallecidos.
407 Colegio Médico de Chile. October 25, 2019. Colegio Médico expuso en comisiones de Derechos Humanos del Senado y la Cámara de Diputados;
Sociedad Chilena de Oftalmología. November 11, 2019. Informe Unidad Trauma Ocular Hospital del Salvador.
408 Publimetro. November 19, 2019. "Me pareció raro su parche": fotógrafo denuncia uso de apodos en la identificación de carabineros durante
marcha en Concepción.
409Emol. November 20, 2019. Contraloría oficia a Carabineros por presuntas irregularidades en identificación de uniformes. Publimetro.
November 24, 2019. Cómo olvidar a "Superdick": Carabineros ingresa respuesta a Contraloría por uso de apodos y denuncia amenazas de
muerte a uniformado.
410Fundación Datos Protegidos and Observatorio del Derecho a la Comunicación. Informe sobre los múltiples casos de violaciones a los
derechos humanos en Chile durante las primeras 5 semanas la crisis social. Ch. I. Para. A. CNN Chile. November 21, 2019. Contraloría agrega
video desmentido por Carabineros a investigación sobre uniformados sin identificación.
411 Consejo Para La Transparencia (CPLT). October 22, 2019. Declaración Pública.
412 Information broadcast by Chilevisión on its nightly news show of October 27. Fundación Datos Protegidos and Observatorio del Derecho
a la Comunicación. Informe sobre los múltiples casos de violaciones a los derechos humanos en Chile durante las primeras 5 semanas la crisis
social. Ch. I. Para. C.
413 Facebook. Community Standards Enforcement Report. Fayer Wayer. October 21, 2019. Chile: ¿Están realmente las redes sociales borrando
los videos de denuncia?
98
to make serious or urgent events visible. In addition, said users would not receive any information regarding
the reasons why their accounts or contents have been deleted414.
309. Likewise, this Office has received information on complaints regarding investigations and intimidation
actions initiated by the Chilean police that would use as evidence information coming from social network
monitoring, through the monitoring of Internet users who use some hashtags such as
#ChileViolaLosDerechosHumanos #LosMilicosNoSonTusAmigos #ChileNoQuiereMigajas #ChileDesperto
#RenunciaPiñera #ChileQuiereCambios,, which would have been trending during every day of social protests
and state of emergency in the country415.
G. Progress
310. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the approval by the Senate Constitution
Commission on June 10 of a large part of the article on the Protection of Personal Data project, although until
the end of this annual report a definition would be pending as to whether a specialized Agency will be created
or if the role will be assumed by the Council for Transparency416 .
311. On July 12, the Comptroller General of the Republic of Chile published an opinion in which it resolved
that “it is not appropriate” for public institutions to block users of their Twitter accounts. And that, therefore,
they must unblock those individuals who are prevented from entering these institutional channels. However,
this "in no way means that people can treat the authorities in inappropriate or insulting terms or refer to public
services without due respect," according to the entity417.
312. According topublic information, on November 19, the Court of Appeals of Santiago de Chile accepted an
appeal for protection and ordered the press team of the Presidency of the Republic to rule on the request for reaccreditation of the media, The Times Chile to cover the activities in the Palacio de LaMoneda418.
313. Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must be prohibited
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression. ”
314. In addition, the Inter-American Court indicated that, "with regard to accreditations or authorizations to
the press media for participation in official events, which imply a possible restriction on the exercise of the
freedom to seek, receive, and disseminate information and ideas of all kinds, it must be demonstrated that its
application is legal,pursues a legitimate objective, and is necessary and proportional in relation to the objective
it intends in a democratic society. Accreditations requirements must be concrete, objective, and reasonable, and
its application transparent. It is upto the State to demonstrate that it has complied with the above requirements
when establishing restrictions on access to information under its control419.
H. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
315. On May 14, the National Renovation [Renovación Nacional] (RN) Congress Deputy, René García was
accused of insulting parliamentarians and assaulting Radio ADN journalist Kevin Felgueras420 in the framework
of the debate of the commission investigating the purchase of land by Under Secretary Rodrigo Ubilla. Garcia
would have kicked the journalist to prevent him from opening a door. Through a public statement, the bench of
congress deputies of the Party for Democracy [Partido por la Democracia] (PPD) rejected the attitude of the
parliamentarian and recalled that "our code of conduct requires us to strive to act in all aspects of life according
to the virtues of an exemplary citizen, and clearly in this case it he has overlooked this rule that regulates our
actions"421.
316. On June 20, The Clinic’s site reported that strangers entered their offices and at least 15 computers and
other media work equipment were stolen, including sensitive material. In addition, according to a statement
414Derechos Digitales. October 2019. Situación de derechos humanos y el uso de tecnología en el contexto de la protesta social en Chile 2019.
III, Pag. 6.
415 Derechos Digitales. October 2019. Situación de derechos humanos y el uso de tecnología en el contexto de la protesta social en Chile 2019.
VIII, Pag. 10 . La Tercera. October 28, 2019. Gobierno rastrea rol de venezolanos en Twitter.
416 Senado Chile. June 11, 2019. Protección de datos personales: dudas por la institucionalidad que se hará cargo.
417 Contraloría de Chile. Dictamen 014953. PDI, uso cuenta institucional red social Twitter, improcedencia bloqueo usuarios particulares,
derecho a petición. La Tercera. July 12, 2019. Contraloría determina que "no procede" que una institución pública bloquee a usuarios de Twitter
por opiniones o expresiones.
418 Poder Judicial República de Chile. November 19, 2019. Corte de Santiago ordena a la Presidencia responder solicitud de reacreditación de
medio de prensa.
419I/A Court H. R. Case Claude Reyes et al v. Chile. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Serie C No. 151, para. 93; I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v.
Venezuela. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C No. 194. Para. 375; I/A Court H. R. Case Perozo et al v. Venezuela. Judgment of January 28,
2009. Serie C No. 195, para. 346.
420Cooperativa CL. May 15, 2019. Diputado García insultó a parlamentarias y agredió a periodista en el Congreso.
421 EMOL. May 16, 2019. Gobierno llama "al respeto" tras agresión de diputado García a periodista y dice que siempre rechazarán la violencia.
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from the media, strangers were able to access the entire building, where the facilities of Chile Transparente and
other organizations are also located422.
317. On August 9, a TVN journalist formally denounced the Coquimbo Unido staff for sexual harassment, a
situation that would have occurred when she was covering a soccer team's training at the Las Rosas sports
complex. According to the journalist’s account, a group of players shouted obscenities and made gestures of
sexual connotation with their genitals. For its part, the Club defended itself, in a statement, and said that from
that moment on it will limit access to the press, arguing that it was the reporter who would have been confused
because “the facts show that yesterday a part of the press crew crossed the limits of proximity of the dressing
room of our Honor Roll”423.
318. On numerous occasions, this Office has emphasized that social gender constructions and historical
discrimination against women determine thatthepatterns of violence thatpersist in the region against thepress
have particularities and/or a differentiated impact on women journalists and media workers. The Office of the
Special Rapporteur has indicated that violence against women journalists and media workers “manifests itself
in different ways, from murder, sexual violence, including sexual harassment to intimidation, abuse of power,
and threats based on gender”.424 This Office has also observed that “violence against women is perpetrated by
different actors, such as State officials, sources of information, or colleagues and takes place in various contexts
and spaces, including the streets, workplace, and state offices or institutions”425.
319. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators,
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
I. Communications Surveillance
320. According to a report called Operación topógrafo: el espionaje del Ejército a cuatro denunciantes de
irregularidades426, of the newspaper La Tercera, broadcasted on August 10, the Army Intelligence Directorate
(DINE) would have carried out a so-called “Operation W” aimed at spying to journalist Mauricio Weibel
Barahonda. Indeed, this body would have followed the aforementioned journalist and would have intervened
his telephone lines between 2016 and 2017 from the DINE, when he was finishing the process of his book
"Traición a la patria", in which he reported a case of corruption over alleged fraud and diversion of public funds
from the Copper Reserved Law that would have been perpetrated by members of the Armed Forces. The
investigation had a high impact on public opinion and on the response of the institutions due to the public
interest of the investigation and the alleged acts of corruption that it wouldreveal427.
321. After knowing the information, Weibel recalled having been followed by strangers -whichwas repeatedfor several occasions in 2016 and in different activities, bothpublic andprivate. During that time, he held several
meetings with newspaper sources and was still in full investigation into the events inside the Army. The
journalist also reported two assaults on The Clinic newspaper while publishing reports on irregularities there,
in which they only stole computers, as well as having been the victim of computers hacks while working on the
TVN television channel428. In 2017 the authorities would also have intervened the phones of four active and
retired Army officials who were suspected of leaking documents to the press about irregularities in the Chilean
armed forces. According to the archives published by the newspaper La Tercera, the case of espionage on these
four officials was called " Operación Topógrafos” and consisted of five records with 18 pages of transcripts and
two telephone conversations. In accordance with the powers established in Article 41 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Office of the Special Rapporteur sent the State of Chile requesting information
on the public allegations of alleged espionage on journalist Marcelo Weibel and on four informants of alleged
acts of corruption in the Army of that country. The request sent on August 26 was not answered within the
granted period, nor by the closing date of this report.
422 The Clinic. July 1, 2019. Comunicado público: Desconocidos ingresan a oficinas de The Clinic y se llevan al menos 15 computadores. La
Tercera. July 1, 2019. Semanario The Clinic sufre robo de "material sensible" en sus oficinas.
423 La Tercera. August 10, 2019. Una periodista de TVN denuncia al plantel de Coquimbo Unido por acoso sexual; el club lo desmiente. Bio Bio.
August 10, 2019. Periodista de TVN presenta denuncia contra futbolistas de Coquimbo Unido por acoso sexual. 24 Horas Chile / Youtube.
August 9, 2019. Periodista de TVN Red Coquimbo sufrió acoso sexual durante entrenamiento de Coquimbo Unido.
424 IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 251.
425IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 251. The Office of the Special Rapporteur quotes
several sources, including: CIMAC. Informe diagnóstico. Violencia contra mujeres periodistas. México 2010-2011. September 7, 2012. P. 11;
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). June 7, 2011. The silencing crime: Sexual violence and journalists.
426 La Tercera. August 10, 2019. Operación topógrafo: el espionaje del Ejército a cuatro denunciantes de irregularidades.
427Cooperativa. August 11, 2019. Ejército por presunto espionaje: Las actividades de inteligencia se han ajustado a la ley. La Izquierda Diario.
August 12, 2019. Se destapa el libre espionaje del Ejército de Chile.
428 IFEX. August 20, 2019. Chile accused of spying on investigative journalist Mauricio Weibel. La Tercera. August 12, 2019. Operación W:
periodista denunciará caso de espionaje que apunta al Ejército.
100
322. On March 18, a new Mobile Surveillance System in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago was presented
in Chile429, which through the use of drones and cameras would seek to combat crime and assist in the
coordination of the various regional and community authorities to improve security. According to the available
information, the unmanned aircraft would be equipped with high-definition cameras to obtain visual
information and transmit it live to monitoring centers located in the regional municipalities, where trained
operators would observe the images delivered by the drones430.
323. This Office was informed that, together with high-definition cameras, aircraft would have computer
programs that would allow them to do automated facial recognition. In addition to the aircraft in the
Metropolitan Region, a pilot program would have been implemented in Antofagasta in December 2018, and the
extension to the regions of Coquimbo, Valparaíso, Biobío, and La Araucanía is planned this year; and the rest of
the country will be applied in 2020. In accordance with the powers established in Article 41 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Office of the Special Rapporteur sent a letter requesting information on the
implementation of a new Mobile Surveillance System in the country to the State of Chile, where it is observed
that the characteristics of the described program and the technologies involved in it have the potential to affect
the right to privacy and freedom of expression, due to its massive, permanent, and indiscriminate nature. The
request sent on June 11, was not answered within the grantedperiod, nor at the closing date of this report.
J. Other social protests
324. Throughout 2019, this Office has registered different complaints about repressive actions that occur in
the context of student demonstrations by Police officers in Chile, framed in the so-called Safe Classroom [Aula
Segura] project, which sought to strengthen the powers of directors of educational establishments, allowing
them to immediately expel students who are involved in serious acts of violence. This initiative has received
harsh criticism due to complaints of violations of the rights of the girls, boys, and adolescents, which translates,
for example, in a systematic review of the backpacks of the students of the National Institute in mobilizations
and in the immediate vicinity of the educational establishment431.
325. In this context, on May 28, civil society organizations denounced excessive use of force against
protesters as well as communication students. The photography student of the Arcos Institute, Javiera Godoy,
and the photographer of Agencia Aton, Javier Torres, were attacked, their material stolen, and they were
detained by members of the Special Forces (FFEE) of thePolice432.
326. On September 27, the Climate March was held in the Metropolitan region of Santiago de Chile, which
had a violent closure with a report of 13 persons detained and 10 injured, including five press professionals. A
relevant case is that of the journalist of CHV News, of initials NK, who was stabbed in the leg by a stranger, while
the cameraman’s equipment would have been stolen. Likewise, cameraman Ricardo Leiva and journalist
Sebastián Marchant, both of TVN, were assaulted by strangers, and the record of the attack was broadcasted on
the channel itself. Aggressions were also reported against the CNN press team433, Andrea Von Dessauer, Nicolás
Krumm, Cristián Álvarez, and Marcelo Villagrán.
327. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of
assembly”434 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly to through social protest must not be subject to
authorization by the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its realization”435.
429 Prensa Presidencia de Chile. March 18, 2019. Presidente Piñera lanza sistema de vigilancia con drones en la Región Metropolitana: “Es
nuestro deber hacer todo para llevar más tranquilidad y seguridad a los hogares chilenos”.
430 IFEX. April 5, 2019. Contra la vigilancia masiva en los espacios públicos del “Sistema de televigilancia móvil”.
431 Ministerio de Educación de Chile. September 20, 2018. Gobierno envía al Congreso Proyecto de Ley “Aula Segura”.
432 El Ciudadano. May 29, 2019. “Me golpearon varias veces la cabeza con una lacrimógena”: Los relatos de los reporteros agredidos por FFEE
en el Instituto Nacional. “Testimony of Javiera Godoy photoreporter beaten by Special Forces carabinera Nicole Doumot Guzmán, today at
the gates of the National Institute”. Twitter account of Piensa Prensa. @PiensaPrensa May 28, 2019. 9.16 P.M. “Mauricio, a photographer
arrested by police officers at the gates of the National Institute: "They grabbed me for taking pictures when they were holding detainees ".
May 28, 2019. 6.15 P.M. “Carabineros trying to take photo cameras from photographers detained at the National Institute (to hide evidence)
of beatings”. May 28, 2019. 5.40 P.M.
433 Cooperativa CL. September 27, 2019. Encapuchados agredieron a equipos de prensa en marcha por el clima. Bio Bio. September 27, 2019.
Apuñalan a periodista de CHV durante marcha contra cambio climático y roban cámara del canal. La Nación. September 28, 2019. Rubilar y
agresión a equipos de prensa: “Cuando se ataca a un periodista se ataca al corazón de la democracia.
434 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
435 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
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10.COLOMBIA
328. Throughout 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur noted with concern the excessive use of force in
the context of socialprotests initiated since November 21,in Colombia. In particular,it draw attention to a series
of actions that led to detentions of journalists, as well as physical attacks and multiple obstacles that the
communicators had to face during the coverage and recording of protests. In a more general context, the Office
of the Special Rapporteur warns that journalists who carry out investigative journalism were subjected to
stigmatization by political leaders, contract termination, and dismissals in various media, which raises concerns
about a possible chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression.
329. Likewise, the office received information on the murder of four communicators for reasons allegedly
linked to their journalistic work and urged to investigate these cases without ruling out the hypothesis related
to the exercise of their profession. Finally, this Office highlights progress in the area of the National Unit for the
Protection of Journalists and in the area of community broadcasting. Progress was also noted in various
investigations concerning murders of journalists, notwithstanding that there are still pending cases that must
be addressed with due diligence and sufficient resources to end impunity for crimes perpetrated in previous
years.
A.Prosecution of justice
330. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that high levels of impunity persist in Colombia with regard
to crimes and attacks againstjournalists for reasons related to their work. As documented by thisOffice, between
1995 and 2019 more than 100 journalists were killed in situations related to their professional practice.
Likewise, this Office observed in its previous annual reports on the tendency for these crimes to remain in
impunity as a result of excessive delays in the investigations that led to the prescription ofthe cases436.
331. Within the aforementioned context, regarding the murder of Jaime Garzón in 1999 that was declared a
crime against humanity in 2016437, the Office of the Special Rapporteur notes with deep concern the decision of
the Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Bogotá adopted on July 19, in which it decided to revoke said
qualification and reduced by four years the 30 years penalty imposed on the convictedperson as the intellectual
author of the crime, José MiguelNarváez Martínez, formerDeputy Director of the former Administrative Security
Department (DAS). At the close of this report, the Criminal Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court would have
pending the definition of the status of the qualification438. In turn, the Office of the Special Rapporteur was
informed that the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) would have denied the request for freedom to Colonel (r)
Jorge Elíecer Plazas Acevedo, who is being prosecuted for his alleged participation in the crime of journalist
Jaime Garzón439.
332. Regarding the progress in the investigation into the kidnapping and torture suffered in 2001 by
journalist Claudia Julieta Duque, following her journalistic work on the murder of Jaime Garzón, on January 18,
the Second Special Criminal Court of Bogotá would have decided to order the freedom by William Alberto
Merchán, former DAS agent who would have been involved in the events, due to the expiration of the term for
the start of the oral trial440. However, on February 19, the Superior Court of Bogotá would have revoked that
decision. On February 25, the trial against Merchán441would have begun, although on August 14 it transcended
in the media that he was again released following the order of a court in Bogotá as a result of delays in the
progress of the trial
442. Within this context, with respect to the process followed against Emiro Rojas Granados,
former Deputy Director of the DAS, in July the Office of the Special Rapporteur received with concern the
information on a judicial resolution adopted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court of Bogotá that ordered
436IACHR. Annual Report 2014. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 13.
March 9, 2015; IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression..OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 48/15. December 31, 2015; IACHR. Annual Report 2016. Annual Report of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 22/17. March 15, 2017; IACHR. Annual Report 2017. Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 210/17. December 31, 2017; IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office
of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019.
437IACHR. Annual Report 2016. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. (Chapter II)
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 22/17. March 15, 2017. Paras. 313, 314.
438 El Universal. July 26, 2019. Tribunal redujo condena a exdirector del DAS por homicidio de Jaime Garzón; El País. July 26, 2019. Crimen de
Jaime Garzón no se puede catalogar como de lesa humanidad: Tribunal; El Heraldo. July 31, 2019. Consejo de Estado y Fiscalía clasificaron
crimen de Jaime Garzón como de lesa humanidad: víctimas; El Heraldo. August 13, 2019. Corte definirá si el de Garzón fue un crimen de lesa
humanidad; lafm. August 12, 2019. Corte decidirá si caso de Jaime Garzón es un crimen de lesa humanidad.
439RCN Radio. November 28, 2019. JEP negó libertad a coronel procesado por el crimen de Jaime Garzón; CM& Sistema Informativo. November
28, 2019. La JEP niega libertad al coronel (r) Jorge Eliécer Plazas Acevedo.
440FLIP. January 30, 2019. Exfuncionarios del DAS investigados por el delito de tortura contra Claudia Julieta Duque se encuentran en libertad.
441El Espectador. 25 de febrero de 2019. Se inicia juicio contra exagente del DAS que habría torturado a Claudia Julieta Duque.
442Wradio. August 14, 2019. En libertad acusado de tortura psicológica a periodista Claudia Julieta Duque; RCN Radio. August 14, 2019. En
libertad exagente del DAS procesado por tortura psicológica contra periodista.
102
journalist Duque to avoid issuing opinions or non-objective information about the trial443. After this judicial
decision, journalist Duque announced on November 17 that she would suspend herparticipation in the criminal
proceedings initiated against the alleged perpetrators to avoid further revictimization444.
333. Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza spoke on several occasions regarding this restriction imposed on
journalist Julieta Duque and recalled that the prohibition of prior censorship is the rule in the inter-American
system. Although during criminal proceedings, the courts may adopt certain exceptions to the principle of
publicity, they must adhere to protect a legitimate interest and comply with the necessity and proportionality
test to achieve the intendedpurpose. However, in no case should the victim herself be prevented from accessing
information and disseminating information about her own case.
334. Despite the context indicated above, this Office documented a series of developments by the State of
Colombia in its obligation to seek justice, within which convictions were recorded for crimes of threat against
journalists445 and other progress in investigations andprocesses related to murders of journalists446. Among the
cases observed, according to the available information, Jorge Hernando López Escobar, convicted in 2015 as an
accomplice to the murder of journalist Orlando Sierra, was presented to the Caldas Sectional Prosecutor on
January 22 following a ruling by the Criminal Court of the Supreme Court of Justice issued on December 11, 2018
that ratified the sentence of 36 years and 3 months in prison for FerneyTapasco González, who was declared as
the intellectual author of the crime in 2015. However, the criminal cassation instance reduced the sentence of
28 years and 10 months in prison for a sentence of 17 years for López Escobar and his brother Fabio López
Escobar447.
335. With regard to the kidnapping, rape and torture of Colombian journalist Jineth Bedoya in 2000, on May
6 of this year, the Fifth Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit sentenced Alejandro Cárdenas and Jesús Emiro
Pereira to 30 and 40 years448. However, despite these convictions, at least 25 people, including public officials,
would be involved in the facts, and regarding those the investigations have not progressed449. Within this
context, on July 16, the IACHR presented to the Inter-American Court case 12.954, Jineth Bedoya Lima et. al, v.
Colombia for the breach of a series of recommendations to the State for it to carry out a complete, impartial,
effectiveinvestigation and within a reasonable timeframe that allows to determine all the corresponding
responsibilities for the crimes committed against the journalist Jineth Bedoya Lima, including the possible
participation of state agents, guaranteeing her safety and that of her family450.
336. Regarding the murder of Nelson Carvajal Carvajal in 1998, the Office of the Special Rapporteur
welcomes the recognition of the State of Colombia of its international responsibility, in compliance with the
ruling of the Inter-American Court of March 13, 2018. The Government made this recognition in the framework
of the Half-Year Meeting of the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) held in Cartagena, Colombia, onMarch
443 FLIP. July 25, 2019. FLIP rechaza orden de censura en el caso de la periodista Claudia Julieta Duque; Wradio. July 26, 2019. Juez prohíbe a
Claudia Duque emitir opinionessobre proceso por tortura psicológica; La Nueva Prensa. July 25, 2019. Periodista Claudia Julieta Duque, víctima
de tortura, recusa a juez de su caso y anuncia que la desacatará; La Nueva Prensa. July 25, 2019. Tortura,silenciamiento y censura permanente.
444El Espectador. November 18, 2019. "La impunidad ha ganado una vez más la batalla en este país": Claudia Julieta Duque; Knight Center for
Journalism in the Americas. November 20, 2019. Colombian journalist Claudia Duque renounces criminal proceedings in case for her
psychological torture; denounces impunity; Equipo Nizkor. November 18, 2019. Ante la orden de silenciamiento forzado, CJD renuncia a su
presencia en el procedimiento penal y rechaza la competencia de la JEP.
445República de Colombia. Fiscalía General. September 3, 2019. Tres condenas por amenazas contra periodistas, defensores de derechos
humanos y líderes sociales; Asuntos Legales. April 3, 2019. Fiscalía condenó a 38 meses de prisión a Francisco Andica por amenazas a
periodistas y magistrados; El Heraldo. April 3, 2019. Condenan a tuitero que amenazó a ‘Matador’; FLIP. September 10, 2019. FLIP reconoce
el trabajo de la Fiscalía en investigación de amenazas pero exige más avances; FLIP. December 12, 2019. Juez profiere la condena más alta por
amenazas contra periodistas.
446 Regarding progress made in the investigations into the crime against Guillermo Cano Isaza in 1986, who served as director of El
Espectador newspaper, the Attorney General's Office obtained a "medida de aseguramiento en cárcel" (jail assurance measure) for Jhon
Jairo Velásquez Vásquez aka Popeye , and Gustavo Adolfo Gutiérrez Arrubla, aka Maxwell. As was reported, these individuals "were part of
the so-called armed wing of Pablo Escobar's structure and, apparently, had knowledge of and had allegedly influenced the planning of the
attack against then director of El Espectador daily." República de Colombia. Fiscalía General de la Nación. May 27, 2019. Medida de
aseguramiento en cárcel para alias Popeye por magnicidio del periodista Guillermo Cano Isaza. Regarding the murders of social communicator
Luis Peralta and his wife Sofía Quintero in 2015 in El Recreo neighborhood of Doncello, department of Caquetá, legal authorities
apprehended a person who was allegedly involved in the crime. In March 2018, the material author of this crime, YeanArlex Buenaventura,
was sentenced "to more than 50 years in prison, for the crimes of aggravated homicide in conjunction with trafficking, manufa cturing and
illegal carrying of firearms." República de Colombia.Fiscalía General de la Nación. March 22, 2019. Aprehendida en Doncello (Caquetá)
adolescente que habría participado en homicidio de un periodista y su esposa en el año 2015.
447República de Colombia. Corte Suprema de Justicia. Sala de Casación Penal. SP1658/2018. December 11, 2018; República de Colombia.
Fiscalía General de laNación. January 24, 2019. Capturado para cumplir condena cómplice del homicidio de Orlando Sierra; La Patria. January
22, 2019. Se entregó Jorge Hernando López Escobar, cómplice del asesinato de Orlando Sierra Hernández; La Patria. January 23, 2019. Se
entregó cómplice en asesinato de Orlando Sierra; WRadio. January 24, 2019. Fue capturado un presunto cómplice del homicidio de Orlando
Sierra.
448 CPJ. May 8, 2019. Colombia sentences two ex-paramilitary fighters for 2000 attack on Jineth Bedoya; Knight Center for Journalism in the
Americas. May 8, 2019. After 19 years, two former paramilitary members sentenced for abduction, torture and sexual abuse of Colombian
journalist; El Heraldo. May 7, 2019. Condenan a dos paramilitares por secuestro y violación de la periodista Jineth Bedoya; FLIP. May 7, 2019.
Sentencia en contra de paramilitares: punto de partida para la justicia en el caso de Jineth Bedoya.
449 FLIP. May 7, 2019. Sentencia en contra de paramilitares: punto de partida para la justicia en el caso de Jineth Bedoya.
450 IACHR. July 25, 2019. IACHR Takes Case Involving Colombia to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
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29, 2019451. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur welcomes the decision adopted on August 14 by the
Office of the Prosecutor 95 of the Delegated Unit before the Superior Court of the Judicial District of Bogotá to
declare this crime as a crime against humanity452.
337. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur welcomes the request of forgiveness by the State of
Colombia to the relatives of the journalist Gerardo Bedoya Borrero, murdered in 1997 in Cali. The recognition
of the international responsibility of the State was carried out in a public event held at the La Tertulia Museum,
in Cali, Valle del Cauca, on September 30453, after the arrival of a friendly solution between the State and the
Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) on September 4454.
338. Within the context of crimes against journalists that would be close to prescription, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur welcomes the decision taken in September by the Attorney General's Office to declare the
murder in 1999 of Guzmán Quintero Torresas a crime against humanity; he served as journalist for the
newspaper El Pilón in the city of Valledupar455.
B. Progress
339. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes the decisions of the Constitutional Court in which it
introduces inter-American standards related to the weighting of the right to freedom of expression, the right to
privacy, and the protection of journalists456.
340. Among the cases observed by this Office, in accordance with a judgment of that judicial instance of May
15, 2019, regarding an amparo writ against the National Protection Unit, the court considered that this
institution “violated the rightto dueprocess of the petitioner”since“it did not fulfillits duty to assess the relevant
elements”in order to weigh the level of risk of a journalist, such as“theprofile of the communicator”; “the content
of the information or opinion he disseminates”; and "the context of theplace inwhich he performs his duties”457.
341. In this case, journalist Herley Ramírez Alzate initiated a “amparo writ” against the National Protection
Unit (UNP) under the consideration that several rights ended up being violated by such entity, within which
were affected his right to work and freedom of the press, because in 2018, protection measures that had been
assigned in 2016 were withdrawn. The UNP assessed his risk situation regarding his work as “ordinary”458.
342. In accordance with the reasoning of the court, in order to offer a sufficient guarantee of the right to due
process facing the need to require a personal protection service “… the administrative actions that carry out
valuation studies and security measures must be justified in individualized and specific technical studies that
substantiate them sufficiently and reasonably”
459.
343. Likewise, the court considered different inter-American standards in relation to the obligation of the
State to protect journalists due to their professional work, indicating the “reinforced responsibility” of the State
in contexts of “special vulnerability”; the analysis of “the needs of the communicator's profession and other
individual circumstances”; the gender perspective; the non-limitation to “adopt measures after the events have
occurred” and the need to put into operation “prevention mechanisms and policies to fight impunity and solve
the root causes of violence against journalists”; the analysis of "the local realities that affect them"; among
others460.
344. On the other hand, a bill introduced in 2018 that sought to “guarantee the protection of the honor and
good name of citizens from insults and slander that are presented through social networks and other platforms
in the web”, finally ended up being archived on April 3,2019461.
451 República deColombia. Consejería Presidencial para los derechos humanos y asuntos internacionales. March 29, 2019. Estado colombiano
reconoce responsabilidad y pide perdón en el caso Carvajal Carvajal y otros.
452452Lafm. August 16, 2019. Crimen del periodistaNelson Carvajal, declarado como de lesa humanidad; FLIP. August 22, 2019. SIP,RFKHuman
Rights y FLIP aplauden declaratoria de lesa humanidad del homicidio del periodista Nelson Carvajal.
453 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). September 30, 2019. SIP y gobierno de Colombia resaltan figura de periodista asesinado hace 22
años.
454 IACHR. September 4, 2019. IACHR Welcomes Signing of Friendly Settlement in Case 12,909 Gerardo Bedoya Borrero and Family.
455 El Heraldo. September 14, 2019. Fiscalía declara crimen de lesa humanidad asesinato de periodista Guzmán Quintero; El Pilon. September
15, 2011. Los crímenes de periodistas declarados de lesa humanidad; FLIP. September 26, 2019. Luego de 20 años, homicidio de Guzmán
Quintero Torres es declarado de lesa humanidad; FLIP. Impunidad en Colombia.
456República de Colombia. Corte Constitucional. Sentencia T-145/19; Sentencia T-155/19; Sentencia T-102/19; Sentencia T-179/19;
Sentencia SU274/19; Sentencia T-361/19; Sentencia C-276/19.
457 República de Colombia. Corte Constitucional.Sentencia T-199/19.
458 República de Colombia. Corte Constitucional.Sentencia T-199/19.
459 República de Colombia. Corte Constitucional.Sentencia T-199/19.
460 República de Colombia. Corte Constitucional.Sentencia T-199/19.
461República de Colombia. Congreso de la República. Available at: http://leyes.senado.gov.co/proyectos/index.php/proyectosley/cuatrenio-2018-2022/2018-2019/article/179-por-medio-del-cual-se-crean-normas-de-buen-uso-y-funcionamiento-de-redessociales-y-sitios-web-en-colombia
104
C. Murders
345. Despite the progress made by the Colombian State in its obligation to investigate crimes perpetrated
against journalists, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observes an increasingly critical climate of violence
against the press that translates into a context that seriously restricts freedom of expression and the right of all
Colombian society to receive information of high public interest, and also reveals the institutional weaknesses
for the prevention of these crimes. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur documented with deep
concern the murder of fourcommunicators for reasons allegedly linked to theirprofessional work and fears that
these crimes will lead to the silencing and self-censorship ofcommunicators.
346. Among the crimes documented by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, information was received about
the murder of Mauricio Lezama in Arauquita, department of Arauca, on May 9. The victim worked as a
departmental film advisor and cultural manager and would have been working on a documentary of historical
and political content linked to the armed conflict in Colombia462. According to published information, the ELN
would be involved in the crime463.
347. On June 12, the social communicator Libardo Montenegro was killed with firearms by hitmen in
Samaniego, Nariño department464. The victim served as an announcer for the community radio station
Samaniego Stereo and days before his murder he was promoting a march in defense of humanrights465.
348. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on the murder committed against
Anderson Pérez Osorio, on June 17, in the municipality of Caloto, department of Cauca. As reported, the victim
in his past belonged to the ranks of the Farc and was serving as a human rights activist and social
communicator466.
349. On October 18, the announcer of Radio Planeta,Javier Córdoba Chaguendo, was killed with firearms, in
the town of the Llorente district of the department of Nariño. The murder would have occurred in front of the
station's facilities. According to the available information, the communicator had no threats of any kind and
hosted entertainment programs467.
350. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that according to Principle 9 of the IACHR Declaration of
Principles on Freedom of Expression, "[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation, threatening of social
communicators, as well as the material destruction of the media, violates the fundamental rights of persons and
severely curtails freedom of expression. It is the States' duty to prevent and investigate these acts, to punish
their perpetrators and to ensure adequate reparation for the victims".
462República de Colombia. Gobernaciónde Antioquia. Mauricio Lezama: líder social y Consejero cultural que pierde Colombia; República de
Colombia. Gobierno Departamental de Arauca. May 13, 2019. Sentidas condolencias ofrece Gobierno Departamental a la Familia Lezama;
Nodal. Colombia: May 11, 2019. Asesinan a cineasta que realizaba un documental sobre víctimas del conflicto armado.
463TRT Español. May 20, 2019. Asesinan al director de cine Mauricio Lezama en Arauca, oriente de Colombia;El Diario del Llano. May 10, 2019.
ELN sería responsable del asesinato de Mauricio Lezama en Arauca; FLIP. July 9, 2019. El homicidio de Mauricio Lezama y la sentencia de
silencio para la prensa en Arauca; FLIP. May 9, 2019. Asesinado en Arauquita el Consejero de Cine Mauricio Lezama; Inter American Press
Association (IAPA). Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Colombia. October 3, 2019.
464El País. June 12, 2019. Asesinan a periodista en Samaniego, Nariño; El Nacional. June 12, 2019. Asesinaron a periodista de radio comunitaria
en el suroeste de Colombia; 90 Minutos. June 12, 2019. Investigan asesinato de periodista tras atentado en Samaniego, Nariño; La opinión. June
13, 2019. Asesinado otro periodista en Samaniego, Nariño; lafm. June 12, 2019. Periodista fue asesinado en Nariño.
465 FLIP. June 12, 2019. La FLIP rechaza el asesinato del periodista Libardo Montenegro en Samaniego y exige investigaciones; FLIP. August 12,
2019. El homicidio de Libardo Montenegro y la condena de la autocensura para Samaniego; Servindi. June 14, 2019. Libardo: una luz de paz y
comunicación que la violencia apagó; Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Colombia.
October 3, 2019.
466Canal1. June 18, 2019. Denuncian asesinato de excombatiente y periodista de la FARC en Cauca; FLIP. June 22, 2019. Comunicado de la FLIP
sobre el asesinato de Ánderson Pérez.
467 RCN Radio. October 19, 2019. Asesinan a locutor de radio en plena cabina en Tumaco (Nariño), QHubo Cali. October 19, 2019. Balearon a
sangre fría a un locutor en plena emisora; Tubarco. October 19, 2019. Locutor fue asesinado por sicario que se hizo pasar por cliente.
105
D. Attacks against journalist
351. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes with concern the continuity of a context of aggressions468,
within which there was a high number of episodes of death threats469, physical attacks470, and intimidation
through social networks471, text messages472, and intimidating calls473 and pamphlets with intimidating
messages474, recorded in different regions of Colombia that affects journalists covering different topics of high
public interest linked to the peaceprocess, corruption, and drug trafficking, among others. These aggressions
were focused on regions of Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, Cauca, La Guajira, Santa Marta, Mitú, among other locations.
352. The Office of the Special Rapporteur urges the State of Colombia to develop and articulate protection
mechanisms for the prevention of violence against journalists, as well as to continue the investigations that lead
to sanction of the material and intellectual authors, and to ensurean adequate reparation for the victims, in
accordance with Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR.
E. SocialProtest
353. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observed the development of numerous social protests during the
year in different regions of Colombia, in which there were incidents between protesters and police officers, as
468On February 7, during the ceremony of the National Journalism Award, the Minister of Information Technology, Sylvia Constaín, referred
to the work of the Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (FLIP) and expressed her concern over the threats to journalists , and said that"the
Government has asked the authorities to take all necessary measures to protect the lives of communicators and to progress in the
investigations until they find those responsible".República de Colombia. Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información. February 7, 2019.
Palabras de la ministra de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones, Sylvia Constaín, en el Premio Nacional de Periodismo..
The Office of the Special Rapporteur is also aware of the constant monitoring carried out by FLIP: as of late July it had registered more than
200 violations of freedom of expression and more than 250 victims. FLIP. Mapa de violaciones a la libertad deprensa.
FLIP. February 17, 2019. ELN retiene a periodistas en el Catatumbo y hurta material periodístico; El Noticiero del Pueblo. March 11, 2019.
Periodistas De Cartagena Rechazan Amenazas Con Plantón En Plaza De La Paz;FLIP. July 5, 2019. Primer semestre de 2019: 196 ataques a la
prensa y una sentencia positiva; El informador. July 23, 2019. Multinacional rechaza amenazas contra periodistas en La Guajira; 90 minutos.
August 6, 2019. FLIP rechazó amenazas de muerte contra tres periodistas de Cali enviadas a su celular; El Nodo. August 8, 2019. #ALERTA
Periodistas de varios medios de comunicación reciben amenazas de "Brazo armado" de FARC; El País. August 8, 2019. 85 periodistas han
recibido amenazas de muerte en lo corrido del año en Colombia; Uniminutoradio. August 8, 2019. Hay preocupación por amenazas a periodistas
colombianos; 90 minutos. August 9, 2019. Crece rechazo por amenazas que recibieron tres periodistas y dos camarógrafos de Cali; lafm. August
16, 2019. Cinco periodistas denuncian amenazas de muerte; La Nueva Prensa. September 13, 2019. Claudia Duque: “Hay una estrategia de
silenciamiento a la prensa en Colombia”; El Espectador. May 3, 2019. Amenazan a periodista de Radio Nacional de Colombia en Mitú; Lafm.
May 5, 2019. Periodista Daniel Martínez dejó Arauca por amenazas a su vida; RCN Radio. January 11, 2019. Periodistas fueron intimidados en
El Salado durante trabajo de campo; Mundonoticias. March 11, 2019. Hoy plantón en contra de las amenazas a periodistas en Cartagena;
Canal1. Amenazan a periodista con cuchillo mientras grababa a un colado en TransMilenio; Radionacional. March 3, 2019. Periodista de Radio
Nacional en Mitú denuncia amenazas contra su vida; Pacocol. May 14, 2019. Denuncia pública: Continúan amenazas de paramilitares en
Arauca; IFEX/ Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). May 26, 2019. Colombian photojournalist Federico Ríos flees after online harassment;
FLIP. October 3, 2019. Radio Súper Popayán estuvo cinco horas fuera del aire por un ataque a su infraestructura; FLIP. October 4, 2019. El CPJ
y la FLIP expresan su preocupación por la amenaza a Daniel Coronell;
469Lafm. January 11, 2019. Periodistas son amenazados en El Salado cuando hacían trabajo de campo; Fecolper. January 19, 2019. Periodistas
de Caracol Radio son amenazados de muerte en El Salado – El Carmen de Bolívar; lafm. March 3, 2019. Periodista Emerson Castro denuncia
amenazas de muerte; FLIP. June 5, 2019. La FLIP rechaza la amenaza de la que fue víctima la periodista Tatiana Salamanca; FLIP. August 6,
2019. Preocupantes amenazas de muerte contra periodistas que investigan cultivos ilícitos; FLIP. September 11, 2019. Periodista de RTVC en
Nariño fue víctima de nuevas amenazas contra ella y su familia;
470FLIP. January 31, 2019. Periodista Tana Montoya fue víctima de intento de homicidio en el municipio de Anzá; FLIP. May 23, 2019. La FLIP
rechaza graves agresiones contra periodistas de Q’hubo; FLIP. May 27, 2019. FLIP rechaza obstrucción a la circulación y violencia contra
Boyacá 7Días; RED+. July 10, 2019. En intento de asesinato a periodista de Cúcuta un menor de edad resultó muerto; El Tiempo. July 10, 2019.
Periodista de Cúcuta salió ileso de atentado pero su sobrino murió; La Opinión. May 23, 2019. Salvaje agresión a equipo de Q’hubo Bogotá; El
País. June 10, 2019. Periodista denuncia ser golpeada por su jefe en Revista Congreso, en Bogotá; FLIP. July 29, 2019. La FLIP rechaza el ataque
a un vehículo de TeleantioquiaNoticias.
471 Protagonista. January 12, 2019. Vanessa de la Torre denuncia amenaza de muerte a través de redes sociales; Primer Tiempo. May 5, 2019.
PrimerTiempo.CO rechaza amenazas contra periodista Rafa Guerra; FLIP. May 20, 2019. Desconocidos atacaron a periodista de la Silla Vacía
a través de sus redes sociales; lafm. June 11, 2019. Ernesto Macías anuncia medidas contra revista Congreso por agresión a periodista; FLIP.
August 6, 2019. La FLIP rechaza las amenazas y el ciberacoso en contra de la periodista Vicky Dávila a través de redes sociales; Agencia API.
September 22, 2019. Vicky Dávila denuncia campaña de desprestigio en su contra.
472 La opinión. March 17, 2019. Amenazan a periodista deportivo en Nariño; Diario del Sur. March 18, 2019. "Ojo con lo que dice": periodista
deportivo de Pasto recibe escalofriante amenaza de muerte; 90 minutos. August 6, 2019. FLIP rechazó amenazas de muerte contra tres
periodistas de Cali enviadas a su celular; El Nodo. August 8, 2019. #ALERTA Periodistas de varios medios de comunicación reciben amenazas
de "Brazo armado" de FARC; lafm. August 16, 2019. Cinco periodistas denuncian amenazas de muerte;
473 FLIP. April 3, 2019. La FLIP rechaza el doxing de Abelardo de la Espriella en contra del periodista Camilo Poveda; FLIP. May 2, 2019. La
FLIP rechaza las amenazas contra el periodista Daniel Martínez de RCN en Arauca; El País. August 13, 2019. Periodistas del Cauca denuncian
amenazas de disidencias de las Farc; RCN Radio. September 7, 2019. Amenazan a periodista por denunciar corrupción electoral en Pasto; FLIP.
August 9, 2019. La FLIP rechaza el hostigamiento a la periodista Jineth Bedoya Lima;
474El Informador. July 23, 2019. Multinacional rechaza amenazas contra periodistas en La Guajira; Hoy Diario del Magdalena. August 7, 2019.
Con panfletos amenazan a periodistas en Santa Marta; República de Colombia. Cámara de Representantes. February 7, 2019. Representante
Liberal Andrés Calle Recibe Amenazas; FLIP. September 27, 2019. Nueve periodistas de Pasto fueron amenazados por las ÁguilasNegras.
106
well as attacks by state security forces on journalists whoprovided coverage475.
476. Within this context, on April
4, the IACHR and the Office in Colombia of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rightsurged to
reach a peaceful agreement in the context of violence registered by the Mingasocial initiated in Cauca, which
caused the death of several people, both mingueros and national policepersonnel477.
354. As of November 21, mass protests began in different regions of Colombia to demand the access of
different sectors to social rights, for the fulfillment of the peace agreements, as well as for the context of
insecurity and murder of social and indigenousleaders. Within the framework of these protests, the IACHR
learned about the excessive use of force, the detention of hundreds ofpeople, and the death ofpeople due to acts
of vandalism478. In turn, the Office of the Special Rapporteurdocumented with grave concern serious restrictions
by state security forces on journalists covering the protests. Since the beginning of the protests and during the
first weeks of December, dozens of attacks by elements of the Police and protesters against journalists were
reported, resulting in coverage restrictions, physical attacks, arrests of journalists, as well as damage to work
equipment479.
355. Among the documented cases, the Office of the Special Rapporteur learned with deepregret of the death
of the 18-year-old studentDilan Cruz in a hospitalin Bogotá after being hit by a stunning bomb bypolice officers
in a protest in Bogotá on November 23480.
356. Within the framework of the protests initiated on November 21, at least 19 reporters would have been
arbitrarily detained481. During the day of November 21, the Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed of the
arrests of the independent journalist Andrés Bayona, who was also physically assaulted by elements of the
Police, and of the photographer Andrés MatheoAgudelo482. Also, linked to the coverage of the protests, this Office
received information on the arrest on December 5 of the journalist María Montiel, of Colombia Informa, because
of her journalistic coverage of theprotests; on December 6, journalist Maritza Sánchezwould have been arrested
along with a colleague from the Universo Centro media, because ofpublications linked to the actions of the Police
during the protests; On December 7, three independent reporters who were covering a protest at the El Dorado
airport in Bogotá would have been arrested483. While journalists would have been released after a few hours of
detention, this Office notes with concern that such measures are deliberately aimed at preventing journalistic
coverage.
475Entre los casos documentados, en marzo, una serie de protestas por parte de comunidades indígenas se llevó adelante en una zona
fronteriza con Ecuador, donde los manifestantes bloquearon las calles impidiendo el paso de frontera. Esto despertó la reacción policial y se
registró una fuerte represión por parte de los agentes de seguridad. Las protestas se habrían llevado en razón por la violencia en las zonas
donde radican estas comunidades y por incumplimientos por parte del gobierno en relación con compromisos asumidos.
Canal1. 5 de enero de 2019. San Andrés protesta contra gobierno militar impuesto por Duque; El País. 1 de marzo de 2019. Varios heridos y
detenidos dejan protestas sindicales en Popayán, Cauca; Publimetro. 25 de abril de 2019. Fotógrafo habría sido agredido por la Policía en
medio de las protestas; Portafolio. 25 de abril de 2019. Así fue el balance de las marchas de este jueves en el país; Publimetro. 25 de abril de
2019. Vandalismo y disturbios en el paro: daños a la Catedral Primada y la Plaza de Bolívar; FLIP. 26 de abril de 2019. La FLIP rechaza las
agresiones contra la prensa durante el cubrimiento del Paro Nacional; ONIC. 26 de abril de 2019. ONIC alerta sobre represión a la protesta
social pacífica en la vía Quibdó – Risaralda; Eje21. 26 de abril de 2019. Protestas en Colombia dejan 35 personas detenidas y 11 más heridas;
FLIP. 22 de marzo de 2019. La FLIP rechaza obstrucciones e intimidaciones contra periodistas en el Cauca; FLIP. 20 de marzo de 2019. La FLIP
rechaza las agresiones del Esmad en contra de periodistas que cubrían la Minga en el Cauca; FLIP. 11 de abril de 2019. La FLIP rechaza las
agresiones a la prensa en medio del cubrimiento de la Minga en el departamento del Cauca; Publimetro. 4 de septiembre de 2019. Revelan
videos de policías agrediendo brutalmente a estudiantes en Soacha; OCEColombia. USO rechaza represión del ESMAD a protesta pacífica de la
UIS; FLIP. 9 de octubre de 2019. Esmad agredió a periodista de Colombia Informa durante las manifestaciones en la Universidad Industrial de
Santander.
476 Semanario Universidad. March14, 2019. Protestaindígena en Colombia es respondida con represión y choques; Perú 21. Colombia: Protesta
indígena bloquea importante vía y genera represión y choques.
477 IACHR. April 5, 2019. IACHR and Colombian Branch of the OHCHR Insist on the Need to Keep up Talks, Stress their Call for Non-Violence
in Cauca.
478 IACHR. December 2, 2019. IACHR Concerned about Repression by Government Agents in Colombia, Rejects All Forms of Violence in the
Context of Protests.
479El Universal. December 16, 2019. La nueva generación de la protesta en Colombia; El País. December 11, 2019. Flip ha registrado 47
violaciones a la labor periodística desde el inicio de las protestas;Blu Radio. November 22, 2019. Los cinco desmanes del Esmad más repudiados
en redes sociales; Seguimiento.co. November 25, 2019. Periodistas de Noticias RCN han sido expulsados durante cubrimiento de protestas;
LaFm. November 29, 2019. En libertad periodistas retenidos por Esmad en Barranquillla; RCN Radio. December 11, 2019. Flip analiza si existe
patrón de Policía para entorpecer trabajo de la prensa; Blu Radio. December 7, 2019. Denuncian conducción arbitraria de tres periodistas que
cubrían plantón en El Dorado; Opanoticias.com. November 28, 2019. (Video) Policía agrede a ‘pata y bolillo’ a periodista hasta dejarla
inconsciente en Bogotá durante protestas; FLIP. December 11, 2019. Nuevos hechos de violencia contra la prensa se presentaron durante las
movilizaciones del 10 de diciembre; FLIP. November 21, 2019. En paro del #21N la Policía agredió e incumplió sus compromisos con la prensa;
El Tiempo. November 22, 2019. Denuncian ataques de la Policía a periodistas internacionales; FLIP. November 26, 2019. La FLIP rechaza los
ataques contra los periodistas en el marco de las manifestaciones y alienta a la prensa para que continúe su cubrimiento; Fecolper / Twitter
account. “The country and the world have the right to know what is happening in #NationalStrike #Colombia from all sides. We demand the
Public Forces and individuals do not restrict journalistic exercise. Let's guarantee the human right to information! @IvanDuq ue
@PoliciaColombia”. @FECOLPER. November 30, 2019; Kien y Ke Noticias.December 3, 2019. Van 61 periodistas agredidos durante el paro;
FLIP. December 11, 2019. Nuevos hechos de violencia contra la prensa se presentaron durante las movilizaciones del 10 de diciembre.
480 El País. November 26, 2019. Muere Dilan Cruz, el joven que recibió un disparo de un policía durante las protestas en Colombia; La Vanguardia
/ EFE. November 26, 2019. Conmoción en Colombia por la muerte de un estudiante durante las protestas.
481FLIP. December 7, 2019. FLIP rechaza descomunal aumento de detenciones ilegales a periodistas.
482FLIP. November 21, 2019. En paro del #21N la Policía agredió e incumplió sus compromisos con la prensa.
483FLIP. December 7, 2019. FLIP rechaza descomunal aumento de detenciones ilegales a periodistas.
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357. The Special Rapporteur recalls that social protest is a fundamental tool for the defence of human rights
and essential for the critical political and social expression of the authorities' activities. The Commission has
pointed out that "it is in principle inadmissible to criminalize per se demonstrations in the public arena when
they are carried out in the context of the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly"484 and that
"the exercise of the right of assembly through social protest should not be subject to authorization by the
authorities or to excessive requirements that make it difficult to carry out".485
358. Likewise, the Joint Declaration on Violence against Journalists in the Context of Social Demonstrations,
adopted in 2013, indicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression "are fundamental and
guaranteed as a necessary condition for the existence and functioning of a democratic society. Furthermore, the
dispersal of a demonstration must be justified by the duty to protect persons, and the safest and least harmful
measures for the demonstrators must be used. The use of force in public demonstrations must be exceptional
and in strictly necessary circumstances, in accordance with international principles known.”486
F.Protection mechanisms
359. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recognizes the efforts of the Protection Unit of the State of Colombia
in the implementation of various protection mechanisms for journalists and human rights defenders, while
urging them to make progress and articulate more effective mechanisms in order to prevent and curb the
growing context of violence against thepress.
360. This Office highlights that on March 7, the director of the National Protection Unit, Pablo Elías González
Monguí, participated as a panelist in an event called “Regional Dialogue Table on the implementation and
effectiveness of measures to protect journalists and the Open meeting on Media and Democracy in the
Americas”held in Washington D.C., on issues such as the protection of journalists in Colombia, at the invitation
of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. In this event, the official presented a series of
measures adopted by the UNP, the implementation of measures for the protection of journalists and their
effectiveness. Likewise, he participated in the event “Women Journalists: Discrimination and Gender-based
Violence against women journalists in the exercise of their profession” in the law faculty of George Washington
University.
361. Regarding what was stated by the representative of the UNP in the first activity indicated, he discussed
the legal framework for the protection of journalists in Colombia, which starts from the Constitution, whose text
has a special norm for the protection of journalistic activity to guarantee freedom and independence journalist's
professional, based on the concept that "the press is free, although responsible." In accordance with the
aforementioned, the Constitutional Court has interpreted the obligation to provide security according to three
dimensions: as a value; as a collective right; and, as an individual right. Therefore, he emphasized that the
protection mechanism has an individual and collective protection program. In addition, following the
parameters of the doctrine of the Constitutional Court, he said that it should be identified whether the risk is
ordinary or extraordinary. If a risk is identified, there is an obligation to assess, based on a careful study of each
individual situation, the existence of the characteristics of this risk and the possibility of its being specified.
Likewise, he pointed out that there is an obligation to identify the source or origin of the risk, and if there is a
risk linked to a threat, under the parameters of the Constitutional Court that defines risk, threat, and
vulnerability. In addition, he indicated that for any of these three elements protection can be provided. Among
other points mentioned, the director clarified that the Unit is attached to the Ministry of Interior, and has 6,500
escorts and 2,500 armored cars, and has 200 risk analysts. On the other hand, he indicated by means of a graph
how the number of journalists killed has dropped since protection mechanisms were put in place. He also
reported that currently under the protection mechanism181 journalists are protected by 258 men, vests, and
40 armored cars that havebeen assigned. Finally, he mentioned the developing work carried out with the
Prosecutor's Office on risk agents and homicides487.
484 IACHR. Informe sobre Seguridad Ciudadana y Derechos Humanos. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Párr. 197.
485IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
486United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
487The director also addressed the ways to define protection measures, when danger is imminent, a situation in which, for example, it is
necessary to move the person out of the territory; as well as situations where “soft” protections are available such as providing a vest. Risk
assessment is carried out every 12 months. He also pointed out the prohibition of creating a greater risk, for example, through stigmatizing
statements. Regarding protection approaches, he mentioned that there is a gender perspective and an ethnic approach. He also mentioned
there is a risk scale. The danger must be certain, significant, exceptional, and imminent. For a journalist to receive protection, he or she must
be accredited as a journalist. Thus, information about the applicant's activity is sought. The risk of each request is analyzed and weighted
and it is determined which measure to request from a Committee that is in charge of recommending the corresponding measures.
Temporality is also defined and security measures are implemented, surveillance of the measures is carried out and even ifthey are misused.
Also, he said some areas have been identified that are at greater risk and are located in the Colombian Pacific and the Catatumbo area, places
with drug trafficking. In these areas, risks have been identified and collective protection is implemented, i.e., self-organization by
communities is encouraged as well as their own joint protection mechanisms. Collective protection has had better results withindigenous
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362. The IACHR and the office of its Special Rapporteur have defined some of the requirements for effective
protection mechanisms. For example, to emphasize: 1) the importance of guaranteeing the financial and
personnel resources necessary for the adequate implementation of the mechanism; 2) the need to ensure
effective coordination among the entities responsible for implementing measures ofprevention, protection, and
justice; 3) the need to adequately define the protection measures contemplated by the mechanism and the
procedure for their adoption; 4) the need to guarantee the full participation of journalists, civil society, and
beneficiaries in the implementation and operation of the mechanism; and 5) the convenience of seeking support
from the international community for the operation of the mechanism488.
G.Stigmatizing statements
363. The Office of the Special Rapporteur identifies in Colombia a trend to stigmatize journalists and the
media that publish or disseminate critical information against the Government. This context is setby high-level
state authorities and public officials489, which puts at risk the free exercise of journalistic work and undermines
the obligation to “adopt a public discourse that contributes topreventing violence against journalists”490.
364. Among the cases observed by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, this Office documented the context
of threats and stigmatizing statements directed against the New York Times correspondent, Nicholas Casey, for
the publication of an article on May 18 titled “Las órdenes de letalidad del Ejército colombiano ponen en riesgo a
los civiles, según oficiales”
491in which he questions the work of military commanders in the framework of the
fight against armed groups and alleged cases of “false positives”. Following this, the journalist was the victim of
harassment that originated from high parliamentary authorities who also disseminated deliberately false
information with the intention of discrediting him and linking him to the guerrillas. Within this context, Casey
had to leave the country on May 19 in the face of growing threats received through social networks. Likewise,
the New York Times photographer, Federico Ríos Escobar had to leave the country because of the threats
received by a photo published by Senator María Fernanda Cabal on her Twitter account that gave rise to
stigmatization against Casey492.
365. This Office urges the State of Colombia and its authorities to adopt a public discourse that helps prevent
violence against journalists in response to the growing context of attacks against thepress.
H. Subsequent liabilities
366. According to the information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, this Office learned of the
civil lawsuit initiated by Senator Álvaro Uribe in the United States against journalist Daniel Coronell for a series
of publications made on issues related to the senator493. Within this context, the journalist published on April 7,
2019 a column called “¿Por quéquierensilenciarme?” In which he denounces that lawsuit494. On the other hand,
the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on the filing of criminal complaints for insult and
people because they control the territory, and with black communities, as stated. He mentioned he has a budget of 350 million, with
resources that come entirely from the State. He observed the complexity of the situation in the case of murdered individuals and social
leaders who had received no threats, as far as the Protection Unit knew. In this regard, the unit director pointed out the early warning system
by the Ombudsman's Office. It is important that the Unit has its own information and risk map, and that it does not depend in any way on
other entities, he stated. He also mentioned there should be a network formed by social organizations, the police, the army, and an elite
group that must react quickly.
488 IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 81; IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Office of the
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II: 2010 Special Report on Freedom of Expression in Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
5. March 7, 2011. Para. 712.
489RCN Radio. March 6, 2019. Corte Suprema archivó denuncia de periodista contra Uribe por injuria y calumnia; Publimetro. September 10,
2019. El ataque de Álvaro Uribe a reconocida periodista por una columna; Red+. September 10, 2019. Petro reveló nombres de periodistas que
habrían recibido dineros de Odebrecht; Hoy Diario del Magdalena. September 11, 2019. Tres periodistas denuncian a Petro; FLIP. October 12,
2019. La FLIP expresa su preocupación por la situación de la prensa en Ipiales; Las2Orillas. September 3, 2019. El despiadado señalamiento
del candidato uribista de la alcaldía de Cucuta a un periodista. Video; FLIP. September 4, 2019. Candidato del Centro Democrático señaló al
editor general del Q’hubo de Cúcuta de ser vocero de FARC;
490United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
491The New York Times.May 18, 2019 Colombia Army’s New Kill Orders Sell Chills Down Ranks.
492 La Opinión. May 19, 2019. Periodista del New York Times salió de Colombia tras informe sobre el Ejército; La República. May 19, 2019.
Periodista del New York Times salió del país por razones de seguridad; Red+. May 19, 2019. Periodista Nicholas Casey sale del país por
señalamientos de senadora María Fernanda Cabal; FLIP. May 20, 2019. FLIP condena estigmatizaciones al periodista Nicholas Casey;
Uniminutoradio. May 20, 2019. Periodista del New York Times salió del país. El fotógrafo también; lafm. May 21, 2019. Nicholas Casey,
periodista del NYT, fue víctima de noticia falsa; Publimetro. May 22, 2019. La 'fakenews' que divulgó María Fernanda Cabal sobre Nicholas
Casey.
493 FLIP. April 9, 2019. La FLIP rechaza acoso judicial contra el periodista Daniel Coronell; El Heraldo. May 19, 2019. SIP preocupada por
demandas de expresidente Uribe contra periodista Coronell;
494Semana. April 7, 2019. ¿Por qué quieren silenciarme?
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slander initiated by former prosecutorNéstor Humberto Martínez against a group of journalists because of a
series of publications that reveal irregularities done by Martínez when he was Prosecutor495.
367. The Special Rapporteurship reiterates, in accordance with Principle 11 of the IACHR's Declaration of
Principle on Freedom of Expression, that "[p]ublic officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that
criminalize offensive expression or that target public officials are generally known as 'insult laws', which
undermine freedom of expression and the right to information.
I. Legal Reforms
368. The Office of the Special Rapporteur learned of a bill filed on August 20 in the House of Representatives
that seeks to regulate "the policies for the use and appropriation of social networks and other general
provisions." The proposal aims to "protect users against harmful or potentially dangerous behaviors resulting
from the overreach or inappropriate use of virtual social networks"; establishes a series of definitions;
prohibitions, such as "being under 14"for the use of social networks,"usurping the identity of another and create
profiles that do not represent a real person or incur the commission of punishable criminal offenses",
"publishing expressions or insulting or threatening comments about other people, groups, or communities that
aggravate, affect, or offend their good name, honor, privacy, personal integrity, freedom of expression or
harassment on the Internet”, among others. It also seeks to create the obligation for users to corroborate or
verify the information before sharing or publishing it496.At the close of this report, the Office of the Special
Rapporteur had not received information on the status of theproject.
369. In another case, the Office of the Special Rapporteur also learned of a bill that was in the Senate on July
20 that seeks to modify the current Criminal Code and adopt "criminal and administrative measures against
corruption." The proposal, among other provisions, seeks to extend Art. 418 of the Criminal Code and impose
the penalty of prison of up to 54 months for "disclosure of secrets" by public officials, as well as increase the
penalty currently in force. However, theproposal has a paragraph that seeks to guarantee source confidentiality
for journalists497.
J.Censorship of journalistic material / Prior censorship / Direct and indirect censorship
370. In the context of an investigation into corruption cases in thepenitentiary field, on January 31, following
a decision of the Municipal Criminal Court 22, a group of reporters was prevented from accessing a series of
preliminary hearings that were carried out at different times until February 18. On February 14, this groupfiled
an amparo writ before the Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Bogotá requesting a precautionary
measure to enter the remaining hearings, a claim that was denied. On February 27, the court denied the merits
petition on the grounds that the hearings had already concluded. The Court ended up confirming the ruling on
the grounds that the decision sought toprotect the right to life of integrity of the possible victims and guarantee
the results of the investigation, although it also warned about the adoption of measures for the media so they
can do their job498.
371. In the 174 Period of Sessions of the IACHR of November 12, 2019, the civil society representatives
presented the mentioned context and noted that it is a “conduct widely repeated throughout the territory” which
“has caused journalists to opt for not covering the judicial hearings that as a rule are of a public nature”. For its
part, the State representatives set forth the regulatory framework applied to criminal trials and the exceptions
allowed. Special Rapporteur Edison Lanza noted the importance of weighing in accordance with inter-American
standards andpointed out that the issue is not only about the right of journalists to cover hearings, but the right
of the whole society to receive information of highpublic interest, more when dealing with facts connected with
possible situations of corruption, accountability, transparency in the exercise of public function, social control,
among others499.
372. On the other hand, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information about the cancellationof
the column of the investigative journalist Daniel Coronell in the magazine Semana by the board of directors, at
the end of May. The decision would have been taken after the publication of a column in which he questioned
495 Periódico El Jurista. April 9, 2019. Por injuria y calumnia exfiscal Martínez denuncia a periodista; Publimetro. August 15, 2019. Periodista
denuncia que exfiscal Néstor Humberto Martínez lo intimidó; Las2Rodillas. Por ‘injuria y calumnia’, exfiscal Martínez denuncia al senador Jorge
Robledo; WRadio. August 26, 2019. Néstor Humberto Martínez vuelve a denunciar a Jorge Enrique Robledo; El Espectador. August 18, 2019.
El lío judicial entre Néstor Humberto Martínez y un periodista por programa de YouTube;
496 República de Colombia. Cámara de Representantes. Proyecto N°176/2019C. “Por medio del cual se regulan las políticas de uso y
apropiación de las redes sociales y se dictan otras disposiciones generales”. August 20, 2019.
497 República de Colombia. Cámara de Senadores. Proyecto 010/2019C. “Por medio del cual se adoptan medidas en materia penal y
administrativa en contra de la corrupción y se dictan otras disposiciones”.
498 República de Colombia. Corte Suprema de Justicia. STP5404-2019; FLIP. May 7, 2019. FLIP rechaza fallo de la Corte Suprema que limita el
derecho de acceso a audiencias.
499 IACHR. 174 Public Hearings. Libertad de expresión y acceso a la información en juicios penales en Colombia. November 12, 2019.
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the directive for not publishing information related to measures taken by military commanders500. However, the
editorial announced in June that the column of the journalist was reinstated in its usual space501.
373. In another case, according to the available information, anamparo writ filed by the FLIP and the
“Univertopias” program was admitted on July 19 by the Second Criminal Court for Adolescents with the
Guarantee Control Function of Bogotá against the District University Francisco José de Caldas due tothe
withdrawal ofa radio program from the station502.
374. Also, in another episode, according to the information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur,
in August the Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Cali in a case following an amparo writ,resolved to
order the El País media to censor the face of a person in a video who was involved in a traffic accident until the
affected person consents to the disclosure503.
375. Also, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on the impediment of entering the
country in October to Mexican journalist Alejandra Rajal who was to be part of a program of the International
Women's Media Foundation (IWMF). Regarding this situation, the immigration authority would have said that
the impediment decision was based on a “sovereign” and “discretionary” decision, in addition to the fact that she
did not have the required documents and would not have explained the reasons for her presence in the
country504.
376. This Office was informed of the cancellation during December 2018 of the “Los Puros Criollos” program
broadcasted by Radio Televisión Nacional de Colombia. According to information of public knowledge, the
reasons for the cancellation would have arisen following a series of inquiries from the presenter of the program
on the bill of modernization of the Ministry of Technology and Communication505. In addition, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur learned of the cancellation in September of the news report "Noticias Uno" broadcasted on
weekends on Channel 1 in Cablenoticias, a subscription channel. The management of the channel reported that
the reason for the cancellation was for financial reasons506, while other sectors denounced this as a case of
censorship for political reasons507.
377. The office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Article 13(3) of the American Convention establishes
that "[n]o one may restrict the right of expression by means or through indirect means, such as the abuse of
official or private controls over newsprint, radio frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of
information or by any other means aimed at preventing the communication and circulation of ideas and
opinions.
K. Freedom of expression in electoral contexts
378. Within the regional electoral context in Colombia, the IACHR expressed concern at the serious acts of
violence that have taken place in the framework of this process. Since the beginning of the electoral campaigns,
in July of this year, there have been high levels of violence against political candidates. More than 20 episodes of
violence were recorded, including threats, kidnappings, and attacks. The Ombudsman's Office also identified
that 402 municipalities and 16 non-municipal areas of Colombia presented electoral risk due to the incidence of
illegal armed groups, of which 78 would be at extreme risk508. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur
documented episodes of harassment of journalists within this context509.
500 El País. May 30, 2019. La revista colombiana ‘Semana’ cancela la columna de Daniel Coronell; FLIP. May 29, 2019. Sobre la salida de Daniel
Coronell de Revista Semana.
501 Semana. June 11, 2019. Daniel Coronell regresa a SEMANA.
502 FLIP. July 24, 2019. Admitida tutela contra la Universidad Distrital por retiro de programa radial; Las2Orillas. July 31, 2019. Juez admite
tutela contra la Universidad Distrital por retiro de programa radial.
503 RCN Radio. August 20, 2019. Periódico El País apelará fallo que ordena edición de una foto; El País. 16 de agosto de 2019. SIP expresa su
preocupación por fallo contra El País Cali y periodismo en general.
504 Noticias Barranquilla. October 20, 2019. Polémica en redes por inadmisión de periodista mexicana en Colombia – Servicios – Justicia;
505 El Espectador. February 20, 2019. “Los Puros Criollos podrían volver cuando haya cambio de Gobierno”: Santiago Rivas; SEMANA. February
23, 2019. “Sí hubo censura, él sabe que hubo censura”: Coordinador de la Liga contra el Silencio.
506 CM& Sistema Informativo. September 2, 2019. Canal 1 anuncia cancelación de los noticieros del fin de semana; Blu Radio. September 2,
2019. Anuncio del fin de Noticias UNO se convierte en agria lucha política en redes.
507Telesurtv. September 1, 2019. Denuncian cierre de noticiero independiente en Colombia; El Tiempo. September 2, 2019. Las reacciones tras
anuncio de salida del aire de Noticias Uno.
508 IACHR. September 10, 2019. CIDH expresa preocupación por violencia durante el proceso electoral en Colombia.
509 Canal Tropical. August 11, 2019. Por amenaza de asonada y posible atentado a periodista, cancelan debate de candidatos a alcaldía de
Soledad; FLIP. August 15, 2019. FLIP presenta queja ante el CNE en contra de Carlos Caicedo; FLIP. August 31, 2019. Periodista Blanca Urango
denuncia graves agresiones por parte de Adelina Covo, candidata a la alcaldía de Cartagena; RCN Radio. September 7, 2019. Amenazan a
periodista por denunciar corrupción electoral en Pasto; Bocaya Extra. September 8, 2019. "Vas a quedar con la boca llena de moscas":
escalofriante amenaza a periodista de Nariño; Radio Nacional. September 9, 2019. Periodista de Radio Nacional en Pasto denuncia amenazas
contra su vida; El Planeta. Periodista denuncia por ataque a candidata a la Alcaldía de Cartagena;
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379. In another context, at the request of different civil society organizations, a groupof politicalparties and
movements signed an agreement on freedom of the press and against misinformation on May 3 in order to
ensure that citizens can vote freely in regional elections510.
L.Community broadcasting
380. The Office of the Special Rapporteur highlights the progress made by the State of Colombia in the
process of extending the granting of permits directed to different regions of the country, which would occur
after ten years since the last process was carried out. According to the information released by the Government,
the final specifications for the expansion of community radio stations in different regions of the country were
published, seeking to ensure that “with this service they may have new channels that help strengthen their
regional identity and opportunities of communication, turning the population into a participatory agent that
provides solutions to the problems that occur in their territory and that promotes free expression”511.
381. Also, according to the information, 626 community radio stations are registered in Colombia. Before the
opening of the aforementionedprocess, the MinTIC received 1,573 expressions of interest in 578 municipalities
in the country, which would mean more than 250% of all stations currentlyoperating512.
382. The Special Rapporteur recalls that in our region, community media play a fundamental role in the
exercise of freedom of expression and access to information by different sectors of society513. For this reason, it
is necessary for States to recognize them legally and to consider reserves of spectrum for this type of media, as
well as equitable conditions of access to licenses that differentiate the different realities of the private noncommercial media. Given the existing situation of exclusion, States should adopt positive measures to include
the non-commercial sectors in the media. These measures include securing frequencies in the broadcasting
spectrum for different types of media, and specificallyproviding that certain frequencies be reserved for the use
of community media, especially when these are not equitably represented in the spectrum. In this regard, the
Special Rapporteur has insisted on the need for broadcasting regulations to establish the duty to allocate part of
the spectrum to community media.514.
M. Internet and Freedom of Expression
383. The Special Rapporteurship has received reports of a series of actions that seek to block technological
platforms for collaborative mobility through administrative and judicial processes to censor their
dissemination515 in recent years in Colombia. In this regard, on 20 December, in the framework of a process
promoted by the telecommunications services company COTECH S.A. against Uber in Colombia (Uber S.A.S, Uber
Technologies, and Uber BV) for alleged unfair competition, corresponding to violations of public transport
regulations and deviation of customers, the Colombian Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (SIC)
ordered the immediate blocking of Uber's technological application throughout thecountry516.
384. The decision would force Uber to immediately suspend the use of the technological application in the
Colombian territory through the different web pages linked to the company. On the other hand, the SIC would
also oblige Internet and cell phone companies to block Uber's technologicalapplication.
385. In their Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression on the Internet made in 2011 by the IACHR and UN
Special Rapporteurs, they indicate that freedom of expression applies to the Internet in the same way as it does
to all media. Restrictions on freedom of expression on the Internet are only acceptable when they comply with
international standards that provide, inter alia, that they must be provided by law and pursue a legitimate aim
recognized by international law and be necessary to achieve that aim (the "tripartite"test).
386. The principle of neutrality is a design principle of the Internet, by which the utility of networks is
maximized, treating all "data packets" equally without distinction. As the Office of the Special Rapporteur
510 EFE. May 4, 2019. Partidos políticos colombianosfirman un pacto por la "libertad de prensa"; El Espectador. May 3, 2019. Partidosfirmaron
pacto político en favor de la libertad de prensa para las elecciones de octubre; FLIP. 7 de mayo de 2019. El PAN convoca partidos políticos para
firmar pacto contra la desinformación;
511 República de Colombia. Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y de las Comunicaciones. October 4, 2019. Condiciones definitivas
para adjudicar emisoras comunitarias.
512 República de Colombia. Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y de las Comunicaciones. October 4, 2019. Condiciones definitivas
para adjudicar emisoras comunitarias; 512 República de Colombia. Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y de las Comunicaciones.
October 4, 2019. “Con asignación de nuevas emisoras comunitarias, estamos cumpliendo la promesa de ampliar el acceso a la información en
las regiones”: Ministra de las TIC.
513 IACHR. . Justice and Social Inclusion: The Challenges of Democracy in Guatemala. Chapter VII (The Situation of Freedom of Expression).
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118. Doc.5rev.1. December 29, 2003. Para. 414; IACHR. Annual Report 2002. Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
Of Expression. Chapter IV (Freedom of Expression and Poverty). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117. Doc. 1 rev. 1. March 7, 2003. Para. 41.
514IACHR. Annual Report 2009. Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI (Freedom of Expression and
Broadcasting). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51. December 30, 2009. Para. 92 and following.
515 Ignacio BoulindECEEMBER 30, 2019. Disponible en Archivo Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión. Infoner. January, 2018.
Cómo defendernos de las #fakenews y la posverdad.
516 Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio. Sentencia de Primera Instancia 20 de diciembre de 2019. Semana. December 20, 2019. 88.000
conductores y 2 millones de usuarios, los afectados de la decisión según Uber.
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maintained, net neutrality is a necessary condition for exercising freedom of expression, and it is transversal to
the guiding principles. What thisprinciple pursues is that the freedom of access and choice of users to use, send,
receive or offer any content, application or legal service through the Internet is not conditioned, directed or
restricted, by means of blocking, filtering, or interference. States must guarantee the validity of this principle
through adequate legislation.
N.Deliberate Misinformation
387. During 2019 in Colombia, different journalistic verification websites denounced the use of deliberate
information to attack journalists, activists, and politicians who oppose the government of Colombia. Among
them is an investigation called "La liga contra el silencio" where, through hacking a group of Whatsapp, led by
government officials, they allegedly designed a series of strategies on social networks to position issues of
political interest517.
388. The Inter-American Court has established, with regard to possible civil liability, that civil sentences in
the area of freedom of expression must be strictly proportionate so as not to cause an inhibiting effect on this
freedom, since "the fear of civil sanctions, in the face of the claim can be as or more intimidating and inhibiting
to the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal sanction, insofar as it has the potential to compromise
the personal and family life of the person who denounces a public official, with the obvious result of selfcensorship, both for the person affected and for other potential critics of the actions of a public official”518.
O. Other relevant situations
389. According to the information available, during the IAPA half-year meeting held from March 29 to 31 in
Cartagena, Colombia, President Iván Duque highlighted the importance of freedom of expression and ratified
Chapultepec's statement as a commitment in favor of this right519. Likewise, Vice President Marta Lucía Ramírez
highlighted and joined the message given by the IACHR and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression “which notes that in the region women have less participation and visibility in the crucial issues on
government and politics, which means that the work of women journalists is less visible, less valued”which
results in“an unjustified wage gap with respect to their male colleagues”520.
390. On the other hand, the Office of the Special Rapporteur noted with particular concern a context of mass
layoffs of journalists from some media outlets. According to the information available, more than three hundred
layoffs would have been registered in different media outlets due to economic motivations, particularly in print
and television media521.
517 La Liga del Silencio. Februry 7, 2020. En las entranas de una bodeguita uribista.
518Corte IDH. Caso Tristán Donoso Vs. Panamá. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 27 de enero de 2009. Serie
C No. 193. Párr.129.
519 La República. March 30, 2019. Presidente Duque ratifica compromiso con libertad de prensa al firmar Declaración; Metro. Durante reunión
de la SIP, presidente Duque ratifica compromiso con la libertad de prensa.
520 República de Colombia. Vicepresidencia. Marcha 30, 2019. Palabras de la Vicepresidente de laRepública,Marta Lucía Ramírez en la Reunión
de Medio Año de la Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa (SIP).
521Pacifista. April 10, 2019. Despidos de periodistas causan miedo y silencio en los medios colombianos; Publimetro. June 25, 2019. Así
funcionará ahora El Tiempo sinlos 150 periodistas despedidos; La República.Marach 23, 2019. El medio de comunicación Vice Colombia despide
a todos los periodistas de su plantilla; Fundación Gabo. April 3, 2019. ¿Cómo interpretar la ola de despidos en medios de comunicación este
año?; Pulzo. June 25, 2019. Periodistas ‘de vieja data’ de El Tiempo confirman su salida del medio en redes sociales;
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11.COSTA RICA
391. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observed an increasing tendency in violent acts
against the media and journalists in social protest contexts, accompanied by excessive use of force towards
protesters. Likewise, it took note of legislative projects that are pending study by Congress and that would
establish regulations for the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, such provisions could
adversely affect the right to freedom of expression. Finally, this Office welcomed the ruling issued on August 9
by the constitutionality chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that reiterated that no compulsory membership
is required, nor would it be mandatory to join the Journalists' Association, to be able to practice journalism in
the country.
A.Progress
392. The Office of the Special Rapporteur welcomed the ruling issued on August 9 by the Constitutional Court
of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) which reiterated as unconstitutional to require compulsory membership,
and that it would not be mandatory to join the Journalists' Association, in order to practice journalism522. The
ruling was issued in the context of a statement by the Journalists' Association of Costa Rica [Colegio de Periodistas
de Costa Rica] (COLPER), in which it threatened to report unlicensed persons before the competent judicial
bodies. The Constitutional Court maintains that as "guarantor of dignity, the rights and freedom of people, it
reiterates that journalism can be exercised without having to have an academic degree or being a member of the
Journalists' Association." This is determined by sentences 2019-15038 and 2019-15039 respectively. The Court
concluded in the sentences that a journalist is the one who regularly or habitually dedicates themselves to
informing, and highlights the definition that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights states of this profession
(Advisory Opinion oc-5/85 of November 13, 1985): "The "professional journalist" is the person who has decided
to exercise freedom of expression in a continuous, stable, and remuneratedmanner".
393. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that principle 6 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expression of the IACHR states that “compulsory membership or the requirements of a university degree for
the practice of journalism constitute unlawful restrictions of freedom of expression. Journalistic activities must
be guided by ethical conduct, which should in no case be imposed by the State”523.
394. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights maintains on the compulsory membershipin an association
prescribed by law for the practice of journalism that "the professional journalist is not, nor can it be, anything
other than a person who has decided to exercise freedom of expression in a continuous, stable, and remunerated
manner"524.
B. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
395. On July 27, an explosive device detonated in front of the facilities of Televisora in Costa Rica, in Sabana
Oeste. The Judicial Investigation Agency (OIJ) would confirm there was planning prior to the placement of the
explosive on the outskirts of Televisora, since a basic knowledge of its operation and activation would have been
necessary525. On the topic, the body said that it is conducting an investigation into the case, and that the device
found in the place is one of the most important clues526.
396. The Representaciones Televisivas (Repretel) journalist Laura Brenes and cameraman Rodrigo Ramírez,
denounced that they would have been attacked by protesters while they were covering the protests on August
7 where public sector union organizations demanded the autonomy of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund
(CCSS) just outside the Ministry of Finance527. According to information received by this Office, journalists from
Teletica, Repretel and CRHoy, would have been receiving attacks during demonstrations by that union sector
since September 2018528.
397. On September 3, the photographer of the newspaper La Nación, John Durán, reported having been
assaulted while covering the demonstrations convened by the Union of educators before the approval of Bill
522Sala Constitucional. Resolución N. 2019015039 Exp. 19-009887-0007-CO. Available at:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cPk8rsPTdnGuVI7CPl-SmsHQa46_8zBS/view?usp=sharing Listin Diario. August 10, 2019. Corte de Costa
Rica reitera que no se necesita título para ejercer periodismo. El País. December 9, 2019. Sala IV: Título universitario no es requisito para
ejercer el periodismo.
523 IACHR. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. 2000.
524 I/A Court H. R. Advisory opinion OC-5/85. Available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_05_ing.pdf
525Civicus. August 15, 2019. Dispositivo explosivo sale en frente de la estación de televisión de Costa Rica ; Teletica. August 4, 2019. Artefacto
explosivo daña ventanal de Televisora de Costa Rica.
526 Amnesty International. July 29, 2019. Costa Rica: Attack on television station is deeply concerning; Instituto de Prensa y Libertad de
expresión (IPLEX). July 29, 2019. Unirnos en contra de la violencia y en defensa de la Democracia; Inter American Press Association (IAPA).
July 31, 2019. IAPA condemns attack on Costa Rican TVchannel;
527Am prensa. August 8, 2019. Manifestantes tiran agua a equipo de Repretel para echarlo de huelga (VIDEO); CR Hoy. August 8, 2019.
Reportaje enoja a sindicatos y agreden a periodista de Repretel; Noticias Costa Rica. August 8, 2019. Sindicatos agreden a periodista de
Repretel que dio a conocer caso de asegurado que murió.
528 CRHoy. August 8, 2019. Reportaje enoja a sindicatos y agreden a periodista de Repretel.
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21049 in front of the Legislative Assembly529. Other journalists from Canal 6 de Noticias Repretel, CRHoy and El
Observador, reported that their press equipment were damaged during the same coverage530.
398. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation, of and/or threats to social
communicators, as well as the material destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of
individuals and strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the State toprevent and investigate such
occurrences, to punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation”531.
399. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, according to the Joint Declaration on Violence Against
Journalists and Communicators in the Framework of Social Demonstrations, “attacks against journalists
covering these situations violate both the individual aspect of freedom of expression —because they are
prevented from exercising their right to seek and disseminate information, and a chilling effect is generated—
as its collective aspect —since society is deprived of the right to know the information that journalists obtain—
. For this reason, the rapporteurs have acknowledged that given the importance of the work of journalists
covering these situations, States must grant them the maximum degree of guarantees to fulfill their function.
This duty is not limited to granting concrete protection measures for communicators. It also includes the
obligation to create the necessary conditions to mitigate the risk of exercising the profession in these situations.”
C. Social Protest
400. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information on the approval in the first debate by the
Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica on September 3 of Bill 21049, “To provide legal security on strikes and its
procedures,” presented by the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN). This project would propose new regulations
to exercise the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, arguing the obligation of the State to guarantee the
continuity of the provision of public services during strikes532.
401. According to public information, on September 3 while the last motions were submitted to the project,
a group of protesters would have questioned the possible violation of ILO Convention 87 “on freedom of
association and protection of the right to organize”, signed with the International Labor Organization (ILO), as
well as the prohibitionist nature of the project533.
402. This Office has taken note of the constitutionality consultation presented on September 5 by congress
deputies opposing the approval of the project and which would currently be pending resolution by the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, causing a stopin the course of its legislative process534.
403. The Office of the Special Rapporteur is concerned about the direct and indirect restrictions on the rights
of trade unions and their union members to exercise their right of association, to freedom of peaceful assembly,
and expression through the exercise of their trade union freedoms and recalls that the right of assembly is
protected by Articles XXI of the American Declaration and 15 of the American Convention. This right, also
recognized in other internationalinstruments535,is essential for the enjoyment of various rights such as freedom
of expression, the right of association, and the right to defend rights. Political and social participation through
the exercise of the right of assembly is an essential element for the consolidation of the democratic life of
societies and therefore, it has an imperative social interest. The protection of the right of assembly entails not
only the obligation of the State not to interfere in its exercise in an arbitrary manner, but also the obligation to
adopt, in certain circumstances, positive measures to ensure it536.
404. University students linked to the Interuniversity Autonomous Front protesting in San Pedro, Heredia,
due to the budgetary reclassification of the Special Fund for Higher Education (FEES) denounced the excessive
use of force for the disproportionate amount of riot control and use of weapons by the Police537.
405. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that according to Article 13.2 of the American Convention,
in all its limitations on freedom of expression, to be legitimate, they must meet a strict tripartite test, which
requires that the sanctions: (1) be defined precisely and clearly through a formal and preexisting material law;
529 La Nación. September 3, 2019. Fotógrafo de “La Nación” relata como fue agredido: “Albino me señala y la gente se viene contra mí”.
530 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). October 3, 2019. Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Costa Rica.
531 IACHR. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. 2000.
532 La Nación. September 3, 2019. Con 40 votos a favor y 15 en contra aprobada ley para frenar abusos en huelgas en primer debate ; Efe.
September 4, 2019. El Congreso de costa Rica aprueba en primer debate una ley para regular las huelgas ; Teletica. September 4, 2019.
Diputados aprueban en primer debate el proyecto para regular huelgas.
533 Semanario Universidad. September 10, 2019. Proyecto para regular huelgas muestra múltiples choques con convenio de OIT; Asociación
de profesores de segunda enseñanza. September 6, 2019. Campaña con opiniones de expertos sobre el Proyecto de Ley Anti-huelgas N21049.
534 Diario Extra. April 1, 2019. Amenazas latentes a la prensa en Costa Rica.
535 This right is also recognized by article 20.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; by article 21 of the International Covenant on
Human Rights and by article 5 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote
and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
536 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
130.
537El Mundo.cr. November 21, 2019. Estudiantes de la UNA denuncian que fueron reprimidos con gases lacrimógenos por la Policía ; CR Hoy.
November 21, 2019. Con gases lacrimógenos, así levantaron bloqueos universitarios (VIDEO)
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(2) be aimed at achieving legitimate objectives authorized by the Convention ("respect for the rights or
reputation of others" or "protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals"); and (3) be
necessary in a democratic society (for which they must meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and
proportionality). This test is applied with a specialintensity when prohibitions are established through criminal
law. Likewise, the IACHR and the Court have consistently held that the necessity test for limitations must be
applied in a more strict manner whenever it concerns expressions pertaining to the State, matters of public
interest, of public officials in the exercise of their functions or candidates for public office, or individuals
voluntarily involved in public affairs, as well as political discourse and debate.
406. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the political and social critical expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of
assembly”538 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly through social protest must not be subject to
authorization by the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder itsmaterialization”539.
D.Subsequent liabilities
407. According to information received by this Office, on December 27, 2018, Teletica, Canal 7, announced
the dismissal of the humorist Francisco Blanco, after he told a joke in the transmission of the Tope San José
program, which would have been described as “machista” (sexist)540. In this regard, the Minister of Justice,
Marcia González541 and the Minister of the Status of Women, Patricia Mora542, said on social networks that the
program was opposed to efforts to combat gender violence by government agencies, asking to take action
against the Television, such as a readjustment of its contents and the dismissal of the comedian.
408. According to the information available, in January the Office of Protection of Citizens' Data [Protección
de Datos de los Habitantes] (Prodhab) attached to the Ministry of Justice, notified to Diario Extra the instruction
to remove the photograph of a person published in one of their notes, arguing that the Law on Data protection
No. 8968 gave citizens the power to ask the media to remove images and other details from their files that would
identify them in news. Diario Extra filed an amparo writ before the Constitutional Court, whichwould bepending
resolution, arguing that this Law should not be usedas a mechanism to regulate journalistic activity543.
E.Legal Reforms
409. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of Bill 21187 “Law to Combat Cybercrime,”
presented by the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC) and discussed on July 4 by the Commission on Security
and Drug Trafficking544. This Office observes that the approval of this project could be used to persecute
journalists who publish content incompatible with the interests of certain sectors of the population, because it
contemplates prison for those who manufacture or disseminate deliberate misinformation545.
410. In accordance with principle No. 2 of the Joint declaration on freedom of expression and “fake news”,
disinformation, and propaganda, of 2017, the Special Rapporteurs of the UN, OSCE, IACHR, and ACHRP, stated
that “Criminal laws on defamation constitute restrictions disproportionate to the right to freedom of expression
and, as such, must be repealed. Civil law rules regarding the establishment of subsequent responsibilities for
false and defamatory statements will only be legitimate if the defendants are granted a full opportunity toprove
the truthfulness of those statements and they do not prove such truthfulness, and if the defendants can also
present other defenses, such as a fair comment defense.
F. Censorship
411. According to public information, on December 22, 2018, the Office of control and propaganda attached
to the Ministry of Interior and Police of Costa Rica, notified Diario Extra an administrative resolution that
538 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
539 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
540 CrHoy. December 27, 2018. Despiden a un humorista por chiste sobre violencia doméstica en Costa Rica ; Montevideo portal. December
27, 2018. Despiden a humorista de TVen costa Rica por chiste sobre violencia doméstica ; La Teja. December 27, 2018. Despiden a humorista
de Teletica que hizo chiste sobre la violencia doméstica.
541 Marcia González Aguiluz/Facebook, December 27, 2018.
https://www.facebook.com/MarciaGonzalezAguiluz/posts/2258235604389984
542 Patricia Mora Castellanos/Facebook. December 26, 2018. La violencia contra las mujeres no es un chiste.
543 Diario Extra. April 1, 2019. Amenazas latentes a la prensa en Costa Rica.
544 Proyecto de Ley. Ley para combatir la ciberdelincuencia Expediente No. 21.187. Available at: http://www.aselex.cr/boletines/Proyecto21187.pdf
545 CRHoy. January 6, 2019. Producir y difundir fake news podría llevarlo a la cárcel ; Radio y televisión Martí. August 2, 2019. El gobierno
de costa Rica inicia lucha contra las “fake news”.
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censored the content of one of its covers, claiming that it was improper use photos or other images from social
networks, despite theirpublic nature546. Various civil society organizations would have expressed concern about
the fact547.
412. On February 22, the Constitutional Court ruled against the digital newspaper La Teja, ordering it to
delete a video about the sentimental life of a model uploaded to its website, arguing the violation of her right to
privacy in relation to honor and good name, as well as her right to free personality development. The judges
applied in this case the rule of the right to forget that affects the right toinformation548.
413. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that all restrictions on freedom of expression, including
those affecting expression on the Internet, must be established clearly and precisely by law, proportional to the
legitimate objectives sought, and based on a judicial determination of contradictory procedures. In accordance
with principles 10 and 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, this Office
recalls that “reputation protection must be guaranteed only through civil sanctions”,particularly “in cases where
the offended person is a public official or public or private person who has voluntarily become involved in
matters of public interest" because the officials "are subject to greater scrutiny by society”. In addition, the
IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to sanction expressions related topublic officials
is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as information or expression on matters of public
interest, and violates the right to freedom of expression.
414. Likewise, principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that
“prior censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or
information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must
be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition
of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
G. Access to public information
415. According to public information, on November 13 the project “Reform of Articles 17 and 34 of the
Municipal Code, Law N. 7794, of April 30, 1998, and its reforms to guarantee transparency and access to
information in the entities belonging to the Municipal Regime” was transferred to the Permanent Committee on
Affairs. This project seeks to give citizens access to information on municipalities. The project would have been
debated on November 19 and would be pending approval by the Executive at the close of thisreport.
416. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the complaint made by the digital newspaper
CRHOY, on the decision of the Ministry of Communication not to publish the presidential agenda, highlighting
that access to spaces to request information from the president is increasingly reduced, which would affect the
work of the media549. According to the available information, also in 2018 various media outlets would have
denounced the State for their lack of transparency550.
417. Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[a]ccess
to information held by the State is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.” Taking into account theprinciple of maximum disclosure, the law should guarantee the most effective
and widest possible access topublic information, and exceptions should not become the general rule in practice.
In addition, the exceptions regime must be interpreted restrictively and any doubt must be resolved by
transparency and access.
546 Oficina de Control de propaganda. December 21, 2019. Resolución 228/2018.
547 The Inter American Press Association (IAPA) sent a letter to the Office of propaganda control criticizing the State interference in the
media’s criteria and content, requesting the withdrawal of the notification of censorship. The Colegio de Periodistas stated that it was
dangerous for any organ to previously censor the covers or publications of notifications; Diario Extra. January 10, 2019. SIP denuncia
intromisión de Gobierno en Diario Extra.
548 Sala Constitucional. February 22, 2019. Resolución Nº 03316 – 2019. Available at: https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen1-0007-911421
549 CRHoy. February 15, 2019. Para evitar a la prensa, ministra oculta agenda de Alvarado.
550 La República.net. August 6, 2018. Falta de transparencia del gobierno evita saber cómo gasta dinero de impuestos.
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12.CUBA
418. Restrictions on freedom of expression, access topublic information, and protest have persisted in Cuba
during 2019. President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s administration has reportedly intensified crackdowns on dissidents
and opponents, as well as the harassment and systematic persecution of independent journalists, human rights
advocates, activists, and dissidents who disseminate information and opinions on matters of public interest
outside the control of the State.551
419. The harassment of journalists, activists, artists and human rights defenders is not onlyphysical, but also
psychological, and being subjected to humiliating treatment as part of police and government control has
become normalized. Notably, CubaNet journalist Roberto Jesús Quiñones Haces was sentenced to one year in
prison for the crimes of resistance and disobedience due to his decision to cover the hearings in a trial of public
interest. This Office, together with the United Nations (UN), sent an Article 18 letter requesting information on
the conditions in which the journalist was being held.
420. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has also expressed its concern over the potential enactment of new
laws such as Decree Law No. 370 “on the computerization of society in Cuba,” which undermines the exercise of
freedom of expression and the possibilities for establishing digital media outlets. Similarly, Decree Law No. 349
punishes noncompliance with Cuba’s cultural policy, and has reportedly led to the intensified censorship and
persecution of artists in Cuba.
A. New constitution and Freedom of expression in Cuba
421. A new national Constitution552 was adopted for the first time in 44 years in February 2019, amid
complaints about the lack of access to information and persecution of citizens who sought to discuss the draft.
According to reports, there were several flaws in the process with respect topublic awareness and debate of the
draft Constitution. Despite the organizations’ efforts to generate a multi-stakeholder dialogue, there were “legal
and political barriers” that limited effective citizen participation,553 as well as a lack of mediapluralism.
422. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that, despite the fact that this new Constitution includes
rights and guarantees554 that were absent from the 1976 Constitution, it fails to effectively create the
mechanisms needed to implement them in practice,555 and it upholds a Cuban legal system that restricts the
exercise of freedom of expression. Indeed, the Constitution itself subordinates the exercise of this right to the
protection of certain objectives and interests, in a manner incompatible with international human rights
instruments.
423. The new Constitution provides for the preservation and strengthening of the socialist State, sole state
or social ownership of the media, and the interests of the working people; as well as criminal laws that include
various forms of contempt of public authority [desacato] or subversion intended toprotect State security forces
and the socialist order, among other things. The Cuban legal system takes a restrictive and instrumental view of
freedom of expression with regard to the activities of journalists and the media. Articles 54 and 55 are
particularly relevant to the exercise of freedom of expression in Cuba. The first article statesthat:
424. Art. 54. The State recognizes, respects, and guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and expression.
Conscientious objection may not be invoked with the intention of evading compliance with the law orpreventing
another from complying with the law or exercising their rights.
425. This Office observes that the Constitution adopted in February 2019 establishes the State’s general
obligation to recognize, respect, and guarantee freedom of thought, conscience, and expression, while the 1976
Constitution did not contain any similar provision. However, for those rights to be enforceable in Cuba, they
must be interpreted in conjunctionwith other constitutionalprovisions thatprevent politicalpluralism and nongovernment ownership of media outlets, thus preventing de facto the free exercise of freedom of expression
through independent media. Moreover, as this Office of the Special Rapporteur stated in its 2018 Special Report
on the situation of freedom of expression in Cuba, the constitutional reform of 2019 also failed to establish legal
proceedings to guarantee or protect the exercise of fundamental freedoms.556
426. Similarly, it is troubling that the new Cuban Constitution kept the main restrictions of the previous legal
system in terms of subordinating freedom of the press to interests not authorized under international law,
551 Telemundo 51. Díaz-Canel descarta libertad de prensa en Cuba . July 16, 2018; Radio y Televisión Martí. Informe ante ONU denuncia
violaciones a derechos humanos en Constitución cubana. May 1, 2019.
552 El Diario. La SIP lamenta que el Estado cubano siga reprimiendo la libertad de prensa. July 20, 2019; New York Times. Cubans Approve
a Constitution, but Opponents Speak Out. February 25, 2019.
553 IACHR. Press Release 058/19 IACHR Concerned about Cuba’s New Constitution and its Implementation. March 4, 2019.
554 BBC Mundo. Referendo Constitucional en Cuba: 5 puntos que explican la polémica por la Constitución que se votó este domingo. February
26, 2019.
555Race & Equality. Condenas premeditadas: Análisis de la situación de la administración de justicia en Cuba. June 2019. Ch. VIII.
556 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 43.
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rendering the exercise of the right illusory and its recognition purely rhetorical.557 This relates to Article 55,
which provides that:
427. Art. 55. Citizens are entitled to freedom of the press. This right is exercised in accordance with the law
and the aims of society. The fundamental means of communication, in any of its forms, are the socialist property
of all the people, or of political, social, and mass organizations; they are not subject to any other form of
ownership. The State establishes the principles of organization and operation for all media.
428. This Office notes that, in addition to continuing to subject freedom of expression to the “objectives of
socialist society,” the new Constitution maintains the prohibition of non-state media. As the provision expressly
states, the media “are the socialist property of all the people.” This is even more worrisome considering that the
article designating the PCC as the country’s highest leading force also remains in effect. This Office observes that
maintaining the government’s monopoly on the media is also contrary to the provisions of the new Constitution,
which defines Cuba as a democratic State governed by the rule of law. In other words, it is impossible to speak
of the existence of a democratic system without full respect for freedom of expression and the opportunity for
citizens to exchange information, ideas, and opinions from a variety of information sources, including the ability
to establish or co-found media outlets.558
429. Article 4 of the new Constitution is also relevant. It establishes that “Citizens have the right to combat
through any means, including armed combat when other means are not available, against anyone that attempts
to overthrow the political, social, and economic order established by this Constitution,” which could open the
door to the use ofphysical violence againstpersons who express their interest in changing the country’spolitical
order.
430. Finally, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that Article 53 of the new Constitution recognizes
the right to access to public information, establishing that “All people have the right to request and receive
information from the State that is true, objective, and timely, and to access the information generated by bodies
of the State and its entities, according to the established regulations.” While this is a stepforward, given that the
1976 Constitution did not recognize the right to access to information, its wording does not fully encompass the
scope and content of that right. Under Article IV of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
“Every person has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of
ideas, by any medium whatsoever.”
431. The Office of the Special Rapporteur stresses the importance of ensuring that the laws enacted to
guarantee the exercise of the right to access to public information are fully consistent with the respective
obligations. It must have a limited regime of exceptions, an effective and suitable remedy to ensure the
satisfaction of the right to access to information, an appropriate mechanism for individuals to enforce this right
if the State refuses to provide information, and the opportunity to have decisions reviewed on appeal by a
guarantor body. At the same time, the right to judicial review of the administrative decision should be
established through a remedy that is simple, effective, prompt, and inexpensive, and that allows individuals to
contest the decisions of public officials.559
B.State media monopoly, censorship, and compulsory membership in a professional association to
practice journalism
432. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the hostile environment in which journalists and
reporters have been working in 2019. This hostile environment continues to be observed by different human
rights institutions and international bodies, which place Cuba among the top 10 countries with the most
widespread censorship practices in the world.560 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) places Cuba 169 out of 179
countries included in its 2019 ranking, which it compiles based on the degree of freedom enjoyed by
journalists.561
433. According to available information, various forms of repression persist, such as compulsory
membership in a professional association to practice journalism; threats, summonses, and interrogations
designed to intimidate; illegal and/or arbitrary detentions; searches and seizures of journalistic equipment or
other property; dismissals and denials of authorization to practice a profession or economic activity; pressures
and threats to journalists’ families and the people around them, as well as defamatory practices; and barriers to
departure from Cuba and other arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement. Criminalization and the use of
557 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 44.
558 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 45.
559IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Paras. 29 and 63-64.
560 CPJ. 10 Most Censored Countries. 2019 report..
561 This report measures the situation of freedom of the press, based on an assessment of pluralism, independence of the media, quality of
the legal framework and safety of journalists in these countries. [Reporters Without Borders. Clasificación Mundial de RSF 2019: Balance de
América Latina: La mecánica del Miedo].
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the criminal law has been normalized, seriously undermining journalism and those who seek to express their
opinions in Cuba. For instance, it was reported that in May 2019 the Chief Justice of the People’s Supreme Court
threatened to impose a “Gag Rule” on individuals who work with foreign media and in furtherance of the
objectives of the Helms-Burton Act, title III of which was fully implemented in April by President Donald Trump,
allowing U.S. citizens to file lawsuits as of May 2 of this year against businesses operating on properties seized
by the Cuban regime.562
434. In addition, independent journalists have unlawful status under Cuba’s existing legal framework, given
that journalists are required to be members of the official media, or of the Union of Cuban Journalists (UPEC)—
the sole and official journalists’ union—in order to practice the profession.563 According to public knowledge,
journalists who practice the profession despite these restrictions are threatened with criminal prosecution for
the offenses of “impersonation of a public official” or “acting without legal capacity.” This is openly contrary to
freedom of expression and freedom of the press, which require guarantees for their full enjoyment.564
C.Persecution of the independent press
435. The Cuban State uses arbitrary detentions—usually short in duration—, internal deportations,
summonses topolice stations, home raids, pressure on families, travel restrictions, and the confiscation of work
materials to prevent independent journalists from working freely. Reported complaints565 state that those
affected are often intercepted in the street, and that State agents frequently carry out “seizures” in operations in
which they raid homes, intimidate families, and arrest journalists. This Office has been informed that detained
journalists are held incommunicado and reportedly crowded into cells together with detainees accused of
common crimes.566 It is reportedly also common for relatives of independent journalists to be pressured to
cooperate with State security forces.567
436. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has noted that those raids, summonses, and detentions of
independent journalists inten sify in the lead-upto majorpolitical events, to prevent journalists from being able
to provide news coverage.568 On August 16, independent journalists reported threats and arrests that had kept
them from leaving their homes to cover theprotest demonstrations of SNet users in Cuba,including, for instance,
writer and photographer Ariel Maceo of ADN Cuba, journalist José Jasán Nieves of the magazine El Toque, and El
Estornudo journalist Abraham Jiménez.569
437. This Office has noted that on November 11 several activists, artists, and independent journalists
reported that the politicalpolice had begun a wave of arrests to restrict their movements or keepthem besieged
in their homes, allegedly because of the visit of Spain’s royal couple and the official celebration of Havana’s 500th
anniversary.570 On November 12, independent journalist and religious activist Ricardo Fernández was detained
for 29 hours by State security forces in a cell at Villa María Luisa based on their criminal complaint alleging that
he “acted without legal capacity.”571 On November 15, journalist Yoani Sánchez condemned a police operation
562 Miami Diario. October 11, 2019. Siguen las amenazas contra periodistas independientes en Cuba: Autoridades del régimen buscan aplicar
la «Ley Mordaza». Cubanos por el Mundo. October 15, 2019. Régimen de Cuba amenaza con aplicar «Ley Mordaza» a periodistas
independientes en Granma. Cibercuba April 17, 2019. Estados Unidos confirma la aplicación del Título III de la Ley Helms-Burton a partir del
2 de mayo; Radio Televisión Martí. May 9, 2019. Cuba amenaza con la Ley Mordaza en respuesta a la activación de la Helms-Burton; Cubanet.
May 10, 2019. FDHC al Tribunal Supremo de Cuba:“No le corresponde amenazar a los ciudadanos”; InterAmerican Press Association (IAPA).
Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Cuba. October 7, 2019; CNN. April 17, 2019. Trump administration targets so-called 'troika
of tyranny' with wave of new sanctions.
563 See article 2 of the UPEC Statutes: “The Upec is a trade organization recognized in Article 7 of the Constitution ofthe Republic that states:
'The Cuban socialist state recognizes and encourages mass and social organizations, arising in the historical process of the struggles of our
people, which group different sectors of the population within them, represent their specific interests and incorporate them into the tasks
of building, consolidating and defending the socialist society”.
564 IACHR. 173 Period of Sessions, Hearing on Serious Human Rights Violations in Cuba. September 23, 2019.
565 Interviews with IACHR in 2019. Office of the Special Rapporteur. Julio Cesar Álvarez and Vladimir Turro Páez. Aristegui Noticias. October
10, 2019. Medios cubanos exigen legalización del periodismo no estatal y denuncian agresiones.
566 CubaNet. September 24, 2019. La cárcel que encierra a Roberto Quiñones. Cibercuba. October 1, 2019. El periodista Roberto Quiñones
cuenta sus malas condiciones en una cárcel de Cuba. ADN Cuba. September 27, 2019. Denuncian violación de derechos a Roberto Quiñones en
la prisión de Guantánamo.
567Interviews with IACHR in 2019. Office of the Special Rapporteur. Journalist of digital magazine El Estornudo. Abraham Jiménez. Film
producer and artist. Michel Matos.
568Diario de Cuba. October 9, 2019. La Seguridad del Estado 'visita' a la familia de un periodista de DIARIO DE CUBA. Cibercuba. November 9,
2019. Activistas cubanos convocan a campaña por los derechos humanos durante visita de los Reyes de España a la isla.
569 On August 16, 2019, the director of El Toque magazine, José Jasán Nieves Cárdenas, reported he was summoned by telephone due to
his coverage of protests by SNet users in Cuba. Más de un centenar de usuarios de SNet protestan frente al Ministerio de Comunicaciones.
14 y Medio. August 10, 2019. Con arrestos y amenazas, la Seguridad del Estado aborta una protesta a favor de SNet. 14 y Medio. August 17,
2019.
570 Diario de Cuba. November 13, 2019. Operativos de la policía política en toda Cuba por la visita de los reyes de España. Diario de Cuba.
November 14, 2019. Casas sitiadas y llamadas de advertencia: más represión por la visita de los reyes de España. CiberCuba. November 9,
2019. Activistas cubanos convocan a campaña por los derechos humanos durante visita de los Reyes de España a la isla.
571 APLP. November 14, 2019. Arrestado el periodista Ricardo Fernández Izaguírrez. Diario de Cuba. November 14, 2019. Liberado bajo
amenazas el periodista independiente Ricardo Fernández Izaguirre.
120
at her apartment that reportedly prevented her and her spouse Reinaldo Escobar—also a journalist—from
moving freely and leaving their residence.572
438. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has also received reports of landlords being pressured to evict
independent journalists from their rented homes, as said to have happened in the cases of Adriana Zamora,
Odalina Carmona, Sol García, and Ernesto Carralero.573
439. According to available information, the Cuban State has tightened controls and restrictions on both the
foreign and domestic travel of journalists, editors, and freedom of expression activists throughpractices known
as “regulations,”574 which are used frequently and generally without due process.575 At least 200 such
“regulations” were reported in 2019,including, according to the information received as of the close of this 2019
report,in the cases of La Hora de Cuba journalists Inalkis Rodríguez, Iris Mariño, Sol García, Isal Arango, Augusto
César San Martín, Osmel Ramirez, and Camila Acosta.576
440. This Office has also documented the denial of entry into Cuba of reporters seeking to cover various
topics.577 There have been restrictions on the coverage of public demonstrations and protests, such as the case
of Washington Blade editor and reporter Michael Lavers, who was detained at José Martí International Airport
in Havana before being deported and declared “persona non grata” because he intended to cover the Conga, a
well-known parade organized by the Cuban LGBTI+ movement.578 On May 11, an LGBTI+ march called by
independent activists following the cancellation of the traditional official march ended in repression and arrests,
including those of reporters Ileana Hernandez of Cibercuba and Boris Gonzalez Arenas of Diario de Cuba.
579
441. In 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has monitored more than 50 complaints of violent
persecution against independent journalists, activists, and advocates in 10 of the island’s 14 provinces.580 The
CubanHuman Rights Observatory (OCDH) documented atleast 1,468 arbitrary arrests in justthe first 10 months
of the year, and this situation has reportedly intensified as a result of the different movements campaigning for
a “no” vote on the new Constitution in the February 2019 referendum on its adoption. In this context, there were
at least 218 arbitrary detentions on the island inNovember.581
442. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has also received information on the normalization of subjecting
independent journalists in Cuba to humiliating treatment, such as in the case of Osvaldo Landín Baños,582 an
independent journalist from Perico, in Matanzas, who was reportedly struck by a National Revolutionary Police
(PNR) vehicle in 2019. Also of special concern are cases reported by women journalists in detention, who have
reported being forced to undress and placed in humiliating positions.583 Iris Mariño, a journalist from the
independent newspaper La Hora de Cuba, for instance, stated that she had counted 22 instances of harassment
against her, including detentions and interrogations where no female officer had beenpresent.584
443. In April 2019, the IACHR grantedprecautionary measures on behalf of Diario de Cuba journalists Manuel
Alejandro León Velázquez, Osmel Ramírez Álvarez, and Adriana Zamora García, as well as their relatives, on the
grounds that their right to life and personal integrity faced “a situation of seriousness and urgency.” On that
same occasion, the IACHR asked the Cuban State to take measures to protect the right to freedom of expression
of the newspaper Diario de Cuba.
585
572ADN Cuba. November 15, 2019. Prohíben salir de su casa a Yoani Sánchez y Reinaldo Escobar.
573 Diario de Cuba. August 18, 2019. La policía política deja sin vivienda a dos periodistas de DIARIO DE CUBA a punto de ser padres.
574 ADN Cuba. June 3, 2019. Crece la lista de periodistas y activistas "regulados" en Cuba. Interviews with IACHR in 2019. Office of the Special
Rapporteur. Testimony of independent journalist Lázaro Yuri Valle Roca.
575 Race & Equality. June 2019. Condenas premeditadas: Análisis de la situación de la administración de justicia en Cuba. Cibercuba.
November 17, 2019. Autoridades cubanas impiden salir del país a la periodista independiente Camila Acosta. According to public
information, these impediments, commonly called “regulations,” maintain a list of the names of Carlos Alejandro Rodríguez, Maily Pérez,
Regina Coyula, Joan Manuel Núñez Díaz, Sol García, Maykel González, Yoandy Izquierdo, Anderlay Guerra, Raúl Velázquez, Iván Hernández,
Abel Estrada, Henry Constantín, Augusto Cesar San Martín, Yusimí Rodríguez, Ileana Álvarez, and Yaudel Estenoz. Other journalists who
have recently reported bans are: Julio Aleaga, Amarilis Cortina, Victor Manuel Domínguez, Niober Garcia, Jose Fornaris, Anay Remon, Osmel
Ramirez, Manuel León, Javier Valdez, Luz Escobar, Boris González Arenas, Manuel Alejandro León Velázques, among others.
576 ADN Cuba. May 22, 2019. Prohíben salir del país a 4 jóvenes de la revista La Hora de Cuba; Puente a la vista. May 25, 2019. Reguladas: El
caso de ‘La hora de Cuba’. Diario de Cuba. October 10, 2019. El periodista de DIARIO DE CUBA Osmel Ramírez Álvarez cumple 700 días
'regulado'. Cibercuba. October 24, 2019. Gobierno de Cuba impide viajar a 15 activistas para asistir a evento en Miami. 14 y Medio. November
4, 2019. Crece la represión en Cuba: Ferrer sigue "desaparecido" y suben a 200 los 'regulados'.
577 Radio y TV Martí. January 18, 2019. Expulsan de Cuba a dos estudiantes brasileños por entrevistar a esposa de opositor Telemundo51. May
2, 2019. Reportera de Telemundo es deportada de Cuba. Cubanet. November 19, 2019. Régimen cubano impide salir del país a la periodista
Camila Acosta; Régimen cubano impide salir del país a la periodista Camila Acosta.
578 The Washintong Blade. May 9, 2019. Cuba blocks Blade reporter from entering country.
579 The Washintong Blade. May 9, 2019. Cuba blocks Blade reporter from entering country.
579 APLP. October 10, 2019. Arrestados en La Habana tres periodistas. Radio y TV Martí. November 14, 2019. Contra la Censura. Cibercuba.
September 29, 2019. Detienen a la reportera de CiberCuba Iliana Hernández por protestar contra "la política de regulados" del Gobierno.
580 IACHR 173 Public hearings. Septiembre, 2019. Informe primer semestre APLP Cuba. Race and Equality Report 2019.
581 Observa Cuba. October 3, 2019. Gobierno de Díaz-Canel casi duplica las detenciones arbitrarias en septiembre. Diario de Cuba. December
4, 2019. Noviembre: el mes de los arrestos domiciliarios en Cuba.
582 ADN Cuba. July 25, 2019. Denuncian atropello y causa legal fabricada contra periodista independiente.
583 IACHR 173 Public hearings. Septiembre, 2019. 173 Periodo de Sesiones Audiencias CIDH.
584 ADN Cuba. November 1, 2019. Dos Journo Heroes cubanas.
585 IACHR . Medidas cautelares No. 1025-18. 4 de abril de 2019.
121
444. Finally, according to available information, other journalists who have been repeatedly and deliberately
harassed in Cuba in the past five years include: Yoani Sánchez (the beneficiary ofprecautionary measures issued
by the IACHR), José Jasán Nieve,586 Luz Escobar,587 Ileana Álvarez,588 Roberto Quiñones, Eider Frometa,589
Yoarielis Centelle,590 Arodis Pelicie,591 Osmel Ramírez,592 Martha Liset Sánchez,593 Carlos Alejandro Rodríguez,
Maily Esteves,594 Alberto Corzo, Alberto Castaño,595 Rudy Cabrera,596 José Fornaris, Boris González,597 Mario
Echevarría, Regina Coyula, Joan Manuel Núñez, Roberto Rodríguez, Luis Cino, Sol García,598 Emiliano González,
Raúl Velasquez, Manuel Alejandro León,599 Alexander Rodríguez, Alejandro Hernández, Osniel Carmona, Yuri
Valle, Anderlay Guerra, Augusto César San Martín, Carlos Alberto Torres, Niorbis García, Yordis García, Daniel
González, Deris Solís, Adrián Quesada, Vladimir Turró, Eradilys Frómeta, Inalkis Rodríguez,600 Rosalia Viñas,
Idilsa Bailly,601 Oscar Padilla, Dagoberto Valdés, Yoandy Izquierdo, Rafael Gordo, Mario Echavarría, Yaudel
Estenoz, Yuri Valle,602 Odalina Carmona,603 Ernesto Carralero, Julio Aleaga, and Henry Constantin,604 among
others.605
D.Politically motivated criminalization of critical or dissenting speech
445. As the Office of the Special Rapporteur stated in its 2018 Special Report on the situation of freedom of
expression in Cuba, journalists, artists, human rights advocates, and activists, as well as political dissidents,
intellectuals, and thought leaders continue to face serious hostility, persecution, and harassment. Multiple
sources have consistently reported that such persons are frequently deprived of their liberty arbitrarily on
criminal charges—such as contempt of public authority [desacato], attack against a public authority [atentado],
and disorderly conduct—at times being subject to assaults, threats, and abuse while in custody. The most
commonly reported forms of harassment includephysical assaults, vandalism,public repudiation, and other acts
targeting opponents of the Cuban government. In a joint communiqué published simultaneously on October 7
by 19 independent Cuban media outlets, the island’s journalists condemneda wave of repression by MiguelDiazCanel’s government designed to silence them.606
446. According to the information received, the misuse of the criminal law mechanism of subsequentliability
against persons who express opinions, share information, or criticize matters of public interest, or refer to
government employees or officials, is one of the most severe tactics used against particular groups. This Office
has identified different civil society organizations607 that remain active despite this harassment, including, for
instance, the Cuban Institute for Freedom of Expression and the Press (ICLEP), the Association for Press
Freedom (APLP), and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU). 608
447. This Office attaches special importance to the arrest of opposition activist José Daniel Ferrer, who was
detained at UNPACU headquarters in an operation carried out by 60 members of the special forces, the police,
and the State security forces. He was missing for about 30 days before being charged with assault and battery.
586 Puroperiodismo/ Youtube. August 22, 2019. José Jasán Nieves de elTOQUE sobre el periodismo móvil en Cuba.
587 CiberCuba. May 22, 2019. Prohíben salir de Cuba a la periodista Luz Escobar.
588 14 y Medio. August 16, 2019. "Resistir por resistir no tiene ningún sentido".
589 Diario de Cuba. February 12, 2019. José Daniel Ferrer: 'O nos respetan o nos matan'..
590 Radio Televisión Marti. February 22, 2019. Entrevistas con periodistas del Instituto Cubano por la Libertad de Expresión y Prensa.
591 CiberCuba. June 21, 2019. Redada a la prensa independiente.
592 Diario de Cuba. October 10, 2019. El periodista de DIARIO DE CUBA Osmel Ramírez Álvarez cumple 700 días 'regulado'.
593 Radio Televisión Martí. June 25, 2019. Cacería de brujas contra periodistas independientes en Cuba.
594 Confidencial. September 19, 2019. Declaración de la prensa independiente de Cuba.
595 Knight Center. June 26, 2019. Cuban journalists report increase in detentions and other abuses of power by authorities..
596 CubaNet. September 27, 2019. Escapando en silencio o la autocensura en Cuba.
597 CibeCuba. October 10, 2019. La esposa del activista cubano Boris González Arenas denuncia que sigue en paradero desconocido.
598 ADN Cuba. October 6, 2019. Asamblea de la SIP en Miami denuncia represión al periodismo independiente cubano.
599 CiberCuba. October 24, 2019. Gobierno de Cuba impide viajar a 15 activistas para asistir a evento en Miami.
600 CiberCuba. May 22, 2019. Impiden a periodistas independientes de Camagüey participar en evento en el extranjero.
601 Diario Las Américas. October 19, 2019. Cuba niega salida de periodista para asistir a congreso de prensa interamericana.
602 Diario de Cuba. June 19, 2019. 'Expatriaciones forzosas': nueva denuncia contra el régimen cubano ante la ONU.
603 Infobae. September 17, 2019. Informe denuncia "terrorismo de Estado" contra periodistas en Cuba.
604 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). August 31, 2019. Detienen temporalmente a Henry Constantín, representante de la SIP en Cuba.
605 Asociación Pro Libertad de Prensa de Cuba. September 2019. Monthly monitoring report. IACHR. 173 Public Period of Hearings. Freedom
of Expression and Human Rights in Cuba.
606 Knight Center. October 7, 2019. 19 independent Cuban media outlets publish joint declaration demanding more protection and respect
for the press from government.
607 IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur. Press Release R152/18. The Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses Concern over Criminal
Convictions for desacato laws in Cuba. July 17, 2018.
608 Asociación Pro Libertad de Prensa Cuba(APLP). November 2019 report. Yucabyte. October 2019. Declaración de Medios Independientes
Cubanos. INFOBAE. October 5, 2019. La SIP denunció que la libertad de prensa en Cuba está peor que nunca. Amnesty International. August
27, 2019. Cuba: Amnistía Internacional adopta cinco nuevos presos de conciencia. EuropaPress. November 7, 2019. AI pide por carta al Rey
que en Cuba se interese por José Daniel Ferrer y por la liberación de seis presos de conciencia. Cibercuba. October 2, 2019. Al menos 125
presos políticos "por oposición al régimen", según Cuban Prisoners Defenders..
122
His wife Nelva Ortega Tamayo, and their three minor children, were also detained while holding a peaceful
protest for his release.609
448. Among the exemplary cases highlighting the situation is the case of Cubanet journalist Roberto Jesús
Quiñones Haces, who was sentenced to a year in prison for the crimes of resistance and disobedience. According
to reports, on April 22, Quiñones was arrested and beaten by National Revolutionary Police (PNR) officers while
covering the trial in a case that the Cuban State had brought against the married couple Rigal-Exposito, who
were prosecuted for the decision to homeschool their children, among other older cases.610 On October 1,
Quiñones Haces and other inmates sent a letter to Cubanet describing the conditions to which they were
subjected in prison. After the letter was published, his son, Roberto José, denounced internationally that the
journalist had been subjected to reprisals through “disciplinary measures.” These measures reportedly included
the suspension of telephone calls and being barred from going out into the prisonyard.611
449. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has also documented serious politically motivated structural
discrimination in the exercise of human rights; anyone who thinks or speaks out about matters ofpublic interest
in a way that the State considers contrary to its official discourse faces persecution and harassment. Although
the new Constitution includes an acknowledgement of the right to equality and nondiscrimination in broad
terms, it does not address politically motivated discrimination. While the Office welcomes the inclusion of
prohibited grounds for discrimination such as gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and
disability,612 it notes that political opinion is also a prohibited ground—widely recognized in human rights
instruments613—but it is not protected in the text of the Constitution. A democratic system must have regulatory
conditions under which all persons, without discrimination, can exercise their rightsfreely.
E.Censorship and persecution of artists
450. For more than three decades, the IACHR has affirmed thatthere is a practice of tight government control
in Cuba that shows “intense intolerance of works of art that might raise questions as to the virtues of thepolitical
system or the correctness of the ruling group.” On this point, the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur
have continued to receive information indicating that ideological differences have served as grounds for
hindering artistic expression.614 To wit, Decree 349615 was enacted to update Decree 226 of 1997, and regulates
the cultural policy and the “provision of artistic services.” Various artists and activists who call themselves
“artivists” have complained616 that the law requires the approval of government authorities for artists to be able
to present their work to the public and provides for an “inspector” who can close an exhibition or end a concert
if he or she determines that they are inconsistent with the cultural policy of theRevolution.
451. The information received in 2019 shows that numerous artists—such as theater directors,617 musical
groups,618 writers, and others619—continue to be badly harassed in an attempt to keep them from expressing
609 14 y Medio. September 8, 2019. Detenido José Daniel Ferrer junto a otros activistas en Santiago de Cuba. Radio y TV Martí. December 2,
2019. Activistas de Amnistía Internacional reclaman libertad de José Daniel Ferrer. 14 y Medio. October 25, 2019. Liberadoslos hijos y la esposa
de José Daniel Ferrer tras ser arrestados durante una protesta. EFE. November 2, 2019. El opositor cubano José Daniel Ferrer cumple un mes
detenido en paradero desconocido. New York Times. December 3, 2019. Activist’s case hints at what changes and whatstays the same in Cuba.
610 Knight Center. September 13, 2019. Cuban journalist begins serving year-long prison sentence after being convicted of resistance and
disobedience
611 ADN Cuba.September 27, 2019. Denuncian violación de derechos a Roberto Quiñones en la prisión de Guantánamo. Radio y TV Martí.
November 12, 2019. Quiñones Haces denuncia vejaciones en documentos escritos desde prisión. Radio y TV Martí. November 12, 2019. Niegan
visitas al abogado y periodista Roberto Jesús Quiñones.
612 Proyecto de Constitución de la República de Cuba. Article 40.
613 See inter alia Universal Declaration. Article 2; PIDCP. Article 2.1; and CADH. Article 1.
614 IACHR. Special Report on the Situtation of Freedom of Expression in Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31, 2018.
Para. 127.
615 Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba. Ministerio de Justicia. DECRETO No. 349/2018. Letras Libres. December 10, 2018. ¿Qué es el
Decreto 349 y por qué los artistas cubanos están en contra? New York Times. February 17, 2019. Is This the End of Cuba’s Astonishing Artistic
Freedom?.
616 El País. September 14, 2019. Tania Bruguera, la artista enemiga número 1 del régimen castrista. Cibercuba. October 26, 2019. Serie
documental independiente reúne voces contra censura del Decreto 349.
617 In December 2017, the Interior Ministry had reportedly summoned theater director Adonis Milás after he decided to join an alternative
biennial. Likewise, members of Milan's group, Perséfone Teatro, were pressured. The director reportedly belonged to the Asociación
Hermanos Saíz that had recently organized presentations of the Hamletmachine play in Santiago de Cuba. The play had been previously
approved by a jury of the Provincial Council of the Performing Arts of Santiago de Cuba. However, State Security allegedly suspended the
second performance, claiming that the play would question Fidel Castro's image. Due to the alleged pressure of the regime's agents, the
actors reportedly now fear working. IACHR. Annual Report 2017. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter IV.B.
Cuba. Para. 69.
618 Likewise, members of the punk rock music group Porno para Ricardo claimed they were harassed and censored by the government, and
unable to perform publicly in Cuba, due, among other things, to a repertoire that reportedly criticizes the official regime. Puente
Democrático. El punk rock cubano en Buenos Aires. May 3, 2017.
619 Diario de Cuba. #00Bienal: el régimen responde al arte independiente con represión. May 13, 2018; Martí Noticias. Creadores buscan
espacios fuera de la UNEAC y las instituciones oficiales de Cuba. February 27, 2018.
123
their social and political concerns through art.620 This Office has received information about persecution
unleashed against artists who oppose Decree 349, including, for instance, Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, who has
reportedly been arrested several times this year.621 In September 2019, he was detained along with artists Iris
Ruiz and Amaury Pacheco in Havana during the celebration of the first anniversary of the declaration of the San
Isidro Movement.622 Artist Tania Bruguera reportedly had a similar experience on December 5, 2018, when she
was detained on her way to a protest across from the Ministry of Culture. This was reportedly the third time
Bruguera had been arrested in a week.623
452. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that this practice is based on existing law. Indeed, this
Office notes that Cuba’s new Constitution, adopted in February 2019, has adhered to the same line as the 1976
Constitution, as Article 32 states that, “In its educational, scientific, and cultural policy, the State abides by the
following tenets: […] h. Freedom of artistic creation is promoted in all of its expressions, in accordance with the
humanist principles upon which the State’s cultural policy and the values of socialist society are based;” and
Article 79 stipulates that the State “promotes culture and various artistic expressions, in accordance with
cultural policy and the law,” which, as this Office observed, is patently incompatible with freedom of artistic
expression.624
453. In more specific terms, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that the provisions implementing
cultural policy dictated by the Ministry of Culture include (i) the Regulations of the National Registry of Fine Art
and Applied Art Creators; (ii) the Regulations for the system of artistic hiring, marketing, and compensation in
music and performing arts events in the national territory; (iii) the Regulations for the system of labor relations
of workers in the arts sector; and (iv) the Regulations of the evaluation system for workers in the arts sector.
Recently, on December 7, 2018, Decree No. 349 was enacted, having been approved on April 20, 2018. This
decree penalizes noncompliance with the cultural policy625 and, according to reports, has exacerbated the
censorship and persecution of artists inCuba.
454. Chapter II of this Decree Law, which establishes the violations, is particularly relevant. For instance,
under Article 2.1, “any person who, as an individual artist or acting on behalf of the group to which he or she
belongs, provides artistic services without the authorization of the appropriate entity” is in violation, as is “any
person who provides artistic services without being authorized to perform artistic work in an artistic position
or occupation.” In addition, Article 4.1 establishes that is a violation when a person or entity “establishes spaces
for the sale of fine art without the required authorization, or without being registered with the Registry of Fine
Art and Applied Art Creators.”
455. In general terms, this policy establishes that in order to practice professionally, Cuban artists must be
qualified by the State. Only artists listed in the Registry of Fine Art and Applied Art Creators can exhibit their
work, provide services in public, or have commercial spaces. They are evidently required to establish ties with
a State institution in order to be remunerated for their work, and only the institutions authorized by the Ministry
of Culture or the ICRT can establish work or commercial relationships with artists. They cannot enjoy shows or
productions, or developor exhibit their skills in public, without the authorization of the State. Apparently,public
servants are authorized to decide when a work of art fails to comply with ethical and cultural values, or other
broad criteria. The measures that can be applied range from fines or the seizure of goods, to the immediate
suspension of the show or cancellation of the authorization to perform the activity.626
456. The Office of the Special Rapporteur finds that these lawspreserve the State’s limitation and restriction
of artists’ freedom of expression, by allowing for the punishment of those artists who do not share the official
ideological discourse or have differences with the ideology imposed by the Cuban government, through
excessively broad drafting language. They also limit access to culture, to the extent that only those listed in the
620 Diario de Cuba. La Seguridad del Estado impide la celebración de un evento literario con escritores censurados. February 4, 2018; Martí
Noticias. Policía política reprime evento literario contra la censura en Cuba. February 4, 2018. In 2018 it was reported that the Political Police
prevented literary event “Palabras excluidas” from beind held on February 3 at the Museo de la Disidencia. State Security all egedly
prevented several writers from reaching the venue, including writer Ángel Santiesteban
621 Artforum. August 13, 2019. Cuban artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara arrested over performance with cuban flag; 14yMedio. August 11,
2019. El artista Luis Manuel Otero lleva 24 horas en paradero desconocido; IVPress Online. August 13, 2019. Lanzan artistas cubanos reto por
bandera; Cuba comenta. July 10, 2019. Gobierno cubano promulga nueva Ley de Símbolos Nacionales; Diario Las Américas. July 10, 2019.
Régimen cubano censura uso de símbolos nacionales en prendas de vestir; Invasor. July 13, 2019. En Cuba, nuevas leyes de Pesca, de Símbolos
Nacionales y Electoral.
622 Cibercuba. September 15, 2019. Fernando Rojas arremete contra Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara: “No tiene aval artístico; ADN Cuba.
September 17, 2019. “La libertad es un vicio para mí”: Exclusiva con Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara; 14yMedio. September 15, 2019. Liberado
el artista Otero Alcántara tras pasar más de 72 horas detenido.
623AFP. December 5, 2018. Artista Tania Bruguera detenida en Cuba por protestar contra decreto oficial; El Nuevo Herald/AFP. December 5,
2018. Tania Bruguera detenida por tercera vez en Cuba por protestar contraun decreto oficial; The Guardian. December 6, 2018. Cuban artists
fear crackdown after Tania Bruguera arrest.
624 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 129.
625 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 130.
626 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 131.
124
Registry of Fine Art and Applied Art Creators may hold exhibitions, provide services in public, or have
commercial spaces.
457. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that UN Rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, also expressed their views on
June 12 in a communication to Cuba. According to the Rapporteurs, “the vagueness and excessively broad
wording of Decree 349 allows for the possibility of its arbitrary application and, therefore, it runs the risk of
violating not only the right to freedom of artistic expression and creativity of all persons in Cuba, but also the
right of everyone to seek and receive information and ideas of all kinds.” They also expressed their “particular
concern that theDecree establishes a system ofprior censorshipof the arts, as itsprovisions appear to go beyond
any legitimate objective of regulating the artistic sphere and therefore directly conflict with Cuba’s obligations
under international human rights law with respect to freedom of expression, artistic freedom, and the right to
participate in cultural life.” In addition, they found it troubling that this Decree “gives inspectors absolute
authority to impose penalties based on their personal opinions. Moreover, given that the sanctioning body and
the appeals body are one and the same, [they] are also concerned that there is no meaningful and impartial
appeal process; therefore, it is not an effective [judicial] remedy by the competent judicial, administrative, or
legislative authorities.”627
458. As this report has already mentioned, independent artists have reportedly tried to have a discussion
with government officials in response to the Cuban law, launching digital campaigns for its review like
#NoAlDecree349 andprotests that were violently repressed and resulted in the arrest of “artivists.”628 Since the
law entered into force, this Office of the Special Rapporteur has documented—among others—the arrest of
rappers Lázaro Leonardo Rodríguez Betancourt, known as “Pupito en Sy,” and Maikel Castillo Pérez, known as
Maikel el Obsorbo, who were reportedly being persecuted for having come out in opposition to Decree 349 and
the Cuban regime.629 According to available information, the former was released from custody and the latter
was sentenced to a year and a half in prison for the crime of “attack against a public authority” (atentado).630
The Office was also informed that artists Yanelis Núñez and Nonardo were reportedly in exile in Spain after
being targeted for constant harassment.631 It also received reports of the suspension of a concert by Osvaldo
Navarro Veloz, known as “Navypro,”632 the arrest of six artists in Havana during a peaceful protest outside the
Cuban Ministry of Culture, and the persecution and arrest of husband and wife authors Nancy Alfaya and Jorge
Olivera Castillo.633
459. Finally, according to available information, the “artivists” denounced an increase in the excessive use of
force in the repression of their public protest through artistic actions. One example of this was when police
intervened in an activity organized by the Club of Independent Writers and Artists and the Di.Verso Project.634
Another example of the use of violence through arrest is the case of theater director Adonis Milan,635 who was
held in solitary confinement, allegedly subjected topsychologicaltorture, and forced to sign a report on counterrevolutionary activities.
F.Limitations on the right to freedom of expression on the Internet
460. As the Office of the Special Rapporteur stated in its 2018 Special Report on the situation of freedom of
expression in Cuba, if anything has changed recently in the area of freedom of expression, it has been due
essentially to the slow and gradual development of communication technologies that, even with severe
restrictions, have become relevant in a country whose legal media are controlled by a single-party State. In
recent years, Internet use and the development of digital media have allowed for the opening of spaces for the
circulation of information and ideas beyond the reach of official government control. It has been thanks to these
technologies that a growing number of journalists have started digital media outlets in the last couple of years
outside the official discourse and the control of the State to disseminate their work, as well as to promote the
exchange of information and opinions.636
461. The main cadre members of the regime seem to recognize the importance of the platform for
disseminating content and knowledge, as long as it does not contravene the rules andprinciples geared towards
627 United Nations. Mandatos de la Relatora Especial sobre los derechos culturales; del Relator Especial sobre la promoción y protección del
derecho a la libertad de opinión y de expresión; del Relator Especial sobre los derechos a la libertad de reunión pacífica y de asociación; y
del Relator Especial sobre la situación de los defensores de derechos humanos. Referencia OL CUB 2/2019. June 12,2019.
628La Vanguardia. December 3, 2018. Detenidos en Cuba Bruguera y dos artistas más por protesta contra Decreto 349.
629 Cubanet. August 25, 2019. Régimen cubano acusa de “atentado” a rapero Maikel el Obsorbo. November 9, 2018. Diario de Cuba. 'Nunca me
he callado', dice el rapero cubano Pupito en Sy tras su excarcelación.
630 Cubanos por el mundo. April 26, 2019. Maikel Castillo Pérez ‘El Osorbo’ sentenciado a año y medio de prisión por criticar el 349.
631 Diario de Cuba. March 28, 2019. Dos activistas contra el Decreto 349 se exilian en Madrid.
632 Cibercuba. March 24, 2019. Autoridades cubanas suspenden concierto en Matanzas del rapero independiente Navypro .
633 PEN International. No Date. Comunicado PEN.
634 Diario de Cuba. October 1, 2019. Un violento despliegue policial frustra un taller de escritores independientes y el proyecto Di.Verso.
635El Diario de Cuba. September 9, 2019. 'Tengo miedo de que el miedo me haga traicionar mis principios y a la gente que yo quiero'. .
636 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 197.
125
maintaining and favoring the regime; however, any use of the Internet for other purposes, particularly open
criticism of the system, runs the risk of being removed, blocked, or filtered from the web by the authorities.637
462. This Office has received multiple complaints during 2019 about the ambiguous regulations on the
computerization of society in Cuba, specifically Decree Law 370, which enhances government regulation and
relegates the private sector to a simple, monitored “complement.” 638 In addition, there have been reports that—
less than six months after the Internet became accessible through mobile data in Cuba—there have been service
failures, limited compensation, mobilizations, and campaigns to lower the price of the Internet
(#BajenLosPreciosDeInternet).639
463. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that, according to available information, access to the web
is seriously constrained by (i) highly restrictive and ambiguous legal provisions, (ii) the limited connectivity of
the Cuban population, (iii) the blocking and censorship of critical media, and (iv) web surveillance, as discussed
in this section. The risks of persecution and repression against those involved in this type of activity seriously
undermine progress in terms of press freedom on the Internet in Cuba.640
464. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information confirming that the Cuban population
faces serious obstacles to Internet connectivity and universal access. According to reports, Cuba first connected
to the worldwide web in 1996, but the private use of personal computers was not authorized by the State until
2008. Despite the government’s claims that it intends to promote the widespread use of the Internet on the
island—and the fact that Cubans have been able to have home wifi since July 29, 2019641— over the years Cuba
has been ranked last in Latin America in terms of the spread of information and communication technologies,
due in part to high prices.642 According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in 2017, Cuba
ranked 137 out of 176 countries, two spots lower than the previous year.643 According to figures that cite
independent estimates and government statistics as a source, between 5% and 27% of thepopulation has access
to the Internet, but none of the estimates clearly states the methodology used to calculate access. In the case of
government statistics, the figure does not distinguish between connecting to the Internet and Cuba's intranet, a
closed network of sites hosted mainly on Cuban domains.644 In addition, according to available information,
there are still a number of decrees, ministerial resolutions, and various regulations governing the use of new
technologies in the country. Some of the ones that the Office of the Special Rapporteur considers to have the
greatest impact on freedom of expression are: Decree No. 209 of 1996, Resolution No. 56 of 1999, Resolution
No. 92 of 2003, Resolution No. 179 of 2008, and Resolutions No. 72 and No. 73 of 2009.
465. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observes the recent publication in 2019 of Decree Law 370 “on
the computerization of society in Cuba.” According to its text, the decree seeks, inter alia, “to strengthen the
computerization process, with a view to coherently modernizing all spheres of society and contributing to the
economic and social development of the country.”645 Although this may be a step forward for information and
communication technologies in the country in terms of the legal system, IT security, and other aspects, the Office
of the Special Rapporteur notes that provisions like Article 68 and Chapter II are of specialconcern.
466. For instance, Article 68, which establishes “violations associated with communication and information
technologies,” could establish a censorship regime in the country and serve as a legal instrument to punish the
independent press. For instance, this article stipulates that it is a violation (f) “to host a site on servers located
in a foreign country, other than as a mirror or replica of the main site on servers located within the country.”646
The Ministry of Communications clarified through a Tweet that this would not apply to blogs, or to personal or
news sites.647 Nevertheless, according to reports, different organizations have expressed concern over the
wording of theprovision, which refers clearly to “sites,” without further specification.648 The Office of the Special
637 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 198.
638 Freedom House. Global Press Freedom in Peril 2019. Radio y TV Martí. July 5, 2019. Así funciona el “corralito" digital cubano. 14 y Medio.
July 5, 2019. El Gobierno refuerza su control sobre el contenido de las redes. El País. August 13, 2019. Cuba y los derechos informáticos.
639 Yucabyte. December 2, 2019. Internet por datos móviles en Cuba: un año y contando…
640 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para.199.
641 New York Times. July 31, 2019. Cuba Expands Internet Access to Private Homes and Businesses; Radio Televisión Martí. September 17,
2019. CPJ:Nuevas medidassobre acceso a Internet en Cuba,"una trampa" para mediosindependientes; El Comercio. July 29, 2019. Cuba amplía
su acceso a internet, una herramienta para defender la revolución.
642 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para.217.
643 ITU. Measuring the Information Society Report 2017 . P. 31
644 CPJ. Connecting Cuba:
More Space for Criticism but Restrictions Slow Press Freedom Progress. 2016. P.27.
645 Decreto-Ley 370 “sobre la informatización de la sociedad en Cuba”. Published on July 4, 2019. Article 5 (4).
646 Decreto-Ley 370 “sobre la informatización de la sociedad en Cuba”. Published on July 4, 2019. Article 68 (f).
647 DL-370 computerization, contraventions subsection f), in the case of natural persons, refers to national platforms and applications of
services offered on the Internet and used by citizens, it does not refer to blogs, personal or informational sites”. Twitter account of Ministerio
de Comunicaciones Cuba @MINCOMCuba. July 5, 2019.
648 Tremenda Nota. July 10, 2019. Decreto-Ley 370: internet bajo control en Cuba; Knight Center. July 10, 2019. Independent Cuban media
criticize government decree establishing sanctions on sites hosted outside of the country.
126
Rapporteur is of the opinion that this law could be used against non-State media in Cuba, which are all hosted
outside the country because they are unable to acquire “.cu” domains or be legally recognized.
467. Similarly, subsection (i) makes it a violation to “disseminate, through public data transmission
networks, information contrary to the social interest, morals, propriety, and the integrity of individuals.”649 The
Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that this subsection would not pass the three-part test of legality,
necessity, and proportionality for implementing permissible limitations to freedom of expression online. In this
regard, its excessively broad and open-ended wording—which would not meet the minimum standards
required by the principle of strict legality—could allow for a broad interpretation of the article and leave that
interpretation to the discretion of judges. This could serve to establish undue restrictions on the exercise of the
rights to freedom of expression and assembly through the Internet, affecting the free flow of information. The
Office of the Special Rapporteur also observes that the penalties provided for in Chapter II of the Decree Law
would be disproportionate, by including, for instance, the “seizure of the equipment and means used to commit
the violations,” “temporary suspension or permanent cancellation of the license,” “the closure of facilities,” and
fines that could amount to several hundred U.S. dollars, substantial sums in Cuban pesos.
468. At the same time, different administrators and users condemned the imminent disappearance of what
is considered the largest informal Internet network in the world, which connects at least 20,000 people, the socalled Street Network (SNet). According to reports, on May 21, 2019, the Cuban government passed two
resolutions on wireless telecommunications that establish new requirements for the use of the country’s radio
spectrum, which make the network illegal and will lead to itsdisappearance.650
469. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has also documented the blocking of several media sites that cover
Cuban news, reportedly carried out at irregular intervals with no notice to those affected. According to
information provided to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, Tremenda Nota, 14yMedio, ADN and Diario de Cuba
were among the blocked sites.
651
470. Finally, the Office has received information on alleged surveillance activities targeting Internet users,
contrary to the right to privacy and protection of personal data. This has occurred either as a consequence of
using email and messaging services, or by means of software that allows general surveillance of the web,
especially of users who connect from cybercafés.652 It is particularly troubling that, in recent years, State
surveillance of web activity has reportedly been used as a means to identify independentjournalists andpolitical
dissidents, leading to patterns of harassment653—traditionally used against the print media—against
individuals engaged in this kind of Internet activity.654
G.Repression of social protest
471. As the Office of the Special Rapporteur stated in its 2018 Special Report on the situation of freedom of
expression in Cuba, There is systematic repression in Cuba by State agents and groups loyal to the ruling party,
who seek to prevent peaceful protests or meetings organized by human rights defenders, activists, or
government opponents to protest human rights violations and/or political or social issues655 Article 56 of the
Cuban Constitution establishes the right to peaceful freedom of assembly in thefollowing terms:
472. Art. 56. “The State recognizes the rights of assembly, demonstration, and association for lawful and
peaceful purposes, provided that they are exercised with respect for public order and in compliance with the
requirements established by law.”
473. This Office observes that the broad interpretation and application of the concept of “public order” in
Cuba—including through the abusive application of the criminal law—and the regulatory framework currently
in force, may make it impossible in practice to exercise this right without being subject to obstacles and
retaliation.656 The use of force toprevent the exercise of the right topeaceful assembly,including cases of street
649 Decreto-Ley 370 “sobre la informatización de la sociedad en Cuba”. Published on July 4, 2019. Article 68 (i).
650Diario de Cuba. August 23, 2019. Someterse o desaparecer, las opciones que deja el régimen cubano a la red independiente SNet.
651 Tremenda Nota. September 14, 2019. Tremenda Nota, otra revista que no puede leerse en Cuba.
652 Recently it was also reported that the new toDus messaging application, created by the Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas (UCI) and
ETECSA, would jeopardize the personal data of users in the hands of the government. Informe País Cuba 2018. Para. 238.
653 According to the available information, for example, Sol García Basulto and Henry Constantín, journalists from La Hora de Cuba, were
permanently spied on and were victims of cyberbullying through social networks. Informe País Cuba 2018. Para. 242.
654FH. Freedom on the Net 2017: Cuba; FH. Freedom on the Net 2016: Cuba; FH. Freedom on the Net 2015: Cuba; FH. Freedom on the Net
2014: Cuba. Pp. 13-16.
655 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 185.
656 IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Cuba. OEA/SER.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.21/18 December 31,
2018. Para. 187.
127
beatings, public humiliation and physical assault, is reportedly a common practice.657 Cases of excessive use of
force against demonstrators generally go unpunished.658
474. Organizers andparticipants have also been subject to arrests—normally of short duration—detentions,
assaults, and threats. According to the information received, they are routinely detained, often in anticipation of
future protests, for exercising and trying to exercise their right toprotest.659 They are also frequently threatened
or criminalized for offenses like disturbing the peace, attack against a public authority [atentado], and contempt
ofpublic authority [desacato].660 In some cases, detainees are reportedly beaten, kept incommunicado, subjected
to degrading treatment, and even forced to say revolutionary slogans and participate in activities in support of
the regime.661 Different members of civil society662 have reported to this Office that the use of violent force by
security agents to prevent public demonstrations has been aggravated by the current situation in the region,
specifically the popular protest uprisings in Venezuela andNicaragua.663
475. Finally, this Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that some of the most relevant examples from 2019
include the violent repression of the alternative march against homophobia, held in Havana on May 11, after the
State cancelled the traditional “Conga” organized by the National Center for Sexual Education. (Cenesex).664
According to public knowledge, a few participants were detained and interrogated for several hours by
plainclothes officers identified as members of the Cuban State security forces. Other activists were similarly
detained by the Cuban police hoursprior to the March to keepthem from participating.665 Another case reported
was the blocking of the march against animal abuse on World Environment Day. The Municipal Assembly of
People’s Power in the territory of Santa Clara reportedly refused to authorize the demonstration and called its
objective into question.666
657 IACHR. IACHR. Annual Report 2016. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc. 22/17. March 15, 2017. Para. 452; IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression.. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 48/15. December 31, 2015. Para. 429, 434; IACHR. Annual Report 2014. Annual Report of the Office ofthe
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 13. March 9, 2015. Para. 320; IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of
the Office ofthe Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 252; IACHR. Annual
Report 2011. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69. December 30, 2011. Para.
47, 250, 251; IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5 corr. 1. March
7, 2011. Para. 402; IACHR. Annual Report 2008. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134. Doc. 5 rev. 1. February 25, 2009. Para. 233; IACHR. Annual Report
2002. Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom Of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117. Doc. 1 rev. 1. March 7, 2003. Para. 104, 105;IACHR.
IACHR Concerned Over Assault onBeneficiary of Precautionary Measures in Cuba. November 10, 2011
658 IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 9-34; IACHR. Annual Report 2014. Annual Report
of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 13. March 9, 2015.
659 IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Informe País Cuba 2019. Paras. 190, 191, 192.
660 DDC. August 16, 2018. El poco conocido Gulag del Caribe.
661 Radio Martí. February 27, 2017. Lisandra Rivera Rodríguez: ‘58 días en una celda por negarse a obedecer a sus carceleros’; Civicus and
CCDHRN. October 5, 2017. P. 14. Presentación conjunta al EPU de las Naciones Unidas.
662 Interviews with IACHR in 2019. Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
663 Interviews with IACHR in 2019. Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Manual Silvestre Cuesta, Michael
Matos y Gorki Aguila.
664Cubanet. May 29, 2019. Denuncian represión de régimen cubano contra asistentes a marcha LGBTI.
665 Noticiero Universal. May 29, 2019. OCDH denuncia la represión del gobierno de Cuba contra participantes de la Marcha del 11-M
666 Cubanet. April 25, 2019. Autoridades de Santa Clara frenan marcha contra el maltrato animal.
128
13.DOMINICA
476. During 2019, the government of Dominica requested assistance to carry out an electoral reform to the
CARICOM Secretariat (CARICOM), the Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC) and the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States (SG / OAS), which in August carried out a Joint Special Mission in the country.
The three organizations made a series of recommendations, noted the lack of information from citizens
regarding electoral reform and their rightto vote, stating that “not allpeople had received sufficient and accurate
information that would allow them to understand the issues and form opinions substantiated ”, and highlighted
the need to improve and balance the access of all parties to public and private media. According to public
information, Deputy Héctor John and the brother of the leader of the United Workers Party Brian Linton would
have been arrested and charged with incitement at a public meeting of that party, after demanding that the
aforementioned electoral reform be carried out.
A. Legal reforms
477. The Government of Dominica asked the CARICOM Secretariat (CARICOM), the Commonwealth
Secretariat (COMSEC), and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (GS/OAS) to assist the
country with various aspects of electoral reform.
478. The three organizations teamed up in a Joint Special Mission to the country, conducted August 6-9.
During the mission, they met with key actors in the electoralprocess,including government authorities, electoral
authorities, political parties, and members of civil society.667
479. Finally, the Mission made several recommendations with respect to updating the voters’ list, issuing
identification cards,and voting by the diaspora. It also highlighted the importance of educating the public about
the electoral reform, affirming that in this case, “not all persons had received sufficient, accurate information to
allow them to understand the issues and to form considered opinions.”The report also shows that the
stakeholders consulted expressed their concern about the need to improve and level the playing field for all
parties in their access to public and private media.668
480. In addition, Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) leader Kent Vitalproposed freedom of information as one
of the electoral reforms needed to ensure a free and fair election.In this regard, he maintained
that,“Transparency reduces the ability of elected officials to hide officialinformation that could be important for
the public to exercise fair judgement in selecting the government that they want to manage their affairs.”669
481. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, “Elections are tightly linked to freedom of expression
and information as it is essential for citizens to have as much information as possible to make a decision in
casting their votes. Accordingly, free circulation of facts, ideas, and opinions is crucial. Unquestionably, the most
common way for citizens currently to inform themselves is through themedia.”670
B. Social Protest
482. According to available information, Hector John, MP for the Salisbury constituency, was arrested and
prosecuted forincitementbased on statements made at a public meeting of the United Workers Party
(UWP)about the civil unrest that would occur if elections were held without electoral reform [“I am going to tell
you something before I leave, don’t think that you will call the elections without electoral reform. You will have
civil unrest on your hands”].671
483. Brian Linton, the brother of UWP leader Lennox Linton, was also arrested and taken to the police
headquarters in Roseau for questioning in connection with allegations of incitement. Linton was released
without charge several hours later.672
484. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for the defense of human rights, and
an essential means of expressing political and social criticism of the activities of government authorities. The
Commission has stated that, “It is, in principle, inadmissible to punish demonstrations in public places as such
when they are held in the framework of the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly,” and that “The
667The Commonwealth. August 5, 2019. Joint Special Mission to Dominica; CARICOM. August 6, 2019. Joint Special Mission heads to Dominica;
Government of Dominica Web Portal.Report of the Joint CARICOM – Commonwealth – OAS Special Mission to Dominica.
668 CARICOM – Commonwealth – OAS Special Mission to Dominica. August 6-9, 2019. Report of the Special Mission; Government of Dominica
Web Portal.Report of the Joint CARICOM – Commonwealth – OAS Special Mission to Dominica.
669 Dominica News Online. June 2, 2019. DFP leader proposes electoral reform measures for free and fair elections.
670 IACHR. Annual Report 2005. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI Freedom of
Expression and the Electoral Process: The Case of Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 77 February, 2006. Para. 2.
671 Dominica News Online. 13 de septiembre de 2019. Hector John charged with incitement; Dominica News Online. 14 de septiembre de
2019. Hector John granted bail in incitement case; Caribbean Chronicle. 14 de septiembre de 2019. Hector John granted bail in incitement
case; Q95DA. 16 de septiembre de 2019. Salisbury MP speaks to the media after his arrest and subsequent release on an incitement charge.
672 Dominica News Online. 14 de noviembre de 2019. Brother of UWP leader picked up by police; Dominica News Online. 14 de noviembre de
2019. Brian Linton released without charge; Q95DA. 14 de noviembre de 2019. Leader of the UWP Lennox Linton shares statements on the
situation which saw his brother arrested for incitement charges earlier this morning.
129
exercise of the right to freedom of assembly through social protest must not be subjected to a permit from the
authorities or to excessive requirements that prevent it from happening.”
485. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has stated that,“The application of criminal law to the conduct of
participants in a demonstration constitutes a serious restriction with far-reaching consequences for freedom of
expression, and for the rights of assembly, association, and political participation, which […]can only be used in
very exceptional circumstances and is subject to a higher level of scrutiny.”673It has additionally stated that,“The
criminalization of those who participate in or lead public demonstrations not only has an impact on the rights
to freedom of expression and assembly, but also has serious and systemic effects on the exercise of the rights to
freedom of association and political participation. In particular, criminalization affects the free functioning and
coordination of organizations, political parties, unions, networks, movements, and other groups to which the
accused persons belong.”674
673IACHR. Protest and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF.22/19. September 2019. Para. 185.
674IACHR. Protest and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF.22/19. September 2019. Para. 193.
130
14.ECUADOR
486. Between January and June 2019, Ecuador was in a transition process initiated with the change of
government of President Lenin Moreno, marked by actions that sought to dismantle a series of repression and
control mechanisms over the press, the media, and civil society organizations. Still, the Office of the Special
Rapporteur expressed its concern regarding violence against communicators and the media, aswell as violations
to the right to freedom of expression during social protests and the state of exception decreed in October.
487. In April, the Ecuadorian government launched the Interinstitutional Committee for the Protection of
Journalists and Communication Workers, as suggested by the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur in
its recommendations after the country visit. This Committee is an instance of inter-institutional coordination of
the Ecuadorian Government and instances of civil society organizations, although these are only listed as guests.
488. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the elaboration of a document called Public Policy
for the Protection of Communication Workers, carried out through different meetings and thematic roundtables
by the Information and Communication Council, an institution that exercises the technical secretariat of said
Committee, in order to broaden the spectrum of inputs focused on developing the basis for a public policy of
security for journalists.
A. Progress
489. The Office of the Special Rapporteur highlights the decision adopted on September 4 by the
Constitutional Court of Ecuador, through which it revoked the decision adopted by the First Criminal Chamber
of the Pichincha Provincial Court of Justice675, via the right of reply, against the newspaper La Hora Ecuador and
Editorial Minotauro SA, for being inadmissible676. The Court observed that the information published by the
newspaper La Hora referred to the figures for government advertising expenses reported by a civil society
organization677. It indicated that data referring to public spending constitute information of public interest and
have the character of discourse specially protected by the right to freedom of expression678. The ruling also
reiterated thatthe right to rectification or response constitutes an effective mechanism so thatthose who believe
to be affected by information they consider false -in the case of rectification- and inaccurate or aggravating -in
the case of a reply-, may request that the information be corrected, or render their version of the published
information. The Court concluded that the protection action initiated to establish a right of response in this case,
in addition to being inadmissible, has the potential to generate an inhibitory effect in the media regarding
information of public interest.
B. Freedom of expression, protests, and state of exception
490. On October 5, the government of President Lenín Moreno issued Executive Decree No. 884 to impose a
state of exception for 60 days679 nationwide in Ecuador, which was applied with respect to the "freedom of
association, assembly, and free transit ", and was then extended through Executive Decree No. 888, with the
establishment of a curfewand the militarization of the capital, Quito680. The state of emergencywas the response
to the protests unleashed by a series of measures announced on 1 October that would have been taken to reduce
public spending681. In the economic682, labor, and tax reforms683, the abolition of fuel subsidies was included,
which would have triggered greater social rejection, which was manifested through the occupation of oil wells
in the Amazon, roadblocks, and a call for massive demonstrations throughout the nationalterritory684.
491. This Office has noted with concern685 the excessive use of public force by Ecuadorian security agents to
suppress protests organized by different sectors of civil society in the National Strike686 that was held from
October 2 to 13.
675 El Universo. November 14, 2012. Diario La Hora rectifica nota tras orden de juez por demanda del gobierno.
676 El Comercio. September 11, 2019. Corte Constitucional dice que entidades del Estado no pueden argumentar daño al honor.
677 Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Judgment No. 282-13-JP/19 of October 4, 2019.
678 Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Judgment No. 282-13-JP/19 of October 4, 2019. Para. 70.
679 Corte Constitucional del Ecuador. October 7, 2019. Constitutionality ruling modified by Release .
680 El País. October 12, 2019. Lenin Moreno decreta la militarización y el toque de queda en Quito.
681 Infobae. October 1, 2019. Ecuador anunció que abandonará la Organización de Países Exportadores de Petróleo en 2020.
682 BBC Mundo. October 11, 2019. ¿Cuál es el papel del FMI en la crisis de Ecuador?
683 La Razón. October 8, 2019. El “hachazo” económico de Lenín Moreno y las medidas para suavizarlo. France24. October 8, 2019. Ecuador,
en estado de excepción entre la furia contra el retiro de los subsidios a los combustibles.
684 Decree No. 884 informs the Presidency of Oficio No. 2019-3679-CG-QX-PN on events carried out in places occupied or made unusable by
protesters. It details "serious alterations to public order" and it "does not rule out the occupation of facilities of state institutions", among
others.
685 IACHR. Press Release 252/19. IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship Concerned about Excessive Use of Police Force against
Demonstrators and Attacks on Journalists during Protests in Ecuador. October 9, 2019.
686 Página 12. October 10, 2019. Crisis en Ecuador: masiva marcha y paro en Quito contra el ajuste.
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492. The State of exception was reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which in its resolution indicated that
the state of exception required687 that the National Police and the Armed Forces fulfilled their duties to protect
andprevent the integrity and rights of citizens, and limited its validity to 30 days688.
493. According to public knowledge information689, during the 12 days of protest, seven690 people would
have lost their lives, the number of detainees would have reached 1,152691; it should be noted that among them
there would be several children with their mothers692, who also denounced the lack of due process guarantees
in the detentions693. The Ombudsman of Ecuador reported 1,340 detainees694. Regarding the number of people
injured during the demonstrations, for itspart, the National Police of Ecuador counted 430 wounded agents, 108
patrolmen, and 7 burned motorcycles, also 26 Community Police Units (UPC) would have been attacked695.
494. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that States must act on the basis of the legality of protests
orpublic demonstrations and under the assumption that they do not constitute a threat topublic order. In order
to contribute to the non-repetition of these events. In that sense, State security operations must be carefully
planned under clear action protocols that guarantee the use of less lethal, progressive, and proportional
weapons, with absolute adherence to human rights, and favor dialogue. This Office emphasizes that the fact that
some groups or individuals exert violence in a demonstration does not make, per se, the entire protest violent,
nor authorizes the security forces to dissolve the protest through the use of force or topractice mass detentions.
In that sense, it warns that the use of the police and security forces must focus strictly on the containment of
acts of violence; as well as guaranteeing the right toprotest, without any direct repression or arbitrary detention
of peaceful protesters.
C. Aggressions and attacks on the press during protests
495. The escalation of violence also led to the obstruction of the work of the press, due to a series of attacks
against journalists and media outlets by both public security forces and protesters. These incidents would have
been enhanced by stigmatizing statements against journalists and the media, disseminated during mobilizations
by radicalized sectors696.
496. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has expressed its condemnation and concern regarding acts of
violence perpetrated towards the press, originated by both security agents andprotesters. According to reports
collected by this Office, there would have been more than a hundred attacks against journalists, community
communicators, photographers, camera people, and the media697 consisting of threats, harassment, arbitrary
detentions, physical attacks, impediment of coverage, confiscation of equipment, indiscriminate use of chemical
agents, surveillance, suspension of transmissions, raids of media, blocking of websites and social networks,
among other violations to freedom of expression.
497. According to information provided by civil society organizations698, the Ombudsman's Office and other
government institutions in Ecuador, about 120 attacks699 against the media and journalists (including
photographers, camera people, community communicators) would have been registered, the number of media
687 INFOBAE. October 10, 2019. La ministra del Interior de Ecuador se disculpó por la actuación policial durante las protestas.
688 IACHR. Press Release 252/19. IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship Concerned about Excessive Use of Police Force against
Demonstrators and Attacks on Journalists during Protests in Ecuador. October 9, 2019. United Nations. Ecuador: ONU Derechos Humanos
expresa preocupación por violencia en manifestaciones. Press release of October 6, 2019. Amnesty International. Ecuador: Authorities must
end repression of demonstrations immediately. Press release of October 9, 2019.
689 Amnesty International. October 9, 2019. Press release. Ecuador: Authorities must end repression of demonstrations immediately.
690 Defensoría del Pueblo Ecuador. October 9, 2019. Pronunciamiento: Defensor del pueblo exige al gobierno nacional detener la violencia que
vive el país. October 14, 2019. Seventh report: La defensoría del pueblo presenta séptimo informe con resultados de la vulneración de derechos
durante el estado de excepción.
691 Defensoría del Pueblo Ecuador. October 14, 2019. Seventh report: 274 people prosecuted while 878 were released without prosecution or
criminal responsibility. La defensoría del pueblo presenta séptimo informe con resultados de la vulneración de derechos durante el estado de
excepción.
692 Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humanos (INREDH), Comisión Ecuatoriana de Derechos Humanos, Observatorio de
Derechos y Justicia (ODJ Ecuador). October 7, 2019. Joint press release. Alerta de derechos humanos: Represión en zonas de paz, detenciones
irregulares y falta de acceso a la justicia.
693 El Comercio. October 9, 2019. La Fiscalía procesó a 142 de 676 detenidos por paralización.
694 Expreso. October 13, 2019. Defensoría del Pueblo eleva a siete los fallecidos en protestas.
695 Ministerio de Gobierno Ecuador. October 15, 2019. Conferencia de Prensa y Comunicado.
696 VOA Noticias. October 9, 2019. ¿Qué ocurre con la prensa en Ecuador en medio de la actual crisis?. IACHR. Informe Especial sobre la
Situación de la Libertad de Expresión en Ecuador. June 2019. Paras. 433 - 434. FUNDAMEDIOS. October 14, 2019. La prensa fue blanco de los
violentos: 135 periodistas agredidos en 12 días de protestas.
697 IFEX. October 14, 2019. IFEX-ALC condemns repressive actions against journalists in Ecuador. FUNDAMEDIOS. October 14, 2019. La
prensa fue blanco de los violentos: 135 periodistas agredidos en 12 días de protestas. United Nations News. October 7, 2019. La ONU pide
garantizar el derecho a manifestarse pacíficamente en Ecuador.
698 IACHR. Visit in Loco to Ecuador. UNP. October 29, 2019 Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
699 IACHR. Visit in Loco to Ecuador. FUNDAMEDIOS. October, 2019 . La prensa fue blanco de los violentos: 138 periodistas agredidos en 12
días de protestas.Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
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attacked would reach 20700, which would have taken place in the provinces of Pichincha, Guayas, Tungurahua,
Chimborazo, Morona Santiago, Manabí, Azuay, Pastaza, and Sucumbíos.
498. The excessive use of force701, and the use of chemical agents and rubber bullets left as a result several
injured journalists, among them, stands out for its gravity, the impact of a tear gas grenade in the face702 of the
digital media reporter, Wambra, Juan Carlos González in Quito; it was also reported that a motorized National
Police in Guayaquil ran over the Universal newspaper reporter, Ronald Cedeño. Tomebamba radio journalist,
Juan Francisco Beltrán703, El Comercio photographer, Julio Estrella704, and the API agency photographer, among
others, were sprayed with pepper spray directly on the face when covering the protest. The Primicias portal
reporter, Adriana Noboa, and El Comercio reporter, Yadira Trujillo were prevented by at least 12 riotpolice from
filming repression against protesters with their cell phones and reported being beaten (by toletazos)705 by the
Police. The journalists Charlie Granda, Luis Granda, and Wilson of the community radio #Periférik, were attacked
by a tank706. On Saturday, October 5, the cameraman of the Guarmillas site, David Aguiar, was injured with a
rubber bullet in the upper right part of the thorax707.
499. The attacks perpetrated against press workers also came from protesters708, union members, and social
movements709 who participated in the protests, among the multiple complaints of cases and incidents is that of
TVC reporter Andrea Orbe and her cameraman Tito Correa, who would have been physically and verbally
assaulted when they covered the closure of roads in the North Pan American Highway710. On the same day, the
TC Televisión television journalist, Mauricio Ceballos and his cameraman would have been attacked through
beatings with sticks and stones by protesters in the town of Santa Lucia (Guayas)
711. The journalists of Red
Informativa in Quito, as well as William Rivadeneira of Cable Mágico, Carlos López of Macas News, and César
Correa of radio Shalom denounced physical aggressions and harassment of protesters in Morona Santiago while
broadcasting live.
500. Along the same lines, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and its Office of the
Special Rapporteur712 took note that some journalists reported having been “held” 713, against their will, in the
Agora of the House of Culture where the indigenous leadership was in session. According to information
received, a section of the indigenous leadership would have required several newspaper teams to broadcast live
an act of "indigenous justice" against 8 police officers, also "held" in response to the death of protesters during
protests714. In that context, the Office of the Special Rapporteur condemned the aggression against the journalist
of Teleamazonas, Freddy Paredes715, when he was walking in the streets surrounding the House of Culture, who
was brutally beaten with a stone, resulting in the fracture of his collarbone and a bruise with an open head
wound. Paredes filed a complaint with the Prosecutor for attempted murder. The culprit, who would have been
identified, is now a fugitive716. The indigenous people who escorted Paredes to the exit of the House of Culture
cleared themselves of responsibility for the aggression.
700 Defensoría del Pueblo del Ecuador. October 14, 2019. La defensoría del pueblo presenta séptimo informe con resultados de la vulneración
de derechos durante el estado de excepción. FUNDAMEDIOS Ecuador. October 9, 2019. Socios de FUNDAMEDIOS condenan la violencia, piden
que se busque una solución democrática y exigen protección para el trabajo de la prensa.
701 Clip of a journalist being assaulted shown on Twitter account of journalist Andrea Orbe
702 Metro Ecuador. October 9, 2019. Un periodista fue alcanzado por un bomba lacrimógena en el paro nacional. Fundación El Churo. Wambra
Medio Digital Comunitario. Informe Situación de los medios comunitarios, digitales y alternativos en el contexto de protesta de octubre,
Paro Nacional Ecuador.
703 Journalist @jfbeltranr denounces that he was the victim of pepper gas thrown by members of the Police”. @LaVozdeTomebamba. October
9, 2019. 3.34 PM.
704 “Police officers attack two photojournalists from EL COMERCIO and a reporter from Primicias portal, when they were doing their job in
downtown Quito”. @elcomerciocom October 3, 2019. 11.55 AM.
705 “Kicks, sticks, pepper gas to our faces, taking away our phones to step on them and break them. That is the work of today's @EcuadorPolice
against a fully identified press”. @RougeHead October 3, 2019. 12.03 PM.
706 Knight Center. October 7, 2019. In Ecuador, journalists are attacked during coverage of protests against rising fuel prices
707Defensoría del Pueblo del Ecuador. October 14, 2019. La defensoría del pueblo presenta séptimo informe con resultados de la vulneración
de derechos durante el estado de excepción.
708 Reporters Without Borders. October 9, 2019. Media targeted in Ecuador’s deepening crisis.
709 Radio Canela FM Macas. October 7, 2019. Manifestantes vinculados a Elvis Nantip, seguidor de Rafael Correa, gritaron insultos a periodistas
y medios en marcha realizada en Macas.
710 “We have just been at km 1 of the Pan American Highway North, we were going to record a report of the closure there. They forced us out,
they took my cellphone and deleted all the videos, hit us with sticks. They cornered me and threatened me. They took my microphone”.
@AndreaOrbe5 October 7, 2019. 8.28 AM.
711 In this way a group of protesters assaulted journalist Mauricio Ceballos of TC and his fellow cameraman. It happened this morning on the
road to Saint Lucia. Total rejection to this type of reaction”. @CarlosSacoto October 7, 2019. 2.17 PM.
712 “@RELE_CIDH warns that more than 80 journalists have been assaulted or their equipment destroyed by both state agents and protesters in
#Ecuador. We call on state agents and protesters to guarantee and respect the work of the press that is reporting in the protests.” @CIDH
October 10, 2019. 6.11 P.M.
713 EFE. October 11, 2019. Los indígenas liberan a los agentes retenidos tras escenificar el funeral de uno de sus dirigentes.
714 FUNDAMEDIOS. October 10, 2019. FUNDAMEDIOS condena con firmeza la retención arbitraria e ilegal de más de 30 periodistas, así como
la vigilancia a reporteros extranjeros.
715 FUNDAMEDIOS. October 10, 2019. Condena la agresión al periodista Freddy Paredes y rechaza la violencia hacia toda la prensa durante el
paro nacional.
716 El Comercio. October 11, 2019. El periodista Freddy Paredes presentó una denuncia por tentativa de asesinato.
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501. During the on-site visit to Ecuador to establish the facts, the social movements involved recognized the
situation of tension, but indicated that the journalists would not have been held against their will and that they
could have made live broadcasts from the place. They also denounced permanent outages in internet access by
the telephone platforms of the companies Claro and Movistar717.
502. Attacks were also reported against journalists, community communicators, and coverage workers from
different areas of the country, such as Ediasa reporter in Manabi, Jose Diego Delgado, who was attacked with
stones by protesters, who destroyed his tripod, also against the correspondent of Teleamazonas in Mora
Santiago, Elvis Nantip, who reported blows and the destruction of hiscamera.
503. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also recorded the arbitrary detention of a group of journalists in a
parking lot in the San Blas area of Quito, who denounced that protesters did not let them out for at least two
hours718.
504. The obstruction in coverage719 and the lack of guarantees720 for journalistic work prevailed during the
days of the conflict. On October 7, Ecuadorian security forces evicted journalists from the Presidential Palace721
after President Moreno moved from the capital to Guayaquil, where journalists would have been left
unprotected from the protest coming to the Palace. In the midst of this situation, several journalists were
attacked, such as Teleamazonas reporter, Fausto Yepez, cameraman Alexander Herrera, and assistant Dario
Zapata, who denounced live hostilities against the press and attacks against the Noticias Caracol722 team of
Colombia, who would have been insulted and accused of misinforming. The vehicle in which the journalist Paúl
Romero723 was transported from the Ecuavisa media was stoned by the protesters, leaving serious damage to
his equipment. According to public information, CONAIE and other social organizations denounced that
strangers would have joined the protest to commit vandalism and attack thepress724.
505. Finally, on October 12, there were serious and coordinated attacks against facilities of various media
outlets in Quito. A mob would have thrown Molotov bombs, set an antenna on fire, and two vehicles in the
Teleamazonas television channel building where 25 workers were hiding in the security room725. Outside they
threw stones and sticks and tried toprevent the passage of firefighters who were going toput out the fire. Police
arrived and rescued the workers, although the transmission had to be interrupted. In El Comercio newspaper,
something similar happened: “They are getting into the newspaper, here we are some colleagues working,” said
one of their reporters in a voice note registered in a group chat of press workers, her colleagues would have
asked for help from the ministries of Government and Defense and the ECU911726.
506. The State has the obligation toprovide security for journalists and communicators who are carrying out
their informative work within the framework of a public demonstration, as well as guarantee that they are not
detained, threatened, attacked, or limited in any way in their rights for exercising their profession. Attacks
against journalists and the destruction or confiscation of equipment of those who cover these situations violate
freedom of expression, both in their individual and collective dimension.
507. The Office of the Special Rapporteur urged the authorities, through a statement issued on October 9727,
to promptly and thoroughly investigate any allegations of violence and establish the corresponding sanctions,
both for the allegations of excessive use of force committed by the agents of the police and security forces, as for
the acts of aggression and looting by thepopulation.
D.Detentions y subsequent liabilities during the protests
508. Also in the context of theprotests,information was received on the detention of eight communicators728
and the sentence of five days in prison against the communicator of the Confederation of Indigenous
Nationalities of Ecuador [Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador] (CONAIE), Camila Martínez,
convicted of a second-class offense, contemplated in article 394 of the Integral Criminal Code (COIP) of Ecuador.
717 Fundación El Churo. Wambra Medio Digital Comunitario. Informe Situación de los medios comunitarios, digitales y alternativos en el contexto
de protesta de octubre, Paro Nacional Ecuador. Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
718 Ecuavisa. October 9, 2019. Periodistas de distintos medios intentan salir por el parqueadero de San Blas para precautelar por su seguridad
Quito.
719 Ecuavisa. October 7, 2019. Twitter account of journalist Jackeline Rodas.
720 Primicias Ecuador. October 7, 2019. Twitter account of journalist Wilmer Torres.
721 DW Español. “Military forces evict journalists from the presidential palace”. @dw_espanol. October 7, 2019. 10.33 P.M.
722 Twitter account of journalist Carolina Cuenca. October 8, 2019. “Protestors don’t want any media to cover the events” @carocuencaE.
723 Twitter account of journalist Paul Romero. October 8, 2019. “Crossing through El Ejido Park, they threw stones at us and destroyed our
vehicle”. @mromerorivera
724 El Telégrafo. October 8, 2019. La Conaie y Roldán rechazan vandalismo en manifestaciones. CNN Internacional. October 16, 2019. Investigan
a seguidores de Correa detenidos durante protestas en Ecuador.
725 Consejo de Prensa Peruana. October 15, 2019. Atacan medios de comunicación en Ecuador.
726GK City. October 14, 2019. La prensa herida . IACHR. Visit in loco to Ecuador. October 29, 2019. Unión Nacional de Periodistas del Ecuador
(UNP). Avaiable at: Archive Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
727IACHR. Press Release 252/19. IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship Concerned about Excessive Use of Police Force against Demonstrators
and Attacks on Journalists during Protests in Ecuador. October 9, 2019.
728 EFE. October 10, 2019. La SIP condena agresiones y detenciones a periodistas en Ecuador.
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This provision sanctions with prison those who mistreat, insult, or assault the agents who guard public order.
In addition, seven other journalists were arrested without due process, to be subsequently released.729
509. Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: “[p]ublic
officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information." In
addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to sanction expressions related to
public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as information or expression on
matters ofpublic interest and violates the right to freedom of expression730. Also, in the face of the arrests made,
the IACHR recalls the importance of the follow-upby the Ombudsman's Office to verify the status of the detained
persons; in addition, the importance that the rights to security, integrity, and due process are guaranteed.
E. Suspension and censorship of the media during protests
510. On Wednesday, October 9, the Pichincha Universal radio station received the order, from the Ministry of
Communication of the Presidency, to adhere to the public radio signal -indefinitely-, a measure that was later
replaced by a judicial request of suspension of the broadcast filed by the Telecommunications Regulation and
Control Agency [Agencia de Regulación y Control de las Telecomunicaciones] (ARCOTEL) through investigation
No. 170101819100814 as a provisional precautionary measure. This Office was also informed about the raid of
the Pichincha Universal radio installations, for the alleged crime of “incitement to discord among citizens”731.
511. With reference to the suspension of the Universal Pichincha Radio signal, a constitutional guarantee
judge accepted the protection action presented by their defense and granted a precautionary measure in favor
of the media that was out of the air for 16 days732. The Radio denounced a campaign of judicial harassment by
the government of Ecuador, because the State Attorney General's Office through the Prosecutor Luis Sandoval
of the Office of Organized, Transnational, and International Crime, requested733 information on the staff working
in said Radio. In addition, the radio web portal would have been reported for alleged copyright violations of the
photographs.
512. Along the same lines, according topublic knowledge information, the cable and satellite television signal
of the TeleSUR network was removed from the air in Ecuador for three days734. The President of the chain,
Patricia Villegas said the cut was made without any justification, and was restored the next day.
513. Through a public statement735, different alternative media that covered the demonstrations in Ecuador
denounced the government for technological and digital censorship and indicated that they would have been
intervened and their rights violated.
514. According to information reported by different media, radios and channels that emit a signal in
Modulated Frequency (FM) from the provinces of Tungurahua, Cotopaxi, and Chimborazo736 would also have
been taken off the air, this fact was reported after the indigenous movement took back Pilisurco hill where the
antennas are located.
515. The IACHR recalls that, in accordance with article 13 of the Convention, the right to freedom of
expression “may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private
controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information,
or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas andopinions.”
516. The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, adopted by the IACHR in 2000, provides in
principle 5 that, “[p]rior censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression,
opinion, or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic
communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as
the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate
the right to freedom of expression.”
729 FUNDAMEDIOS. October 8, 2019. Comunicadora de CONAIE sentenciada a prisión y 7 periodistas fueron detenidos en protestas.
730 IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions
and Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015
731 ARCOTEL. Memorando ARCOTEL- CCON-2019-1309-M.
732 Pichincha Universa. October 25, 2019. Pichincha Universal vuelve al aire.
733 Fiscalía General del Estado de Ecuador. Oficio No. FPP-FEDOTI9-4168-2019-003702-0.
734 Without any justification at this time our signal has been removed from satellite 722 and cable 626 channels in Ecuador. We denounce this
and call upon our users in this country to demand operators the immediate restitution of teleSUR”. @pvillegas_tlSUR October 12, 2019. 6.11
P.M.
735 Pichincha Comunicaciones. Convergencia de Comunicadores y Medios Independientes, Alternativos, Populares, Indígenas, Comunitarios
y Digitales del Ecuador. Medios alternativos denuncian persecución e intentos de censura por parte del Gobierno Nacional. October 16, 2019.
736 El Comercio. October 7, 2019. Las radios y canales de televisión no emiten su señal desde las antenas del Pilishurco en Tungurahua.
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F. Situation of the Community Media in the protests
517. Different community, digital, and alternative media in Ecuador denounced violations of their right to
exercise freedom of expression and access to information, in addition to physical attacks and impediment of
coverage such as those occurred on October 3 against journalists Luisa Aguilar and José Mosquera, both from
Wambra Digital. In the city of Cuenca, they reported that Radio Kimsakocha journalist Diana Narváez would have
been hit on her right heel by a tear grenade737.
518. The Wambra community digital media also denounced that the head of Communication of the Ministry
of Interior and its head María Paula Romo would have referred to the medium as "important for spreading fake
news", after having claimed that such fake news hadpart of the responsibility for the violence during the national
strike738.
519. In the same vein, according to information provided to this Office during the work visit to Ecuador by
the mission of the IACHR, the Convergence of Alternative, Community, Indigenous, and Independent Mediums
[Convergencia de Medios Alternativos, Comunitarios, Indígenas e Independientes] created by 23 media as a result
of the national strike in Ecuador denounced different violations to the exercise of freedom of expression such as
prior censorshipthrough a technological attack with the blocking of telephone and internet signalin the vicinity
of El Arbolito Park and the House of Culture in Quito, as well as various attacks on community radio official
accounts. It also reported excessive use of violence by the security forces and denounced political persecution
by the Minister of the Interior, María Paula Romo, who said that the media "transmitted false information"
accusing those present of being part of them739.
G . Internet and Freedom Expression during protests
520. According to information provided by the NetBlocks organization, from October 9 to 12, severe cuts in
the Internet would have been recorded at different times and for several hours740, coinciding with the highest
peaks of repression and violence of protests and demonstrations in Ecuador741.
521. According to different organizations, multiple media outlets would have reported difficulties in their
communications and Internet connection during the mobilizations which would not have been related to a
slowdown or collapse due to the intensity of network use742. During eleven days of mobilization, signalinhibitors
would have been found, since as journalists approached areas of conflict, or clashes between protesters and
police, the cell phone signal declined, so that no calls could be made or SMS or online messages sent, preventing
coverage. However, when moving away from the conflict zone, the signal was restored and returned to
normal743.
522. Along the same lines, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information about a DDO attack on
the Wambra Community Digital Media website744, which would have prevented access to emails, topublish new
information, and to transmit the daily information about the National Strike, through of their platform. As
reported, the attack would have occurred hours after an interview to the brother of Marco Otto was published,
one of the young men who died after falling from the bridge of the Quito neighborhood of San Roque, in the
context of the dispersion of demonstrations by of cops.
523. This Office also received complaints about deliberate disinformation campaigns aimed at exacerbating
the spirits of the population immersed in the conflict as documented by several civil society organizations745.
524. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that human rights and, in particular, the right to freedom of
expression, find on the Internet a unique instrument to display their enormous potential in broad sectors of the
population. The relevance of the Internet as aplatform for the enjoyment and exercise of human rights is directly
737 IACHR. Visit in loco to Ecuador. Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom ofExpression.
738IACHR. Visit in loco to Ecuador. Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
739IACHR.Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. October 2019. Convergencia de Medios Alternativos, Comunitarios, Indígenas e
Independientes . Report on communication and information workers during theNational Strike;Digital Sevilla. October 15, 2019. El Gobierno
del Ecuador carga contra los medios internacionales por informar sobre las protestas
740 NetBlocks Mapping Net Freedoms. October 13, 2019. Mobile internet disrupted in Quito as Ecuador political crisis escalates.
741 El Espectador. October 11, 2019. Ecuador restringe redes sociales durante las protestas de esta semana.
742 LaLibre.net. October 2019. Contribution to the observation mission to Ecuador by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,
Edison Lanza, and Commissioner Luis Ernesto Vargas of the IACHR. USUARIOS DIGITAL. October 2019. Protestas en Ecuador de Octubre
2019. Observaciones sobre el ámbito digital.
743 Fundación El Churo. Wambra Medio Digital Comunitario. Informe Situación de los medios comunitarios, digitales y alternativos en el
contexto de protesta de octubre, Paro Nacional Ecuador.
744 Fundación El Churo. Wambra Medio Digital Comunitario. Informe Situación de los medios comunitarios, digitales y alternativos en el
contexto de protesta de octubre, Paro Nacional Ecuador. Avaiable at: Archive Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
745 Visión 360. October 21, 2019. Youtube channel. Desinformación durante el paro nacional, Hospitales en espera. “During 11 days of
#NationalStrikeEc the information of@ECUADORCHEQUEA never stopped ...We posted more than 140 messages and deniedmore than 60 "fake
news"so you #Nevertakebull from anybody... ever. We invite you to take a look at this shortsummary of our work”. Twitter account of Ecuador
Chequea @EcuadorChequea. October 15,l 2019. 10.40 A.M. USUARIOS DIGITAL. October 2019. Protestas en Ecuador de Octubre 2019.
Observaciones sobre el ámbito digital.
136
linked to the architecture of the network and the principles that govern it, including the principle of openness,
decentralization, and neutrality.746
525. In the 2011 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet747, the Office of the Special
Rapporteur indicated that freedom of expression is applied to the Internet in the same way as to all media, so
that the restrictions and mandatory blocking of entire websites, IP addresses, ports, network protocols, or
certain types of uses (such as social networks) is an extreme measure — analogous to the prohibition of a
newspaper or a radio or television station. Such blockages or restrictions cannot be justified, even for reasons
of public order or national security, and cannot be used as censorship measures or as mechanisms to prevent
access to information for the population. In addition, given the rights-enabling nature of freedom of expression,
these restrictions also affect the exercise of other rights and have an important impact on the economy748.
526. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has argued that “net neutrality is a necessary condition for
exercising freedom of expression […]. What this principle pursues is that the freedom of access and choice of
users to use, send, receive, or offer any content, application, or lawful service through the Internet is not
conditioned, addressed or restricted, by means of blocking, filtering, or interference”.
H.. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and the media
527. During 2019, in Ecuador the pattern of attacks against journalists and press personnel by authorities
and public officials has persisted. This has been manifested by the promotion of violence against journalists
through stigmatizing speeches and legalprocesses, among otherpractices contrary to inter-American standards
regarding the creation of an autonomous and democratic civic space.
528. On February 27, a mob of protesters attacked and would have damaged the work equipment of the
cameraman and reporter of the UCSG Televisión channel in Guayaquil during a press conference by lawmaker
Ronny Aleaga749. The journalist of the newspaper La Hora, Andrea Grijalva, denounced750 the verbal aggression
of several supporters of former President Rafael Correa against several journalists when they were covering the
statements of politician Fernando Balda at the State Attorney General's Office (FGE), in Quito, on March 11.
529. Also, on March 24, blogger Tayisiya Teplyuk751 of San Vicente, Manabí province, denounced death
threats after publishing and questioning the results of the sectional elections in her city. Among the insults
uttered are several derogatory expressions about her origin and her gender.
530. On June 1, sports journalist of radio Súper in Riobamba (Chimborazo), Joaquín Yaulema, reported being
insulted and assaulted (blows to the face) by the president of the Association of Non-Amateur Football of
Chimborazo [Asociación de Fútbol No Aficionado de Chimborazo] (AFNACH), Gustavo Torres while performing
the live broadcast where he noted the poor state of the stadium in which a game was held. Along the same lines,
days before, the journalist would have been intimidated, through an official statement752 from the Olmedo
Sports Center Club.
531. On July 28, the radio program 'Espacio La Voz' of radio Guaranda, conducted by Zamny Nájera
Benavides, was interrupted by relatives of the governor of the province of Bolívar, León Ortiz, during an
interview on mining in the area, the presence of Chinese companies, and the lack of prior consultation for the
extraction of minerals753.
532. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also notes the attack on the facilities of the Center for Digital
Autonomy [Centro de Autonomía Digital] (CAD), a non-profit organization created by the activist, Ola Bini, which
according to public knowledge information754, was robbed on the night of July 31 and they would have stolen
important electronic documents.
533. The journalist and director of the Fundación Mil Hojas, Martha Roldós, would have been intimidated by
eight strangers who would have followed her and then were hanging around her home in Quito on August 8755.
As a result, she filed a formal complaint with the Pichincha Prosecutor for intimidation.
746 IACHR. Office ofthe Special Rapporteur. Freedom of Expression and the Internet. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF. 11/13. December 31,
2013; IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet. OEA/Ser.L/V/II
CIDH/RELE/INF.17/17. March 15, 2017.
747 IACHR. United Nations. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet. June 1, 2011
748 IACHR. Annual Report 2016. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
22/17. March 15, 2017. Para. 466.
749 El Comercio. February 27, 2019. Disturbios en hotel antes de rueda de prensa de legislador Ronny Aleaga. La República. February 27, 2019.
Supuestos simpatizantes de Bucaram trataron de impedir a «huevazos» denuncias contra Moreno.
750 “The level of verbal violence registered outside of @FiscaliaEcuador, against the press is regrettable. A group of correistas, in support of
@ronnyaleaga, insult journalists. The debate must be elevated, criticism done with arguments, not with shouts and insults”. @Andreagijalva
March 11, 2019. 11.19 A.M.
751 FUNDAMEDIOS.Alertas. Blogger es amenazada por cuestionar elecciones seccionales.
752 Club Centro Deportivo Olmedo. Comunicado Rechazamos este tipo de actuaciones que atentan el buen nombre del Ciclón de Los Andes. May
27, 2019.
753 Facebook. June 30, 2019. Video Sandy Nájera Jiménez.
754 TeleSUR. August 1, 2019. Roban centro informático donde trabaja Ola Bini enEcuador.
755 Plan V. September 1, 2019. La emboscada nocturna que Martha Roldós sufrió enQuito.
137
534. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators,
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
I..Social Protest
535. Beyond the social and political crisis that hatched in October in Ecuador, civil society had previously
denounced the excessive use of force to suppress public protests. On July 11, at least 15 students from the
University of the Arts of Guayaquil would have been violently evicted by the Police while they intended to
perform a performance in defense of nature, outside the Anthropological Museum of Contemporary Art [Museo
Antropológico de Arte Contemporaneo] (MAAC), where an event related to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development was being held756. On this same line, on August 10, three young people who were skating and
making a film for the magazine 'Tres Sucres' were arbitrarily detained in the Plaza Colón, also in Guayaquil.
According to the record to which this Office had access, members of the National Police pushed and beat the
three athletes and 10 other skaters who were alsothere757.
536. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly”
and that “the exercise of the right of assembly to through social protest must not be subject to authorization by
the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder itsrealization.”758
J. Protection mechanisms
537. In April of this year, the Ecuadorian government launched the Interinstitutional Committee for the
Protection of Journalists and Communication Workers, as suggested by the IACHR and its Office of the Special
Rapporteur in its recommendations after the country visit. However, sectors of civil society objected initially
that the entity created would not have the necessary representativeness and ask for greater inclusion759. The
inter-institutional coordination is made up of the Secretary of Communication, who chairs it, the Minister of the
Interior, the Chancellor, the General Secretariat of the Presidency, and the President of the Information and
Communication Council, who exercises the technical secretariat who have been in charge of developing the
bases for a public policy of security for journalists.
538. According to information provided to this Office, the only moment of full operation of the Committee
was in the framework of the protests last October, during the retention of some journalists in the House of
Culture of Quito. During that episode, the Committee met under the direction of the Ministry of Interior and with
the help of a mediating team of the United Nations to achieve the release of the journalists
539. On the other hand, civil society organizations have maintained their requests to the government to fully
investigate the murder of the three journalists of El Comercio in March 2018 on the border with Colombia and
that impunity does not prevail. According to information provided to this Office on June 14, the case passed to
the Truth Commission of the Prosecutor's Office after 1 year and six months from when it was opened.
540. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government ensure the training of the
personnel of each department involved in this Committee on how to fulfill their obligations toprotect journalists
and that they fully understand the importance of the role of journalists in a democratic society. The Government
must also provide sufficient resources to this program to ensure effective coordination between all authorities,
and also toprovide it with thepossibility of acting in the different regions of the country in a sustainable manner.
541. It is also essential to strengthen coordination with the State Attorney General's Office so that it can fulfill
its responsibility to identify and investigate the risks faced by journalists who receive attacks and threats. The
investigation of attacks on the press should be perceived as an essential aspect of any protection program. It is
also essential that the risk assessment methodologies include a differentiated approach that takes into account
the specific risks that certain groups of journalists face, including women journalists and community or
indigenous media journalists.
K. Stigmatizing statements
542. In Ecuador, stigmatizing statements against the press inherited from the previous government persist,
which would drive campaigns against communicators. On June 28, journalists from the population of Guayas in
756 Voces del Sur Unidas. July 11, 2019. Policía detiene a estudiantes que intentaban hacer un performance en un evento gubernamental.
757 David Holguin. Facebook. August 11, 2019. Agresión en Plaza Colón
758 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.66. December 31, 2009. Para. 197. IACHR. Second Report on
the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para. 139.
759 Knight Center. June 19, 2019. Ecuador creates new state committee to protect journalists, but civil society demands more participation.
138
Guayaquil were evicted with the use of violence by supporters of the priest and public official, José Tuárez,
president of the Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control [Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y
Control Social]. There, Tuárez called the present journalists "corrupt" and accused them of media lynching760.
543. According to public information, in May, former Presidential Councilor Santiago Cuesta, repeatedly
reported that activist Fernando Villavicencio and journalist Christian Zurita would have mutilated names in a
journalistic investigation that resulted in the criminal inquiry in the Arroz Verde case761.
544. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that with their
statements they are not harming the rights of those who contribute to public deliberation through the
expression and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media, and human rights organizations; and
must pay attention to the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their expressions do not
constitute, in the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights
of those who intend to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and diffusion of their
thought.”762
L. Subsequent Liabilities
545. On February 7, the journalist of the newspaper El Telégrafo Néstor Espinosa, along with its director,
Fernando Larenas received a notification from the Northern 1 Criminal Judicial Unit, of Guayaquil, for a process
initiated against them by a traffic agent accusing them of alleged crime of violation of privacy after the
publication of the article "An agent of the CTE threatens with lies" in the "Crónica de a pie" section of the
newspaper. The case is of special relevance since the complaints of the journalist in his chronicle relate a series
of violations committed by the official during a detention. According to public information, on April 9, a Judge of
the Multicompetent Court of the Canton Playas, Guayas province dismissed the accusation and confirmed the
innocence of both journalists763.
546. On April 11, the Swedish human rights defender and computer activist, Ola Bini was arrested by officers
of the Technological Crimes Investigation Unit of the National Police, at the Mariscal Sucre airport in Quito764,
when he was about to travel to Japan. The arrest came a few hours after journalist Julian Assange was evicted
from the Ecuadorian embassy in London. The activist was put under pre-trail detention for 70 days, for the
alleged attack on the integrity of the State's computer systems. On June 20, a provincial court ordered his release
after accepting a habeas corpus action. In its argument, after considering international human rights standards,
the court recognized the illegality and arbitrariness of his detention.
547. The Office of the Special Rapporteur of the IACHR and the Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and
Expression of the United Nations sent to the Ecuadorian state two Art. 41 letters765 requesting information on
the possible violation of the right to freedom of expression and due process of Ola Bini. Both offices thanked the
government of Ecuador for their willingness to respond to the concerns of the Special Rapporteurs, but
expressed their concern regarding the lack of clarity in the motivation of the opening of this process and of the
pre-trial detention ordered.
548. The experts of the United Nations and the IACHR welcomed the release of Bini from prison and
expressed concern about the ongoing investigations and criminal proceedings against him, given the lack of
information as to the reasons that could support suchprocedures.
549. As indicated in the second Art. 41 letter, although the mentioned evidence could qualify for the pre-trial
detention of Bini, under Ecuadorian domestic law, no response has been given regarding the legal or factual
basis of the accusations against him, for which reason the experts reminded the State of Ecuador of its
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 9, 14, and 19, in
addition to its simultaneous obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Articles 7, 8,
and 13.
550. They also recalled that Article 9 of the ICCPR states that any person arrested “shall be informed, at the
time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him”. Article
14 of the ICCPR establishes minimum guarantees that must be guaranteed for anyone facing criminal charges.
760El Universo. June 28, 2019. José Carlos Tuárez, presidente del CPCCS, dice que no tiene nada que ocultar. Voces del Sur Unidas. July 5, 2019.
Funcionario llama “corrupta” a prensa local y la acusa de linchamiento mediático. GK. July 22, 2019. Los frentes abiertos del cura Tuárez.
761 El Universo. May 9, 2019. Periodista Christian Zurita entregó información sobre caso 'Arroz Verde'. El Universo. May 13, 2019. Consejero
de Lenín Moreno dice que periodistas mutilaron publicación de caso "Arroz Verde". El Mercurio. June 23, 2019. “El poder jamás va a tolerar al
periodismo de investigación”.
762 I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
763 El Telégrafo. April 5, 2019. Periodista denuncia nuevo caso de acoso judicial. Voces del Sur Unidas. April 2019. Periodista y director de
diario son demandados por agente de tránsito.Fundamedios. Actualización: Juez ratifica inocencia de Néstor Espinosa.
764 BBC Mundo. April 12, 2019. Julian Assange: Ecuador arresta a un "colaborador cercano" de WikiLeaks. Plan V. August 24, 2019. La Fiscalía
apunta contra Ola Bini con la tesis del Pantallazo. CNN. August 16, 2019. Fiscalía de Ecuador presentó nuevos hallazgos del celular de Ola Bini.
765 IACHR/United Nations. The IACHR's Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, Edison Lanza, and the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye. Information request.
CIDH/RELE/Art.41/7-2019/39
139
Article 14 (a) guarantees the right of every person “to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which
he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him”. In addition, Article 19 of the ICCPR states
that attacks, including criminalinvestigation andprosecution of individuals for their legitimate right to exercise
their freedom of expression are incompatible with the Covenant. Likewise, Article 7 of the ACHR states that
“Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his detention and shall be promptly notified of the
charge or charges against him”. In addition, Article 8 of the ACHR defines minimum guarantees to which every
person is entitled, without discrimination, when accused of criminal offenses. Finally, the Special Rapporteurs
noted that the damages should not be presumed but be proven, and that States should not make assumptions
that cannot be technically supported and that are based exclusively on the nature of the media or its comparison
with others766.
551. According to public information on August 30, the newspaper team of the La Posta site was denounced
by the general manager of Isidro Ayora Hospital, Humberto Navas, accusing the site of disclosing unauthorized
public information and threatening the image and good name of the institution767. The director, Luis Vivanco
and the journalists Ana Oquendo, Mónica Velásquez, and Jenny Navarro would have made their declarations at
the Prosecutor's Office on September 2768.
552. On September 8, the communicator Henry Córdova was arrested outside his home located in Quinindé
(Esmeraldas), accused of dishonoring the prefect of the province, Roberta Zambrano. The communicator was
sentenced to 20 days in prison and a fine of US$5,000 for a fourth class violation based on article 396 of the
Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code769, whose numeral 1 sanctions with imprisonment of 15 to 30 days, the
person who by any means utters expressions in discredit or dishonor against another." This Office recalls that
in June 2019, President Lenin Moreno sent to the National Assembly the reform of this article to eliminateprison
for crimes against honor that would punish communicators with six months to a year.
553. On November 5, the prefect of the province of Pichincha, Paola Pabón, filed a civil lawsuit against the
journalist Christian Zurita and the activist Fernando Villavicencio, for an alleged moral damage generated in a
journalistic investigation note, in the digital media La Fuente. Pabón's lawsuit says she feels harmed by the
article “¿Cómo se financió la campaña de Lenin y Glas?” Through the civil action the official seeks an economic
reparation of $66,000770.
554. The Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court determined that in a democratic society
public offices must have a higher threshold of tolerance for criticism771, because “they have voluntarily exposed
themselves to more demanding scrutiny and because they have an enormous capacity to dispute information
through their public announcement reach”772. In this regard, the Inter-American Commission stated that “[t]he
type of political debate that gives rise to the right to freedom of expression will inevitably generate certain
critical or even offensive speeches for those who holdpublic office or are intimately linked to the formulation of
public policy773”. Therefore, as stated in principle 10 of the 2000 Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression adopted by the Inter-American Commission, “[t]he protection of a person’s reputation should only
be guaranteed through civil sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official”. That is,
the use of criminal mechanisms to punish speech in matters of public interest, and especially related to public
or political officials, does not respond to a pressing social need that justifies it, is unnecessary and
disproportionate, and can be a means of indirect censorship, given its discouraging effect on the debate on
matters of public interest.
766 IACHR. Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet. OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.17/17 March 15, 2017. Para. 93.
767 “Humberto Navas López, manager of Maternity wing at Isidro Ayora, filed a lawsuit against the #laPosta team. Navas wants to imprison us
for reporting the hospital's irregularities”. Twitter account of La PostA. @LaPosta_Ecu August 20,l 2019. 2.03. P.M.
768 LaHora de Quito.August 31, 2019. Periodistasde LaPosta,demandados por investigación.Fundamedios. September 2, 2019. Actualización:
Director de La Posta rindió declaraciones en Fiscalía tras denuncia por un reportaje.
769 La Hora. November 14, 2018. Periodista sentenciado a 20 días de cárcel y al pago de 5.000 dólares. Fundamedios.USA. September 18, 2019.
Detienen a periodista en Ecuador por “desacreditar la honra de la Prefecta”.
770 Pichincha Universal. June 10, 2019. Prefecta presentará demanda contra periodistas que la inculpan en caso “Majano”. El Universo.
November 5, 2019. Paola Pabón demanda civilmente por nota periodística
771 I/A Court H. R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Serie C No. 177, para. 86-88; I/A Court H. R., Case of Palamara Iribarne
v. Chile. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Serie C No. 135, para. 83-84; I/A CourtH. R., Case of“The Last Temptation of Christ”(Olmedo Bustos
et al) v. Chile. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Serie C No. 73, Para. 69; I/A Court H. R., Case of IvcherBronstein v. PerU. Judgment of February
6, 2001. Serie C No. 74, para. 152 and 155; I/A Court H. R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Serie C No. 111,
Para. 83; I/A Court H. R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Serie C No. 107, para 125 - 129; I/A Court H. R., Case
of Claude Reyes et al v. Chile. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Serie C No. 151, Para. 87.
772 I/A Court H. R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Serie C No. 177, para. 86-88; I/A Court H. R., Case of Palamara Iribarne
v. Chile. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Serie C No. 135, Para. 83; I/A Court H. R., Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ”(Olmedo Bustos et
al) v. Chile. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Serie C No. 73, Para. 69; I/A Court H. R., Case of IvcherBronstein v. Peru. Judgment of February 6,
2001. Serie C No. 74, para. 152 and 155; I/A Court H. R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Serie C No. 111,
Para. 83; I/A Court H. R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Serie C No. 107, para. 125 - 129; I/A Court H. R., Case
of Claude Reyes et al v. Chile. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Serie C No. 151, Para. 87; I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama.
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Serie C No. 193, Para. 115.
773IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato" Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
140
555. The Inter-American Court has established, as regards the possible civil liability, that civil sentences
regarding freedom of expression must be strictly proportioned so as not to cause a chilling effect on this
freedom, since “the fear of a civil sanction, given the claim [...] of an extremely high civil reparation, can clearly
be as or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression as a criminal sanction, as
long as it has the potential to compromise the personal and family life of who denounces a public official, with
the obvious and disvaluable result of self-censorship, both for the affected individual and for other potential
critics of the performance of a public servant.774
556. Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: “[p]ublic
officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information." In
addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to sanction expressions related to
public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as information or expression on
matters of public interest, and violates the right to freedom of expression775.
M. Legal Reform
557. In 2018, the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur published a Special Report on the Situation
of Freedom of Expression in Ecuador776 that contains an analysis of the measures adopted by the current
government as part of the process of normalization of the Ecuadorian State's relations with civil society, the
media, journalists, and international human rights oversight bodies.
558. After the publication of said report, this Office has taken note of the reform of the Communications Law,
eliminating the Superintendence of Information and Communication (SUPERCOM) on July 31777, which had been
created in the previous government to control and administratively sanction the media. Likewise, the offense of
media lynching, which banned the dissemination of information that repeatedly ispublished through the media
to discredit a person, was also eliminated. Other codes and standards were also abolished such as the
subsequent liability of the media and administrative sanctions.
559. Along the same lines, on June 20, the President of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, presented the amendment to
article 396 of the Comprehensive Criminal Code (COIP) that stipulates a prison sentence of fifteen to thirty days
to the person who, through any medium, "utter expressions in disrepute or dishonor against another." Instead,
there is a figure called contravention against honor, which eliminates the penalty of imprisonment, but sanctions
with community work of up to 80 hours or a fine of three to six unified basic salaries, despite being considered
progress, the same continues to sanction expressions of public interest, since the contravention is not
eliminated, only the penalty is modified.
560. This Office has also taken note of the proposed law presented to the Senate of Ecuador on February 26
to regulate the use of social networks, which in its text it establishes twelve articles that would seek to control
the contents published on theseplatforms778.
N. Censorship of journalistic material / Prior or indirect censorship
561. According to information provided to this Office, on June 4 journalists from Ecuador TV, Ecuavisa,
Primicias, RTS, the Catholic University channel, among others, would have been prevented from accessing apress
conference organized by the Anti-Corruption Secretariat and the Secretariat of Real Estate Management of the
Public Sector in Samborondón (Guayaquil) on the Petroecuador corruption case
779.
562. On August 15, journalists from the La Posta site, Luis Vivanco and Anderson Boscán, were evicted from
the National Electoral Council, being prevented from covering the takeover by the Yasunidos collective, who
demanded that a referendum be carried on oil exploitation in that area780.
563. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Article 13. 2 of the American Convention states that the
exercise of freedom of expression "shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent
imposition of liability." In the same vein, principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles provides that, “prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must be prohibited
774 I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009.
Serie C No. 193, Para.129.
775 IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions
and Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015.
776 IACHR. The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, Edison Lanza, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye. Informe Especial sobre la Situación de la Libertad de
Expresión en Ecuador. June 2019.
777 El Comercio. July 31, 2019. La Supercom deja de existir este miércoles 31 de julio del 2019.
778 Ecuavisa. February 27, 2019. Daniel Mendoza propone ley para regular redes sociales. Voces del Sur Unidas. February 27, 2019. Rechazo a
proyecto de ley para regular redes sociales.
779 Voces del Sur Unidas. 4 de junio de 2019. Impiden ingreso a medios a rueda de prensa sobre Petroecuador.
780 Voces del Sur Unidas. August 15, 2019. Desalojan a periodistas del CNE cuando intentaba cubrir protesta pacífica de Yasunidos.
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by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
O. Access to public information
564. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the preparation and presentation on December
11 of the preliminary draft of the Organic Law on Transparency and Access to Public Information, following the
Model Law 2.0 of the Organization of American States (OAS) which was carried out in coordination between the
Anticorruption Secretariat of the Presidency of Ecuador, the Ombudsman's Office, Fundamedios, and the
Citizenship and Development Foundation. According to information provided to this Office, the initiative arose
as a result of the lack of citizen empowerment regarding the control of public acts that the same Constitution in
force in the country recognizes.
P. Internet and freedom of expression
565. Throughout 2019, cyber-attacks, cyber threats, and violations related to copyright and hacking have
been reported in Ecuador. Among them it should be noted that on July 11 the digital portal La Fuente was
suspended by order of the Moreno Presidency arguing that the media violated copyright and author rights when
using graphic material without authorization in various journalistic reports781.
566. Another media that would have denounced the shutdown of its website is Wambra who denounced that
on August 29 that after the publication of an article on safe abortion in Ecuador its web portal would have been
suspended until the morning of September 2. They also denounced that they would have been targeted by trolls’
attacks by conservative groups that do activism against abortion and sex education782.
567. Along these lines, the Office of the Special Rapporteur expresses its concern regarding the information
that arises from the transparency report of the Twitter platform, which highlighted Ecuador as a case study due
to the more than 200 requests to take down content due to copyright made by the Presidency through the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)783.
568. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has stated that “net neutrality is a necessary condition for
exercising freedom of expression […]. What this principle pursues is that the freedom of access and choice of
users to use, send, receive, or offer any content, application or lawful service through the Internet is not
conditioned, addressed, or restricted by means of blocking, filtering, or interference”.
Q. Diversity and pluralism
569. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the new process for the assignment of radio and
television frequencies available in Ecuador. On August 28, the executive director of the Telecommunications
Regulation and Control Agency (ARCOTEL), Ricardo Freire, said that the call for tender for television signals will
be in October and for broadcasting stations in Modular Frequency, in December. According topublic knowledge
information, prior to the start of the tender, a comprehensive reform of the regulation would have been carried
out, which included public consultations in April for 302 frequencies available in the provinces of Santa Elena,
Loja, Morona Santiago, and Galapagos. In accordance with the Organic Law of Communication, the qualifying
title for the operation of frequencies will lastfor a period of 15 years. The distribution of the radio spectrum also
had reforms784, it was established that 56% of the radio spectrum will be for private media, 34% for community,
and 10% forpublic.
570. On April 4, Radio Pichincha Universal reported the decision to turn off the radio equipment, which
operates within its facilities in Quito, for alleged non-payment of rent. According to public information, the
Gamavisión channel cut off the electricity supply to the Pichincha radio transmission equipment because the
equipment worked from the technical range of the Gamavisión channel that was beingliquidated785.
571. On March 20, the Radio Yumbo station in Quinindé (Esmeraldas Quinindé) reported the power outage
in the radio studios. The events would have occurred since the end of February and would have been repeated
when the station’s opinion program, La Comunidad Informa,is on the air. The radio management said the Mayor
of the province is responsible for the outages due to criticism made by the station786.
572. On April 23, the Ecuador Inmediato portal denounced the closure of its platform after an alleged claim
by the Presidency of the Republic to its Web server in Canada, dated April 1, for copyright infringement on
781 Voces del Sur Unidas. July 11, 2019. Web de La Fuente es dado de baja por denuncia de la Presidencia de la República. Fundamedios. July
25, 2019. Twitter cierra nuevamente la cuenta de portal digital investigativo.
782 Fundamedios. September 2, 2019. Sitio web del medio Wambra está fuera del aire.
783 Twitter. October 2019. DMCA takedown and counter-notices.
784 GK. September 5, 2019. ¿Cuáles son las reformas a la Ley Orgánica de Comunicación?.
785 El Comercio. April 5, 2019. Señal de radio Pichincha Universal fue cortada por mora, según Gamavisión.
786 Fundamedios. March 20, 2019. Director de Radio denuncia agresiones a emisora por parte del Alcalde (e) de Quinindé.
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photographs and news of their property787. The management of Ecuador Inmediato made the corresponding
disclaimers alleging persecution based on falsehoods through 25 complaints to the Presidency of Lenin Moreno,
which were not answered until the closing of this AnnualReport788.
573. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that the allocation of radio and television licenses must be
guided by democratic criteria and pre-established, public, and transparent procedures that serve as a brake on
the possible arbitrariness of the State and that guarantee conditions of equal opportunities for all persons and
sectors interested. In this regard, principle 12 of the Declaration of Principles has emphasized that “[t]he
concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies should take into account democratic criteria that
provide equal opportunity of access for allindividuals”.
574. It also reiterates the need to maintain the spectrum reserve for the community sector and indigenous
peoples, with the incorporation into the law of a strict definition of community medium – this is means at the
service of a given community – as well as equitable conditions of access to licenses that differentiate realities
other than non-commercial private media. In this regard, the State informed that the Organic Law of
Telecommunications (LOT), created the Arcotel, as “[t]he entity responsible for the administration, regulation,
and control of telecommunications and the radio spectrum and its management, as well as the technical aspects
of the management of social media that use radio frequency, or frequencies that install and operate networks”.
Likewise, it noted that “the equitable distribution of frequencies does not refer to a minimum floor. Article 106
of the current Organic Law of Communication establishes the following equitable distribution of frequencies:
Article 106.- The frequencies of the radio spectrum destined for the operation of radio and television stations of
open signal will be distributed equally in three parts, reserving 33% of these frequencies for the operation of
public media, 33% for the operation of private media, and 34% for the operation of community media. This
distribution will be achievedprogressively.”
787 Ecuador Inmediato. April 24, 2019. Según A. Michelena, tenemos otras 25 denuncias de Presidencia de la República por supuesto
"fotomentaje".
788IACHR. Visit in loco to Ecuador. Avaiable at: Archive of Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
143
15. EL SALVADOR
575. During 2019, the aggressions, threats, and lack of guarantees for journalistic work in El Salvador
continued. The country had presidential elections on February 3 marked by some obstructionsin voting centers
and limitations on access to information. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has followed up on different
stigmatizing statements made by public authorities against press and media workers. In addition, other
incidents were recorded, such as restrictions on questions from all media duringpress conferences, obstructions
in journalistic coverage, defamation campaigns on social networks against communicators, and intolerance of
criticism by authorities of the different political powers, all of which are indicators contrary to the creation of
an environment conducive to the normal development of the journalistic exercise.
576. This office was informed that the Attorney General's Office of El Salvador subpoenaed seven journalists
from Factum magazineto testify as witnesses, as they would have uncovered, through an article, a corruption
case involving former government authorities.
A. Progress
577. According to public information, civil society organizations put together the Center for Monitoring
Aggressions against Journalists in the 2019 electoral elections held in El Salvador to guarantee freedom of
expression through the registration, verification, and monitoring of cases, and thus ensure the right ofpeople to
be informed from various approaches. This Office notes that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) incorporated
in its 2019 report instructions by the Vote Receiving Boards [Juntas Receptoras de Votos] (JRV) and a section on
the right of journalists to provide coverage within the voting centers.789
B. Impunity
578. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that in El Salvador there are two cases of impunity, that of
Roxana Contreras, journalist and presenter of Canal 29 of Apopa, and Samuel Rivas, cameraman of Canal 21,
both murdered in 2017. Likewise, this Office has received information on the request of the Government of the
Netherlands for Colonel Mario Reyes Mena, among others, to be brought to justice in El Salvador for human
rights violations during the war in 1982 after the commission concluded that Dutch journalists Jan
Kuiper,KoosKoster, Hans terLaag, and Joop Willemsen were murdered in anambush790.
579. The IACHR has reiterated that the murder of journalists constitutes the most extreme form of
censorshipand States have a positive obligation to identify and punish the perpetrators of these crimes. For the
Commission, it is essential that the State of El Salvador fully and effectively investigates the murders of
journalists and clarifies their motives and judicially determines the relationship they may have to journalistic
activity and freedom of expression.
C. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
580. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on the persistence of acts of
harassment,intimidation, and threats to the media and journalists in El Salvador. According topublic knowledge
information, about 20 attacks were recorded. On May 12, two cameramen from Televisión Oriental (TVO)791were
attacked bypolice officers while they were doing a coverage in the department of San Miguel. A similar situation
was reported in the same month by another journalist from the eastern area, who was threatened with the
confiscation of his work equipment. In the same vein, this Office was informed about attacks by security agents
who retained a photojournalist from El Diario de Hoy on June 1 during President Bukele'sinauguration and
erased the material he had recorded about an incident between an elderly woman and security forces792. On May
19, the United Community Association for Water and Agriculture [AsociaciónComunitariaUnida por el Agua y la
Agricultura] (ACUA) reported an attack on Radio Bálsamo, a member of the Participatory Broadcasting
Association of El Salvador [RadiodifusiónParticipativa de El Salvador] (ARPAS), which was robbed ofequipment
for transmission andproduction793.
581. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of States toprevent and investigate such occurrences, topunish their perpetrators, and
to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
789 APES. January 28, 2019, APES anunció el Centro de Monitoreo de Agresiones contra Periodistas para Electorales 2019
790 AP. March 25, 2019. Buscan justicia para holandeses muertos en El Salvador. AlJazeera. March 29, 2019. El Salvador: Justice demanded for
1982 killing of Dutch reporters.
791 El Mundo. May 13, 2019. Agentes agreden a periodistas mientras cubrían escena homicidio en San Miguel.
792 El Salvador. June 1, 2019. Batallón Presidencial retiene y amenaza a fotoperiodista de El Diario de Hoy.
793 ARPAS. May 19, 2019. Nuevo atentado contra Radio Bálsamo
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D. Protection Mechanisms
582. The Bureau of Protection of Journalists and Media Workers Related to Information reported to this
Office that they are still waiting for the approval of theSpecial Law for Integral Protection draft billpresented on
October 23, 2018.In addition, this Office took note of the requests for speediness in the approval of this law that
wasdrafted with different sectors of civil society.794
583. On March 22, civil society organizations together with the Salvadoran Institute for the Development of
Women [Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer] (ISDEMU) presented a decalogue of coverage on
violence against women journalists aspart of a much broaderprojectthat seeks to developa gender institutional
policy in El Salvador795. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have defined some of the
requirements for protection mechanisms to be effective. For example, to emphasize: 1) the importance of
guaranteeing the necessary personnel and financial resourcesfor the adequate implementation of the
mechanism; 2) the need to ensure effective coordinationamong the entities responsible for the implementation
of measures of prevention, protection, and prosecution; 3) the need to adequately define protective measures
called for in themechanism and the procedure for their adoption; 4) the need to guarantee the full participation
ofjournalists, civil society, and beneficiaries in the implementation and operation of the mechanism; and 5)the
benefits of seeking support from the international community for the mechanism’s operation.
E. Stigmatizing Statements
584. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has given special follow-up to different stigmatizing statements
made by public authorities against the press and media workers, particularly the statements made by the
President, Bukele on his Twitter account796, according to public knowledge information they have been
increasing797. This Office has taken note of different smear campaigns, online harassment, and threats unleashed
against journalists, communicators, and press personnel following the stigmatizing statements of President
Bukele798.
585. The statements made to journalists are of relevance799, for example, against Factum Magazine: “Today
FACTUM graduated on Fake News, "interpreting" tweets with things that have NOTHING TO DO. Journalistic
method? Where? @FitoSalume you should tell your employee @HsilvAvalos to stop being a journalistic hitman.
From what I understand this is a thing of the owner of the circus”; or those against the site Datos y Opinión, among
others.
586. In the same vein, according to public knowledge information, the Association of Municipal Workers
[Asociación de TrabajadoresMunicipales](ASTRAM) accused the journalist of Factum magazine, Fernando
Romero, of being a “journalist hitman”, after he questioned a tripby a government authority. “Salvadoran people,
identify this individual, he is one of the “journalists" HITMAN paid by the flour man. He and others are after an
official,"the union wrote on social networks.800
587. The attacks and threats via Social Networks towards women journalists are especially relevant for the
Office of the Special Rapporteur, as is the case of El Faro journalist, Valeria Guzmán, after the publication on
October 4 of the report titled “The bridge built on Twitterdoes not yet exists in Torola”801. There are also threats,
misogynistic insults, and discrediting of work againstFoco TV journalist Karen Fernández802, after the president
re-tweeted one of the phrases with which the communicator argued in the program República SC on Canal 33on
the use of political communication in the Territorial Control Plan803. Among the insults poured by Bukele's
supporters are: "I would like for your mother to be raped and killed to see if you would think the same thing ...
moron", "Corrupt old lady. Wait until you are raped and then I want to hear your opinion”,and“I hope she is raped
by criminals to see if she keeps talking so much shit”, amongothers.
794 El Mundo, October 23, 2018. Presentan ante la Asamblea proyecto de ley de protección a periodistas; Asociación de Periodistas de El
Salvador (APES), April 25, 2019, Reportaje: Ley de protección a periodistas es urgente
795 La Palabra Universitaria, March 22, 2019, ISDEMU presentó el decálogo para la cobertura de sucesos de violencia contra las mujeres.
796 “About those media that presented themselves as "independent", now coming out with a clear and totally subjective agenda,should scare no
one.Itis clear the media cannotlive on air,they have sponsors and their agendas must yield to them”.Twitter account of President NayibBukele.
April 20, 2019. 7.45 P.M.
797 Twitter account of President NayibBukele, April 20, April 30, and June 3, 2019. El País, España. May 12, 2019. Los exabruptos en Twitter
de NayibBukele, el presidente ‘millennial’. Press release by Revista Factum, May 2, 2019, Aclaración. Periódico El Salvador , July 3, 2019. APES
condena acoso a periodistas por sus opiniones en Twitter. Revista Séptimo Sentido, June 30, 2019, O conmigo o contra mi.
798 El Liberal. July 14, 2019. Denuncian nuevo caso de ciberacoso de parte de seguidores del presidente Bukele contra periodista. El Mundo.
September 11, 2019. Registran cuatro expresiones de odio contra periodistas en gobierno Bukele.
799 El Salvador. July 19, 2019. Fusades exige cesar acoso digital a las voces críticas al gobierno.
800 El Mundo, June 16, 2019, Astram lanza graves acusaciones y pone en riesgo a periodista de Factum.
801 APES. October 9, 2019. Periodista de El Faro es amenazada por Twitter.Knight Center. September 6, 2019. Salvadoran journalists warn
about lack of access to official sources and little tolerance for criticism from the new government.
802 El Liberal. July 14, 2019. Denuncian nuevo caso de ciberacoso de parte de seguidores del presidente Bukele contra periodista.
803803“ The president RT one of those phrases, one that did not represent my full analysis. Hundreds of his followers responded with threats of
sexual violence and discrediting my work”. Twitter account of journalist Karen Fernández @KarenAlessaF July 14, 2019. 10.46 AM.
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588. In addition, attacks were registered against the editor of La PrensaGráfica and broadcaster of Morning
Club, Mariana Belloso804, who posted a phrase about Bukele's press conference on her Twitter account which
earned her the reaction of the president who indicated: “A half-truth is worse than a thousand lies (...) I am
becoming more and more convinced, that there are journalists who want our security plan to fail and that our
people continue to suffer. I can't find another explanation for this misinformation”. After the publication of these
tweets, Belloso began to receive a series of threats and attacks. In addition, Belloso's Twitter account was
reported and blocked a few days after the event805. According to information reported to this Office, this type of
reaction is encouraging the self-censorship of many journalists on social networks for fear of reprisals. The
cyberbullying of President Bukele's followers has become common in social networks against people who
question or disagree with the decisions of his government.
589. As the Office of the Special Rapporteur has indicated in its report on Women Journalists and Freedom
of Expression, online violence has a self-censorshipeffect on the exercise of freedom of expression806. In
particular, "while there are countless women journalists who decide to continue publishing information in the
face of violence, threats, or harassment, others resort to self-censorship, close their digital accounts, or leave the
profession." In the opinion of the Secretary General of theUnited Nations, “[t]he attacks can also have a deterrent
effect on other women journalists. The resultis the lack of female perspectives and voices in the media in relation
to a wide range of issues, which has serious consequences for freedom andplurality in the media.” This exclusion
strengthens discrimination and inequality807.
590. The existence of a context of marked confrontation, in which there are constant disqualifications and
stigmatization, creates a climate thatprevents a reasonable andplural deliberation on allpublic affairs. While it
is true that the tension between the press and governments is a normal phenomenon that derives from the
natural function of the press and that occurs in many States, it is also true that an acute polarization closes the
spaces for calm debate, and it does not help neither the authorities nor the press to better fulfill their role in a
vigorous, deliberative, and open democracy. In these cases, it is the State's task, given its national and
international responsibilities, to contribute to a climate of greater tolerance and respect for the ideas of others,
even when they are offensive or disturbing808.
591. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that with their
statements they are not damaging the rights of those who contribute to public deliberation through the
expression and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media, and human rights defenders
organizations, and must take into account the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their
expressions do not constitute, in the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful
pressure on the rights of those who intend to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and
diffusion of their thought.”809
F. Social Protest
592. According to public information, at the end of 2018, clashes between street vendors and police officers
in Santa Tecla took place. The conflict arose due to differences between the Mayor's Office with suppliers
regarding the relocation of the street vendors. More than 20 people were injured by stones, bullets, and sharp
objects, a person who was shot in the head died in the hospital. Journalists Oscar Machón and Ricardo Chicas
Segura were also injured in the demonstration.810
593. Aspart of a series ofprotests made since 2018 in favor of the nationalization of water in El Salvador, on
March 20,incidents were reported between the Maintenance of Order Unit [Unidad de Mantenimiento del Orden]
(UMO) and protesters, with a balance of two arrests and intimidation actions, in addition to excessive use of
force and shooting with rubber bullets at a group ofjournalists.811
804 ““President @nayibbuke asks the population to stop paying gangs. Follow the press conference on Radio Nacional 96.9 fm” Twitter account
of journalist Mariana Barroso @Beiioso June 30, 2019. 8.03 P.M. InformatTVX. July 19, 2019. ¿Cómo surgieron las campañas de desprestigio
y amenazas contra periodistas y defensoras de DD.HH.?. El Liberal. July 15, 2019. Hermano del presidente Bukele justifica ciberacoso a
periodistas y analistas: "No la vieron venir"
805 Periódico Digital 503. July 12, 2019. Cuenta de periodista Mariana Belloso desaparece de Twitter.
806IACHR. Annual Report 2016. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter IV Silenced zones:
Highly dangerous areas for the exercise of freedom of expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 22/17. March 15, 2017. Para. 68.
807 UN General Assembly. Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity. Report by the Secretary General. A/72/290. August 4, 2017. Para.
12. See also: FundacionKarisma, Misoginia en internet: bombardeo a campo abierto contra las periodistas, February 24, 2016.
808 IACHR. Annual Report 2014. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of
the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 13. March 9, 2015. Para. 65.
809 I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
810 La Prensa Gráfica, November 8, 2018, Gobierno condena violencia con que se reprimió protesta de vendedores en Santa Tecla ; El Salvador,
November 8, 2018, Tensión en Santa Tecla: más de 50 lesionados tras enfrentamiento entre vendedores informales con agentes del CAM.
811 El Salvador, March 20, 2019, VIDEO: Disturbios y dos detenidos en marcha “en defensa del agua” en la Asamblea Legislativa ; La Prensa
Gráfica, March 20, 2019, “Marcha por la defensa del agua”: Dos detenidos y daños en edificio de CSJ durante confrontación con UMO.
146
594. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the political and social critical expression of the activities of the authorities812. Likewise, the 2013
Joint Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social demonstrations indicates that the
rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and their guarantee is a necessary condition for
existence and functioning of a democratic society. A State may impose reasonable limitations on demonstrations
in order to ensure their peaceful development or disperse those that become violent, provided that such limits
are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, andproportionality. In addition, dispersing a demonstration
must be justified by the duty to protect people, and the safest and least harmful measures for protesters should
be taken. The use of force in public demonstrations must be exceptional and in strictly necessary circumstances
in accordance with internationally recognizedprinciples”813.
G. Source Confidentiality
595. This Office was also informed that on February 17, the Attorney General's Office (FGR) summoned seven
journalists from Factum magazine to testify as witnesses in a corruption case that the media had uncovered in
its article, “Audios reveal that former president Funes paid to buy congress deputies.” Said subpoena indicates
that arrest would apply if the journalists did not appear when they are required. 814
596. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that any measure tending to confiscate journalistic material,
which requires revealing sources or citing journalists as witnesses, has a restrictive effect on freedom of
expression. According to Principle 8 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR,
"every social communicator has the rightto keephis/her source of information, notes,personal andprofessional
archives confidential."
H. Legal Reforms
597. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the amendment of the Special Law on Computer
and Related Crimes that would seek to criminalize the use of false profiles in social networks, newspapers, and
digital magazines through the incorporation into the body of law of article 24-A. If approved, the rule would
punish those who take over profiles to challenge or criticize public officials and political parties with four to
eight years in prison815. Until the closing of this report, the amendmentprocess was still in the congress of El
Salvador.
598. This Office was informed about the Territorial Control Plan in El Salvador, announced on June 18.
According to the government it aims to deal with criminal groups816 with the incorporation of 2,000 soldiers,
which would represent the intervention of the Army in the public security forces. Different civil society
organizations and the United Nations (UN) asked to reconsider the measure because the professionalization and
modernization of the National Civil Police (PNC) should beprioritized.
599. This Office has referred on multiple occasions to the fact that restrictions on freedom of expression,
including those affecting expression on the Internet, must be established clearly and precisely by law,
proportional to the legitimate objectives sought and based on a judicial determination of contradictory
procedures.
600. In accordance with principles 10 and 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of
the IACHR, this Office recalls that “the protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through
civil sanctions”, particularly “in cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person, or a
private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest"because officials"are subject
to greater scrutiny by society." In addition, the IACHR has repeatedly stated that the application of criminal law
to sanction expressions related to public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such
as information or expression on matters of public interest and violates the right to freedom ofexpression817.
I. Censorship of journalistic material / Prior or indirect censorship
601. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has been informed about the impediment of coverage and the
prohibition of entry to a press conference by the Presidency of El Salvador to the journalists of El Faro, Gabriel
Labrador and the cameraman Víctor Peña and another journalist of the Factum Magazine, Fernando Romero, on
September 6 when the Presidency was about to launch the International Commission against Corruption and
812 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139
813United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
814 Periódico Equilibrium, February 21, 2019, FGR cita a periodistas de Revista Factum como testigos, pese a limitantes legales. Press release
by Factum magazine, February 19, 2019.
815 El Mundo. June 11, 2019. Desisten de dar cárcel por uso de perfiles falsos
816 Forbes. 19 de Junio de 2019 ¿En qué consiste el plan de seguridad de NayibBukele?.
817 CIDH. Informe Anual 2015. Informe de la Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión. Capítulo V (Conclusiones y Recomendaciones).
OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. 31 de diciembre de 2015.
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Impunity of El Salvador [ComisiónInternacional contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad de El Salvador] (CICIES),
which has the technical support of the Organization of American States (OAS)818. According to a statement made
by the Secretariatof Communications, it informed that the decision to restrict access to these two media is due
to alleged misconduct by their journalists in previous conferences. According to the Secretariat, the order would
remain firm "until there is no serious commitment on the part of the restricted media on this day to respect the
work of other journalists and the institution"819. The journalists involved explained that they respect the
development of the conferences, but that as a result of the organizers' refusal to give them space for direct
questions (round of questions), they raised their voices to be heard by the authoritiespresent. Although the ban
on journalists was lifted on September 12, there are still several complaints820 against the Secretary of
Communication for the obstruction of questions. Another fact is that, after this series of statements by
government authorities against the press, the journalists involved reported having been subjected to
harassment and intimidation via social networks,821even by President Bukele through his Twitter account822.
602. Article 13.2 of the American Convention explicitly states that the exercise of freedom of expression
cannot be subject to prior censorship. Additionally, principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression enshrines that “[p]rior censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any
expression, opinion, or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic
communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as
the arbitrary imposition of information, and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate
the right to freedom of expression.”
603. In addition, the Inter-American Court indicated that, "with regard to accreditations or authorizations to
the press media for participation in official events, which imply a possible restriction on the exercise of the
freedom to seek, receive, and disseminate information and ideas of all kinds, it must be demonstrated that its
application is legal,pursues a legitimate objective, and is necessary and proportional in relation to the objective
it intends in a democratic society. Accreditation requirements must be concrete, objective, and reasonable, and
its application transparent. It is upto the State to demonstrate that it has complied with the above requirements
when establishing restrictions on access to information under its control”.823
J. Freedom of expression in electoral contexts
604. El Salvador had presidential elections on February 3. According to public information, incidents were
recorded regarding the limitation of the journalistic exercise and access to information during the elections, the
most recurring being the obstruction of voting centers, a physical aggression, and a digital attack. The main
complaints were against the Municipal Electoral Boards and Vote Receiving Boards, the National Civil Police,
partisan militants, politicalparty leaders, and security teams, such as the Minister of Defense, whopushed away
a journalist who tried to interview him in a voting center.824
605. On the other hand, the leader of theGran Alianza por la Unidad (GANA), Andrés Rovira, responded with
hostility when he was questioned about his party's participation in the Bukele government cabinet. Before the
elections, the secretary general of the Nuevas Ideas party, Federico Anliker, also had hostile responses when
asked if the ballot boxers would be appointed by their political group or by GANA, the party Bukele participated
in825.
606. The electoral campaign prior to the elections in El Salvador was marked by the lack of open debate with
Civil Society on proposals. In addition, this Office was informed of the refusal of interviews by the presidential
candidates, including the president-elect, Bukele, who avoided interviews or public debates and privileged
unidirectional communication, through his Twitter account.826
607. In electoral contexts, freedom of expression is directly linked to political rights and their exercise, and
both types of rights are mutually reinforcing. A healthy democratic debate demands that there be the highest
level of circulation of ideas, opinions, and information regarding the candidates, their parties, and their
proposals during theperiodpreceding the elections, mainly through the media, the candidates, and of those who
wish to express themselves. It is necessary that everyone can question and inquire about the capacity and
818 El Faro. September 6, 2019.Presidencia bloquea acceso a El Faro y Revista Factum a conferencia de prensa.
819 El Mundo. September 6, 2019. Presidencia veta a periodistas de El Faro y Factum por "mal comportamiento".
820APES. September 17, 2019. Mesa de Protección a Periodistas pide a presidente Bukele garantizar el ejercicio periodístico en su gobierno.
821 CNN. September 11, 2019. Casa Presidencial de El Salvador prohíbe de nuevo el acceso a periodista de revista Factum.
822 “Those at Factum and El Faro are acting as“victims”, but this isthe reality”. Twitter account of NayibBukele. September 6, 2019. 11.57 P.M..
823 I/A Court H. R., Case of Claude Reyes et al v. Chile. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Serie C No. 151, para. 93; I/A Court H. R., Case od
Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C No. 194, para. 375; I/A CourtH. R., Case of Perozo et al v. Venezuela. Judgment
of January 28, 2009. Serie C No. 195, para. 346.
824 Asociación de Periodistas de El Salvador, February 5, 2019. Resultado del monitoreo de agresiones contra periodistas durante Elecciones
2019.
825 El Mundo, February 6, 2019, Presidente de Gana a periodista: "Yo no soy hijo suyo para que me hable así"; El Salvador, February 7, 2019,
VIDEO: Rovira se enfurece tras preguntas de periodistas por situación de GANA en el nuevo Gobierno.El Diario de Hoy, March 30, 2019, El
Salvador alerta sobre los ataques digitales a medios.
826 Revista Factum, April 25, 2019, El día en que Nayib no tuiteó: habló.
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suitability of the candidates, dissent and confront their proposals, ideas, and opinions, so that voters can form
their criteria to vote827. As the IACHR has highlighted, free speech and political debate are essential for the
consolidation of the democratic life of societies, and therefore have an imperative social interest828.
K. Access to Public Information
608. During 2019, the IACHR repeatedly expressed its concern regarding the lack of access to the files of the
Ministry of Defense to investigate crimes committed during the armed conflict. This Office was informed about
the willingness of the new government to eliminate some secretaries, including that of Transparency, also
eliminating the secretaries of transparency of some institutions of the Executive branch which, as reported by
the APES, would delay the processes of access to public information for journalists and the media.829
609. Regarding transitional justice, different civil society organizations have denounced the obstructionin
access to archives on the armed conflict through the denial of permits or the lack of official data from the time
of the armed conflict.
610. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the creation of an ad hoc Commission to study
the implications of the ruling that invalidated the General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of Peace830, which
would help to fulfill the obligations emanating from the sentence831 for the access to information by victims,
their representatives, and other sectors of society interested832.
611. Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[a]ccess
to information held by the State is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.”
L. Internet and Freedom of Expression
612. This Office was informed that on January 29, the feminist organization "Las 17" suffered an attack on its
website, which would have been temporarily closed. On February 7, defenders Andrea Ayala and Bárbara
Romero from the Salvadoran Lesbian Women for Diversity Space [Espacio de MujeresLesbianassalvadoreñas por
la Diversidad] (ESMULES) were victims of a slander and smear campaign.
613. The Office of the Special Rapporteur stated on several occasions that online violence has a selfcensorship effect on the exercise of freedom of expression. In particular, "while there are countless women
journalists who decide to continue publishing information in the face of violence, threats, or harassment, others
resort to self-censorship, close their digital accounts, or leave the profession." In the opinion of the Secretary
General of the United Nations, “[t]he attacks can also have a deterrent effect on other women journalists. The
result is the lack of female perspectives and voices in the media in relation to a wide range of issues, which has
serious consequences for freedom and plurality in the media.” This exclusion strengthens discrimination and
inequality.833
M. Diversity and Pluralism
614. This Office has received information on the suspension of all official advertising assigned to El Diario de
Hoy for denouncing the blockade against journalists from El Faro andFactum834.
615. According to information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, the Ministry of Labor in El
Salvador would be carrying out selective labor inspections835 after the Bureau of Protection of Journalists and
Media Workers Related to Information asked that unit to pay attention to the precariousness towards press
workers due to the increase of labor violations836. Along these lines, according to a statement issued by the
827 I/A Court H. R. Case of Ricardo Canese vs Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Serie C No. 111, Para. 90.
828 IACHR. Allegations before the Inter-American Court in the case of Canese v. Paraguay. Transcribed in: I /A Court H.R. Case of Canese Vs.
Paraguay.
829 Twitter account of President NayibBukele, June 2, 2019. El Salvador, June 5, 2019, Supresión de secretarías de la Presidencia genera
incertidumbre y tensión en empleados.
830 IACHR. 173d Period of Sessions. October, 2019. It shall be noted that this IACHR has expressed concern about the integration of said
commission; see: IACHR. Annex to Press Release 220/18: Summaries of Hearings
169th Period of Sessions in Boulder, Colorado October 19, 2018.
831Supra note 12. Part IV.2.F.
832Supra note 12. Item 1 of the decision.
833 UN General Assembly. Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity. Report by the Secretary General. A/72/290. August 4, 2017. Para.
12. See also: FundacionKarisma, Misoginia en internet: bombardeo a campo abierto contra las periodistas, February 24, 2016.
834 IAPA. Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA, El Salvador, October 3, 2019; El Salvador. September 28, 2019. Abogados explican
vías legales ante violación a la libertad de expresión.
835 ARPAS. October 11, 2019. Preocupa a Relator CIDH denuncia de «selectividad» en inspecciones a medios de El Salvador. El Mundo. October
11, 2019. Relator de libertad de expresión de CIDH tilda de "preocupante" denuncia en El Salvador. La Vanguardia. October 9, 2019. Periódico
de El Salvador pide a Bukele "no violentar" la libertad de prensa..
836 APES. August 30, 2019. Mesa de protección a periodistas pide al ministerio de trabajo verificar garantías laborales en medios informativos.
149
Protection Bureau, the media selected837 for the inspections would have been chosen for political reasons, they
also denounced that said selection would have been made on a discretionary basis. It should be noted that many
of these inspections went viral on Social Networks, including the Twitter account of President Bukele838: “But I
know @fe_valencia and although I cannot help him as an official, I can as a person. For which I offer a donation
from my family, to pay the 3 months he owesof labor and employer fees to @isss_gob_sv”.
837 Ministerio de Trabajo El Salvador/ Facebook. August 22, 2019. Un equipode inspección de nuestro Ministerio se desplazó a lasinstalaciones
de Radio Maya Visión con el objetivo de verificar las condiciones laborales del personal.
838 “This is the statement of Co Latino denouncing that the Ministry of @LaborSV came to make an inspection, is full of accusations of alleged
political motivations. Now read numeral 4 of the same statement. Now explain to me what the State is supposed to do”. Twitter account of
NayibBukele. October 8, 2019. 8.21 P.M
150
16. UNITED STATES
616. There is still a climate of hostility toward journalism and the free functioning of the media in the United
States. a constant remarks disparaging the press as a“dishonest,”“corrupt,”“enemy of the people”that
spreads“fake news,”andhis comments on “virtual acts of treason,” undermine the role of the press. This
environment has paved the way for government supporters to attack and harass journalists and media outlets
as well. There have also been attacks on the press during protests and demonstrations; in particular, two
journalists were injured by rubber bullets during protests demanding the resignation of former Governor in
Puerto Rico.
617. Likewise, the Espionage Act continues to be enforced, and journalists have been ordered by the courts to
reveal their sources or to appear as witnesses to events they have reported or investigated. In particular, the Office of
the Special Rapporteur is concerned about the charges brought under the Espionage Act against Julian Assange for
publishing “government secrets,” and the search of a journalist’s home in San Francisco to ascertain hissources.
Nevertheless, the Office of the Special Rapporteur highlights progress on the judicial and legislative fronts, both at
the federal and state levels, which have issued favorable decisions that protect freedom of expression, as well as
legislative initiatives intended to protect and guarantee this right.
A. Progress
618. Boththe House of Representativesand the Senate have passed and/or introduced a number of
resolutions and legislative initiatives to protect the practice of journalism and access to public information, as
well as to ensure the existence of a freepress.
619. On July 15, 2019 the House of Representativespassed a resolution acknowledging the vital importance
of a free and independent press to democracy, human rights, and good governance. The resolution also
condemns the increase in threats topress freedom and reaffirms it as a priority for the United States.839
620. In addition, a bill was introducedto require the President, or a designee of the President, to brief the
members of the press assigned to report on the White House on the official business of the President at least
twice a week, which information shall also be transmitted to the public.840In another resolution, the House of
Representatives stressed the importance of freedom of expression for democracy and opposed the “fake news”
and inaccurate facts it considersto be issued by President Donald Trump, and considers that “alternative or
inaccurate facts” should be retracted immediately.841
621. In the judicial sphere, the Office of the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that there have been some court
judgments upholding the right of access to public information and freedom of expression.
622. On February 22, 2019 theU.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington atTacomafound a
state law on cyberbullying unconstitutional. The court granted the motion filed by Richard Rynearson—an
online activist whoregularly wrote about civil liberties issuesrelated topublic figures and government officials—
to find the law unconstitutional, on the grounds that it was overly broad and criminalized free speechprotected
by the First Amendment. The court found that the lawfocused on communications that had “intent to harass,
intimidate, torment, or embarrass any other person […] anonymously or repeatedly,” and therefore was
overbroad, could have achilling effect, and did not protect anonymity, which allows individuals to express
themselves freely without fear of retaliation or social ostracism. The court reiterated that emotionally
distressing or outrageous speech is protected speech, especially when it touches on issues of public, religious,
or politicalinterest.842
623. In addition, on July 9, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuitaffirmed the
decision of the 2018United States Southern District Court of New Yorkin the case ofKnight Institute v. Trump,
ruling thatPresident Trumpviolated the First Amendment by blocking the plaintiffs on his Twitter account
(@realDonaldTrump) because they posted tweets that criticized him or hispolicies. The Court of Appeals found
that the account was used for official purposes and was a public forum, and therefore could not be considered a
personal account, and that blocking the plaintiffs was a government restriction on freespeech. The Court found
that Twitter's interactive features (reply, retweet, like) are forms of expression that allow people to
839United States. Congress (House of Representatives). H. RES. 345- Responding to widening threats to freedoms of the press and expression
around the world, reaffirming the centrality of a free and independent press to the health of democracy, and reaffirming free dom of the
press as a priority of the United States in promoting democracy, human rights, and good governance on World Press Freedom Day. July 15,
2019.
840 United States. Congress (House of Representatives). HR. 2641-Free Press Act of 2019. May 9, 2019. Also, on April 18, 2019, resolution
H.RES. 325 was introduced in the House of Representatives, through which the House considers that all briefings held by the President or
Federal agencies should be made available to the press, exceptfor under circumstances that are consistent with Federal law. Both proposals
have not been passed yet.
841 United States. Congress (House of Representatives). H. RES. 284-Opposing fake news and alternative facts. April 2, 2019. The proposal
has not been passed yet.
842 United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma. Rynearson Vs. Ferguson. 355 F.Supp.3d 964 (2019). February 22, 2019
151
communicate with the President and thousands of others, and highlighted the danger of government
suppression of views considered unfavorable.843
624. Finally, on August 6, 2019,in the case ofOpen Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) v. Central Intelligence Agency,
et al.,the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, ruled that neither theDepartment of
State nor the Department of Defensecould delay the release of documents related to the murder of Jamal
Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and columnist for the Washington Post, who was killed in October 2018. The court
ordered that, because of the public interest in the case, and the importance of processing requested information
in a timely manner, the agencies should process the information at a faster rate.844
B. Attacks, threats, and intimidation of journalists and themedia
625. According to public information, there were a number of attacks on journalists during the year for
reasons related to theirprofessional work. These include cases of direct threats to reportersproviding coverage,
threats via social media, physical assaults during attempts to report, and verbal abuse bypoliticalpartisans.
626. The Office of the Special Rapporteurhas learned of several attacks and the lack of security measures for
reporters covering President Trump’s political rallies. For example, on February 11, 2019 a group of reporters,
including a BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) camera operator, were attacked by a man participating in
the political event while they were covering a presidential speech delivered at a rally in El Paso, Texas. They
were attacked after anti-media epithets were heard.845In addition, the Office of the Special Rapporteurreceived
information that several journalists fromBuzzFeedandHuffpostwere the victims of harassment, bullying, and
homophobic messages on social media after they announced that they had been fired.846In addition, a picture of
two lynching victims, hanging from a tree, was sent to Huffpost reporter Nick Wing,with the caption, “Just kill
them. Make America great again.”847In October 2019, a group called “American Priority,” consisting of
supporters of President Trump, showed a “video meme” during a three-day event at a Trump-owned resort in
Miami, Florida. The video showed the president stabbing, shooting, and brutally attacking journalists from
different media outlets (PBS, NPR, Politico, The Washington Post, NBC and Vice News, and MSNBC)and political
opponents inside a church, called “The Church of Fake News.”848 The White House Correspondents’ Association
condemned the video.849
627. A survey by theCommittee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)showed that women journalists in the United
States are exposed to various risks due to the practice of their profession,including risks thatfollow them home,
given that the respondents highlighted online harassment as one of the biggest threats. A large percentage of
the journalists interviewed said they had experienced securityproblems, threats, verbal harassment, unsolicited
sexual advances, or threatening voice mails, and spoke of the mental health implications of dealing with such
attacks, particularly when reporting and investigating alone.850
628. The Office of the Special Rapporteuris equally concerned over the pattern of hostility toward the press
on the part of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP). According to civil society organizations, at least 12
journalists were held for prolonged periods at points of entry and at the Mexican border, subjected to closer
scrutiny by CBP border officials, subjected to secondary screening and/or more rigorous checks than others,
questioned about their coverage of migration issues, and had their electronic devices inspected. In some cases,
they were even asked to hand over their passwords, and/or to show photographs and notes collected in the
course of their professional work.851This situation led the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the New
York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) to file a lawsuit against President Donald Trump’s administration because
of the hostile treatment of journalists on the U.S.-Mexico border.852Similarly, according to information known to
843 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, New York. Knight First Amendment Institute, et al v. Donald J. Trump, et al. No. 18-
1691-cv. July 9, 2019.
844 United States District Court. Southern District of New York. Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) v. Central Intelligence Agency, et al.Cas No.
1:19-cv-00234-PAE. August 6, 2019.
845 CPJ. June 12, 2019. CPJ concerned about journalists' safety at Trump's rallies. U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. February 22, 2019. Cameraman,
other reporters attacked at Trump rally.
846 Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Weekly Address, January 21-27, 2019. BuzzFeed and HuffPost journalists harassed online following
mass layoffs. NBC News. January 25, 2019. 4chan trolls flood laid off HuffPost, BuzzFeed reporters with death threats.
847Twitter account of Nick Wing @nickpwing. January 24, 2019.
848 NBC News. 14 de octubre de 2019. Report: Internet meme showing Trump shooting media, political opponents shown at president's resort.
Reporteros Sin Fronteras (RSF). 15 de octubre de 2019. US – Trump should condemn video depicting violence against journalists..
849 Politico. October 14, 2019. Press organization condemns fake massacre by Trump depicted at pro-Trump event.
850Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). September 4, 2019. ‘The threats follow us home’: Survey details risks for female journalists in U.S.,
Canada, and Why going solo is a risk for female reporters in the US and Canada.
851 Reporters Without Borders (RSF). US Weekly Address, February 4-10, 2019. Journalists facing harassment while reporting from southern
border. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). February 11, 2019. Several journalists say US border agents questioned them about migrant
coverage.U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. No date. Available at: https://pressfreedomtracker.us/borderstop/?categories=5&date_lower=2019-01-01&date_upper=2019-12-17. See also, First Amendment Watch at New York University.
November 22, 2019. ACLU Sues Trump Administration over Hostile Treatment of Journalists at Border..
852 Huffpost. November 20, 2019. ACLU Sues Trump Administration for Detaining Journalists at Border. First Amendment Watch at New York
University. November 22, 2019. ACLU Sues Trump Administration over Hostile Treatment of Journalists at Border.
152
this office, the Department of Homeland Security has created a database of people who report on conditions at
the U.S.-Mexico border.853The Office of the Special Rapporteuralso learned of other cases in which CBP officers
at other U.S.points of entry harassed journalists, accused them of belonging to the“fake news media,” andwriting
“propaganda.”These incidents were condemned by acting CBP Commissioner MarkMorgan.854
629. In addition, President Donald Trumpinstructed federal agencies not to renew subscriptions to the New
York Times and the Washington Post, which he has called “fake news,” after he said the newspapers were
providing unfair coverage. According to reports, the White House cancelled the print subscription to both
newspapers, although the online subscriptions will reportedly be maintained until the instruction is
implemented.855
630. Principle 9 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression states that,“The murder,
kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction of
communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrictfreedom of expression.
It is the duty of the state toprevent and investigate such occurrences, topunish theirperpetrators and to ensure
that victims receive due compensation.”
631. With respect to violence against women journalists,the Office of the Special Rapporteurhas emphasized
that,“Women journalists […] disproportionately and routinely face gender-based violence in the workplace and
in the field,”856and differentiated forms of violence from State and non-State actors,857as well as a lack of
protection and obstacles to access to justice that are differentiated from their male counterparts.The Office of
the Special Rapporteurhas emphasized the importance ofintegrating a genderperspective to ensure that women
journalists are adequately protectedand can exercise their right to freedom of expression without undue
restrictions.858
632. In addition, and in relation to the indirect restrictions on freedom of expression noted in this
section,Principle 13 of the IACHR’sDeclaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression states that, The exercise
of power and the use of public funds by the state, […] among others, with the intent to put pressure on and
punish or reward and provide privileges to social communicators and communications media because of the
opinions they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited by law. The means of
communication have the right to carry out their role in an independent manner. Direct or indirect pressures
exerted upon journalists or other social communicators to stifle the dissemination of information are
incompatible with freedom of expression.”
C. Social protest
633. The Office ofthe Special Rapporteurobserves that at leastthree journalistswere arrested while covering
protests during 2019. Three journalists were detained inSacramento, California, while covering a protest held
in response to the prosecutor’s decision not to file criminal charges against the officers who shot and killed
Stephon Clark, 22-year-old African-American man. A journalist was also handcuffed and detained for 30 minutes
by police in Connecticut while covering a demonstration commemorating the death of a teenager named Jayson
Negron at the hands of the police. In another incident, a photojournalist was arrested in New York City while
covering a protest held to call for a more aggressive approach to climate change.859
634. The Julyprotests in Puerto Rico began after the Puerto Rican Center for Investigative Journalism leaked
hundreds of misogynistic, homophobic, and violent text messages between then-Governor Ricardo Rosselló and
members of his cabinet in a private Telegram chat. Thousands of Puerto Ricans took to the streets with the
slogan“¡Ricky Renuncia!” [Resign, Ricky!], due to the allegations of corruption and the information provided from
that chat. Based on information brought to the attention of this office by various civil society organizations, and
according to public information, the Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that there were a number of attacks
853 NBC San Diego. March 6, 2019. Source: Leaked Documents Show the U.S. Government Tracking Journalists and Immigration Advocates
Through a Secret Database. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Weekly Address, March 4-10, Leaked database reveals US government secretly
tracking journalists at US-Mexico border.
854Reporters Without Borders (RSF). October 9, 2019. Border agents muststop harassing journalists at US ports of entry, and Weekly Address,
August 19-25, 2019. CBP harasses journalist, suggesting troubling trend. U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. No date. Available at:
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/border-stop/?categories=5&date_lower=2019-01-01&date_upper=2019-12-17.
855 The Wall Street Journal. October 24, 2019. Trump to Tell Federal Agencies to Cut New York Times, Washington Post Subscriptions. The
Guardian. October 24, 2019. White House to federal agencies: cancel New York Times and Washington Post subscriptions. First Amendment
Watch at New York University. October 25, 2019. Frustrated by Their Coverage, Trump says He will Unsubscribe from The New York Times
and The Washington Post.
856 IACHR. Women Journalists and Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF.20/18. October 31, 2018. Para. 5. UN General
Assembly. Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity. Report by the Secretary General. A/72/290. August 4, 2017. Para. 8..
857 IACHR. Women Journalists and Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF.20/18. October 31, 2018. Para. 3. IACHR. IACHR
Calls on States to Recognize and Protect the Work of WomenHuman Rights Defenders. November 29, 2017. See also:IACHR. Second Report
on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.283.
858IACHR. Women Journalists and Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. CIDH/RELE/INF.20/18. October 31, 2018. Para. 76. Párr. 76.
859U U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. March 13, 2019. Three journalists arrested while covering Stephon Clark protest in Sacramento. May 13,
2019. Connecticut reporter arrested and briefly detained while covering demonstration. July 9, 2019. Photojournalist arrested while covering
climate demonstration, equipment seized
153
on journalists during the coverage of the marches and protests. For example, WAPA-TV broadcast journalist
Orlando Rivera Martinez was hit by a rubber bullet while covering the protests on July 15. Joe Raedle, a
photojournalist with Getty Images, was hit by a rubber bullet while covering protests in San Juan outside La
Fortaleza, the official residence of Governor Ricardo Rosselló, onJuly 17, 2019. Telemundo cameraman Jorge
Figueroa was injured that same night, as police began firing tear gas to disperse the protesters, and in the midst
of the chaos he waspushed and fell to the ground. In addition, documentary filmmaker Ricardo Olivero was shot
with “crowd control ammunition” while filmingpolice dispersing protesters in San Juan on July 23, 2019, despite
being clearly identified with credentials.860
635. There were also several reports of violence and repression during these protests, in which the police
reportedly used excessive force against the demonstrators. According to reports, “The State’s response to these
demonstrations was repressive, with an overreaching and abusive use of force. [...] The Puerto Rico Police
deployed a large number of officers, forming a perimeter around the Fortaleza (Governor’s residence), with antiriot equipment, taking an intimidating stance. That night the Puerto Rico Police fired an excessive amount of
tear gas, pepper gas, and rubber bullets, acting completely irresponsibly, without following any of the protocols
on the use of force and without the demonstrators having caused any violentincidents.”861
636. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for the work of defending human
rights, and essential for the political and social criticism of government authorities’ activities. The Commission
has stated that, in principle, criminalization per se of demonstrations in public thoroughfares is inadmissible
when they are carried out in exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly”862
and that “the exercise of the right of assembly through social protest must not be subject to authorization on
the part of the authorities or to excessive requirements that make suchprotests difficult to carry out.”863
637. The Joint Declaration on Violence Against Journalists and Media Workers in the Context of Protests,
adopted in 2013, states that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly “are fundamental, and
guaranteeing them is a vital condition to the existence and proper functioning of a democratic society. A State
may impose reasonable limitations on demonstrations for purposes of ensuring that they are conducted
peacefully, or to disperse those that turn violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of
legality, necessity, and proportionality. In addition, the breaking-up of a demonstration must be warranted by
the duty to protect individuals, and authorities must use the measures that are safest and least harmful to the
demonstrators. The use of force at public demonstrations must be an exception, used under strictly necessary
circumstances consistent with internationally recognized principles.”864This declaration also establishes that,
“the protection of freedom of expression requires authorities to ensure the necessary conditions for journalists
to be able to cover noteworthy events of interest to the public, such as the social protests mentioned.”
D. Stigmatizing statements
638. Senior public officials continued to make stigmatizing statements about various media and journalists
at official events, political rallies, and on social mediaduring 2019.Through his Twitter account, President
Trumpfrequently referred to different media outlets critical of his government as “dishonest” and
“corrupt”“fakenews media,”865claiming that “there has never been a time like this in American history,” and
describing them as “enemies of the people” and of the State.866
639. According to information known tothe Office of the Special Rapporteur, at the G20 Summit, President
Trump “joked” with Russian President Vladimir Putin about “getting rid of journalists” and said that Russia did
860 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. July 26, 2019. Photojournalist struck in the head by rubber bullet while covering Puerto Rico protests. July 31,
2019. Documentary filmmaker shot with ‘crowd control ammunition’ while filming protests in Puerto Rico.
861 Letter requesting the IACHR to condemn police violence against protesters in Puerto Rico and any other remedies they deem pertinent.
Letter presented by the Human Rights Clinic of the Faculty of Law of the Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, Instituto Caribeño de
Derechos Humanos (ICADH), Comité de América Latina y el Caribe para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de PR (CLADEM –PR) and
Kilómetro Cero. July 19, 2019. Available at: Archives ofthe Office ofthe Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.See also, The New York
Times. July 27, 2019. Did Puerto Rican Police Go Too Far During Protests? What the Video Shows.
862 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
863 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
864United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
865 ““The rigged and corrupt media is the enemy of the people”. Twitter account of Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump. February 17,
2019.
866 Twitter account of Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump. February, March, July 2019. “Fake News equals the enemy of the people”.
“The Mainstream Media is out of control. They constantly lie and cheat in order to get their Radical Left Democrat views out there
for all to see. It has never been this bad. They have gone bonkers, & no longer care what is right or wrong. This large scale false
reporting is sick!” Twitter account of Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump. July 22, 2019. See also, The Hill. March 19, 2019. Trump
blasts ‘fake news media’ as ‘absolute enemy’ in the latest attack on media.PressTV. March 19, 2019. Fake news media is ‘absolute enemy’
of people: Trump.
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not have the same problem as the United States with “fake news.” The Russian president contradicted this
assertion, saying that they did have that problem.867
640. Similarly, in February 2019, the president called CNN and NBC “fake news”868
. He also claimed that
Saturday Night Live was working in collusion with the Democrats and Russia and that should be examined by
the Federal Election Commission or the Federal Communications Commission, for being “fake news.”869 Those
statements were made after the program aired a parody of the president’s announcement of a state of
emergency870, and subsequently,in March 2019, retransmitted the sketch entitled “It’s a Wonderful Life,” which
parodied what Donald Trump’s life would have been like if Hillary Clinton had won the election.
641. Following the publication of the summary of Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report (“Mueller
Report”), which concluded that there was insufficient evidence of coordination by the Trump campaign with
Russia to influence the 2016 elections (collusion), the President again described certain media outlets as
“enemies of the people” and as “the real opposition party.”According to the President, the media had provided
biased coverage of the investigation into the alleged collusion. Heindicated that“For two years they pushed the
Russian Collusion Delusion when they always knew there was No Collusion.”871In addition, President Trump
and former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani demanded an apology from Chris Cuomo and CNN for their
behavior and biased coverage of the alleged collusion. According to the information available, Cuomo refused to
apologize because it was the job of journalists to investigate the possible existence of such facts.872
642. The Office of the Special Rapporteuris also concerned about other statements made by President Trump,
who accused the New York Times of a “virtual act of treason,”after the newspaper reported, based on
information provided through various interviews with former and current officials, on the increase in
cyberattacks on Russia’s power grid as a warning and deterrent mechanism for its cyber operations. According
to information known to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, the newspaper cleared the article beforehand with
various national security officials, who reportedly stated that it did not raise any potential national security
concerns.873
643. Against this backdrop of stigmatizing statements, President Trump’s supporters have also been hostile
to the media he publicly disparages, particularly against CNN. On June 18, 2019, during the rally to launch
President Donald Trump’s re-election campaign in Orlando, Florida, he reportedly encouraged the crowd, which
began to shout “CNN sucks!”The President once again said, “There is a lot of fake news there in the back,”
pointing at the members of the press covering the event. After six minutes of coverage, and after the anti-CNN
chants, the network cut away from the rally and began to analyze the event and report other news.874
644. In a joint press release, the UN and IACHRSpecial Rapporteurs “urged [President Trump] and his
administration to cease efforts to undermine the media’s role of holding government accountable, honest and
transparent,” asserting that“these attacks run counter to the country’sobligations to respect press freedom and
international human rights law.”875
645. It is legitimate for politicians and public officials to criticize, correct, or object to specific media
reporting, but when doing so they should always be careful to ensure that their comments are accurate, avoid
867 Trump stated: “Get rid of them. Fake news is a great term, isn’t it? You don’t have this problem in Russia but we do,” Trump said. Putin
replied in English: “We also have. It’s the same.” The Guardian. June 28, 2019. Trump jokes to Putin they should ‘get rid’ of journalists. Global
News. June 28, 2019. Trump joked to Putin about getting ‘rid of’ journalists- a look at how they treat media.
868Real Clear Politics. July 13, 2018. Trump Refuses Question From CNN's Jim Acosta: "CNN Is Fake News"
869 “It’s truly incredible that shows like Saturday Night Live, not funny/no talent, can spend all of their time knocking the same person (me),
over & Over, without so much of a mention of ‘the other side,’”. “Like an advertisement without consequences. Same with Late Night Shows
……” Trump then suggested that the Federal Election Commission or Federal Communications Commission “look into this.”
“There must be Collusion with the Democrats and, of course, Russia! Such one-sided media coverage, most of it Fake News”. Cuenta Oficial
de Twitter de Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump. 17 de marzo de 2019. CNN. 17 de marzo de 2019. Trump’s ‘SNL’ attack crosses
the line.
870 “Nothing funny about tired Saturday Night Live on Fake News NBC! Question is, how do the Networks get away with these total
Republican hit jobs without retribution? Likewise, for many other shows? Very unfair and should be looked into,” Trump wrote. “This is the
real Collusion!” Twitter account of Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump.February 17, 2019. New York Post. March 17, 2019. Trump rages
against SNL-despite it being a rerun.The Hill. March 17, 2019. Trump criticizes ‘Saturday Night Live’ after show airs rerun.
871 Cuenta Oficial de Twitter de Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump. 26 de marzo de 2019. Fox News. 26 de marzo de 2019. “Trump turns
up heat on media after Mueller report, renews ‘Enemy of the People’ label”. Politico. 26 de marzo de 2019. Trump: Media disgraced ‘all over
the world’ following Mueller revelations.
872 Newsmax. March 25, 2019. “Giuliani demand for apology rejected by CNN’s Chris Cuomo”. Foxnews. March 25, 2019. Giuliani blasts CNN
during heated interview: ‘This network should apologize’. AP News. March 25, 2019. “Media takes heat following Mueller conclusions”..
873Twitter account of Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump. June 15, 2019. See also, The Week. June 16, 2019. Trump calls report on U.S.
cyber attacks a ‘virtual act of treason’. NBC News. June 16, 2019. New York Times slams Trump: ‘Accusing the press of treason is dangerous’.
Washington Examiner. June 20, 2019. Trump ‘crossed a dangerous line’ accusing the New York Times of treason, Publisher says.
874 The Hill. June 18, 2019.CNN cuts away from Trump rally after crowd chants ‘CNN sucks’. The Daily Beast. June 18, 2019. CNN cuts away
from Trump rally after ‘CNN sucks’ chant breaks out.
875IACHR. August 2, 2018. Joint Press Release 170/18. Trump attacks on the media violate basic norms of press freedom, human rights
experts say.
155
stigmatizing and discrediting the media,and notthreaten journalists or undermine respectfor the independence
of the media.876
E. Subsequent liability
646. The Office of the Special Rapporteurhas received information about a number of civil lawsuits against
journalists or media outlets seeking substantial amounts of civil damages. For instance, Representative Devin
Nunes sued Twitter and three of the platform’s users for $250 million, alleging that Twitter has allowed attacks
by various platform users that amount to a coordinated defamation campaign against him; the tweets in
question included criticism of the congressman and accusations of criminal conduct.877RepresentativeNunes
also filed a $435 milliondefamation lawsuit against CNN on December 3, 2019, alleging that the network falsely
reported that he had travelled to Vienna in 2018 to “dig up dirt on former Vice President Joseph Biden.”878A
senior Trump staffer also sued Politico for $25 million over the publication of twopublic interest articles on the
president’s interaction with Ukraine, which the official saiddisparaged his honesty and integrity.879In
addition,lawyers for President Trumpand hispresidential re-election campaign threatened in a letter to sue CNN
for its allegedly unfair coverage of Trump; however, no lawsuit was filed. Similarly,in August 2019, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed former Republican candidate Sarah Palin to sue the New York Post
over an editorial linking one of her political action committee ads to a mass shooting in 2011 that seriously
injured then-Arizona Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. The newspaper quickly issued a correction
acknowledging that no link had been established between Palin's ad and the shooting.880
647. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteurhave established that while civil proceedings as a
mechanism for subsequent liability constitute measures less restrictive of freedom of expression to redress
alleged harm, they must meet the strict conditions derived from Article 13.2 of the American Convention.881It
must also be recalled thatthe fear of a disproportionate civil penalty may beequally or more intimidating and
inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal punishment, since it has the potential to
compromise the personal and family life of an individual who accuses a public official, with the clear and very
negative result of self-censorship, both of the affectedparty and of otherpotential critics of the actions of a public
official.882
F. Publication of classified information and whistleblowers
648. The Office of the Special Rapporteurnotes that allegations against whistleblowers under the Espionage
Act and other laws continued throughout 2019. An employee of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was accused
of leaking confidential government reports to a lawyer and a reporter, which allegedly described financial
transactions made by former President Trump’s personal attorney, Michael Cohen, according to court
documents released on February 21, 2019.883On May 9, 2019, an indictment was unsealed against former
intelligence analyst Daniel Everette Hale, who was arrested for allegedly leaking classified information to a
journalist about drones and other anti-terrorism measures. He was accused of printing a number of highly
classified documents related to anti-terrorist operations while working as a contractor for the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, or NGA.884Similarly, on October 9, 2019, anti- terrorism analyst Henry Kyle
Freses was arrested for allegedly leaking classified information about a foreign country's weapons systems to
two journalists. The analyst was charged under the Espionage Act with two counts of willful transmission of
national defense information.885
649. On April 11, 2019, Julian Assange was arrested by the Metropolitan Police in London, UK, pursuant to a
warrant issued for his arrest for violating his bond conditions when he entered the Ecuadorian embassy in
London to avoid extradition to Sweden in 2012 on charges of sexual assault and rape; as well as a U.S. extradition
request initially filed for the charge of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion in connection with the release
876 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. May 2, 2018. Joint Declaration on Media Independence and Diversity in the
Digital Age.
877 PEN America. March 21, 2019. Lawsuit filed by Representative Devin Nunes (R-CA) suing Twitter for defamation is an attempt to silence
criticism, restrict online speech. First Amendment Watch atNew York University. March 20, 2019. CA Rep. Devin Nunes Sues Twitter and Three
Users for $250 Million Over Defamation, Negligence and Conspiracy.
878 The Washington Times. December 3, 2019. Devin Nunes slaps CNN with $435 million defamation lawsuit.
879 First Amendment Watch at New York University. November 19, 2019. Trump Staffer Files $25 Million Defamation Lawsuit Against Politico.
880 The Hollywood Reporter. August 6, 2019. Sarah Palin Defamation Lawsuit against N.Y. Times Revived by Appeals Court.
881IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Annual Report 2009. Chapter III (Inter-American Legal Framework of
the Right to Freedom of Expression). OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 51. December 30, 2009. Para. 110.
882 I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra. Para. 129, and Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, supra. Para. 74.
883 The United States Department of Justice. February 21, 2019. IRS Employee Charged with Unlawful Disclosure Of Suspicious Activity Reports.
The Washington Post. February 21, 2019. IRS analyst charged with leaking financial documents on Michael Cohen.
884 The United States Department of Justice. May 9, 2019. Former Intelligence Analyst Charged with Disclosing Classified Information. NPR.
May 9, 2019. U.S. Charges Former Intelligence Analyst With Leaking Classified Data To Reporter.
885The United States Department of Justice. October 9, 2019.Defense Intelligence Agency Employee Arrested for Leaking Classified Information
to Journalists.The Wall Street Journal. October 9, 2019. Counterterrorism Analyst Arrested for Leaking to TwoJournalists.
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of classified military information obtained by whistleblower Chelsea Manning. Julian Assange, who is the
founder of Wikileaks, had been residing in the Ecuadorian embassyin London since June 2012. He was arrested
after Ecuador withdrew the diplomatic asylum granted to him in August 2012.886
650. On May 1, 2019, the Wikileaks founder was sentenced by a British court to 50 weeks in prison for
violating the terms of his bail and failing to voluntarily surrendering to the authorities.887Also, as mentioned
earlier, the first charge brought by the United States concerned the conspiracy to crack a password hash stored
on Department of Defense computers connected to a United States government network used for classified
documents and communications (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network(SIPRNet))888.
651. However, on May23 the United States governmentfiled a superseding indictment that included 17
additional charges under theEspionage Act. The new charges focus on the role the Wikileaks founder played in
obtaining and publishing secret military and diplomatic documents in 2010, information obtained by former US
Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning. According to the Justice Department statement, the charge against
Assange alleges that he conspiredwith Manning to illegally obtain and then disclose classified documents related
to national defense, conspired with her, aided and abetted her, and received and attempted to receive
information with reason to believe that those materials would be obtained unlawfully. The charges contained in
the indictment allege that Assange “solicited classified information” and “actively encouraged” Manning to
provide more information. The Office of the Special Rapporteurnotes that, While most of the new charges related
to obtaining secret documents, some of the charges focused on the publication of certain documents that
revealed the names of journalists, religious leaders, dissidents, and people in dangerous locations such as war
zones who provided information to the United States.889The US government formally requested Assange's
extradition in June 2019.890The United Kingdom’s Home Secretary Sajid Javid approved the extradition request;
however, the final decision rests with the British courts, who will hold a hearing on the matter in February
2020.891
652. Although the sexual assault chargeswere time-barred, the rape investigation against Julian Assange was
reopened in May 2019, so the extradition order to Sweden was upheld.892However, in November 2019 the rape
investigation was closed, as the prosecutor found that“the evidence ha[d] weakened considerably due to the
long period of time that has elapsed since the events inquestion.”893
653. Based on the new charges under theEspionage Act, the Office of the Special Rapporteurexpresses its
concern over theprecedent that this type of charge could set for the exercise of freedom of expression by
journalists and persons engaged in journalistic activities, as well as for the search for information and its
publication in investigations of public interest, particularly with regard to national security. The actions and
activities that support the charges described refer to activities that are normally carried out in investigative
journalism and by the traditional media, which seek and publish information even if it is secret or confidential,
with the respective protection of their sources.
654. In a 2010 Joint Statement, the IACHR and UN Special Rapporteurs said that, “government
‘whistleblowers’ releasing information on violations of the law, on wrongdoing by public bodies, on a serious
threat to health, safety or the environment, or on a breach of human rights or humanitarian law should be
protected against legal, administrative or employment-related sanctions if they act in good faith. Any attempt to
impose subsequent liability on those who disseminate classified information should be grounded in previously
established laws enforced by impartial and independent legal systems with full respect for due process
guarantees, including the right to appeal.” Other individuals, including journalists and civil society
representatives, should never be subject to liability for publishing or further disseminating this information,
886 CNN. April 11, 2019. Police arrest Julian Assange at Ecuadorian Embassy in London.The New York Times. April 11, 2019. Julian Assange
Arrested in London as U.S. Unseals Hacking Conspiracy Indictment. The Guardian. April 11, 2019. Julian Assange faces US extradition after
arrest at Ecuadorian embassy.
887 Reuters. May 1, 2019. Julian Assange sentenced to 50 weeks in British jail for skipping bail. CNN. May 1, 2019. Julian Assange gets almost a
year in UK prison for skipping bail.
888 The New York Times. April 11, 2019. Julian Assange Arrested in London as U.S. Unseals Hacking Conspiracy Indictment. The United States
Department of Justice. April 11, 2019. WikiLeaks Founder Charged in Computer Hacking Conspiracy.
889 The United States Department of Justice. May 23, 2019. WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange Charged in 18-Count Superseding Indictment.
Charges Related to Illegally Obtaining, Receiving and Disclosing Classified Information.
Julian Assange 18-count indictement Available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1165556/download. See also, CNN. May
2, 2019. WikiLeaksfounder indicted on Espionage Act charges, raising issue of pressfreedoms. NBC News. May 23, 2019. WikiLeaks co-founder
Julian Assange indicted on 17 new charges under Espionage Act.
890 El Comercio. June 10, 2019. EE.UU. solicitó la extradición de Julian Assange. Reuters. June 11, 2019. U.S. formally asks UK to extradite
WikiLeaks' Assange.
891 Reuters. June 14, 2019. UK court sets Assange U.S. extradition hearing for February 2020. The Verge. June 14, 2019. Julian Assange’s
extradition to the US will be decided by the UK courts in 2020.
892 CNN. May 13, 2019. Sweden re-opens Julian Assange rape investigation. BBC News. May 13, 2019. Julian Assange: Sweden reopens rape
investigation.
893 CNN. November 19, 219. Sweden drops investigation into Julian Assange over rape allegation. BBC News. November 19, 219. Julian
Assange: Sweden drops rape investigation.
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regardless of whether or not it has been leaked to them, unless they committed fraud or another crime to obtain
the information.894
G.Confidentiality of sources
655. The Office of the Special Rapporteurobserves with concernthe various subpoenas issued to journalists
and media outlets, given the implications for the protection and confidentiality of sources. According to the U.S.
Press Freedom Tracker, at least 20 journalists have been subpoenaed or ordered to hand over their journalistic
material.895For instance, a Nevada judge ordered an online journalist to reveal his sources on the grounds that
he did not work for a print publication and therefore did not qualify as a journalist.896In addition,
BuzzFeedreceived three subpoenas to “produce documents, information, or objectsor to permit inspectionof
premisesin a civil action,” in the defamation case brought by speleologist Vernon against Tesla CEO Elon
Musk,alleging that the tech executive repeatedly labeled him a pedophile without evidence on Twitter and in
communications with BuzzFeed senior tech journalist Ryan Mac, the latter of which were published by
the outlet.897
656. The Office of the Special Rapporteuralso is concerned about the raid on the home and office of journalist
Bryan Carmody, as well as the seizure of electronic devices, equipment, and journalistic materials (notes and
documents). According to public information, on May 10, 2019, San Francisco Police officers raided Bryan
Carmody’s home, after using a sledgehammer to try to break down his front door.The journalist was arrested
and handcuffed during the event. The officers seized phones, computers, tablets, and notebooks, searched his
independent news organization, North Bay News, and confiscated a USB drive, CDs, and a police report on the
death of San Francisco Public Defender JeffAdachi.
657. The search and seizure was carried out because the freelance journalist had obtained a confidential
police report that included information about the death of public defender Jeff Adachi in February of this year
and refused to reveal his source to the authorities.898Although the police had a warrant, the Society of
Professional Journalists of Northern California stressed that the statute governing search warrants expressly
prohibits the police from seizing items protected by the “shield law,” whichprotects journalists from being held
in contempt for refusing to reveal their sources.899Two days after the raid and initial statements by the San
Francisco police chief implying that it was carried out to investigate the journalist’s alleged involvement in a
criminal conspiracy to steal the confidential police report and sell it to local news stations, the police chief
offered an apology. The journalist was also informed that the seized items would be returned to him.900On July
18, 2019, a San Francisco Superior Court Judge quashed the search warrant and held that it should never have
been issued, as the journalist was protected under the “shield law.”He ordered the destruction of the evidence
obtained and prohibited its use. The judge who had originally issued the search warrant noted that she had not
been informed that Carmody was a journalist.901
658. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also notes, on the basis of publicly available information, that
former U.S. Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning was reportedly deprived of her liberty after being held
in civil contempt for refusing to testify before a grand jury and answer questions about the government's
investigation into the actions of Julian Assange and Wikileaks.The whistleblower, who provided confidential
information to the founder of Wikileaks, was arrested in March and released in May 2019. However, she was
again taken into custody for failing to comply with the newly issued subpoena and for refusing to answer
questions about the information provided toAssange.902
894 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. December 6, 2004. Joint Declaration on Access to Information and on Secrecy
Legislation. "Whistleblowers" are individuals releasing confidential or secret information although they are under an official or other
obligation to maintain confidentiality or secrecy.
895 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. No date. Available at: https://pressfreedomtracker.us/subpoena/?date_lower=2019-01-
01&date_upper=2019-12-18
896 The Nevada Independent. March 6, 2019. Shield law does not protect online publishers without press association membership, Nevada judge
rules. Reno Gazzette Jornal. March 7, 2019. Nevada judge rules online journalist must reveal sources, not protected by media shield law.
897 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. October 1, 2019. BuzzFeed receives third subpoena in ongoing Unsworth-Musk defamation lawsuit.
898 Los Angeles Times. May 13, 2019. Raid on San Francisco reporter’s home condemned as an attack on 1st Amendment. CNN. May 27, 2019.
San Francisco police chief says raid on journalist's home may have violated California shield law.
899 The Society of Professional Journalists Northern California. May 12, 2019. SPJ NORCAL condemns search of freelancer Bryan Carmody as
attack on first amendment. CNN. May 27, 2019. San Francisco police chief says raid on journalist's home may have violated California shield
law.
900 CNN. May 27, 2019. San Francisco police chief says raid on journalist's home may have violated California shield law. Reporters Without
Borders (RSF). Weekly Address, May 20-26, 2019. San Francisco police union calls for department chief’s resignation over controversial raid
on journalist’s home.
901 San Francisco Examiner. July 18, 2019. Judge quashes warrant to search SF journalist’s phone records. ABC 7News. July 19, 2019. Journalist
Bryan Carmody has victory in court over San Francisco police in Jeff Adachi death investigation.
902 The Guardian. April 22, 2019. Chelsea Manning to remain in jail after appeals court denies bail request. WUSA9. May 10, 2019. Chelsea
Manning released from jail in Virginia after being held on contempt charge. The Washington Post. May 16, 2019. Chelsea Manning ordered
back to jail after again refusing to testify in WikiLeaks case. Out. July 30, 2019. Chelsea Manning Is Still In Jail. AP News.August 7, 2019. Chelsea
Manning gets credit for time served in contempt case. According to the latter, a judge decided that Manning cannot be detained for more than
18 months for civil disobedience.
158
659. The Office of the Special Rapporteurexpresses its concern about these situationsand recalls that any
measure to seize journalistic material that requires revealing sources or subpoenaing journalists as witnesses
has a restrictive impact on freedom of expression. According to Principle 8 of the IACHR’s Declaration of
Principles on Freedom of Expression, “Every social communicator has the right to keep his/her source of
information, notes, personal and professional archives confidential.”
H.Censorship and revocation of press credentials
660. The Office of the Special Rapporteurhas noted that in 2019 the White House established more stringent
requirements for the granting of certain types of press credentials and has maintained restrictions on press
coverage. The White House revoked the credentials of several members of the Washington D.C. press corps
(known as “hard pass” credentials that allow the highest level of access to the White House) because they did
not meet new requirements.903Several correspondents whohad held suchpasses for yearswere unable to renew
them, and had to apply for “exceptions” to access them or accept six-month passes, which allow more limited
access.904The affected correspondents interpreted these measures as yet another way of limiting the press
freedom of journalists who are critical of President Trump’s administration.
661. Also, on August 2, CNN analyst Brian Karem’s credentials were suspended due to an altercation with
former Trump aide Sebastian Gorka in the White House Rose Garden around a social media event convened by
the President and attended by his loyal supporters. However, in September, a federal judge ordered the White
House and the Press Secretary to return the journalist’s credentials. The Court found that although the
credentials were suspended temporarily, doing so irreparably harmed the journalist’s First Amendment
rights.905The Department of Justice appealed the decision.906
662. In addition, Trump’s campaign stated that it will not grant credentials to Bloomberg Newsjournalists for
demonstrations or other campaign events in connection with the official entry into the 2020 presidential race
of the news organization’s owner, Democrat Michael Bloomberg. This is because its editor-in-chief said that
while Bloomberg News will continue to report on the 2020 campaign, it will “continue its tradition” of not
“investigating” its owner, his family, or his foundation, and that it will extend the same policy to the other
Democratic primary competitors. However, Bloomberg Newsnoted that it will continue to investigate the current
administration of President Trump.907The union representing Bloomberg journalists strongly opposed the
decision and called for it to be rescinded,908while Democratic candidate and network owner Michael Bloomberg
said his news organization’s employees needed to accept certain “restrictions and responsibilities” when
working for the organization.909
663. On September 17, 2019, the United States filed a civil lawsuit against Edward Snowden, a former Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee and National Security Agency (NSA) contractor and whistleblower, due to
the publication of his memoir entitled Permanent Record. The lawsuit alleges that Snowden published his book
without submitting it to the agencies for pre-publication review, in violation ofthe non-disclosure agreements
that he signed. The Department of Justice said that the lawsuit did not seek to “stop or restrict the publication
or distribution of Permanent Record. Rather, […]the government [sought] to recover all proceeds earned by
Snowden because of his failure to submit his publication for pre-publication review in violation of his alleged
contractual and fiduciary obligations.”910 Edward Snowden formally responded to the lawsuit on November 20,
2019,911and reported on his Twitter page that the U.S. government also sued his book’s publisher for failing to
give the agencies in question an opportunity to review the book.912The Office of the Special Rapporteurlearned
that agencies like the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have a “prepublication review
system,” whereby current and former agency employees as well as militarypersonnel must submit any writings
903 The new requirement to be able to access the hard pass is that journalists should have been present at the White House for at least 90
days within a 180 day period.
904 Columbia Journalism Review. May 9, 2019. White House revokes press passes for dozens of journalists; Huffpost. May 9, 2019. White House
rescinds some press passes as journalists slam new attack on media.
905 The Guardian. August 17, 2019. Trump suspends CNN analyst’s credentials in another shot at the press; CNN Business. September 4, 2019.
Judge rules White House must give Playboy columnist Brian Karem his press pass back.
906 Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Weekly Address, September 23-29, 2019. Trump administration appeals decision in Brian Karem’s press
pass case. Deadline. September 27, 2019.White House Appeals Judge’s Decision To Restore Brian Karem’s Hard Pass.
907 CNN Business. November 26, 2019. ‘Everybody’s nightmare come true’: Bloomberg reporters grapple with covering Bloomberg
campaign.BBC News. December 2, 2019. Trump campaign denies press credentials to Bloomberg News.The Guardian. December 2, 2019.
Trump campaign will deny press credentials to Bloomberg News.
908 The Hill. November 25, 2019. Bloomberg union calls on company to rescind decision to notinvestigate 2020 presidential candidates.National
Review. November 26, 2019. Bloomberg Journalists’ Union demands management lift ban on investigating Dem 2020 candidates.
909 AP News. December 6, 2010. Bloomberg: His News reporters need to accept restrictions. Fox News. December 7, 2019. Bloomberg dismisses
complaints from his outlet’s reporters on 2020 coverage: ‘Your paychecks’ come with ‘restrictions and responsibilities’.
910 The United States Department of Justice. September 17, 2019. United States Files Civil Lawsuit against Edward Snowden for Publishing a
Book in Violation of CIA and NSA Non-Disclosure Agreements. The Guardian. September 17, 2019. US government files civil lawsuit against
Snowden over publication of memoir.
911 First Amendment Watch at New York University. December 2, 2019. Snowden Responds to DOJ Lawsuit, Argues Government Selectively
Enforces Prepublication Review Rules.
912Twitter account of Edward Snowden @Snowden. September 18, 2019.
159
about their past workfor agency review and approvalprior to publication. These practices prompted the Knight
First Amendment Institute at Columbia Universityand the ACLUto file a civil suit againstthose agencies, alleging
that the above practice is unconstitutional because it violates the Fifth and the First Amendments to the
Constitution, constituting prior censorship.913
664. Principle 5 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expressionstates that, “Prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic communication must be prohibited
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
665. The Special Rapporteurs of the UN and IACHR and the OSCE Representative stated in a 2003 Joint
Declaration that, “Accreditation schemes for journalists are appropriate only where necessary to provide them
with privileged access to certain places and/or events; such schemes should be overseen by an independent
body and accreditation decisions should be taken pursuant to a fair and transparent process, based on clear and
nondiscriminatory criteria published in advance.”914
666. The Inter-American Court has also held that,“With regard to the accreditations or authorizations for the
written media to participate in official events, which imply a possible restriction on the exercise of the freedom
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of any nature, it must be proven that their application is legal,
it seeks a legitimate objective, and it is necessary and proportional in relation to the objective sought within a
democratic society. The requirements for the accreditation must be clear, objective, and reasonable, and their
application must be transparent. It [is incumbent upon] the State to prove that it has complied with the
aforementioned requirements upon establishing requirements to access the information under its control.”915
667. Likewise, in electoral contexts, a healthy democratic debate requires the broadest possible circulation
of ideas, opinions, and information about candidates, their parties and their platforms in the run-up to an
election, primarily through the media, the candidates, and those who wish to speak out. Everyone must be
allowed to question and investigate the competence and suitability of the candidates, and to disagree with and
compare proposals, ideas and opinions, so that the electorate may form its opinion in order to vote.916
I. Access to public information and restrictions on presscoverage
668. The Office of the Special Rapporteurexpresses its concern overthe restrictions on access to public
information derived from a recent judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 24, 2019, inFood Marketing
Institute v. Argus Leader Media,917the Supreme Court decided, by a 6-3 vote, to expand the definition of the term
“confidential,” restricting access by journalists and the media to information held by the government, as
documents considered confidential are exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of InformationAct(FOIA).
669. A media outlet submitted a request for information to the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), seeking the names and addresses of all stores participating in the federal Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), as well as store-by-store data on annual SNAP food stamp redemption for fiscal
years 2005-2010. The USDA denied the request, invoking FOIA Exemption 4, which protects against disclosure
of“trade secrets and commercial or financialinformation obtained from aperson andprivileged or confidential,”
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). The Supreme Court found that when commercial or financialinformation is both customarily
and actually treated asprivate by its owner andprovided to the government under an assurance of privacy, the
information is “confidential” and fits within Exemption 4.The Supreme Court therefore held that the definition
of "confidential" should cover all information intended to be secret and departed from the previous definition,
in force since a 1974 ruling,which includedas confidential documents those that would cause “substantial harm”
if made public.918
670. The Office of the Special Rapporteur alsolearned thatthe Baltimore City Circuit Courtissued an order on
April 24 of this year, denying journalists access to courtroom audio recordings. Independent journalist Justine
Barron, who conducts investigations into the city’s police department, requested—and was denied—access to
recordings of a hearing, even though in Maryland anyone can obtainsuch audio recordings or transcripts.
913 ACLU. April 2, 2019. ACLU and Knight Institute challenge constitutionality of far-reaching government censorship system. First Amendment
Watch at New York University. April 17, 2019. Prepublication Review: An “Unconstitutional Censorship” of Former Intelligence Officials?
914Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. December 18, 2003. Joint Declaration on Regulation of the Media, Restrictions
on Journalists, and Investigating Corruption.
915I/A CourtH. R., Case of Claude Reyes et al v. Chile. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Serie C No. 151, para. 93; Case of Ríos et al v. Venezuela.
Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C No. 194, para. 375; Case of Perozo et al v. Venezuela. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C No. 195,
para. 346.
916 916I/A CourtH. R. Case of Canese v. Paraguay. Merits,Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Serie CNo. 111. Para. 90. IACHR.
Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. May 15, 2009. Joint Statement On The Media AndElections.
917 Supreme Court of the United States. Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media. 588 U.S. (2019). June 24, 2019.
918 CNN. June 24, 2019.Supreme Court creates new limits to FOIA disclosure. USA Today. June 27, 2019. The Supreme Court rewrote FOIA into
the Freedom FROM Information Act.
160
According to the court’s order, only the parties to the proceedings and/or their legal representatives would be
allowed access to courtroom audio recordings, although the journalist would be able to listen to them at the
courthouse. The administrative order was invalidated by the Court of Appeals, which found that the order
conflicted with a Maryland rule that created a presumption of public access to copies of courtroom audio
recordings.919
671. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also underscores its special concern over the case of professor,
researcher, and human rights advocate Angelina Snodgrass Godoy of the University of Washington (a public
university). As part of the work the professor is doing on U.S. immigration policy and the defense of migrants’
rights through the university’s Human Rights Center (UWCHR)—in particular, an academic investigation of
public interest into the potential violation of various rights of migrant children—she reportedly made several
requests for access to information contained in the records of Cowlitz County, in the State of Washington. The
purpose of the request was to obtain accurate information on the number of minors detained in the county’s
juvenile facility, the length of their detention, and their complete files, among other documents. It was made
noting that certain personal information of minors could be redacted to protect theirprivacy.
672. Even though Cowlitz county provided incomplete information, despite several requests, the county
itself and the Youth Services Center filed a motion for declaratory judgment in state court against the University
of Washington, and Professor Godoy personally, in order to obtain a declaratory judgment establishing that the
county has no independent authority to release judicial records without clear statutory exemption or without
express written authority from the Cowlitz County Superior Court, among other requests. ICE presented a
motion to intervene in the Cowlitz County case and seek its removal to federal court. Because the juvenile facility
is one of three in the country authorized to hold unaccompanied minors for more than 72 hours, and therefore
has a contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the professor filed a FOIA request directly
with ICE. The agency replied that this information was confidential under federal law, despite state regulations
to the contrary. This refusal to provide the information has hindered the professor’s investigative work
regarding a juvenile detention center that reportedly holds migrant children without any supervision and
prompted ICE to file the aforementioned motion seeking to have the case heard by a federal court. The Office of
the Special Rapporteur stresses the importance of academic freedom, which depends on the exercise of various
rights, including the right to freedom of expression and access to information; these rights are essential for
informing others about significant public interest issues such as those described.920
673. In addition, a number of media outlets in variousparts of the country were kept from covering events.921
For instance, on February 27, the White House barred four members of the U.S. press (reporters from the
Associated Press, Reuters, Bloomberg News, and the Los Angeles Times) from covering a dinner between
President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The journalists are part of the White House
press pool that traveled to cover the events held in connection with the meeting. Only photographers and news
camera crews were allowed access, due to “sensitivities over shouted questions in the previous sprays,”
according to then White House Press Secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders. According to publicly available
information, while the White House's practice has been to defend the rights to freedom of expression and access
to information of journalists covering the President's events while traveling abroad, this administration has, by
contrast, limited access.922
674. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has also learned of other cases such as the barring of reporters
from asylum hearings held at the border;923 the exclusion of a reporter who initially had been invited to a border
tour by the Department of Homeland Security;924 the barring of media by the Mayor’s communications team
from attending a public meeting in Newark, New Jersey, on the city’s lead contamination crisis;925 the removal
of reporters from the Kansas Senate, who were also threatened with having theirpress credentials revoked after
9 people began a protest during a hearing on Medicaid expansion,926 among others.
675. In addition, the Office of the Special Rapporteur notes and expresses its concern that daily press
briefings at the White House have not occurred since March 11, 2019 and that, according to the White House
919 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. May 7, 2019. Baltimore court denies reporters access to courtroom audio recordings. The Baltimore Sun.
September 30, 2019. Recordings of court hearings must be available to all who ask, appeals court rules. The Daily Record. October 1, 2019.
Baltimore judge’s order restricting court recording access is invalidated.
920 CNN. Anderson Cooper Full Circle. October 24, 2019. Human rights expert discovers secretive ICE detention centers. Kiro 7. October 24,
2019. UW professor demanding info from ICE about children held in Cowlitz County.
921 Several cases of denial of access to coverage of events by the media have been brought to the attention of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur. See https://pressfreedomtracker.us/denial-access/
922Reuters. February 27, 2019. White House bars four reporters from Trump-Kim dinner. Público. February 27, 2019. La Casa Blanca excluye
a cuatro periodistas de la cobertura de una cena entre Trump y Kim Jong-un.U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. March 4, 2019. White House bars
four print reporters from covering dinner between U.S., North Korea leaders.
923 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. September 23, 2019. Journalists barred from asylum hearings held in tent courts at border.
924 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. September 23, 2019. BuzzFeed says its immigration reporter was excluded from DHS border tour.
925 NJTV News. August 28, 2019. In closing Newark meeting, Baraka administration crosses swords with media again. TAPinto. August 28,
2019. Baraka Administration to Allow Press Access to Lead Water Meetings. U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. September 12, 2019. Media barred
from public lead water crisis meeting in New Jersey.
926 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. June 4, 2019. Reporters removed from Kansas Senate floor, threatened with loss of press passes.
161
Press Secretary, there are noplans to reinstate them any time soon. The administration stopped holding regular
press briefings after President Trump accused certain media outlets of unfaircoverage.927
676. Principle 4 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression establishes that, “Access
to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.” In keeping with the principle of maximum disclosure, the law should ensure the broadest and most
effective access to public information possible, and exceptions should not become the general rule in practice.
Furthermore, exceptions should be interpreted narrowly and any doubts should be resolved in favor of
transparency and access.
J.Internet and freedom of expression
677. On May 20, 2019, the House of Representativespassed a bill establishing the importance of the right to
Internet access for all the world’s people in order tocatalyze innovation, spur economic growth and job creation,
reduce poverty and gender inequality, and guarantee human rights, in particular to promote free speech,
democracy, and good governance. The purpose of the bill is to ensure the effective use of United States foreign
assistance resources toencourage the efforts of developing countries to improve and secure mobile and fixed
access to the Internet, with a differential focus on the most vulnerable groups who have the least access,
including women.928
678. The Office of the Special Rapporteurhas maintained that the principle of universal Internet access
“refers to the need to guarantee connectivity and access to the Internet infrastructure and other ICT services
that is universal, ubiquitous, equitable, truly affordable, and of adequate quality, all throughout the State’s
territory.”929In addition, the joint declaration Twentieth Anniversary of the Joint Declaration: Challenges to
Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade,established that “the right to access and use the Internet [should be
understood] as a human right [and] an essential condition for the exercise of the right to freedom of
expression.”930
679. According to publicly available information, on October 24, 2019 the United States Senate passed
bipartisan legislation intended to helpfurther understand the risks posed by“deepfake” videos, or those altered
by artificial intelligence to change the meaning or reality of thevideo. The “Deepfake Report Act of 2019” (S.
2065)931was passed by the Senate and sent tothe House of Representativesfor consideration. The Act would
require the Department of Homeland Security topublish an annual report on the use of deepfake technology that
would be required to include an assessment of how both foreign governments and domestic groups are using
deepfakes to harm national security.932
680. The discussion of deepfake videos grew exponentially after the release of a slowed-down video of
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi speaking at a Center for American Progress event. The video portrayed the
California Democrat as slurring her words, stuttering, in apparent drunkenness or poor health. The video went
viral on social media, as it circulated on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter and was shared by President Trump
and Rudy Giuliani on Twitter. It was viewed more than 2 million times on the Facebook page of Politics
WatchDog.Youtube removed the video from itsplatform, alleging that it violated its contentpolicy, but Facebook
and Twitter did not.933 Facebook decided to allow the video to stay up, and saidthat it would only reduce its
visibility on user news feeds with a link to a third-party fact checking site stating that the video was
927 U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. January 23, 2019. Trump stops regular press briefings, citing unfair media treatment. CNN. August 28, 2019.
The last 'daily' White House press briefing was 170 days ago.Político. September 23, 2019. White House press secretary says daily briefings
aren't coming back any time soon.
928 United States. Congress (House of Representatives). H.R. 1359-Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2019 o Digital GAP Act. May 20, 2019.
The proposal was passed by the House of Representatives and is currently pending Senate approval. (“This bill directs the Department of
State to advance U.S. policy to promote public and private investments in secure Internetinfrastructure and increase Internet access around
the world. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps shall also make efforts to advance such policy. The President
shall report to Congress about U.S. efforts to implement the policy, including government efforts to provide technical and re gulatory
assistance to developing countries and close the gender gap in Internet access”).
929IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet. OEA/Ser.L/V/II
CIDH/RELE/INF.17/17. March 15, 2017. P. 13.
930 Twentieth Anniversary of the Joint Declaration: Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade. July 10, 2019. Adopted by the
United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information.
931 United States. Congress (Senate). S.2065 - Deepfake Report Act of 2019. October 24, 2019.
932 The Hill. October 25, 2019. Senate passes legislation to combat 'deepfake' videos. The Daily Sentinel. October 28, 2019. U.S. Senate passes
'deep fake' video bill.
933 The New York Times. May 24, 2019. Distorted Videos of Nancy Pelosi Spread on Facebook and Twitter, Helped by Trump. PolitiFact. May
24, 2019. Viral video of Nancy Pelosi slowed down her speech. Fox 11News. May 28, 2019. Pelosi video controversy raises concerns aboutsocial
media and 2020 campaign.
162
misleading.934Nancy Pelosi expressed her disagreement with Facebook’s decision to keep the video despite
knowing it was false and stated the following: “We have said all along, ‘poor Facebook, they were unwittingly
exploited by the Russians.’I think wittingly, because right now they are putting up something that they know is
false. I think it's wrong," she said,“I can take it … but [Facebook is] lying to the public.”Pelosi added: “I think they
have proven — by not taking down something they know is false — that they were willing enablers of the
Russian interference in our election.”935
681. The video of Nancy Pelosi sparked harsh criticism of social media’s role in “fake news” and renewed
concerns about the role platforms should play in controlling fake content and what consequences—if any—
technology companies should face.936However,according to the information available tothe Office of the Special
Rapporteur,only the enactment of the abovementioned legislation is currently under discussion. Also, under
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act-Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, intermediaries
are immune from liability for the publication of content posted by others, and there are currently no regulations
requiring social networking platforms to remove content of any kind.937
682. The Special Rapporteurs ofthe IACHR, the UN, and the ACHPRand the OSCE Representative established
in their 2011 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet that,“No one who simply provides
technical Internet services such as providing access, or searching for, or transmission or caching of information,
should be liable for content generated by others, which is disseminated using those services, as long as they do
not specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey a court order to remove that content, where they have
the capacity to do so (‘mere conduitprinciple’).”938
683. With respect to intermediary liability, the Special Rapporteurs have said that, “States should not subject
Internet intermediaries to mandatory orders to remove or otherwise restrict content except where the content
is lawfully restricted in accordance with the standards outlined above. States should refrain from pressuring,
punishing or rewarding intermediaries with the aim of restricting lawful content.939 [...]At a minimum,
intermediaries should not be required to monitor user-generated content and should not be subject to
extrajudicial content takedown ruleswhich failtoprovide sufficient protection for freedom of expression (which
is the case with many of the ‘notice and takedown’ rules currently being applied).”940
934 The Guardian. May 24, 2019. Facebook refuses to delete fake Pelosi video spread by Trump supporters. Huffpost. May 24, 2019. Facebook
Refuses To Delete Fake Nancy Pelosi Video That Makes Her Seem Drunk.
935 KQED News. May 29, 2019. Nancy Pelosi: Doctored Videos Show Facebook 'Willing Enablers' of Russians in 2016. NBC News. May 29, 2019.
Pelosi slams Facebook for refusing to take down doctored videos. AP News. May 29, 2019. Pelosi slams Facebook for not removing altered video.
936 Fox 11News. May 28, 2019. Pelosi video controversy raises concerns about social media and 2020 campaign. Roll Call. May 28, 2019. Altered
Pelosi videos puts social media in congressional crosshairs.
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider" (47 U.S.C. § 230). Fox 11 News. May 28, 2019. Pelosi video controversy raises concerns about social media
and 2020 campaign.
938Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. June 1, 2011. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet..
939Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. May 4, 2016. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Countering
Violent Extremism.
940 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. June 1, 2011. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet.
163
17. GRENADA
684. During 2019, cases of harassment and restrictions on the coverage of complaints made by
communicators have been reported in Granada. An example of this is the harassment by government authorities
of journalists when asking questions at press conferences, including physical attacks andthreats.
A. Subsequent liability
685. The Minister of Legal Affairs, Kindra Maturine-Stewart, reportedly posted a statement on her personal
Facebookpage on May 4 saying that she would take legal action against the radio station Vibes FM and its owner,
Kimberlain Mills, because of statements made on the show “Hard Talk Unfiltered” on May 2.941
686. Kimberlain Mills had reportedly claimed that the government of Grenada deposited EC$100,000
(approximately US$37,000) in Maturine-Stewart’s personal bank account in connection with certain projects on
the islands of Carriacou and Petite Martinique. The Minister said that “These defamatory statements were no
doubt actuated by spite and malice,”and that she had therefore asked her lawyers to take legal action against
Kimberlain Mills and the radio station.
687. In 2018, High Court had already ordered that radio station and its owner to publicly apologize for its
statements andpayMaturine-Stewart EC$20,000 (approximately US$ 7,000) in damages for the harm caused by
a similar statement.942
688. This Office recalls that Principle 10 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
establishes that, “Privacy laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and dissemination of information of
public interest. The protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in
those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private person who has
voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest. In addition, in these cases, it must be proven that in
disseminating the news, the social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that
false news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the truth or falsity of such
news.”
689. Principle 11 additionally states: “Public officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that
penalize offensive expressions directed at public officials, generally known as ‘desacato laws,’ restrict freedom
of expression and the right to information.”
690. With respect to potential civil liability, the Inter-American Court has held that civil judgments in the
area of freedom of expression must be strictly proportionate so as not to have a chilling effect on this freedom,
since “the fear of a civil penalty, considering the claim […] for a very steep civil reparation, may be, in any case,
equally or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal
punishment, since it has the potential to attain the personal and family life of an individual who accuses a public
official, with the evident and very negative result of self-censorship both in the affected party and in other
potential critics of the actions taken by a public official.”943
691. In addition, in its Guide to guarantee freedom of expression regarding deliberatedisinformation in
electoral contexts,the Office of the Special Rapporteur has recommended that States“should not establish new
criminal [offenses] to sanction the dissemination of misinformation or false news,” indicating that the
introduction of such offenses “could lead the region back to a logic of criminalizing expressions aboutofficials or
people involved in matters of public interest and establishing a tool with a strong chilling effect on the
dissemination of ideas, criticism, and information for fear of being [prosecuted], which would be particularly
restrictive in the context of the electoral contest.” This Office has instead suggested responses that are “nonregulatory in nature” to address the phenomenon of disinformation, seeking to “strengthen the capacities of
citizens to distinguish false information from true information.”It has said that, “State actions must be aimed at
raising public awareness about the existence of the phenomenon, awakening a critical spirit in them when
consuming and replicating that information,and developing the necessary resources to verify information of
doubtful origin.”944
B.Freedom of expression in electoral contexts
692. On February 6, the final report on the March 13, 2018 general elections in Grenada was presented to
the Permanent Council of the OAS, recommending the draftingof “legislation and regulations to govern campaign
financing.”It also suggested the amendment of the Representation of the People Act or the development of
941 Facebook account of KindraMaturine-Stewart. Available at:
https://www.facebook.com/kindramaturinestewart/
942 Antigua News Room. May 6, 2019. Grenada – Government minister to lawsuit against radio station and owner; Now Grenada. May 6, 2019.
Government minister filing defamatory action against radio station and its owner.
943I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009.
Serie C No. 193, Para.129.
944 IACHR. Guide to guarantee freedom of expression regarding deliberate disinformation in electoral contexts. October 17, 2019
164
regulations to “develop regulations to clearly establish the rules, procedures and criteria to follow in defining
constituency and polling division boundaries.”945
693. Franka Bernardine, party leader of theNational Democratic Congress (NDC), also issued remarks about
the general elections, accusing the New National Party (NNP)of having received assistance from Cambridge
Analytica in order to win.946
694. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, “Elections are tightly linked to freedom of expression
and information as it is essential for citizens to have as much information as possible to make a decision in
casting their votes. Accordingly, free circulation of facts, ideas, and opinions is crucial. Unquestionably, the most
common way for citizens currently to inform themselves is through the media.”947
C.Restrictions on press coverage
695. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information on several incidents of harassment and
restrictions on press coverage in Grenada.According to information received, journalist Calistra Farrier asked
Prime Minister Keith Mitchell about his marital status during a press conference after the August 20 cabinet
meeting.He reportedly refused to answer the question,warning the journalist not to pry into his personal
affairs.948Referring to this incident, Press Secretary Philomena Robertson stated that journalists should behave
professionally and respectfully in the workplace. The Media Workers’ Association of Grenada (MWAG)
considered this to be“an attack on press freedom and the reputation of media workers inGrenada.”949
696. In a September 11 post to her personal Facebook account, Calistra Farrier condemned the events that
had taken place in the conference room following the September 10 cabinet meeting. According to the reporter’s
account, she posed a question toMP Clarice Modeste-Curwen of the district of St. Mark about an incident that
had occurred in that district, and Senator Winston Garraway had ordered Modeste-Curwen not to answer the
question. At the end of the press conference, Farrier reportedly approached the MP to obtain remarks, but was
blocked by Garraway. The journalist stated that she was pushed and fell to the ground. She also said that she
was threatened and told not to report what had happened.950In a written statement, Government Senator Simon
Stielldenied that there had been any “physical altercation” between Ms. Farrierand Minister of State Garraway,
and maintained that the government was committed to freedom of thepress.951
697. Based on these events, in a September 2 piece published in the newspaper Now Grenada,the National
Democratic Congress accused the New National Party of controlling, manipulating, and intimidating the
media.952
698. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that “social constructions of gender and historical
discrimination against women determine that the patterns of violence persisting in the region against the press
have particular characteristics and/or a differentiated impact on female journalists and media workers.”953In
his Report on the protection of journalists and media workers, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression stated that, “a gender-sensitive approach should be
taken when considering measures to address the safety of journalists.”954This Office reiterates that States have
a heightened obligation to act with due diligence toprevent violence against women journalists.955
699. The Office of the Special Rapporteur further notes that public officials have a duty to ensure that their
statements do not undermine the rights of those who contribute to the public discourse through theexpression
945OAS. Electoral Mission. Final Report of the Electoral Experts Mission of The Organization Of American States In Grenada. March 13, 2018.
Available at http://www.oas.org/eomdatabase/GetFileA.aspx?id=403-1155-5-0
946 The New York CaribNews. November 7, 2019. British firm affected election outcome says Grenada opposition leader; Now Grenada.
November 4, 2019. New NDC leader blames Cambridge Analytica for party defeat; Nation News. November 5, 2019. British firm affected
election outcome says Grenada opposition leader.
947 IACHR. Annual Report 2005. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI Freedom of
Expression and the Electoral Process: The Case of Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 77 February, 2006. Para. 2
948GrenadaBroadcast. Attorney Hood tells PM Mitchell to answer the question; Now Grenada. August 28, 2019. Former MWAG presidents
concerned about Press Secretary’s statement.
949Now Grenada. August 30, 2019. MWAG responds to Press Secretary’s statement; The Caribbean Post. August 30, 2019. MWAG responds to
Press Secretary’s statement; Trinidad Daily Express. September 10, 2019. The search for clarity – a reporter’s duty.
950Facebook account of Calistra Farrier. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/calistra.farrier; NowGrenada. September 19, 2019. Open
letter to Hon. ClariceModeste-Curwen; NowGrenada. September 18, 2019. Governmentsays “no physicalaltercation” betweenjournalist and
junior minister..
951Spiceislander. September 22, 2019. Statement by Government Senator Simon Stiell; The Caribbean Post. September 19, 2019. Government
says “no physical altercation” between journalist and junior minister; Now Grenada. September 18, 2019. Government says “no physical
altercation” between journalist and junior minister.
952NowGrenada. September 22, 2019. NDC Heartbeat: Mitchell’s attack on the Free Press.
953 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Women Journalists and Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.
CIDH/RELE/INF.20/18. October 31, 2018. Para. 29.
954United Nations. General Assembly. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, Frank La Rue. A/HRC/20/17. June 4, 2012. Para. 52
955 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Violence against journalists and media workers: InterAmerican standards and
national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.CIDH/RELE/INF. 12/13. December 31, 2013.
165
and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media outlets, and human rights organizations, and
should be sensitive to the context in which they speak, so as to ensure that their statements do not constitute,in
the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who
seek to contributewith public deliberation through the expression and [dissemination] of their thoughts.”956
956 I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
166
18. GUATEMALA
700. The media and journalists faced a hostile scenario during 2019, characterized by the persistence of
stigmatization campaigns against the press by high authorities, especially against journalists investigating cases
of corruption and abuse of power by partisans of sectors that opposed the permanence of CICIG in the country.
This panorama deepened during the electoral context and unleashed different types of attacks against the press
and political candidates that were articulated through social networks, hacking of accounts, defamation, hate
speech, as well as discriminatory or sexist. The IACHR also noted with concern the state of emergencypromoted
by the government and the restriction on the right to protest, within which incidents were reported against the
press.
701. On the other hand, the IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship are concerned about the lack of progress
in relation to the implementation of protection mechanisms for the protection of communicators and media, as
well as the institutional weakening of the Historical Archive of the police.
A. Prosecution of justice
702. The IACHR and the Office of the Special Rapporteur observe that in Guatemala high rates of impunity
persist with respect to crimes against journalists in the exercise of their professional work, which generates a
strong chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression; and the consequences for democracy, which
depends on a free, open, and dynamic exchange of ideas and information, are particularly serious957. More than
15 journalists were killed between 2015 and 2018 for reasons allegedly linked to journalistic work;there is little
progress in the investigations and identification of those responsible958.
703. In the framework of the above mentioned, the IACHR identifies progress in relation to the murder of
journalists Danilo López and Federico Salazar in 2015, who served as correspondents for PrensaLibre and Radio
Nuevo Mundo in Mazatenango, department of Suchitepéquez. According to the information available,
congressmanJulio Antonio JuárezRamírezwas indicted as the intellectual author of the crime by the Attorney
General’s Office at the closing of the intermediate stage; he was sent to trial on June 4959. However, on September
17 it was reported in the media that the judges of the High-Risk Court “A” excused themselves from hearing the
trial because they would have made previous statements on the case. At the close of this report, confirmation of
this excuse and the decision on the structure of the court would bepending960.
704. According to the information available, according to the investigations of the Attorney General’s Office,
the congressman would have hired the hitmen in order to assassinate Danilo López following an article
published about hisproblemswith the tax administration that would have ignited the motive of the crime,which
was to prevent the image of the politicianbefore Congress from being damaged961. The court also analyzed
otherevidence elements, such as the motive of contradictingpolitical opinions between the congressmanand the
journalist962. On July 22, the phase of presentation of evidence begun963.
705. In May, Marco Tulio Cano Reyna, who was involved as the contact for hiring the hitmen, declared in a
hearing "under partial reserve”964. According to the information available, on May 29 the High-Risk Court "B"
decreed the dismissal in his favor for the crime of homicide965. Likewise, a hearing on the determination of
measures of benefit established by a collaboration agreement to clarify the crime againstthe journalists would
be pending966.
957 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Violence against journalists and media workers: InterAmerican standards and
national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.CIDH/RELE/INF. 12/13. December 31, 2013.
Para. 287.
958 IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of
the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. Doc. 48/15. December 31, 2015; IACHR. Annual Report 2016.
Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of the State of Freedom of
Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. Doc. 22/17. March 15, 2017; IACHR Annual Report 2017 Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc. 210/17. December 31, 2017; IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
Chapter II (Evaluation of the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019.
959 Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Informe de Cierre. El Legado de justicia en Guatemala. 2019;
elPeriódico. May 28, 2019. Sindicado por asesinato de dos periodistas mazatecos declara en audiencia bajo reserva parcial; Prensa Libre. June
4, 2019. Exdiputado Julio Juárez es enviado a juicio por asesinato de periodista de Mazatenango; Guatevisión. June 4, 2019. Exdiputado Julio
Juárez enfrentará juicio por muerte del periodista Danilo López; La Hora. June 4, 2019. Exdiputado Julio Juárez es enviado a juicio por crimen
contra periodistas.
960 Prensa Libre. September 17, 2019. Tribunal de Mayor Riesgo pide no conocer el juicio contra exdiputado Julio Juárez.
961elPeriódico. June 4, 2019. Suspendido diputado Julio Juárez va a juicio por la muerte de un periodista de Suchitepéquez; Soy505. June 4,
2019. Diputado enfrentará juicio por asesinato de periodistas.
962 Prensa Libre. June 5, 2019. Los argumentos por los cuales se envió a juicio al exdiputado Julio Juárez por el crimen del periodista Danilo
López; Soy505. June 4, 2019. Diputado enfrentará juicio por asesinato de periodistas.
963 Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Informe de Cierre. El Legado de justicia en Guatemala. 2019.
964elPeriódico. May 28, 2019. Sindicado por asesinato de dos periodistas mazatecos declara en audiencia bajo reserva parcial.
965 Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Informe de Cierre. El Legado de justicia en Guatemala. 2019.
966 Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Informe de Cierre. El Legado de justicia en Guatemala. 2019.
167
706. Regarding the murder of journalist Álvaro Alfredo Aceituno López, perpetrated on June 26, 2016967, the
IACHR received information on the arrest of Gilmar Alfonso Gramajo Arteaga, who would be identified as the
alleged material author of the communicator's murder968.
707. Based on the inter-American doctrine and jurisprudence, the IACHR and its Office of the Special
Rapporteur reiterate to the Guatemalan State, in relation to violence and attacks on journalists and the media,
the importance of complying with the three positive obligations arising from the rights to the life, personal
integrity, and freedom of expression, namely: the obligation to prevent, the obligation to protect, and the
obligation to investigate, prosecute, and criminally punish those responsible for these crimes. It is necessary to
combat violence against journalists through a comprehensive policy of prevention, protection, andprosecution.
These obligations complement each otherso that there is a free, robust, and unrestricted democratic debate969.
B. Murders
708. According to information of public knowledge, Luis Vladimir Gutiérrez López, editor of the Magazine
Sin Censuraof San Benito de Mazatenango, Suchitepéquez, was murdered in said town allegedly by hitmen on
June 21, 2019 However, determining the possible link between crime and journalistic workis still pending. As
published, the Attorney General’s Office initiatedthe corresponding investigation970.
709. The IACHR has reiterated that the murder of journalists constitutes the most extreme form of
censorshipand States have a positive obligation to identify and punish the perpetrators of these crimes. For the
Inter-American Commission, it is essential that the Guatemalan State investigate, in a complete, effective, and
impartial manner, the murders of journalists and clarify their motives and judicially determine the relationship
they may have to journalistic activity and freedom of expression. The authorities should not rule outthe exercise
of journalism as a motive for murder and/or aggression before the investigation is completed. The omission of
logical lines of investigation or the lack of diligence in the collection of evidence in this regard can have serious
repercussions in the development of the processes in stages of indictment or trial971. Not having completely
exhausted the logical lines of investigationsfavors, above all, that intellectual authors cannot be identified972.
C. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
710. The Office of the Special Rapporteur received a series of testimonies from journalists who had been
victims of attacks and harassment for reasons related to their editorial positions and threats for their work.
Likewise, it is of particular concern that journalists who investigate alleged acts of corruption or cover the work
of the CICIG are considered "enemies of the country" or "guerrillas”973, which exposes them to a high risk for the
exercise of their work.
711. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur learned of several information describing different
episodes of attacks and threats974 against journalists for reasons related to their work, which raises serious
concerns to this Office due to the lack of adequate measures for the prevention andprotection of communicators
967 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. July 1, 2016. Press Release R91/16 Office of the Special Rapporteur Expresses
Concern over Murder of Journalists and Media Workers in Guatemala.
968 TN23. September 11, 2019. Capturan a supuesto asesino de periodistas.
969 IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 31.
970 La hora. June 22, 2019. MP investiga muerte de periodista en Suchitepéquez; Huehue Noticias. June 22, 2019. Asesinan a periodista en
Mazatenango; "#Suchitepequez • Hitmen shot to death Luis Vladimir Gutiérrez López, 32, the editor of "Sin Censura" magazine. The victim
was riding his motorcycle with journalist Luis de León. The incident happened in the canton San Benito, Mazatenango. @FIP_AL @FEPALC
@APG_1947". Twitter account of Periodistas Unidos. @FIPGUATEMALA01. June 21, 2019.
971IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Special Study on the Status of Investigations into the Murders of Journalists
during the 1995-2005 Period for Reasons that may be Related to their Work in Journalism. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.131. Doc. 35. March 8, 2008.
Para. 116.
972Ibidem, para, 125-126; IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Impunity, self-censorship and armed internal conflict
: An analysis of the state of freedom of expression in Colombia. OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc.51. August 31, 2005, párrs. 65-66.
973Information shared by journalists in Guatemala with the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion el May 20, 2019.
Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.
974 Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala (APG). February 1, 2019. AGP condena amenazas de muerte y agresión contra periodistas.
Available at: https://twitock.com/APG_1947/tweet/1097940870203088896.
168
and the media. These attacks were focused on different locations, such as La Antigua Guatemala, and in the
departments of Sacatepéquez975, Chimaltenango976, Santa Rosa977, among others978.
712. Of particular concern to this Office is information on the aggression, confiscation, and damage to work
equipment by state security agents to journalists who were present to cover a fire that was occurring in La
Antigua Guatemala in the first days of January979. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls thatthe State "must
not prohibit or criminalize live broadcasts of events and must refrain from imposing measures that regulate or
limit the free flow of information through the Internet and other communication platforms”980.
713. El principio 9 de la Declaración de Principios sobre la Libertad de Expresión de la CIDH, establece que:
“El asesinato, secuestro, intimidación, amenaza a los comunicadores sociales, así como la destrucción material
de los medios de comunicación, viola los derechos fundamentales de las personas y coarta severamente la
libertad de expresión. Es deber de los Estados prevenir e investigar estos hechos, sancionar a sus autores y
asegurar a las víctimas una reparación adecuada”.
D .Social Protest
714. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observed the development,throughout the current year, of
numerous social protests in different regions of Guatemala in demand for measures taken by the Government
on the termination of the CICIG mandate981, as well asprotests in the context of the electoral context982. Protests
were also registered for the agreement adopted with the United States Government on asylum983. The IACHR
975 The Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala issued a statement on March 18 condemning the attempted attack against Alex Cruz, a
journalist for elPeriódico, which occurred on the night of March 16 and which injured the media worker's son. The newspaper elPeriódico
also repudiated this attack and demanded the authorities clarify the facts. elPeriódico. March 19, 2019. Agresión contra periodista de
elPeriódico; elPeriódico. March 18, 2019. Comunicado: APG condena amenaza contra periodista de elPeriódico y robo a director de C4.
976 La Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala (APG) issued a statement on March 27 repudiating an assault suffered by journalist Julio Bala,
a correspondent for elPeriódico in Chimaltenango, which according to reports took place on March 26, with the media worker suffering
several blows and his working equipment destroyed while covering a demonstration. elPeriódico. March 27, 2019. Entidad gremial exige
cese de agresiones, acoso y amenazas contra periodistas; deguate.com. March 26, 2019. Comerciantes agreden a periodista de Nuestro Diario
en Tecpán y quiebran su cámara; Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala (APG). May 8, 2019. APG condena ataque en contra de periodista
Santiago Boton. Available at: https://twitock.com/APG_1947/tweet/1125856468425760768.
977 República de Guatemala. Procuraduría de los DerechosHumanos (PDH). September 3, 2019. Verifican acciones del PNC y MP por agresión
de dos periodistas israelíes; elEscuíntleco. September 3, 2019. Periodistas De Origen Israelí De NationalGeographic Agredidos Y Retenidos
En Santa Rosa.
978According to the information the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights sent to the Office of the Special Rapporteur,
between January 11 and October 31, 2018, at least 18 episodes of various violations of the right of freedom of expression occurred in the
departments of Guatemala, Chimatenango, Huehuetenango, Izabal, Quiché, Sololá, Suichitepequez. The media workers affected were as
follow: José Ruben Zamora, director of newspaper ElPeriodico, was a victim of intimidation; AnnabellaGiraca, Antonio Mosquera Aguilar,
Karin Slowing Umaña, Luis Eduardo BarruetoWittig, Manolo Estuardo Vela Castañeda, Marcela GeredaIllescas, Marcelo Colussi, Dina
Fernandez and others, were alleged victims of defamation through a blog published anonymously; Martín Rodríguez Pellecer,Iduvina
Stalinova Hernández Batres, Byron Garoz, Marcia Mejía, Carmen Lucía Alvarado, Julio Serrano Benítez, were alleged victims of defamation
online; Hedy Quino, reporter of La Hora, was an alleged victim of threats from Legislative Branch authorities; Julio Bala, was allegedly
assaulted while covering a social protest; Julio García was allegedly threatened several times while covering an event with municipal
authorities; Santiago Boton, a correspondent for Telesur, suffered the alleged theft of his working equipment, and in another episode he was
allegedly assaulted while covering a social protest; Marvin del Cid, of Artículo 35 association, suffered the alleged theft of his working
equipment; Blaz Arias, an Estor journalist, was reportedly threatened and also robbed of his work equipment; Elena Chiquibal, of Consorcio
de Mujeres de la Cuenca del Lago de Atitlán, was allegedly the victim of surveillance; Francelia Solano, of Nómada, was reportedly
intimidated with legal actions from then candidate Giammattei for the publication of an article; Abel Reina, report edly received different
threats; Francisco Simón Francisco, of Prensa Comunitaria, was reportedly assaulted and intimidated by unknown individuals; BaudilioChoc
Mac, of Prensa Comunitaria, was reportedly intimidated by military personnel while taking photographs of an operative; Mynor Mérida was
reportedly threatened by a Comissioner oftheNational Civilian Police; Carlos Choc, of Prensa Comunitaria, was reportedly subjectto criminal
proceedings in retaliation for his coverage in 2017. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Ataques de Periodis tas 2019.
Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. Other documented cases in: Publinews. October 19,
2019. APG pide al MP investigar agresiones a comunicadores en San Marcos; Crónica. October 23, 2019. APG rechaza intimidaciones en contra
de periodistas en Huehuetenango; elPeriódico. October 24, 2019. Miembros del Sindicato de Trabajadores por la Educación agreden a
periodistas en San Marcos; Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala. October 22, 2019. Atentados contra periodistas en Huehuetenango.
Available at: https://twitock.com/APG_1947/tweet/1186778992168361984.
979 Canal Antigua. January 2, 2019. Esto sucedió con el periodista capturado durante incendio en Antigua Guatemala; elPeriódico. January 3,
2019. Inicia el año con agresión a periodistas; elEscuíntleco. January 3, 2019. Jorge Arriola, Lejos De Reducir Desastres, Ha Incendiado Un
Problema Entre Periodistas Y Policías En Antigua.
980United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
981elPeriódico. January 12, 2019. Decisiones de Morales generan manifestaciones; elPeriódico. January 15, 2019. Manifestaciones rechazan
decisiones contra la CICIG; CNN en español. January 12, 2019. Guatemala: protestas masivas ante la crisis de inconstitucionalidad del país;
TelesurTv. January 14, 2019. Protestan en Guatemala contra presidente Jimmy Morales.
982TelesurTv. August 8, 2019. Claves de la situación política y económica de Guatemala de cara a las elecciones; Resumen Latinoamericano.
June 16, 2019. Guatemala. Protestas por posible fraude en elecciones generales; El Universo/AP. August 6, 2019. Campesinos se toman las
calles de Guatemala para protestar contra el gobierno.
983 El Salvador/EFE. July 30, 2019. Protestas en Guatemala por pacto de asilo con Estados Unidos; telesurTv. August 6, 2019. Protestas en
Guatemala por pacto migratorio y fraude electoral
169
also expressed concern about the excessive use of force in a post-march celebration of the LGBTI Pride in
Guatemala on July 21984.
715. At the beginning of the year, Guatemala continued to experience a climate of tension due to the
numerous protests in different parts of the country in favor and against the decision of President Jimmy Morales
to terminate the mandate of the CICIG and the decision of the Constitutional Court to suspend government
measures in that area. Against this backdrop, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle
Bachelet, called on the Government to guarantee the rights to protest and freedom ofexpression985.
716. On the other hand, within the context of the state of exception decreed by the Government in September
in northwestern regions of Guatemala, the IACHR observes that the rights of assembly and protest were
restricted for aperiod of 30 days986. The Office of the Special Rapporteur received information that soldiers from
the Guatemalan army had assaulted two journalists from El Estor,in Izabal.In this regard, the Attorney General’s
Office for Human Rights would have requested “the Guatemalan Army to instruct soldiers so that their action
protocols are developed within the framework of respect for human rights and the exercise of journalistic
work”987. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur expresses its concern about the raid of the Xyaab
’Tzuultaq’a community radio station by the Attorney General’s Office, police, and military personnel of El Estor,
Izabal,where the State of Siege is stillin force, and confiscated its equipment988. Also,in October President Jimmy
Morales presented a motion to Congress to extend the State of Siege for 30 days, which was finally ratified for
22 municipalities on October 10989.
717. The IACHR urges the State to guarantee and protect the right to freedom of expression and peaceful
protestsfor all persons living in the country, as well as to facilitate these rights being exercised in accordance
with the principles of a democratic society.
718. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool to defend human rightsand it is
essential for political and social critical expression ofauthorities’activities. The Commission has pointed out that
“it is inadmissible, in principle, the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads when they are
carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right to assembly”990 and that
“the exercise of the right to assembly through social protestmust not be subject to authorization by the
authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder carrying it out”991.
719. Likewise, the Joint declaration on violence against journalists and media workers in the context of
protests, adopted in 2013, indicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental,
and guaranteeing them is a vital condition to the existence and proper functioning of a democratic society. A
State may impose reasonable limitations on demonstrations for purposes of ensuring that they are conducted
peacefully, or to disperse those that turn violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of
legality, necessity, and proportionality. In addition, the breaking-up of a demonstration must be warranted by
the duty to protect individuals, and authorities must use the measures that are safest and least harmful to the
demonstrators. The use of force at public demonstrations must be an exception, used under strictly necessary
circumstances consistent with internationally recognizedprinciples”992.
E. Protection mechanisms
720. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur observe as one of its main concerns the lack of
progress in the completion of a protection mechanism for the prevention and protection of communicators and
media, through the articulation of mechanisms that allow a safe environment for journalism. The Office of the
Special Rapporteur has also followed up with special concern the lack of support to the Prosecutor Unit for
Crimes against journalists of the Attorney General’s Office, who is responsible for investigating several murders
of journalists993.
984 IACHR. August 7, 2019. Press Release 196/19 IACHR Concerned about Excessive Use of Force by Police against LGBTI Persons in
Guatemala.
985 Noticias ONU. January 14, 2019. Bachelet exhorta al Gobierno de Guatemala a garantizar las libertades democráticas.
986 TelesurTv. September 5, 2019. Guatemala decreta estado de sitio por asesinato de militares; Prensa Libre. September 4, 2019. Qué significa
estado de Sitio en Guatemala.
987Publinews. September 11, 2019. Periodistas denuncian agresiones de soldados durante estado de Sitio.
988 El Periódico. September 30, 2019. Relator de la CIDH condena allanamiento a radio comunitaria Izabal.
989elPeriódico. October 8, 2019. Gobierno insiste en instaurar Estado de Sitio en 20 municipios del país; Sonora/EFE. October 10, 2019. El
Congreso de Guatemala ratifica el estado de sitio al nororiente del país.
990 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
991IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
992United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
993 Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala. July 13, 2019. Retroceso en el Ministerio Público, MP, en las investigaciones de delitos contra
periodistas. Available at: https://twitock.com/APG_1947/tweet/1154774871001436160; Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala.
September 18, 2019. La Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala APG y su Comisión de Libertad de Prensa ante los inusitados cambios en la
170
721. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have defined some of the requirements for the
protection mechanisms to be effective. For example, it has recommended placing emphasis on: 1) the
importance of guaranteeing the necessary personnel and financial resources for the adequate implementation
of the mechanism; 2) the need to ensure effective coordination among the entities responsible for the
implementation of measures of prevention, protection, and prosecution; 3) the need to adequately define
protective measures called for in the mechanism and the procedure for their adoption; 4) the need to guarantee
the full participation of journalists, civil society, and beneficiaries in the implementation and operation of the
mechanism; and 5) the benefits of seeking support from the international community for the mechanism’s
operation994.
F .Stigmatizing statements
722. The Office of the Special Rapporteur identifies in Guatemala a tendency to stigmatize journalists and
critical media against the Government that stems from the highest authorities995, which puts at risk the free
exercise of journalistic work and undermines the obligation to “adopt a publicspeech that contributes to the
prevention of violence against journalists”996. Of particular concern to this Office is the disqualification by
President Jimmy Morales against the director of La Hora, Oscar Clemente Marroquín, expressing that his activity
and that of his family is "unfair", "cowardly", and "illegal", and that he would attack the media in the same way
the media has attacked his government, by "telling lies”997.Likewise, the president has spoken against
Guatevisión, Prensa Libre, and Emisoras Unidos, calling them "liars, cowards, andridiculous”998.
723. On April 12, during a speech given in Chimaltenango in the context of supervising a public construction,
President Jimmy Morales said,“… I want to thank the Congress of the Republic. Look, making a road today is not
like inUbico's time. I would like to have the laws of Ubico to be able to do the construction work, of course, we
will not have them because today we are a democratic country, a country where we have a beautiful freedom,
but freedom must be taken care of. Freedom should not be abused. Some are shielded by the free expression of
thought to tell lies, raise slander, and the worst thing is that they do it under the great name of journalism and
the defense of human rights, cowards. And I do admire the true journalists and I do admire those who have the
courage to tell the truth, to seem wrong even when they are told otherwise. I admire those, but those who make
political booklets telling all kinds of lies, not caring even about breaking and destroying homes, as they have no
family, as they do not value family, as they do not know what it is to educate a child through example, maybe
they can take out those frustrations”999.
724. The existence of a context of marked confrontation, in which there are constant disqualifications and
stigmatization, creates a climate that prevents a reasonable and plural deliberation on all public affairs. While it
is true that the tension between the press and governments is a normal phenomenon that derives from the
natural function of the press, which happens in many States, it is also true that an acute polarization closes the
spaces for calm debates and it does not helps neither the authorities nor the press to better fulfill their role in a
vigorous, deliberative, and open democracy. In these cases, it is the State's task, given its national and
international responsibilities, to contribute to a climate of greater tolerance and respect for the ideas of others,
even when they are offensive or disturbing1000.
725. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls thatpublic officials have a duty to ensure that with
their statements they are not damaging the rights of those who contribute to public deliberation through the
expression and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media, and human rights defenders
organizations, and must pay attention to the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their
Fiscalía de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio Público (MP), especialmente en la Unidad Fiscal de Delitos contra la Prensa. Available at:
https://twitock.com/APG_1947/tweet/1171855607000948736
994 IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 81; IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Office of the
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II: 2010 Special Report on Freedom of Expression in Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
5. March 7, 2011. Para. 712.
995Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala (APG). Estado de Situación de Libertad de Expresión. January - March 2019. Available at:
https://twitock.com/APG_1947/tweet/1124397305380122624; La Hora. July 3, 2019. Cabrera arremete contra la prensa por compra de
aviones; elEconomista. April 24, 2019. El vicepresidente de Guatemala arremete contra la prensa por las críticas al Gobierno; El Universo.
September 2, 2019. El presidente de Guatemala, Jimmy Morales, arremete contra periodistas; La Hora. June 5, 2019. Con Criterio denuncia al
MP campaña de difamación.
996United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests..
997 La Hora. July 18, 2019. Morales ataca de nuevo a La Hora; vamos a arremeter con mentiras, dice; La Hora. July 19, 2019. PDH y Samayoa:
Declaraciones de Morales contra La Hora podrían constituir delito.
998 Crónica. September 2, 2019. De nuevo, Jimmy Morales se muestra molesto con la prensa por información que publica; LaHora. September
2, 2019. Morales critica a los medios, arranca con “La Hora” y llama cobarde a su Presidente.
999Guatevisión/YouTube account. April 12, 2019. Jimmy Morales arremete contra la prensa y dice que anhela tener las leyes de Ubico. [1:47].
1000 IACHR. Annual Report 2014. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of
the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 13. March 9, 2015. Para. 65.
171
expressions do not constitute, in the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or injurious
pressure on the rights of those who intend to contribute to public debate through the expression and diffusion
of their thoughts”1001.
G. Subsequent liabilities
726. Of particular concern to the Office of the Special Rapporteur is the criminal complaint filed by President
Jimmy Morales in 2018 against a person who published a video on social networks in that year in which he
personally confronted the President at the time when passing through the corridor of a hotel in the Capital, and
expressed himself with offensive words and hard questions. According to the information, the case continued
during 2019 and would have been dismissed in the first instance on March 21 by the Twelfth Criminal Judgment
Court1002; However, this decision would have been appealed by the Attorney General's Office and on May 30 the
president appeared in court to continue with the complaint1003. Said court would have declared itself
incompetent and would have sent the case to Criminal Management for it to indicate the competent court1004.
On June 12, a court had reportedly been appointed to hear the case1005. This Office notes that this judicial action,
aimed at setting a precedent to inhibit any offensive criticism on the Internet, is incompatible with the exercise
of freedom of expression.
727. Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “privacy
laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and dissemination of information of public interest. The
protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in those cases in which
the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private person who has voluntarily become involved
in matters of public interest. In addition, in these cases, it must be proven that in disseminating the news, the
social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that false news was disseminated,
or acted with gross negligence inefforts to determine the truth or falsity of such news.”
728. Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: “[p]ublic
officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information". In
addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to sanction expressions related to
public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as information or expression on
matters of public interestand violates the right to freedom of expression1006.
H. Legal reforms
729. Under the climate of growing tension in Guatemala over measures taken by the Government and
complaints by human rights organizations in a context of persecution and lack of protection, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur received information on an initiative in February that aims reform the Law of NonGovernmental Organizations. According to the information, it would be sought to increase the responsibilities
of the members in relation to the obligations of the association, which would represent a potential economic
asphyxiation and the dismantling of incentives to create associations1007. It establishes,as well,excessively
formal requirements for registration and recognition. of organizations1008. According to public information, the
initiative went through a first debate on May 2 and a second debate on May 3. At the close of this report, a third
debate for the approval of the law would bepending1009.
I. Freedom of expression in electoral context
730. In the context of the presidential elections in Guatemala, which took two rounds of elections, the first
on June 16 and the second on August 11, 2019 in which President Alejandro Giammattei was elected, the Office
1001 I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
1002Publinews. March 21, 2019. Desestiman denuncia de Jimmy Morales contra un hombre que lo insultó; Panorama. March 22, 2019.
Desestiman denuncia presentada contra hombre que ofendió a Jimmy Morales.
1003Publinews. March 21, 2019. Desestiman denuncia de Jimmy Morales contra un hombre que lo insultó; Panorama. March 22, 2019.
Desestiman denuncia presentada contra hombre que ofendió a Jimmy Morales; Soy505/YouTube account. May 30, 2019. Jimmy Morales y el
caso contra el hombre que lo insultó. [6:23].
1004 Prensa Libre. May 30, 2019. Jimmy Morales insiste en demanda contra ciudadano que lo habría insultado; Nómada. May 30, 2019. Resumen
del día: Jimmy quiere respeto (y enjuiciar a un activista).
1005Publinews. June 12, 2019. Designan Juzgado para conocer denuncia del presidente Morales contra un ciudadano;CRN Noticias. June 13,
2019.Gestión Penal designa juzgado para conocer denuncia presidencial
1006IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions
and Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015.
1007elPeriódico. February 13, 2019. Adversan reformas previstas para Ley de ONG; FIDH. February 13, 2019. GUATEMALA: No a la
aprobación de la iniciativa 5257 por amenazar la libertad de asociación.
1008 Noticias ONU. March 6, 2019. Guatemala: Alta Comisionada preocupada por un proyecto de ley que acotaría a las ONG; FIDH. February
13, 2019. GUATEMALA: No a la aprobación de la iniciativa 5257 por amenazar la libertad de asociación.
1009 República de Guatemala. Congreso. Iniciativa 5257. March 14, 2017.
172
of the Special Rapporteur issued a press releaseon June 12 whereby the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala
(OHCHR-Guatemala) expressed concern about attacks against the media and independent journalists, a
situation that had increased as the June 16 elections approached1010.
731. Through the statement, both offices called on the State of Guatemala to guarantee freedom of expression
and access to information so thatpeople can exercise their right toparticipate in the electoral process. Likewise,
it was observed that in accordance with the mandate of the OHCHR-Guatemala, cases of stigmatization,
defamation, hacking of accounts, and even criminalization of journalists were documented, both in social
networks and in statements of the candidates1011.
732. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur and OHCHR-Guatemala condemned the use of
discriminatory, sexist, or hate speech againstpeople or groups, including against candidates, journalists, and the
media, as well as messages that incite violence, which seriously affect freedom of expression and participation
in the electoral process1012.
733. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur documented worrying situations such as the initiative of
the Supreme Electoral Court [Tribunal Supremo Electoral] (TSE) to regulate the content of interviews with
candidates in programs or events of mass visualization, through a “Regulation for the organization of debates,
interviews, and public forums between candidates in the electoral process ”published on March 51013. However,
the aforementioned document was repealed on March 12 by Agreement No. 115-2019 of thesame Court1014.
734. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur learned of the legal action presented in May by the then
candidate Sandra Torres against a group of publishers of elPeriódico under the Law against Femicide, seeking
that the media stop publishing about her. Although the conviction was rejected in the first instance, an appeal
court granted the claim. Subsequently, the candidate would have withdrawn the action. In July, an investigation
against the judges who supported the measure would have been initiated1015.
735. Also, this Office was informed about a complaint by the media Relatoin which it indicated that a series
of articles published on social networks about candidates were taken down due to complaints about alleged
defamatory content of the publications1016.
736. The Association of Journalists of Guatemala [Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala] (AGP) published a
statement on the context of attacks on journalistsmonitoredduring the electoral period, emphasizing that “the
days before and during the elections were the dates when more assaults against communicators occurred” with
23 attacks three days before the first round of elections and 72 hours later1017. In the first round report,
aggressions such as obstruction of sources, intimidation, defamation, censorship, cyber-attacks, and verbal
aggression, were recorded; and those responsible were identified as politicians, settlers, political parties,
security forces, authorities, and unknown individuals1018.
737. Finally, the Office of the Special Rapporteur takes note of a decision by the Constitutional Court in which
it decided that the electoral polls can be published 36 hours before the elections1019.
738. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that “[e]lectoral processes are closely linked to freedom of
expression and information, since in order for citizens to carry out their decisions at the time of voting it is
essential that they have as much information aspossible. For this, it is crucial facts, ideas, and opinions circulate
freely. Without a doubt, the most common way for citizens to inform themselves today is through mass
media”1020.
1010 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. June 12, 2019. Press Release R147/19 Guatemala: Freedom of expression
and the media’s role are crucial to guaranteeing free and transparent elections this June 16.
1011IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. June 12, 2019. Press Release R147/19 Guatemala: Freedom of expression and
the media’s role are crucial to guaranteeing free and transparent elections this June 16.
1012 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. June 12, 2019. Press Release R147/19 Guatemala: Freedom of expression
and the media’s role are crucial to guaranteeing free and transparent elections this June 16.
1013Acuerdo 99-2019 of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral. March 5, 2019. Available at: https://www.relato.gt/acuerdo-99-2019.pdf
1014 Acuerdo N° 115-2019 of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral. March 12, 2019. Available at:
http://ojs.uc.cl/index.php/bjur/article/download/891/1813/
1015 Prensa Libre. May 9, 2019. Sandra Torres denuncia por femicidio a 6 editores de “elPeriódico”. Impacto. May 10, 2019. Sandra Torreslogra
frenar publicaciones en su contra argumentando femicidio; Perspectiva. May 14, 2019. #No nos callarás ¿El #No te toca de Sandra Torres?;
Soy505. May 19, 2019. Sandra Torres habla y justifica sus acciones contra elPeriódico; Prensa Libre. July 27, 2019. Presentan antejuicio contra
magistrados que avalaron restricciones a “elPeriódico” a favor de Sandra Torres.
1016 Relato. Partido Humanista de Mulet intenta silenciar investigaciones de sus candidatos.
1017 Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala (AGP). Agresiones a Periodistas durante elecciones 2019 (Informe final del Centro de Monitoreo
Electoral de la Asolación de Periodistas de Guatemala). Available at: https://twitock.com/APG_1947/tweet/1171855338104078337
1018 Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala (AGP). Report by the Centro de Monitoreo Electoral of the Asociación de Periodistas de
Guatemala APG. First Electoral Round – June 16, 2019. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1di7wRmxTOBHV34MgGq3-
KHjDer1wId4z/view
1019Publinews. April 25, 2019. Encuestas electorales podrán ser publicadas 36 horas antes de las votaciones;
1020 IACHR. Annual Report 2005. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI Freedom of
Expression and the Electoral Process: The Case of Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 77 February, 2006. Para. 2..
173
J. Access to public information
739. According to the information sent by the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience [Coalición
Internacional de Sitios de Conciencia] to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, a series of worrisome decisions that
affect the operation and mission of the Historical Archive of the National Policeof Guatemala [Archivo Histórico
de la Policía Nacional de Guatemala] (AHPN) are noted, particularly due to potential threats related to the
maintenance of the infrastructure of the Archive, announcements of reforms that would seek to limit access to
information for “reasons of national security”, andpossible institutional direction by the Police, as well as threats
to initiate criminal actions for allegedillegalities carried out1021.
740. Related to this context, the Office of the Special Rapporteur learned of a statement issued on May 28 by
the Ombudsman Office in which the importance of access to information to historical archives linked to human
rights is pointed out, and indicates that said files "should notbe classified as sensitive, nor can be restricted,
[since] they are at the service of individuals and families seeking justice”1022.
741. Likewise, in the context of the government's decision on the role of the General Archive of Central
America [Archivo General de Centroamérica] (AGCA), the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur learned
of the dismissal of the director of AGCA, Anna Carla EricastillaSamayoa, and the initiation of an action criminal
for alleged embezzlement and administrative irregularities against her. According to the information available,
the dismissal would have occurred because the former director granted permission for a series of digitized
documents from the National Police Historical Archive (AHPN) to be sent outside the country1023.
742. During the on-site visit in 2017, the IACHR went to the facilities of the National Civil Police Archive, and
expressed the importance that it has in the reactivation and clarification of some criminal proceedings for
serious human rights violations related to the internal armed conflict and its contribution to the recovery of
historical memory. During this visit, the IACHR learned that the Archive depends solely on international
cooperation. The IACHR urged the State to allocate resources and support this measure for memory, truth, and
justice1024.
743. With regards to cases of refusals by authorities to deliver information, the Office of the Special
Rapporteur documented a criminal complaint and the beginning of a process in May, against the mayor of Todos
Santos Cuchumatán, Andrés Mendoza Calmo, for not providing information requested by civil society1025.
744. Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR establishes that
“[a]ccess to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation
to guarantee the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only exceptional limitations that must be
previously established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in
democratic societies.” Taking into account the principle of maximum disclosure, the law must guarantee the
most effective and widest possible access to public information, and exceptions should not become the general
rule in practice. In addition, the exceptions regime must be interpreted restrictively, and any doubt must be
resolved by transparency and access.
K. Internet and freedom of expression
745. In its annual report of 2018, the Office of the Special Rapporteur learned about the so-called “netcenters”
that would operate in Guatemala. This term seeks to describe contexts where people are hired for the
dissemination of false news and the creation of profiles on social networks that seek to attack and disseminate
distorted information1026.
746. The IACHR expresses special concern about the content of the “Bots, Netcenter, and Fight against
Impunity” report prepared by CICIG, which describes the use of social networks to attack civil society leaders,
journalists, prosecutors of the Attorney General’s Office, and members of the International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala with the objective of discrediting these individuals and investigations related to acts of
corruption.
747. In this sense, the report concludes about a series of challenges "regarding the regulation of
dissemination of content on social networks and, especially, on the dissemination of false news" in the face of
1021 Letter from the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience addressed to the IACHR and the Office of the Special Rapporteur. June 4,
2019. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion..
1022 República de Guatemala. Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos. May 28, 2019. Press release 49/19.
1023elPeriódico. July 10, 2019. Cultura destituye a directora del Archivo General de Centro América; Prensa Libre/EFE. July 11, 2019. Tras su
destitución, exjefa del Archivo General de Centroamérica teme por futuro de acervo policial; Sonora. July 7, 2019. Gobierno de Guatemala
destituye a jefa del Archivo General de Centroamérica.
1024 IACHR. Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 43/15. December 31, 2015. Para. 137..
1025 República. May 23, 2019. Alcalde será investigado por no cumplir Ley de Acceso a la Información. Prensa Libre. April 9, 2019. Alcalde de
Todos Santos Cuchumatán en el banquillo por negar información pública; Impacto. May 23, 2019. Alcalde de Todos Santos Cuchumatán es
ligado a proceso penal.
1026IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II(Evaluation of the State
of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019. Para. 638
174
"evidence [of] a process of artificial legitimization of accounts that without belonging to real people, that begins
to build instances of public opinion that do not faithfully represent the population”1027.
L. Diversity and pluralism
748. Aspart of the visit by the Office of the Special Rapporteur in May, this office noted a series of complaints
that point to acts by state agents that would seek to initiate administrative and criminal proceedings, and other
types of harassment, in cases of alleged illegal use of frequencies1028.
1027 Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Informe Bots, Netcenter y Combate a la Impunidad. Caso Guatemala.
May 2019. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.
1028Information shared by community radios and journalists with the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression on May 21,
2019. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
175
19. GUYANA
749. The government of Guyana announced in 2018 that it would work to reduce penalties for the crime of
defamation still in force in the legal system. however, during 2019, multiple complaints would have been filed
for this figure. In this context, the Minister of Public Telecommunications sued the news site Stabroek News and
its columnist Anand Goolsarran, for alleged defamation regarding an investigation into conflicts of interest and
corruption. The top lawyer of the government of Guyana also used the defamation figure to sue the Kaieteur
News newspaper regarding allegedly wrong information that would have been rectified. According to
information received by this office, the government of Guyana would be using the allocation of government
advertising as a tool to reward and punish the media according to its editorialline.
A. Subsequent liability
750. Although the government of Guyana announced in 2018 that it would work to decrease the penalties
for defamation, there is no indication that it has done so to date.On the contrary, during 2019 there have been
multiple complaints alleging defamation.
751. On April 17,Public Telecommunications Minister Catherine Hughes filed a defamation suit against the
news site Stabroek Newsand its columnist Anand Goolsarran. The legal action was based on a publication in
which the columnist wrote that Hughes had allegedly violated the Integrity Commission Act due to the fact that
her company had received a contract from the Energy Department.1029According to reports, Minister Hughes
also sent a letter on April 16 toopposition leader Whip Gail Texeira, threatening to take legal action against her
over statements she had made concerning the same issue.1030
752. In addition, newly appointed Senior Counsel Rajendra Nath Poonaisued the newspaper Kaieteur News
for defamation,based on a May 23 article reporting that the attorney had been convicted of fraud in Canada. The
paper published an apology the next day, because it had confused the attorney with someone else.1031 According
to available information, Judge Fidela Corbin-Lincoln ruled inPoonai’s favor, ordering Kaieteur News to retract
the publication and abstain from disseminating that information in the future. The judge also scheduled a
hearing to assess damages for October 10.1032 However, as of the date of this report, there is nopublicly available
information about that hearing.
753. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, as stated in Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression, “The protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil
sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private person who
has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest. In addition, in these cases, it must be proven that
in disseminating the news, the social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that
false news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the truth or falsity of such
news.”
754. With respect to potential civil liability, the Inter-American Court has held that civil judgments in the
area of freedom of expression must be strictly proportionate so as not to have a chilling effect on this freedom,
since “the fear of a civil penalty, considering the claim […] for a very steep civil reparation, may be, in any case,
equally or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression than a criminal
punishment, since it has the potential to attain the personal and family life of an individual who accuses a public
official, with the evident and very negative result of self-censorship both in the affected party and in other
potential critics of the actions taken by a public official.”1033
B. Government advertising
755. According to the information gathered by this Office of the Special Rapporteur, the government of
Guyana is using the allocation of official government advertising as a political tool.For instance, it has been
reported that in recent monthsthe Guyanese government has markedly reduced the number of advertisements
taken out in Stabroek Newsas compared to other newspapers in thecountry.1034
1029StabroekNews. April 18, 2019. MinisterHughessues StabroekNews, Goolsarran;StabroekNews. May 5, 2019.“Don’tshootthe messenger”;
Stabroek News. April 23, 2019. Guyana courts, CCJ likely to uphold progressive view of fair comment on public interest matter – Ramkarran.
1030I News Guyana. April 18, 2019. Minister Hughes threatens legal act against Teixeira;Stabroek News. April 23, 2019. Guyana courts, CCJ
likely to uphold progressive view of fair comment on public interest matter – Ramkarran;Kaieteur News. April 19, 2019. Minister Cathy Hughes
is asking Gail Teixeira to apologize.
1031Stabroek News. June 1, 2019. Senior Counsel files $45M lawsuit over erroneous Kaieteur News report;Demerara Waves. May 30, 2019.
Senior Counsel Poonai files GYD$45m libel suit against Kaieteur News.
1032Stabroek News. September 18, 2019. Senior Counsel wins judgment against Kaieteur News in libel suit; Guyana Chronicle. September 18,
2019. Court awards judgement against KN.
1033 I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009.
Serie C No. 193, Para.129.
1034Stabroek News. November 1, 2019. Govt’s press freedom assault on SN continuing; Caribbean Life News. November 21, 2019. Guyana ads
dispute spills into Barbados paper.
176
756. PresidentDavid Grangeraccounted for this situation in a November 1 interview with radio
stationKaiteur,maintaining that advertising should be “directed to the media houses based on their willingness
to disseminate news fairly.”1035
757. Different media outlets in the region includingTrinidad ExpressandBarbados Nationhave considered this
“an attack on press freedom,” contending that it is “government retaliation against independent journalism.”
They also asked the Granger administration to reconsider its actions and “demonstrate its commitment topress
freedom.”1036
758. The government, through a statement by Director of Public InformationImran Khan, accusedStabroek
Newsof becoming a political supporter and party mouthpiece of A New and United Guyana. It also said that the
information published by the newspapersTrinidad ExpressandBarbados Nationwas false, stressing that during
the month of October23 different ministries, departments, and government agencies had placed 171 ads in
Stabroek News.
1037
759. This Office of the Special Rapporteur has established that, “Advertising funds must never be distributed
with discrimination—whether positive or negative—based on the editorial slant of the media outlet.”1038It has
clarified that, “Although the media have no intrinsic right to receive advertising funds (…) when a state allocates
such funds in discriminatory ways the right to freedom of expression isinfringed.”1039
760. In addition, Principle 13 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression states that, “the
arbitrary and discriminatoryplacement of official advertising (…) with the intent toput pressure on and punish
or reward and provide privileges to social communicators and communications media because of the opinions
they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited bylaw.”
1035Stabroek News. November 2, 2019. Granger says media houses should get state ads based on “fairness” of reportage; Stabroek News.
November 8, 2019.Ministry complains about SN editorial.
1036Trinidad Daily Express. November 14, 2019. President Granger’s threat to press freedom; Stabroek News. November 18, 2019. Trinidad
Express, Barbados Nation rap Granger administration for press freedom attack on SN; Trinidad Daily Express. November 10, 2019. The
president and “fairness” in the press.
1037Stabroek News. November 19, 2019. Gov’t criticises editorial in Trinidad Express, Barbados Nation on ads withdrawal; Trinidad Daily
Express. November 19, 2019. A political agenda.
1038 IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V Principles on the Regulation of
Government Advertising in the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 5. March 7, 2011. Para. 47
1039 IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V Principles on the Regulation of
Government Advertising in the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 5. March 7, 2011. Para. 49.
177
20. HAITI
761. The Special Rapporteur noted with concern the murder of journalists Petion Rospide and Nehemie
Joseph and the lack of identification and punishment of the perpetrators. Attacks against media and journalists
were also reported during 2019, which has raised doubts regarding the protection for the exercise of the
freedom to express expression in Haiti. Likewise, the Office of the special Rapporteur has registered the
excessive use of force at the moment of repressing and dispersing the protests that erupted due to the political
crisis and the corruption events linked to Petrocaribe, as well as the lack of statistics on deaths and detentions
in this context.
A. Impunity
762. The Office of the Special Rapporteur expresses its concern1040 about the disappearance of journalist
Vladjimir Legagneur, who disappeared on March 14, 2018, when documenting clashes between police and gangs
in the Grand-Revaine neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. According to different Haitian media reports, the police
have not given more information about the investigation of his case since March 13 when they announced that
his file was sent to the justice department. According to a report dated April 3, the Police announced the arrest
of two men who were found with Legagneur'sphone1041.
B. Murders
763. The Office of the Special Rapporteur condemned the murder of journalists Petión Rospide1042, on June
10 and of Nehemie Joseph1043 on October 10, both were shot dead by alleged unknown persons for reasons that
would be related to their journalistic activity.
764. According to public information, the host of Radio Sans Fin, Rospide would have been shot dead while
driving back to his home in an official vehicle of the radio station where he worked in Port-au-Prince. The 45-
year-old reporter had just finished his radio show that focused on corruption allegations against the government
of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse. President Moïse issued a statement on June 11, calling Rospide's death "an
atrocious act" and expressed his rejection of the attacks reported against localmedia.
765. On October 10, Radio Méga reporter Nehemie Joseph was found dead with bullet wounds in his private
vehicle in the town of Mirebalais, north-east of Port-au-Prince. Joseph would have published last September on
Facebook that he would have been threatened by politicians who accused him of inciting protests. In addition,
he would have let his relatives know about the recent threats he allegedly received1044. The work of this
journalist was characterized by expressing criticism of the government and often denouncing the
mismanagement of the political crisis by local authorities1045. According to public knowledge information,
Joseph would have been missing before his murder that occurred near Bayas Park when armed individuals
would have forced him into the trunk of his own vehicle, before fatally shooting him three times1046.
766. The Office of the Special Rapporteur calls on the State of Haiti to investigate,in a complete, effective, and
impartial manner, both crimes and others that are unpunished, to clarify their motives, and to judicially
determine the relationship they may have to journalistic activity and freedom of expression. It also calls to
implement prevention and guarantee measures for journalists who are at risk.
767. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that in accordance with Principle 9 of the Declaration of
Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, “[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to
social communicators, as well as the material destruction of communications media violate the fundamental
rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and
investigate such occurrences,topunish theirperpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
1040 IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. March 29, 2018. Press Release R71/18 Office of the Special
Rapporteur expresses its extreme concern over the disappearance of journalist Vladjimir Legagneur in Haiti, and urges the authorities to
take necessary measures to determine his whereabouts.
1041 VOA News. April 6, 2019. Haiti Police Arrest Suspects Who Say They Murdered Journalist Legagneur. IFEX. April 15, 2019. Violence against
journalists and impunity a constant in Haiti. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). September 14, 2018. Six months later, nothing known about
Haitian journalist’s disappearance.
1042 IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. June 14, 2019. Press Release R151/19 The Office of the Special
Rapporteur condemns the murder of journalist Petión Rospide and expresses its concern over the ongoing violence against journalists in the
framework of the public demonstrations’ coverage in Haiti . Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). June 13, 2019. Radio Sans Fin host Pétion
Rospide killed in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. June 11, 2019. Radio journalist killed in Haiti amid
protests against the country's president.
1043 CPJ. October 11, 2019. Radio Panic FM journalist found dead in Haiti following threats. Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas.
October 11, 2019. Radio journalist killed in Haiti amidst violent protests against country’s president.
1044 AP. October 11, 2019. Thousands of protesters in Haiti loot stores, battle police. Le Nouvelliste. October 10, 2019. Un journaliste tué par
balle à Mirebalais. Amnesty International. October 31, 2019. Haiti: Amnesty International verifies evidence of excessive use of force against
protesters.
1045 RSF. October 14, 2019. Another journalist murdered in Haiti. Knight Center. October 11, 2019. Radio journalist killed in Haiti amidst
violent protests against country’s president.
1046 Periodistas_Es. October 11, 2019. Periodistas asesinados en Haití: Néhémie Joseph. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). October 14, 2019.
Another journalist murdered in Haiti
178
768. In addition, in a joint statement of 2005, the Special Rapporteurs, of the IACHR and of the ACPHR,
affirmed that “[this kind of] crimes have a chilling effect on freedom of expression that increases when
governments do not investigate these crimespromptly or when the perpetrators are not prosecuted”1047.
C. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and the media and PublicProtest
769. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have repeatedly1048 expressed their concern about
the escalation of violence in the demonstrations andprotests inHaiti that have been takingplace since last 2018.
In this context, a Response Room for Timely and Integrated Coordination (SACROI) has also been installed to
monitor the situation1049.
770. According to information received by the IACHR, different attacks against journalists have been
recorded in Haiti in the context of demonstration coverage. Social protests started due to economic andpolitical
factors, centered on the rejection of President Moïse's mandate. In addition to the crisis unleashed following the
presentation of a report on the management of PetroCaribe funds in January this year regarding acts of
corruption by government authorities and other actors, there would also be shortage of fuels, and lack of energy
and food with episodes of violence generated by organized groups. In particular, during its 173rd Session, the
Commission received information from representatives of civil society organizations about the situation of
journalists and the lack of guarantee for their work1050.
771. According to public information, the reported aggressions would come both from the excessive use of
public force and also by armed groups linked to different political sides, that is to say, officialism and opposition,
who depending on the moment of social agitation instigate the population to the attend aprotest or alternatively
prevent them from attending.
772. On February 13, the correspondent journalist for the Reuters agency inHaiti, Robenson Sanon was shot
in the right arm and was injured while covering protests in Port-au-Prince. Sanon said that he could not identify
where the shot came from. According topublic information, Sanon was initially taken to the Hospital of the State
University of Haiti (HUEH), but the unit had no doctors or bandages available. Subsequently, the journalist was
transferred to Bernard Mevs Hospital, where he received care and was discharged the sameday1051.
773. In this context, the National Association of Media of Haiti (ANMH), the Association of Independent Media
of Haiti (AMIH), and the Association of Journalists of Haiti (AJH) issued a statement denouncing the lack of
protection and guarantees for the press staff during the protests in the country, indicating that in just one week
the protesters would have hit journalists, damaged press vehicles and tried to confiscate journalists’ work
equipment. In the same vein, they denounced the attack on the offices of the National Television of Haiti, also
reported cases of interference in the frequencies of the media and indicated that agents of the Haitian national
police would have threatenedcommunicators1052.
774. On June 9, two journalists from Radio Sans Fin (RSF) reported having been almost shot dead1053. To this
incident, other events are added, such as the one registered against the photographer of the Le Nouvelliste
newspaper, who was injured by rubber bullets. In addition, Radio Tele Ginen reporters were reportedly beaten
with stones and their cars were vandalized on Monday, June 10. Rospide, the murdered journalist, reported
these attacks through his radio program and also reported on the attack on two vehicles of Radio Tele Ginen by
groups of protesters. During the protest escalation recorded in June, other reporters injured were Michel
Dominique, Esdra Jeudy, and Richardson Jourdan of TNH08 and Le Nouvelliste's photojournalist, Lesly
Dorcin1054.
775. According to public information, on July 16, three unidentified people fired at the vehicle of journalist
and television political analyst of Tele Pacific and the newspaper Le National, Kendi Zidor1055, who had
previously denounced death threats after the publication of an editorialin the newspaper Le National, where he
1047 The ACHPR Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and the IACHR-OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. 2005.
Joint Declaration.
1048 1048 IACHR. February 13, 2019. CIDH expresa preocupación ante situación en Haití; IACHR. July 3, 2019. IACHR Concludes Visit to Haiti;
IACHR. October 11, 2019. IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression Concerned about Violence and Increased
Political Tensions in Haiti.
1049 IACHR. February 27, 2019. Concerned about Worsening Violence and Scarcity in Haiti, IACHR Unveils Plans for a Rapid and Integrated
Response Coordination Unit to Monitor the Situation.
1050 IACHR/Youtube. September 23, 2019. 173 Period of Sessions. Session on Haiti: violence in social protests. Reuters. December 11, 2019. El
caos se apodera de los suburbios de Haití, sumida en la peor violencia en años.
1051 Loop Haití. February 13, 2019. Haïti - Manifestation : le journaliste Robenson Sanon touché par balle. Knight Center for Journalism in the
Americas. February 18, 2019. Haitian journalist shot during protests against the government.
1052 Le Nouvelliste. February 14, 2019. Violences contre la presse: association de journalistes et patrons de médias protestent.
1053 Loop Haití. June 10, 2019. Haiti - Insécurité : Un journaliste de la RSF tué par balles.
1054 Acento. October 16, 2019. SIP condena asesinato de un segundo periodista en Haití este año.
1055 Le National. May 23, 2019. La justice menottée. Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. July 24, 2019. Journalist who received
threats survives shooting in Haiti’s capital. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). July 22, 2019. Haitian journalist Kendi Zidor survives
shooting attempt in Port-au-Prince.
179
criticized the handling of the Haitian authorities for investigations into the La Saline massacre, in which dozens
of people were allegedly tortured and killed in November 20181056.
776. On August 6, the journalist of the Loop Haiti agency, Luckson Saint-Vil, was attacked by unknown
persons with firearms, when he was going to his home in southern Haiti, reporting that the vehicle transporting
him would have been shot seven times. According to available information, Saint-Vil reported death threats to
the judicialpolice only a few days before the attack. The threats were made after the journalist won the Philippe
Chaffanjon Prize in June 2019 for a report on alleged links between violent gangs and authorities1057.
777. In this regard, the Secretary of State for Communications of Haiti has stated about this, on August 8, that
it condemned the increase in verbal and physical aggressions, as well as intimidation of Haitian journalists, and
would have regretted the slowness of judicial decisions1058.
778. According to information provided to this Office, on September 23, the graphic reporter of the AP
agency, Dieu Nalio Chery received an impact on the face by Senator Jean Marie Ralph Fethière, who shot
indiscriminately when he felt threatened at the doors of the Senate. Chery wore a helmet and a bulletproof jacket
that had “press” written, and was covering a ratification vote of the nominated Prime Minister Fritz William
Michel, accused of corruption1059.
779. On September 30, Radio Sans Fin (RSF) journalist Edmond Joseph Agenor was hit with a bullet in the
wrist when he was covering the clashes between protesters and the police in Port-au-Prince. According topublic
information, Joseph was visibly wearing a press badge, a life jacket, and a helmet. Different civil society
organizations reported that on several occasions the police would have used lethal weapons to disperse the
protests1060.
780. On November 11, the correspondent who was replacing Chery while he was recovering, AP agency
photographer Rebecca Rockwell, was injured by a bottle, again during demonstrations1061.
781. The IACHR was informed about the circulation of hate speech that constitutes incitement to violence
through radio broadcasts and social networks. These speeches would be exacerbating political polarization and
attacks against vulnerable groups. In this regard, the IACHR reiterates that in the face of examples of serious
crimes that have occurred due to the exacerbation of hatred against certain groups, the State must take the
necessary measures to respond to these discourses promoting human rights. In that sense, it also recalls that
Article 13.5 of the American Convention establishes that speech that incites violence for discriminatory reasons
is not protected, and when it can generate real and imminent violence,it can be sanctioned.
782. The media and journalists should, as appropriate, support effective systems of self-regulation, at the
level of specific media sectors (such as professional bodies) or at the level of individual media (public
ombudsmen or publishers), which include standards to promote the veracity of the news, among other things,
contemplating the right of rectification and/or reply in the case of incorrect events in the media. Likewise, the
media should evaluate the possibility of offering critical coverage of misinformation and propaganda as part of
their news services, which would be consistent with their surveillance role in society, especially during electoral
periods and debates on topics of public interest1062.
783. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly”
1063 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly to through socialprotest must not be subject to authorization
by the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its materialization”1064. Likewise, the 2013 Joint
Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social demonstrations indicates that the rights
of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and their guarantee is a necessary condition for
existence and functioning of a democratic society. A State may impose reasonable limitations on demonstrations
in order to ensure their peaceful development or disperse those that become violent, provided that such limits
1056 IACHR. November 22, 2019. A YearAfter La Saline Massacre, the IACHR Remains Concerned about the Ongoing Political and Institutional
Crisis inHaiti.
1057 CPJ. August 13, 2019. Journalist Luckson Saint-Vil survives shooting attack in southern Haiti. Loop Haití. August 6, 2019. Notre reporter
Luckson Saint-vil victime d’une attaque armée à Léogâne.
1058 Prensa Latina. August 8, 2019. Gobierno de Haití deplora aumento de ataques contra la prensa.
1059The Guardian. September 23, 2019. Haiti: photojournalist shot in face as senator opens fire outside parliament. La República. September
23, 2019. Senador de Haití dispara contra manifestantes: ‘’La defensa personal es un derecho sagrado”. BBC. September 24, 2019. Haiti senator
opens fire outside parliament, wounding two.
1060 Reuters. September 30, 2019. Haitian journalist shot in wrist in latest round of protests. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). October
1, 2019. Journalist Edmond Agenor Joseph shot by police in Haiti while covering protests. IJDH. November 14, 2019. CPJ and RSF Call on Haitian
Authorities to Investigate Attacks.
1061 Diario Libre. November 11, 2019. Centenares de opositores intentan llegar a casa del presidente de Haití.
1062 IACHR. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. May 3, 2017. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News",
Disinformation and Propaganda.
1063 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
1064 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
180
are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, andproportionality. In addition, dispersing a demonstration
must be justified in the duty of protection of people, and the safest and least harmful measures for protesters
should be used. The use of force in public demonstrations must be exceptional and in strictly necessary
circumstances in accordance with internationally recognizedprinciples”1065.
784. Likewise, Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR indicates
that “[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material
destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict
freedom of expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their
perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
D.Access to Information
785. Different human rights organizations, journalists, and human rights defenders have denounced the lack
of unreliable data and statistics from the State of Haiti which would hamper their work since they would not
have a real number of people killed since the conflict began, neither about the wounded, detained, nor about
police casualties1066.
1065United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion ofthe Rightto Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
1066 Connectas. December 12, 2019. Haití, ¿cómo salir de la crisis de corrupción y pobreza extrema?".
181
21. HONDURAS
786. During 2019 citizen protests took place in the country, promoted by the education and health unions
in various cities in Honduras, which were supported by broad sectors of the population. Although the
demonstrations developedpeacefully, there were also episodes of violence. The Office of the Special Rapporteur
noted with concern the excessive use of force by state security forces - police and military - in the repression of
protests, which resulted in deaths, detentions and injuries. On the other hand, the persistence of high levels of
violence against journalists and the impunity of most crimes continues to be a serious problem for the exercise
of journalism and the right to freedom of expression. During 2019, at least 6 murders of communicators were
reported that could be linked to the exercise of journalism, and that their material or intellectual authors have
not yet been identified. In addition, numerous communicators and journalists left the country due to threats
received. Also of particular concern was the persistence of the use of criminal law topunish communicators, the
sentence of 10 years imprisonment against a journalist for the commission of crimes of libel being particularly
serious.
A. Progress
787. On August 29, Congress formalized the decision to remove the articles related to crimes against honor
from the new Criminal Code approved in May - and which goes into effect on November 10. Thus, the provisions
on slander and insults were repealed and will be resolved as acivil justice matter. Likewise, Congressman Mario
Pérez, who presided over the commission that prepared the new criminal regulations, informed that those
articles that determined “some kind of responsibility for the media” would also be eliminated”1067. Local and
international journalistic organizations that had warned about the limitations on freedom of expression of such
provisions welcomed the decision1068. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the Office of
the Special Rapporteur, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras (OHCHR) had
expressed in a statement their concern over the aforementioned standards, which implied “disproportionate
restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of the press.” For their part, local organizations such as the
Association of Journalists of Honduras [Colegio de Periodistas de Honduras] had warned that these provisions
criminalized freedom of expression and of the press1069. However, other rules that preoccupied the Office of the
Special Rapporteurwould still remain in the text and could come into force. For example, the inclusion of the
crimes of “exploitation of secrecy or privileged information” and “espionage”, which could criminalize the
journalistic exercise, andthe inclusionof the crimes of “public disorders”, “meetings and illegal demonstrations”,
and “disturbance of order”, which could unduly criminalize the exercise of the right to peaceful demonstration
and freedom of expression1070.
788. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also considers it important that the protection mechanism for
journalists and human rights defenders has been maintained. According to information provided to this Office
by the General Directorate of the Protection System of the Secretariat of Human Rights of Honduras [Dirección
General del Sistema de Protección de la Secretaría de DerechosHumanos de Honduras], 215 people were
beneficiaries of protection measures as of August 30, 2019; 26 are social communicators, 146 are human rights
defenders; 15 justice operators; and 28 journalists. The protection mechanism has units for: Case Reception and
Immediate Reaction, Risk Analysis, Implementation and Monitoring, Prevention and Context Analysis, and a
Legal Technical Advice office. For the 2019 year, the budget allocation by the National Treasury Funds for the
protection program was 17,913,207 lempiras1071, which represented an increase of 20.5% in relation to the
budget allocated in 2018 (14,921,172 lempiras)1072.
B. Murders
789. On March 17, journalist Gabriel Hernández was murdered in the Nacaóme municipality, Valle
department. Hernández, 54, directed the program “El Pueblo Habla” of Valle TV. He was shot by two individuals
aboard a vehicle and died hours later in the hospital. The journalist, who also worked as a correspondent for
1067 Congreso Nacional. August 20, 2019. CN eliminará delitos contra el honor del nuevo Código Penal; La Prensa. August 20, 2019. Congreso
elimina los artículos que violentaban la libertad de expresión.
1068La Prensa. August 31, 2019. SIP aplaude eliminación de penas por injuria y calumnia del nuevo Código Penal; Committee to Protect
Journalists (CPJ). September 3, 2019. Honduras to drop criminal defamation from new penal code.
1069La Prensa. June 14, 2018. CPH exige derogar artículos lesivos a libertad de expresión; La Prensa. May 15, 2019. Nuevo código penal, un
golpe a los medios de comunicación dicen los expertos; Proceso Digital. May 25, 2019. Periodistas advierten riesgos en ejercicio de su profesión
frente a nuevo Código Penal; La Prensa. May 17, 2019. Colegio de Periodistas de Honduras pide declarar inconstitucional artículos que lesionan
la libertad de expresión.
1070IACHR. July 12, 2019. IACHR and OHCHR Express Concern over the Provisions of the Criminal Code in Honduras and Call for a Review in
Accordance with International and Inter-American Human Rights Standards.
1071Information supplied on September 11, 2019 by the Dirección General del Sistema de Protección of the Secretaría de Derechos Humanos
to the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expresion.
1072 Secretaría de Derechos Humanos de Honduras. El Mecanismo de Protección de las y los defensores de derechos humanos, periodistas,
comunicadores sociales y operadores de justicia, en cifras al 2018.
182
Radio Globo, was known for his strong criticism against the municipal mayor of Nacaóme and the congress
deputies of the department. According to available information, the journalist had been subjected to threats,
police attacks, andrefusals of information by municipal authorities, headed by the Mayor of Nacaóme1073. The
Office of the Special Rapporteur condemned the murder in a press release and called on the Honduran State to
fully, effectively, and impartially investigate the crime, clarify its motives, and judicially determine the
relationship it might have to journalistic activity and freedom of expression1074.
790. On July 5, television presenter Santiago Carvajal, a rights activist for the LGTBI community, was
murdered. The communicator would have been attacked with firearms by unidentified individuals in the city of
Puerto Cortés. He died hours later at the Mario Catarino Rivas Hospital in San Pedro Sula. Carvajal directed the
criticalprogram La Galaxia de Santy, on a local television channel. The motives of the crime would not have been
clarified yet1075.
791. On August 31, journalist and communicator Edgar Joel Aguilar, a correspondent for the national
television channel Canal 6 and the local television station Cable Mar TV, was murdered by a stranger who shot
him several times when he was in a barbershop, in La Entrada, Nueva Arcadia municipality, Copan department.
Aguilar coveredpolice news and, according to localpress, days before his death he had received threats through
social networks. The communicator would have made a complaint to the Police Investigation Directorate and
requested protection1076. According to the director of the National Protection Mechanism, Danilo Morales, the
program would not have been informed about the threats against the journalist1077. In previous years Aguilar
had already been the victim of attacks and threats1078.
792. OnNovember 1, journalist Buenaventura Calderón, one of the coordinators of the “Ecos de la Mosquitia”
news program, was killed on KupiaKumi Radio in Puerto Lempira. Calderón was shot to death with his wife,
María Calderón, who died hours later in the hospital. Calderón dealt with issues related to drug trafficking in the
area, corruption and was a defender of the human and territorial rights of mischievous peoples of that region.
According to police authorities, the causes of the murder of the communicator, who was also a merchant, and
his wife, are under investigation1079.
793. On November 21, the body of the communicator and television presenter of Channel 45 of Catacamas
(Olancho), Johana Alvarado, who had signs of abuse and head shots was found. The causes of the crime would
not have been clarified by the Honduran Police1080.
794. On November 25 in Puerto Cortés, department of Cortés, journalist José Arita was killed, who was
reportedly attacked with firearms by strangers when he left the facilities of Puerto Vision Channel 12, after
completing his program “La Hora de the truth". The Honduran Police security spokesman, Jair Meza Barahona,
reported that the murder may be related to Arita's journalistic work1081. The Office of the Special Rapporteur
notes with concern that this would be the sixth murder against presspersonnelin 2019 and urges the Honduran
State to investigate the cases in a complete, effective and impartial manner, clarify their motives and determine
the relationship they could have with the journalistic activity.
795. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has repeatedly indicated that the murder of journalists constitutes
the most extreme form of censorship and States have a positive obligation to identify and punish the
1073 Reporters Without Borders (RSF). March 19, 2019. Journalist murdered in southernHonduras, first this year; Univisión. March 18, 2019.
Asesinan a tiros al periodista hondureño Gabriel Hernández; Proceso Digital. March 17, 2019 Asesinan al periodista Gabriel Hernández en
Nacaome; Secretaría de Derechos Humanos de Honduras. Comunicado. March 20, 2019.
1074 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. March 3, 2019. Press Release R71/19 The Office of the Special Rapporteur
Condemns the Murder of Journalist in Honduras and Urges to Investigate Connection to Journalistic Activity.
1075El País. July 7, 2019. Asesinado un presentador de televisión hondureño integrante de la comunidad LGTBI; El Heraldo. July 6, 2019. Muere
comunicador social de la comunidad LGTBI tras ser atacado a balazos en Puerto Cortés; Telesur. July 7, 2019. Asesinan en Honduras a
comunicador social de la comunidad LGTBI.
1076La Prensa. August 31, 2019. Matan a balazos a corresponsal de televisión en una barbería de Copán; La Prensa September 19, 2019. Unesco
pide que se investigue asesinato de periodista hondureño; El Heraldo. August 31, 2019. Dentro de una barbería matan a un periodista
hondureño; IFEX. September 1, 2019. Asesinan al periodista Edgar Joel Aguilar en Honduras.
1077 Reporteros de Investigación. August 31, 2019. Director del Mecanismo de Protección: no fuimos informados de amenazas a muerte contra
periodista de Canal 6..
1078 CPJ. September 4, 2019. Cablemar TV reporter Aguilar shot dead in Copán, Honduras; El Heraldo. August 31, 2019. Dentro de una
barbería matan a un periodista hondureño.
1079 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. December 4, 2019. Comunicado de prensa R316/19. Relatoría Especial
condena asesinato de periodista José Arita en Honduras e insta a investigar relación con su actividad periodística; CPJ. November 6, 2019.
Asesinan al presentador de radio Buenaventura Calderón en Honduras; Notibomba. November 1, 2019. OACNUDH lamenta crimen de líder
opositor y su esposa en Honduras
1080 1080 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. December 4, 2019. Comunicado de prensa R316/19. Relatoría Especial
condena asesinato de periodista José Arita en Honduras e insta a investigar relación con su actividad periodística; Honduras TV.November 21,
2019. A escasas cuadras del Ministerio Público de Catacamas le quitan la vida a comunicadora social; Tiempo Digital. November 21, 2019.
Matan a comunicadora social mientras cubría noticias cerca del MP de Catacamas
1081 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. December 4, 2019. Comunicado de prensa R316/19. Relatoría Especial
condena asesinato de periodista José Arita en Honduras e insta a investigar relación con su actividad periodística; Comité para la Protección
de Periodistas. November 27, 2019. Asesinan al presentador de programa televisivo José Arita en Puerto Cortés, Honduras; El Heraldo.
November 25, 2019. Matan a disparos a comunicador social en Puerto Cortés.
183
perpetrators of these crimes. For this Office, it is essentialthat the State investigate, in a complete, effective, and
impartial manner, the murders of journalists and clarify their motives and judicially determine the relationship
they may have to journalistic activity and freedom of expression. The authorities should not rule outthe exercise
of journalism as a motive for murder and/or aggression before the investigation is completed. The omission of
logical lines of investigation or the lack of diligence in the collection of evidence in this regard can have serious
repercussions in the development of the processes in stages of indictment or trial. Not having completely
exhausted the logical lines of investigationfavors, above all, that intellectual authors cannotbe identified.
796. Adicionalmente, el principio 9 de la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión de la CIDH
señala que "[e]l asesinato, secuestro, intimidación, amenaza a los comunicadores sociales, así como la
destrucción material de los medios de comunicación, viola los derechos fundamentales de las personas y coarta
severamente la libertad de expresión. Es deber de los Estados prevenir e investigar estos hechos, sancionar a
sus autores y asegurar a las víctimas una reparación adecuada". Particularmente, en el caso de crímenes contra
periodistas y comunicadores sociales, la CIDH ha señalado que la impunidad contribuye a la autocensura de la
prensa.
C. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
797. Violence against journalists and the impunity of the perpetrators of attacks and threats, continues to
seriously affect the exercise of the right to freedom of expression in Honduras. According to the information
received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, several reporters were assaulted while doing their job1082. The
cameraman of the Une TV channel, IssacBuezo, was hit by a rubber bullet launched by members of the National
Police on January 27 when he was covering an operation against a protest of government opponents in
Tegucigalpa1083. The journalist Yeovany Villalobos, of Canal 11, would have been wounded in the eye by a stone
thrown during a confrontation between protesters and the Police, on May 1; Q'hubo TV cameraman Mike Lino
would have been injured in the leg1084. The journalist Melissa Hernández and her cameraman would have been
assaulted on June 28 by members of the National Police in Choluteca while they were covering the eviction in an
area known as the "Barrios Bravos”1085. The journalist Wenceslao Canales, host of the “Cuarto Poder” program,
on Canal 29, and a correspondent for Canal 11, would have received intimidating messages after reporting
critical situations at the “San Isidro” hospital in Tocoa, Colón department1086. Also, on August 5, the director of
the Police Investigation Directorate (DPI) would have attacked and snatched the journalist's cell phone, and
threatened to arrest him while he was covering a police act1087.
798. On September 1, the vehicle of journalist Miguel ÁngelTróchez would have been burned; in previous
days he had been the victim of extortion and death threats. The journalist, host of “Paradise TV” on Canal 24,
would have denounced the facts before the Police Investigation Directorate (DPI), and would have requested
protection from the National Protection Mechanism1088.
799. On September 26 in Tegucigalpa, an unidentified individual would have pointed a gun at journalist
Sandra Maribel Sánchez, a journalist for Radio Progreso, when she got out of her car and would have demanded
that she re-enter it. Another car would have approached at that time, and as a consequence the aggressor, who
was driving a motorcycle, would have fled. Sanchez considered that it was an act of intimidation that could be
linked to her critical reports about the Armed Forces and her allegations about government corruption. The
journalist had already received threats in 2018 due to herwork1089.
800. La Relatoría Especial recuerda que el principio 9 de la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de
Expresión de la CIDH señala que "[e]l asesinato, secuestro, intimidación, amenaza a los comunicadores sociales,
así como la destrucción material de los medios de comunicación, viola los derechos fundamentales de las
personas y coarta severamente la libertad de expresión. Es deber de los Estados prevenir e investigar estos
hechos, sancionar a sus autores y asegurar a las víctimas una reparación adecuada". Particularmente, en el caso
1082 Journalist César Omar Silva was reportedly assaulted by security forces of the Undersecretary of Security, Alejandra Hernández, when
he tried to interview her at Toncontín International Airport, in Tegucigalpa, on August 29. C-Libre. August 31, 2019. Seguridad de funcionaria
agrede a periodista; YouTube/Benjamín Cepeda Carranza. August 30, 2019. Agresión física con el periodista Cesar Silva.
1083C-Libre. January 27, 2019. Policía agrede a camarógrafo mientras cubría represión a protestas;
1084 Also, the director of Radio Progreso, Ismael Moreno, allegedly reported damage to the station's car. C-Libre. May 2, 2019. Ataques contra
la prensa y hacia manifestantes en movilización de 1ero de mayo.
1085Pasos de Animal Grande. July 16, 2019. Honduras en retroceso: Castigos por no seguir la agenda de Casa Presidencial; C-Libre. June 28,
2019. Policía Nacional dispara contra periodista y camarógrafo en Choluteca.
1086C-Libre. July 17, 2019. Periodista es amenazado por denunciar contaminación en hospital de Tocoa.
1087 Facebook account of W Radio. No date. W informa policía agrede a periodista; C-Libre. August 13, 2019. Jefe de la DPI impide cobertura y
amenaza a Periodista..
1088 Proceso Digital. September 1, 2019. Queman vehículo a periodista víctima de extorsión en Santa Bárbara; Tiempo Digital. September 1,
2019. Amenazan e incendian vehículo a comunicador social en Santa Bárbara; C-Libre. September 4, 2019. Amenazas, extorsión y quema de
vehículo sufrió periodista en Santa Bárbara.
1089 HCH Televisión Digital. September 26, 2019. La periodista Sandra Maribel Sánchez sufre un atentado; Committee to Protect Journalists
(CPJ). October 3, 2019. In Honduras, attacker holds gun to head of Radio Progreso anchor Sánchez. Radio Progreso. September 27, 2019.
Radio Progreso denuncia intento de secuestro contra periodista Sandra Maribel Sánchez.
184
de crímenes contra periodistas y comunicadores sociales, la CIDH ha señalado que la impunidad contribuye a la
autocensura de la prensa.
D. Social Protest
801. Intense protests developed during the year, which were repressed through indiscriminate and
disproportionate use of force1090. The armed forces alsoparticipated in the repression, in contradiction with the
inter-American standards on the matter.
802. In April, mass demonstrations began in Honduras to protest the approval of reforms to restructure the
healthand education systems,promoted by the Government. Initially the protests were led by groups of teachers
and doctors –through the Platform for the Defense of Health and Education - who rejected the reforms because
they understood that they would result in a privatization of services and the dismissal of public officials. Then
students and later transport groups and a sector of the National Police joined. The protests were widespread
and spread from the capital Tegucigalpa to several cities in the country. After the impact generated by the
protests, the Executive Branch repealed the reforms, but the demonstrations continued. The reaction of the
government to the protesters would have been the deployment of a severe repression1091, first with police, and
then military, which reportedly aggravated the intensity of the protests1092 and resulted in the death of at least
six people, more than 80 injured1093, and dozens of detainees1094. According to the organization Committee for
Free Expression [Comitépor la LibreExpresión] (C-Libre), from March 4 to June 25 there were at least 346
protests across the country1095.
803. On April 30, the Coalition against Impunity [Coalición contra la Impunidad](CCI), composed of more than
45 civil society organizations, published a statement in which it expressed its condemnation “of the context of
repression, persecution, and violence” unleashed by the government against peoples’demonstrations1096. On
July 15, more than 20 member organizations of the IFEX-LAC advocacy network expressed deep concern about
the situation of freedom of expression inHonduras1097.
804. On May 27, the Secretariat of State in the Security Office issued a statement regarding the call of the
Health and Education unions to continue the protests. The Secretariat indicated that its officials were
"authorized under the lawto evict protesters who persist in blocking the roads and those that with vandalism
destroy public and private property and endanger the physical integrity of the population." It also urged "all
sectors of society to resort to dialogue and avoid criminal actions." Organizations defending freedom of
expression questioned the content of the message, understanding that the Secretariat “stigmatizes social
protest” by defining it as “vandalism actions”1098. On June 9 during a television interview, security secretary
Julián Pacheco Tinoco would have threatened to detain protesters:"It doesn't matter who,it doesn't matter who
we have to go detain, we are going to do it”1099.
805. On June 19, a sector of the National Directorate of Special Forces of the National Police of Honduras
went on strike and ceased participating in security operations; while joining the claims of the Health and
Education unions for better working and salary conditions1100.
1090On February 11, a group of villagers from Yaguacire, a village of the Central District, who had blocked roads in protest of an unfinished
project to pave the access road to the village, were evicted by the National Police with tear gas. Proceso. February 11, 2019. Pobladores de
aldea Yaguacire se toman carretera del Sur, Policía los desaloja; Tiempo Digital. February 11, 2019. Honduras: Policías lanzan gaslacrimógeno
a pobladores de Yaguacire.
1091 An investigation by Amnesty International documented that during the protests security forces reportedly used firearms and
indiscriminately used less lethal weapons, such as tear gas or rubber bullets, injuring dozens of people. Amnesty International. July 5, 2019.
Honduras: Exercising the right to protest has a high cost for those who dare take to the streets; EFE. July 5, 2019. Amnistía Internacional
condena la "respuesta represiva" del Gobierno contra los manifestantes en Honduras
1092At the end of May a group of protesters set tires on fire at the main entrance of the US embassy in Tegucigalpa. El País. June 1, 2018. Las
protestas en la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Honduras, en imágenes; Al Jazeera. June 22, 2019. Honduras protestcrackdown: Fivethings to
know; EFE. June 22, 2019. Manifestaciones siguen enlutando a una Honduras en la que no cesan las crisis.
1093 El País. June 22, 2018. Al menos tres muertos en Honduras tras el despliegue del Ejército por la oleada de protestas; C-Libre. April 11,
2019. Asesinan a menor de edad en represión a protesta en Choluteca; BBC. June 22, 2019. Protestas en Honduras: al menos 3 muertos en las
movilizaciones en contra del gobierno de Juan Orlando Hernández; Infobae. June 21, 2019. Se agudiza la crisis en Honduras: nuevas protestas
dejaron al menos tres muertos; Amnesty International. July 5, 2019. Honduras: Exercising the right to protest has a high cost for those who
dare take to the streets.
1094C-Libre. April 30, 2019. Gobierno desata represión policial- militar contra Plataforma por el derecho a la Salud y Educación; C-Libre. May
27, 2019. Policías y Guardia Presidencial reprimen movilización de Plataforma por la Salud y Educación; C-Libre. May 22, 2019. Fuerza policial
reprime protestas en defensa de la Salud y Educación.
1095Amnesty International. July 5, 2019. Honduras: Exercising the right to protest has a high cost for those who dare take to the streets.
1096C-Libre. 30 de abril de 2019. Pronunciamiento: Frente al contexto de violencia desatada por el régimen de Juan Orlando Hernández.
1097IFEX. July 15, 2019. IFEX-ALC condemns repression and legal initiatives that undermine freedom of expression in Honduras.
1098Secretaría de Seguridad. Comunicado. May 27, 2019; C-Libre. May 28, 2019. Policía oficializa amenaza de continuar represión contra
manifestaciones en defensa de la Salud y Educación.
1099C-Libre. Militares y Policías agreden y levantan perfiles a la prensa y a defensores de DDHH.
1100 RT. June 20, 2019. "No vamos a reprimir más al pueblo": agitadas protestas antigubernamentales en Honduras mientraslos policías entran
en paro; Telesur. June 19, 2019. Policía de Honduras declara paro y protesta contra Gobierno de Hernández; ABC. June 21, 2019. Violentas
protestas en Honduras dejan dos muertos en medio de una huelga policial.
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806. On June 20, President Juan Orlando Hernández reported at a press conference that he ordered the
deployment of the Armed Forces to contain the protests and “guarantee the right to freedom of movement,
protection of private/public property, and of course the protection of the integrity of the population”1101. The
measure was approved by the National Defense and Security Council and was adopted after a day in which
protests intensified, with roadblocks, burning of tires in several cities in the country, and vandalizing
commercial premises.
807. In this context, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information about serious aggressions
committed by security forces against journalists and media workers covering the protests1102. In addition,
various reports of acts of violence and harassment against protesters and human rights defenders participating
in theprotests have been recorded1103. Thus, for example, Journalists Dina Paz and Bladimir Rivera, of CrTv Canal
51, would have been attacked by members of the Police with tear gas, while covering a mobilization in the
department of Choluteca, on April 211104.On April 27, members of the Special Forces Battalion and the National
Police would have launched tear gas against the participants of a mobilization in Tegucigalpa. Melvin Osorto,
leader of the protest movement and member of the Freedom and Refoundation Party [Partido Libertad y
Refundación] (LIBRE), was reportedly arrested by the police after denouncing the repression of the protesters
on Facebook1105. On May 30, during the coverage of a strike called by Health and Education unions in various
parts of the country, several journalists had suffered the theft of their equipment, physical attacks, and
insults1106. Cameraman Gerson Maldonado, of the Azteca Honduras television channel, would have been injured
after being hit by a tear bomb allegedly launched bypolice forces during the repression of a mobilization on May
271107. On May 30, a teacher who participated in the protests in his town was reportedly shot dead by National
Police agents, who had shot at the crowd. The bullet impact would have caused the loss of a kidney and would
have damaged his large intestine, transverse colon, and lung1108.
1101Twitter account of the President of Honduras Juan Orlando (@JuanOrlandoH). June 20, 2019; El Diario/EFE. June 21, 2019. Honduras
ordena despliegue militar y policial para proteger los DDHH en las protestas.
1102Metro TV journalist Marcelo Castellón was reportedly assaulted by members of the Police on April 29 while covering the mobilizations
called for by medical unions, teachers and students in the city of Choluteca. C-Libre. April 22, 2019. April 30, 2019. Ataques hacia la prensa
en manifestaciones por la defensa de Educación y la Salud en Choluteca. On April 30, journalist Alex Cáceres, of local channel Hable Como
Habla (HCH), was reportedly assaulted by riot police officers while covering a mobilization. C-Libre. May 1, 2019. Policías Antimotines
arremeten contra periodista de HCH. Journalist Leonardo Guevara, of Radio Progreso, was reportedly assaulted by members of the National
Police while covering a police operation against demonstrators of the Plataforma en Defensa de la Salud y Educación, in the municipality of
Tela. Twitter account of Leonardo Guevara (@leoguevara80). June 5, 2019; C-Libre. June 8, 2019. Periodista es agredido por enlace policial
que brinda medidas de protección. On June 4, the video equipment of Hispan Tv network journalist, Dassaev Aguilar, was reportedly
destroyed while covering a mobilization in Tegucigalpa. C-Libre. June 7, 2019. Infiltrados en movilización de Plataforma destruyen equipo a
Corresponsal de Hispan Tv. On June 11, journalist Leonardo Pineda and cameraman Jorge Núñez, of Canal 21, were reportedly harassed by
police while covering a demonstration. C-Libre. June 16, 2019. Periodistas continúan siendo víctimas de agresiones policiales en Choluteca. In
July, directors and journalists of Channel 6 reportedly filed a complaint with the Comisionado Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CONADEH)
due to the assualts allegedly suffered by media workers from members of the National Police while covering the demonstrations. The
journalists victims of police assault were Tania Elwin, Román Paz, Lily Valladares, Claudia Sosa, Paola Cobos and Kelin Chirinos. C-Libre. July
28, 2019. Canal 6 denuncia agresiones contra sus periodistas.
1103On April 9 a student protest at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH - CU), was reportedly repressed by the National
Police with tear gas. C-Libre. April 9, 2019. Coalición contra la Impunidad condena el uso de equipo militar para limitar lalibertad de expresión;
C-Libre. April 9, 2019. Fuerza policial arremete “por tierra y por aire” contra protesta estudiantil. On April 29, Riot Police members reportedly
threw tear gas bombs against the headquarters of the Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras (COFADEH). C-Libre.
April 30, 2019. Pronunciamiento: Frente al contexto de violencia desatada por el régimen de Juan Orlando Hernández. On May 22 protest
actions called for by the Plataforma por la Defensa de la Salud y la Educación were reportedly repressed by police forces in three parts of
the country, including a student mobilization which was reportedly repressed with tear gas bombs by the National Police and the Tropa de
Inteligencia y Respuesta Especial (TIGRES). C-Libre. May 22, 2019. Fuerza policial reprime protestas en defensa de la Salud y Educación. On
June 12, at the end of a demonstration called by the Plataforma por la Defensa de la Salud y la Educación in front of Toncontín International
Airport, members of the National Police and the Military Police of Public Order allegedly arrested protesters and assaulted members of the
press and human rights defenders. The media workers assaulted were Leonidas Maradiaga and Albert Palacios, from UNE Tv; Lilian Flores
and Aníbal Recarte, from Suyapa Tv; and MarvinOrtiz, from radio Globo. C-Libre.June 14, 2019. Militares y Policías agreden y levantan perfiles
a la prensa y a defensores de DDHH. Members of the C-Libre organization were also reportedly assaulted during a demonstration in May. CLibre. May 2, 2019. Policía agreden a equipo de C-Libre en represión a manifestaciones en la capital.
1104C-Libre. 22 de abril de 2019. Tercer ataque contra la prensa de Choluteca en abril.
1105C-Libre. April 28, 2019. Represión a últimas protestas en la capital este fin de semana y dejan un detenido; Pasos de Animal Grande. May 3,
2019. Incontrolable la brutalidad policial contra manifestantes.
1106Journalists from canal UNE Tv, Leonidas Maradiaga and Víctor Rodríguez, were threatened and assaulted by members of the Military
Police of the Public Order while recording the arrest of a young man. Jonathan Henríquez, the cameraman of Panorama Cultural e
Informativo (PCI), a Canal 51 show, and journalist Andrés Molina were assaulted with blows and tear gas. Radio Globo correspondent Sandra
Pérez was affected by tear gas thrown by the police force; journalists Wilfredo Zepeda and Fabricio Garibaldi, of Radio Globo and Canal 51
were threatened by police personnel; Alex Martínez, from UNE Tv, was beaten by members of the Police and denounced the theft of his
informative material; journalists Roger Corrales and Nathalia Reynoth, from Viva Tv channel, were chased by a police patrol after they
recorded tear gas bombs thrown against a demonstration. Journalists JavierHidalgo, from Televida, and Leonardo Pineda, from Prensa Libre,
were also victims of police assault. C-Libre. May 30, 2019. Periodistas son víctimas de agresión policial en manifestaciones en defensa de la
Salud y Educación.
1107 Tiempo. May 27, 2019. Policías usan gas contra manifestantes cerca de Casa Presidencial; Pasos de Animal Grande. July 16, 2019. Honduras
en retroceso: Castigos por no seguir la agenda de Casa Presidencial; C-Libre. May 27, 2019. Policías agreden a camarógrafo mientras cubría
manifestación de Salud y Educación.
1108Amnesty International. July 5, 2019. Honduras: Exercising the right to protest has a high cost for those who dare take to the streets..
186
808. On April 11, Wilfredo de JesúsMoncada, who was 17 years-old, died as a result of a shot allegedly made
by security forces from a motorcycle during the repression of a demonstration1109. On June 19, Erik Peralta, 37,
and Luis Maldonado, 29, died. Peralta tried to cross an avenue blocked by a protest when army troops had
arrived at the site and started firing. A bullet would have pierced his chest and caused his death almost
immediately. Maldonado would have suffered a craniocerebral trauma due to the impact of a bullet. Also, on
June 20, Eblin Noel CoreaMaradiaga, a 17-year-old student, would have been executed by a member of the Army
in the town of Yarumela, La Paz, where hours before a road blockade had taken place as a sign of protest1110. On
September 19, the military junior AdánGarcíaBanegas was arrested, whom the Special Prosecutor's Office for
Crimes Against Life identified as allegedly responsible for the killing of CoreaMaradiaga; he was subsequently
prosecuted and subjected to pretrial detention1111.
809. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received with concern information on repressive actions
by security forces against demonstrations convened by students, sometimes even within educational centers.
As a result of police and military actions, students would have been seriously injured and others would have
been detained1112. For example, on June 24, troops of the Military Police would have entered the National
Autonomous University of Honduras [Universidad NacionalAutónoma de Honduras] (UNAH) and shot at dozens
of people protesting in the access area. As a result of the operation, at least five people would have been shot,
including a 25-year-old student, who was shot in the arm, and Elder Nahúm Peralta, another 21-year-old
student, who received a bullet impact that drilled his right buttock1113. In a press release, the National
Interinstitutional Security Force [Fuerza de SeguridadInterinstitucionalNacional] (Fusina) would have justified
its actions by the need to rescue an officer allegedly being held by some students, as well as by the use of Molotov
bombs and other devices that would have been thrown against law enforcement agents1114. Amnesty
International reported that the use of lethal force was excessive and unnecessary. In addition, the organization
would not have been able to find evidence of the alleged retention of the military officer, and the rector of the
university would have affirmed that no evidence had been presented on this fact, nor that there had been a
negotiation process prior to the use of force1115.
810. Five students of the José Trinidad Reyes Institute (JTR) were arrested on July 18 during a protest that
was violently repressed by the National Police. A school security guard would also have been detained.
According to the information reported by the media, members of the Police and the Government Integral Troop
of Special Security Response [Tropa Integral Gubernamental de Respuesta Especial en Seguridad] (TIGRES)would
have launched tear gas outside and inside the facilities of the educational center, in San Pedro Sula. The young
people would have been accused of endangering members of the National Police and of causing damages to
public property. On July 19, a criminal judge would have released the students and the guard and issued
substitute measures to prison. The defense of the students would have shown that, when they were arrested,
they were inside the educational center taking anexam1116.
811. On August 6 in Tegucigalpa, a mobilization in front of the National Congress would have been repressed
by members of the National Police with tear gas, and several students would have been injured. The protesters,
meanwhile, would have burned tires and thrown stones at the police1117. Another mobilization called by
students in front of the headquarters of the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH) in San Pedro
Sula would also have been repressed with tear gas. During the coverage of the protests, the cameraman of Canal
1109C-Libre. April 11, 2019. Asesinan a menor de edad en represión a protesta en Choluteca..
1110 Secretaría de Derechos Humanos. June 24, 2019. Secretaría de Derechos Humanos pide esclarecer circunstancias de la muerte de EBLIN
NOEL COREA MARADIAGA; Amnesty International. July 5, 2019. Honduras: Exercising the right to protest has a high cost for those who dare
take to the streets; Telesur. June 20, 2019. Al menos dos fallecidos y 17 heridos dejan protestas en Honduras; Prensa Libre/EFE. June 20, 2019.
Protestas en Honduras: Dos muertos y varios heridos registra jornada violenta.
1111 Tiempo Digital. September 27, 2019. Envían a prisión a militar acusado de matar a joven protestante en La Paz; Amnesty International.
September 20, 2019. Honduras: Detention of a member of the military could be a first step towards justice for the death of young man; Radio
América. September 26, 2019. Prisión preventiva contra militar por crimen de menor durante protestas en Yarumela.
1112 A journalism student was reportedly assaulted on June 22 during a mobilization called by the official National Party and government
supporters, under the name of "Peace March." In addition to the assault, the young man was reportedly arrested by police officers and
exposed on social networks as a supect of throwing tear gas. He was released after showing he was in the demonstration covering the facts.
Notibomba. No date. Honduras: Estudiante de periodismo es agredido en marcha por La Paz; C-Libre. June 22, 2019. Activistas de la “Marcha
por la Paz” apalean a periodistas en cobertura; Facebook account of Somos Periodismo HN. Así se nos trato en movilicaciones por la "PAZ".
1113Infobae. June 25, 2019. Militares de Honduras entraron a una universidad y dispararon a estudiantes: al menos ocho heridos; La Prensa.
June 24, 2019. Policía Militar ingresa a la UNAH: 4 estudiantes y dos soldados heridos; EFE. June 25, 2019. Tres estudiantes heridos en un
enfrentamiento con policías militares de Honduras; Amnesty International. July 5, 2019. Honduras: Exercising the right to protest has a high
cost for those who dare take to the streets; C-Libre. June 24, 2019. Policía Militar abre fuego en la UNAH, deja varios estudiantes heridos.
1114 EFE. June 26, 2019. Universidad de Honduras pide investigar el uso de la fuerza de policías militares.
1115Amnesty International. July 5, 2019. Honduras: Exercising the right to protest has a high cost for those who dare take to the streets.
1116Tiempo. July 19, 2019. ¡Liberados! Los cinco estudiantes detenidos del JTR; La Prensa. July 20, 2019. Medidas sustitutivas dictan a cinco
estudiantes y un guardia del JTR.
1117 EFE. 7 de agosto de 2019. Manifestantes y policíasse enfrentan en una protesta para pedir salida Hernández;Telesur. 6 de agosto de 2019.
Policía hondureña reprime protesta para exigir renuncia de JOH; C-Libre. 7 de agosto de 2019. Reprimen protestas opositoras a Hernández,
mientras resguardan movilizaciones oficialistas.
187
11, Juan Carlos Castillo, would have been beaten by at least four members of the Police and Special Forces, and
had to be transferred to a medical center because of the injuries1118.
812. On September 9, National Police troops would have repressed with bullets and tear gas manifestations
of villagers and environmental organizations against the installation of a housing complex in the La Tigra
National Park nature reserve1119.
813. The Ministry of Education would have approved a regulation for the organization and development of
the national parades to be held on September 15, published on August 16 in the Official Gazette, which
establishes sanctions for those educational institutions that protest or offend the honor of State authorities
during the event. According to the text, it is not allowed to "carry banners, costumes, legends, accessories, and
other expressions that exhibit political or partisan content outside the theme of the parade"; "To utter insults
against the image and honor of the representative authorities of the three branches of the State and
departmental and municipal authorities", to leave the national parade "without due authorization", not to
appear in the national parade "without just cause", or to act with "manifest disobedience and disrespect"
towards "the authorities that coordinate the event". Those who do not perform “the corresponding greeting in
front of the Main Courthouse or Grandstand of Honor, where the national pavilion is located”, among other
things, will also be subject to sanctions. Those who incur the indicated offenses will be sanctioned, according to
the Statute of the Honduran Teacher, with fines of 5% to 10% of the monthly salary and with the suspension
without salary from eight to 30 days1120.
814. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rightsand
essential for the critical political and social expression of the authorities’ activities. The Commission has pointed
out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalizationper se of demonstrations on public roads when they
are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly”1121 and
that “the exercise of the right of assembly through social protest must not be subject to authorization by the
authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its realization”1122.
815. Likewise, the 2013Joint Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social
demonstrationsindicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and
guaranteeing them is a vital condition to the existence and proper functioning of a democratic society. A State
may impose reasonable limitations on demonstrations for purposes of ensuring that they are conducted
peacefully, or to disperse those that turn violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of
legality, necessity, and proportionality. In addition, the breaking-up of a demonstration must be warranted by
the duty to protect individuals, and authorities must use the measures that are safest and least harmful to the
demonstrators. The use of force at public demonstrations must be an exception, used under strictly necessary
circumstances consistent with internationally recognizedprinciples”1123.
E. Protection mechanisms
816. According to the information received, in some cases journalists in situations of risk and under threats
would have found insufficient protection granted by the National Protection Mechanism for Human Rights
Defenders, Journalists, Social Communicators, and Justice Operators. This situation would have forced several
journalists to leave the country. One of the most serious cases is that of journalist Leonel García Guevara, who
would have left the country after the murder of his colleague Gabriel Hernández in March; both had received
death threats. García Guevara would have requested urgent protection measures from the Protection
Mechanism, which would have been initially denied, but after Hernández's death, the process to assess his risk
situationwould have begun andprotective andpreventive measureswould have been ordered1124. According to
1118 La Prensa. August 7, 2019. Policía agrede a camarógrafo de canal 11 en protesta de la Unah-vs; Tiempo. August 7, 2019. Agresión contra
camarógrafo de Canal 11indigna a periodistas de SPS; El Heraldo. August 7, 2019. Video capta agresión contra camarógrafo durante protestas
en SPS.
1119 Honduras Noticias. September 9, 2019. Toma de calles y enfrentamientos por defensa del Parque Nacional La Tigra, en Tegucigalpa;
Telesur. September 9, 2019. Hondureños rechazan proyecto habitacional en reserva natural; C-Libre. September 13, 2019. Policías disparan
contra manifestantes en defensa del agua; Criterio. September 17, 2019. Tras reunión con alcalde capitalino, policía reprime con bala y bombas
lacrimógenas a defensores de La Tigra.
1120La Tribuna. September 13, 2019. Anuncian sanciones a colegios por malas prácticas en desfiles patrios; El Tiempo Digital. Dos bandas
desafiaron las prohibiciones del Gobierno en desfiles; Confidencial. September 10, 2019. El régimen castigará con dureza a docentes y alumnos
que griten Fuera JOH durante desfiles; El Heraldo. September 12, 2019. Sanciones para colegios que exhiban contenidos políticos en desfiles.
1121IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
1122IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
1123United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
1124 El Heraldo. March 18, 2019. Periodista acribillado en Nacaome decidió renunciar a la seguridad que tenía asignada; Reporters Without
Borders (RSF). March 19, 2019. Journalist murdered in southern Honduras, first this year; Reporteros de Investigación. May 3, 2019.
Periodista abandona Honduras tras asesinato de colega con el que habían pedido información pública al alcalde de Nacaome; Tiempo. March
20, 2019. Muerte de comunicador: PN la califica de “compleja” y asigna equipo de investigadores.
188
information from the Secretariat of Human Rights provided to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, when the
journalist decides to return to the country, he would have police support and police patrols at the place of his
residence, in case he returns to the country.
817. Journalist Joel Mejía would have closed his media JM Visión, in the department of Olancho, and would
have left the country with his family after receiving several threats allegedly from relatives of the mayor of La
Unión, Ramón Edgardo Cárcamo1125.
818. Journalist Jairo López, from the city of Choluteca, reported having been the victim of repeated
harassment, detentions, and threatsby seniorpolice officers due to his work. Although he is a beneficiary of State
protection measures1126, the journalist has questioned that the Protection Mechanism has made decisions
without his consent, such as the withdrawal of the police escort, and that it has not been effective in his
protection1127. According to information provided by the Secretariat ofHuman Rights, López's case was admitted
in February 2017 and is being studied in the Risk Analysis Unit; it would have protective measures such as
specific police support and other accessory measures.
819. Likewise, journalist Edgar Andino, producer of the “El Patrullero de Choluteca” program, broadcasted
on Canal 21, reported that his home was being watched by strangers and that he allegedly received threats from
activists of the National Party in the city of Choluteca. Andino is also a beneficiary of the Protection Mechanism.
The persecution against the reporter would be motivated by the coverage of citizen protest against electoral
fraudin Choluteca1128. According to information provided by the Secretariat of Human Rights to the Office of the
Special Rapporteur, Andino's case was admitted in May 2018. In February 2019, the relocation of him and his
family was adopted as an urgent measure; In addition, theywould have police patrolling, among other measures.
According to the information, the journalist and his family are currently filing for political asylum1129.
820. Journalists SelvinLópezAnariba and Dulce Valle would have left the country after being victims of death
threats and extortion by unknown individuals1130. Journalist Luis Rodríguez would have reported being a victim
of constant threats since 2017, and would have held public officials in the Comayagua department responsible
for any attacks he may suffer in the future1131.
821. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have defined some of the requirements for the
protection mechanisms to be effective. For example, to emphasize: 1) the importance of guaranteeing the
necessary personnel and financial resourcesfor the adequate implementation of the mechanism; 2) the need to
ensure effective coordinationamong the entities responsible for the implementation of measures of prevention,
protection, and prosecution; 3) the need to adequately define protective measures called for in themechanism
and the procedure for their adoption; 4) the need to guarantee the full participation ofjournalists, civil society,
and beneficiaries in the implementation and operation of the mechanism; and 5)the benefits of seeking support
from the international community for the mechanism’s operation1132.
F. Subsequent Liabilities
822. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed about cases in which criminal justice was used to
sanction expressions or information disseminated by journalists, communicators, or persons in the political
sphere. With special concern, this Office received information on the decision of the Criminal Chamber of the
Supreme Court of Justice, which on March 8 ratified a sentence of 10 years in prison to the director of Radio
1125 Reporteros de Investigación. May 3, 2019. Periodista abandona Honduras tras asesinato de colega con el que habían pedido información
pública al alcalde de Nacaome. Criterio. May 11, 2019. Antes de ser el próximo periodista asesinado, Joel Mejía abandonó Honduras; HCH
Televisión Digital. February 5, 2019. Periodista Joel Mejía recibe amenazas por realizar su trabajo en Olancho; C-Libre. February 5, 2019.
Periodista de Olancho recibe amenazas para que abandone la zona.
1126Secretaría de Derechos Humanos. Comunicado. November 10, 2018..
1127Resumen Latinoamericano. January 27, 2019. Detienen a periodista Jairo López y a su escolta cuando cubría las protestas contra JOH; UNE
TV. January 30, 2019. LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN. El periodista Jairo López denuncia amenazas a muerte por mantener su lucha en contra del
régimen orlandista; C-Libre. January 31, 2019. Estado hondureño deja en total desprotección a periodista Jairo López; Pasos de Animal Grande.
November 10, 2018. Urgente: capturan violentamente a Jairo López beneficiario de medidas de protección en Honduras.
1128 Reporters Without Borders (RSF). March 19, 2019. Journalist murdered in southern Honduras, first this year; C-Libre. February 22,
2019. Periodista en Choluteca denuncia amenazas a su vida; Pasos de Animal Grande. February 19, 2019. El Peligro acecha al periodista Edgar
Andino: "Hay un hombre que quiere meterse por la ventana de mi cuarto, ayúdeme por favor".
1129Information supplied on September 11, 2019 by the Dirección General del Sistema de Protección of the Secretaría de Derechos Humanos
to the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expresion.
1130 Proceso Digital. February 22, 2019. Periodistas víctimas de extorsión: Dejamos botado todo en Honduras para salvar nuestras vidas;
Noticias Honduras. February 21, 2019. Dos periodistas más abandonan Honduras por amenazas..
1131 The journalist's program,“Sálvese quien pueda”, broadcast on Canal 38, was reportedly suspended in January, allegedly due to pressures
on the channel's owner by two Comayagua deputies. Tiempo Digital. April 10, 2019. Video / Periodista “Buzo Caperuzo” denuncia amenazas
a muerte de presuntos políticos; Pasos de Animal Grande. April 10, 2019. Ayúdennos gringos a sacar esta maldita mafia: Periodista Luís
Rodríguez; C-Libre. April 12, 2019. Amenazas de muerte denuncia periodista en Comayagua.
1132IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 81; IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Office of the
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II: 2010 Special Report on Freedom of Expression in Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
5. March 7, 2011. Para. 712
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Globo, David Ellner Romero, for the commission of six crimes of “defamation for allegations constitutive of
insults” to the detriment of Sonia Gálvez, former prosecutor for Women and the wife of former Deputy Attorney
General, who accused him of conducting a campaign against heron his media. On March 21, the IACHR granted
precautionary measures for the journalist and, consequently, requested the State of Honduras to suspend the
execution of the conviction1133. However, on March 28, members of the Intelligence Troop and Special Security
Response Group(TIGRES) would have broken into the facilities of Radio Globo and arrested Romero1134.
823. Also, on February 18, congress deputy for the Freedom and RefoundationParty, María Luisa Borjas,
would have been sentenced to two years and eight months in prison for the crime of slander constituting
defamation. Borjas would have been reported by businessman Camilo Atala, whom she had accused as the
intellectual author of the murder of environmentalist Berta Cáceres. On January 29, she had been convicted by
the natural judge of the case and president of the Supreme Court of Justice Rolando Argueta Pérez, who
understood that Borjas' statements were irresponsible, since she did not conduct a prior investigation to ensure
the veracity of her accusation1135.
824. On April 1, Canal 6 journalist Carlos Martínez Zepeda would have been sued by two congress deputies
of the Freedom and Refoundation Party (Libre), Patricia Murillo and Scherry Melissa Arriaga, for alleged crimes
of insult and defamation. The journalist had also been sued in October 2016 by congress deputy Bernardo
Enrique Yllescas1136.
825. Journalist César Omar Silva, of UNE Tv, would have been sentenced on June 3 by Justice of the Peace
Efraín Eduardo Rodríguez to a 37-day prison sentence for “mistreatment”, following a complaint filed on
February 27 by Marcos Porras, who had arrived in Honduras as the ambassador of Venezuela, appointed by the
opposition and self-proclaimed president of that country Juan Guaidó. Porras, who would have refused to grant
an interview to the journalist, would also have initiated a complaint for defamation and slander1137.
826. The IACHR has argued that “[the] type of political debate that gives rise to the right to freedom of
expression will inevitably generate certain critical or even offensive speeches for those who hold public office
or are closely linked to the formulation of public policy”1138. Therefore, as stated in principle 10 of the
Declaration of Principles, "[t]the protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil
sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is apublic official." That is, the use of criminal mechanisms
to punish discourse in matters of public interest, and especially related to public or political officials, does not
respond to a pressing social need that justifies it, is unnecessary and disproportionate, and can be a means of
indirect censorshipgiven its chilling effect on the debate on matters of public interest.
827. Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: “[p]ublic
officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information.” In
addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the use of criminal law to sanction expressions related to public
officials is disproportionate when it comes toprotected speech, such as information or expression on matters of
public interest, and violates the right to freedom ofexpression1139.
G.Legal Reforms
828. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights inHonduras (OHCHR) expressed in a statement their concern overprovisions of the new Criminal
Code of Honduras. While the National Congress announced that it would eliminate articles related to honor
crimes, such as slander and insults - and those that determine some type of responsibility for the media1140-
other rules that concern the aforementioned agencies could continue in force. For example, the criminalization
of the offenses of "exploitation of secrecy or privileged information", "espionage" and "public disorders".
Regarding the latter, the IACHR, its Office of the Special Rapporteur, and OHCHR observed that its formulation
could unduly criminalize the exercise of the right to peaceful demonstration, as well as affect the effective
exercise of the right to freedom of expression.On the other hand, both organizations expressed concern about
1133IACHR.Resolución15/2019. Medida cautelarNo. 75-19. José DavidEllnerRomero respecto deHonduras. March 21, 2019; Criterio.March
25, 2019. CIDH otorga medidas cautelares y pide dejar en suspenso captura contra David Romero.
1134 CNN. March 29, 2019. Justicia de Honduras allana Radio Globo para detener al periodista David Romero; La Prensa. March 28, 2019. Corte
ratifica captura contra David Romero y declara sin lugar solicitud de la CIDH; Twitter account of IACHR (@CIDH). March 29, 2019.
1135El Heraldo. January 29, 2019. Declaran culpable a la diputada María Luisa Borjas por el delito de calumnias constitutivas de injurias;
Tiempo. February 18, 2019. Diputada María Luisa Borjas es condenada a más de dos años de prisión.
1136 Proceso. April 1, 2019. Diputadas presentan querella contra periodista Carlos Martínez; El Patriota. April 4, 2019. Diputadas de Libre
querellan a periodista; C-Libre. February 1, 2019. Periodista querellado teme por su vida y familia.
1137 Pasos de Animal Grande. June 5, 2019. El juego de la "justicia hondureña": Mandar a la cárcel a periodistas críticos; La Prensa. June 3,
2019. Sentencian a periodista César Silva por agresión contra venezolano.
1138 IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato" Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
1139 IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions
and Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015.
1140 Congreso Nacional. August 20, 2019. CN eliminará delitos contra el honor del nuevo Código Penal.
190
the criminalization of "illegal meetings and demonstrations", "association to commit crimes", "disturbance of
order" and "terrorist association". Regarding this last crime, the IACHR and OHCHR observed that as contained
in the new Code, the notion of terrorist association has an excessively broad scope and could lead to the
criminalization of a series of behaviors that do not deserve the classification of terrorism in the light of
international jurisprudence and human rights standards. The IACHR and the OHCHR called on the State of
Honduras to review the provisions of the Criminal Code approved to be in accordance with international
standards and human rights commitments adopted by Honduras1141.
1141IACHR. July 12, 2019. IACHR and OHCHR Express Concern over the Provisions of the Criminal Code in Honduras and Call for a Review
in Accordance with International and Inter-American Human Rights Standards.
191
22. JAMAICA
829. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has observed that in the municipality of St. James it the realization
of a series of events in a state-owned building has been prevented, within the framework of the LGBTIQ
community celebrations in the country. In addition, high level authorities have made stigmatizing statements
regarding communicators and the media.
830. During 2019, several attempts were made to carry out legal reforms that could affect the exercise of
freedom of expression. In this regard, the Criminal Justice and Administration Act has been modified, increasing
the penalties for those who take photographs of persons deprived of liberty. In addition, the amendment to the
Access to Information Act has been proposed to increase theperiod from 20 to 70 years in which the documents
of the cabinet are exempt from being disclosed. The Office of the Special Rapporteur highlights the role played
by civil society organizations to prevent this from happening
A. Access to public information
831. During 2019,there has been discussion in Jamaica about the Access to Information Act, passed in 2002,
and the period of exemption from disclosure it would give to cabinet documents. Section 15(1) of the Act
establishes that, “An official document is exempt from disclosure if it is a cabinet document.”Section 6(2)
additionallyprovides that,“The exemption of an official document orpartthereof from disclosure shall not apply
after the document has been in existence for twenty years, or such shorter or longer period as the Minister may
specify by order, subject to affirmative resolution.”1142
832. The government of Jamaica submitted a draft resolution to parliament, seeking to amend section 6(2)
of the Access to Information Act to extend the period of exemption from public access to cabinet documents
from 20 to 70 years.1143A number of organizations spoke out against such a change, claiming that it would have
a negative effect on press freedom and government transparency.1144Ultimately, Foreign Minister Kamina
Johnson Smith announced on October 4 that she was withdrawing the proposed amendment and establishing a
committee to review theAccess to Information Act, the Archives Act, and the Official Secrets Act.1145At the time
of writing, there is no indication that this Committee has issued a report yet.
833. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls thatPrinciple 4 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression establishes that, “Access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every
individual. States have the obligation to guarantee the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only
exceptional limitations that must be previously established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that
threatens national security in democratic societies.” Moreover, in keeping with the principle of maximum
disclosure, the law should ensure the broadest and most effective access to public information possible.
B. Censorship
834. The Office of the Special received information about a dispute between the Municipality of St. James and
the Montego Bay Pride group, which works to promote and protect the rights of the LGBTIQ community in
Jamaica.
835. According to available information, on September 12, Montego Bay Mayor Homer Davis announced that
the Municipality of St. James would not grant permission to the organization to hold events at the state-owned
Montego Bay Cultural Center. Davis defended this action by saying that it was necessary to avoid disturbing the
“sacredness and purpose” of the building [“We must not do anything to disturb the sacredness and purpose of
why that building is there”]. Councilman Charles Sinclair also explained that “allowing such an event would
breach the municipal corporation’s mandate to uphold Jamaica’s Constitution, which only recognizes marriage
between a man and a woman.”1146
836. The Montego Bay Pride groupannounced in a September 14 press release that a forum to discuss equal
marriage was not allowed to be held at the Montego Bay Cultural Center. The organization said that the mayor’s
statements had a “potential chilling effect on free speech and other constitutional rights”and accused him of
1142 Government of Jamaica. Access to Information Unit. The Access to information Act. January 5, 2004.
1143 Jamaica Observer. October 2, 2019. Gov’t wants waiting period for Cabinet documents extended from 20 to 70 years; The Gleaner. October
3, 2019. “Withdraw it” – Gov’t told to rethink 50-year increase in period of exemption from public access to cabinet documents; My Vue News.
October 2, 2019. Jamaica – Government moving to make it harder to lay hands on cabinet documents.
1144 The Gleaner. October 3, 2019. “Withdraw it” – Gov’t told to rethink 50-year increase in period of exemption from public access to cabinet
documents;Nation Wide NewsNet. October 2, 2019. Gov’tfaces criticism over policy proposal to deny accessto cabinet documentsfor 70-years.
1145 Loop Jamaica. October 3, 2019. Gov’t sends “secret documents” matter to joint select committee; RJR News. October 3, 2019. Gov’t
withdraws controversial resolution to extend exemption of cabinet documentsfrom public disclosure to 70 years; Jamaica Observer. October 4,
2019. Remain vigilant to protect access to information;Stabroek News. October 6, 2019. Jamaica: Gov’t withdraws resolutions barring access
to cabinet documents for 70 years; Loop Jamaica. October 5, 2019. NIA welcomes withdrawal of controversial cabinet documents resolution.
1146TheGleaner. September 13, 2019. NO PRIDE – MoBay Mayor shuts door on gay rights group to protect sacredness of cultural centre; The
Gleaner. September 16, 2019. MoBay Pride furious over civic centre lockout.
1146 Bajan Reporter. September 16, 2019. Montego Bay Pride considers legal action against mayor. The Gleaner. September 16, 2019. MoBay
Pride furious over civic centre lockout; McKoy’s News. September 15, 2019. Montego Bay Pride considers legal action against mayor.
192
wanting tomake democratic debate impossible by censoring Jamaican citizens.1147On September 19, it
announced that the event had been cancelled for security reasons.1148
837. On September 24, Montego Bay Pride filed an application for judicial review with the Supreme Court
against Montego Bay Mayor Homer Davis and the Municipality of St James.1149On October 14, the Court granted
the organization an interim order authorizing it to rent the Montego Bay Cultural Center.1150Finally, upon appeal
by Mayor Davis, on October 16 the Jamaican Court of Appeal reversed the Supreme Court’s order, preventing
the event from taking place.1151
838. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, while it is true that all forms of expression are
protected in principle by the freedom enshrined in Article 13 of the Convention, there are certain types of speech
that receive special protection because of their importance to the exercise of other human rights, or to the
consolidation, proper functioning and preservation of democracy. In the case law of the inter-American system,
the types of speciallyprotected speech are the following three: (a) political speech and speech involving matters
of public interest; (b) speech regarding public officials in the exercise of their duties and candidates for public
office; and (c) speech that is an element of the identity or personal dignity of the person expressingherself.1152
C. Indirect censorship
839. According to public information, on September 11 the Jamaican Senate approved an amendment to
section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Administration Act, significantly increasing the penalties for anyone who
takes photographs of prisoners arriving at or leaving a courthouse. The amendment provides for a maximum
fine of JMD$1 million (approximately USD $7,000), and even the possibility of up to one year in
prison.1153Different national and international organizations have voiced their opposition to this amendment,
claiming that it has a chilling effect on journalists.1154
840. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Principle 5 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression establishes that, “Prior censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted
upon any expression, opinion or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or
electronic communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions,
as well as the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information
violate the right to freedom of expression.”The Office further notes that the use of criminal mechanisms to
punish speech on matters of public interest is not justified by a compelling socialimperative,is unnecessary and
disproportionate, and can be a means of indirect censorship by discouraging debate on matters of public
interest.
D. Stigmatizing statements
841. Prime Minister Andrew Holness gave a speech at a Jamaican Labour Party conference on November 18,
in which he criticized the press for supposedlyreporting only opinions rather than true facts, and he
recommended using social media or hispersonal website as a means of obtaining reliable information.1155
842. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that their
statements do not undermine the rights of those who contribute to the public discourse through the expression
and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media outlets, and human rights organizations, and
1147 Bajan Reporter. September 16, 2019. Montego Bay Pride considers legal action against mayor. The Gleaner. September 16, 2019. MoBay
Pride furious over civic centre lockout; McKoy’s News. September 15, 2019. Montego Bay Pride considers legal action against mayor.
1148 Mamba Online. September 26, 2019. Montego Bay Pride cancelled over security concerns; Erasing 76 crimes. September 19, 2019. Security
risks force cancellation of Montego Bay Pride.
1149TheGleaner. September 29, 2019. MoBay Pride sues Mayor Davis, Municipal Corporation; Buzz Caribbean. September 29, 2019. Lawsuit
filed against Mayor in Jamaica after pride group banned from using cultural centre.
1150 The Supreme Court of Jamaica. Maurice Tomlinson v. Mayor Homer Davis and St. James Municipal Council. October 14, 2019; The
Gleaner. October 15, 2019. MoBay Pride granted interim order to rent cultural centre; Buzz Caribbean. October 15, 2019. MobayPride given
interim order to rent cultural centre.
1151 Court of Appeal of Jamaica. Homer Davis and St. James Municipal Corporation v. Maurice Tomlinson. November 8, 2019; The Gleaner.
October 18, 2019. Court of Appeal overturns interim injunction granted to Mobay pride; Jamaica Observer. October 19, 2019. Appeal Court
overturns order granted to gay pride group; Erasing 76 Crimes. October 16, 2019. Jamaican court again blocks Montego Bay Pride events; Buzz
Caribbean. October 18, 2019. Ruling overturned – Montego Bay Pride barred from using Cultural Centre.
11521152IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Inter-American Legal Framework of the Right to Freedom of
Expression OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09. December 30, 2009 Ch. 2 para. 32.
1153Loop Jamaica. September 16, 2019. $1 million fine for taking pictures of accused persons attending court; RJR News. December 2, 2019.
RSF urges Holness to repeal law that fines journalists $1M or prison time for taking photos of accused persons; Jamaica Observer. September
20, 2019. PAJ joins call to repeal law forbidding courtroom photography.
1154 RJR News. September 17, 2019. Media Association concerned about law which prohibits taking photos of defendants at court; RJR News.
December 2, 2019. RSF urges Holness to repeal law that fines journalists $1M or prison time for taking photos of accused persons; The Kitts &
Nevis Observer. December 3, 2019. Journalist group calls for Jamaica to end court restriction; Jamaica Observer. September 20, 2019. PAJ
joins call to repeal law forbidding courtroom photography.
1155 Jamaica Observer.November 19, 2019. Holnesstakesswipe at press;The Gleaner.November 25, 2019. PAJcriticizesHolness’ remarks about
the press; Irie FM. November 25, 2019. Press Association concerned about Holness criticisms.
193
should be sensitive to the context in which they speak, so as to ensure that their statements do not constitute,in
the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who
seek to contribute withpublic deliberation through the expression and [dissemination] of their thoughts.”1156
1156 I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
194
23. MEXICO
843. During 2019, journalists in Mexico continued to face a crisis of violence that killed 11 communicators.
The attacks on journalists persists, aggravated by the lack of legal consequences expressed in the impunity of
these crimes. The government's response to implement improvements and provide more resources for the
protection mechanism seems insufficient given the magnitude of the violence against journalists and human
rights defenders. In accordance with the recommendations made by the Office of the Special Rapporteur in the
“Special Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Mexico”, after the on-site visit in 2017, this Office
took note of the evaluation of the Protection Mechanism for Defenders of Human Rights and Journalists
requested from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) by the current
government), which is presented as a valuable opportunity to improve different aspects of the protection
mechanism. Also, this office sees with concern, the increase in stigmatizing statements by highpublic authorities
against members of the press, which promotes the practice of mass harassment in social networks, as reported
by different organizations and media.
A. Progress
844. With regards to progress, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information from the Office of
the Special Prosecutor for the Attention of Crimes against Freedom of Expression (FEADLE) about actions taken
in 2019 to investigate and verify the facts and the results of the investigations, regarding the perpetrators of the
murders, and on the multiple gaps that Mexico still faces for reparation andjustice.
845. Among the efforts of the State to guarantee freedom of expression and the integrity of journalists,in July
Congress installed the Commission of Attention to Journalists that urges the 125 Mexican municipalities to
coordinate, in order to guarantee the necessary prevention and protection measures to guarantee that
journalists have a safe and conducive environment to exercise their work freely and independently1157.
846. On January 10, after 13 years of Lydia Cacho being arrested and tortured1158 by the police of Puebla
under the instruction of the then governor, Mario Marín, in complicity with businessman Kamel Nacif in
retaliation for the publication of the book Los demonios del Eden, the State1159 apologized for violations to the
rights of: freedom of expression, personal freedom and security, not to be subjected to torture, nondiscrimination based on gender, and access to justice. However, there are still pending subjects such as the
capture, prosecution, and punishment of those responsible for the material and intellectual torture perpetrated
against her1160.
847. The Office of the Special Rapporteur welcomes the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
(SCJN), which confirmed the ruling issued by a federal court that declared illegal and undue the interruption of
the contract that MVS signed with Carmen Aristegui1161, as well as her dismissal from the radio on March 15,
2015. With this resolution, the ruling issued in June 2018 was also ratified, which was favorable to the
communicator and stipulated that the contract remained in force because there was no justified cause or valid
reason for the company to cancel itarbitrarily.
848. This Office was also informed about the sentence against the former mayor, Emilio Dzul Huchim and
five former municipal police officers from Seyé, Yucatán, for the 2014 attacks against journalist Edwin Canché,
who was physically and psychologically tortured1162. The defendants were not subjected to pretrial detention
throughout the criminal proceedings and thanks to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) the crimes were
reclassified.
849. The Office of the Special Rapporteur highlights the importance of the sentence that ordered FEADLE to
investigate a case and exercise its legal power to prosecute crimes committed against journalists. According to
public information, the Seventh Court of Amparo District in Criminal Matters in Mexico City, on June 28, resolved
in favor of the writ of amparo presented by Propuesta Cívica in the case of journalist Miguel Ángel Villarino
Arnábar, for the refusal of FEADLE to exercise its faculty to open a file and investigate the events that occurred
on April 4, 2018, when the journalist was the victim of torture and threats by a public official (custodian), while
in pretrial detention as a result of a criminal procedure plagued with due process violations1163. These attacks
were in retaliation for his journalistic work with a critical line published through their news portal
"Bestiometro.com".
1157 Congreso de México. April 3, 2019. La Comisión de Protección a Periodistas del Congreso CDMX analiza propuestas para fortalecer la
legislación en la materia.
1158 El Universal. September 12, 2019. Transcripción de la conversación telefónica Kamel-Gamboa. La Jornada. April 16, 2019. Orden de
aprehensión contra Marín y Nacif por torturar a Lydia Cacho.
1159 Aristegui Noticias. August 2, 2019. Detención de Lydia Cacho en 2005, una venganza por la publicación de su libro sobre pederastia:
Aristegui (Video).
1160 INFOBAE. October 17, 2019. Detuvieron al cuarto implicado en tortura a la periodista Lydia Cacho.
1161 CPJ. February 14, 2019. CPJ welcomes Mexican Supreme Court ruling in Carmen Aristegui case. New York Times. July 21, 2019. Mexican
Journalist Who Exposed Scandal Says Lawsuit Is Meant as a Warning.
1162 Diario de Yucatan. January 3, 2019. Sentencia contra exalcalde de Seyé, precedente a favor de la prensa.
1163 Artículo 19. March 21, 2018. Poderes públicos de Campeche reviven la ola de represalias contra periodistas críticos en la entidad.
195
850. As stated by the Special Rapporteurs of Freedom of Expression IACHR and UN, in their "Special Report
on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Mexico"; It is imperative that as a result of the local context, federal
authorities intensify the use of FEADLE's legal authority to investigate andprosecute crimes against journalists,
with strict adherence to establishedprocedures soas notto harm criminalinvestigationswith unjustified delays.
851. The Office of the Special Rapporteur also highlights that it has received the response to an Art.41 letter
sent to the Mexican State regarding the progress in the investigations of the murders of journalists Javier Valdez
Cárdenas, Miroslava Breach Velducea, and Rubén Espinosa Becerril, the latter journalist murdered along with
four other women in an apartment in Colonia Narvarte1164, whose family has repeatedly denounced obstacles to
clarify the facts in their murder and punish those responsible.
B. Impunity
852. In the Special Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Mexico, as a result of the 2017 visit
to the country, this Office emphasizes that attacks against journalists are accompanied by a continuous sense of
insecurity and impunity that perpetuates violence.
853. According to data provided by FEADLE in January 2019 to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, in the
last eight years, only 10 out of 1,140 (00.13%)1165 investigations initiated would have ended in a conviction, a
figure that shows that the lack of legal consequences in the face of an assault againts journalists provokes the
recurrence of the facts and fosters a climate of intimidation. Of the 13 murders reported by this Office in 2018,
to date there is no registered conviction.1166
854. According to public knowledge information, after the murder of journalist Miroslava Breach, the death
of five other people would have been linked to the case, however, the Chihuahua authorities have not yet shown
that they are investigating the events thoroughly1167.
855. All this is a “distraction,” denounces Lydia Cacho, the award-winning Mexican investigative journalist,
exiled since two months ago in the United States after a raid of her house by armed men, who stole her work
material andpoisoned her twopets in Mexico on July 21.
856. This Office has indicated in its 2019 press releases1168, that in Mexico the lack of access to justice and
revictimization of murdered journalists’ families in recent years persists, such as the case of journalist and
activist Moisés Sánchez and journalist Francisco Pacheco1169. Despite the recommendation issued by the
National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), in most cases, FEADLE has not specified the time or manner to
access the contents of the investigation for indirect victims, nor has it carried out diligence to continue with the
integration of the previous investigation, nor has it had constant communication with family members. To this
is added the distrust to the local authorities in charge of the investigations, which in many cases are believed to
have acted in collusion with organized crimeorganizations.
C. Protection mechanism
857. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note that the local prosecutors offices do not obey the
principle of Proactive Transparency1170 that would allow the start of investigations of cases in Mexico. In
addition, according to information provided to this Office,they omit the obligation they have to capture statistics
on investigations where journalists are victims or complainants. In this way, the figures corresponding to the
investigations initiated by FEADLE make visible the structural problems in the fight against impunity in crimes
committed against freedom of expression, and this has become one of the reasons why violence against thepress
in Mexicopersists.Although reports and studies1171 on the structural situation of violence in Mexico indicate that
it is exacerbated due to impunity, most federal entities still do not have specialized agencies for investigating
crimes against journalists and defenders1172.
1164 Gatopardo. August 2, 2019. Caso Narvarte: la verdad como “exquisitez”.
1165 Debate. February 25, 2019. Impunes el 99.13 por ciento de delitos contra la prensa.
1166 Procuraduría General de la República de México. Subprocuraduría de Derechos Humanos, Prevención del Delito y Servicios a la
Comunidad. October 25, 2019. Informe estadístico de la Fiscalía Especial de para la Atención a Delitos cometidos contra la Libertad de
Expresión. México: FEADLE.
1167 Animal Político. September 5, 2019. Las cinco muertes ligadas al asesinato de la periodista Miroslava Breach.
1168 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Press Releases Mexico 2019.
1169Artículo 19. April 25, 2019. A 3 años del asesinato de Francisco Pacheco, FEADLE obstaculiza el acceso a la justicia. Aristegui Noticias. April
25, 2019. Francisco Pacheco: tres años de impunidad.
1170 Artículo 19. Protocolo de la impunidad en delitos contra periodistas. Análisis de investigaciones sobre delitos contra la Libertad de
Expresión. Ch. 1 p. 18.
1171 Propuesta Cívica. Frente al riesgo y al caos. Análisis del marco normativo de protección para personas defensores y periodistas en
México. June, 2019. OACNUDH México. Diagnóstico sobre el funcionamiento del mecanismo. July, 2019. Artículo 19. Protocolo de la
impunidad en delitos contra periodistas. Análisis de investigaciones sobre delitos contra la Libertad de Expresión. Committee to Protect
Journalists (CPJ). Press freedom summit urges Mexico to reform journalist protections. July 2, 2019. Reporters Without Borders (RSF).
Mexico: RSF campaigns on impunity for violence against journalists in Mexico. September 25, 2019.
1172 Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos de México (CNDH). Informe 2019
196
858. As the Special Rapporteur has indicated in its different press releases in 20191173 and in the
aforementioned Special Report, FEADLE lacks effective investigation plans, does not exhaust all the lines of
investigation, does not identify all persons responsible for crimes (which includes intellectual authors and
accomplices), and does not analyze the context in which the crimes occurred, particularly the way in which
political and criminal power operates at the local level and in other local realities. Failures persist in terms of
witness protection and negligence when collecting and effectively preserving police and forensic evidence. In
addition, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information on the ineffectiveness of investigations
into threats and harassment of journalists, both online and in traditional media, which are halted due to
cumbersome legal requirements, such as psychological assessments of victims and lack of true coordination.
between the protection mechanisms. To this end, this Office has identified that obstacles that affect the
participation of victims in investigations and their stigmatization persist. Itis also concerning that the institution
does not use its legal powers to exercise jurisdiction over cases of murders, kidnappings, or disappearances of
journalists in federal entities with the highest levels of violence andimpunity.
859. Along these lines, it should be noted that the implementation of the Protection Mechanism remains
ineffective with respect to coordination between all levels of government and institutions. Despite having signed
cooperation agreements with the 32 federative entities, these are not binding, and the Federal Government
cannot demand compliance, which makes it impossible to properly implement the protection measures. In
addition, the lack of participation of the security forces in the programs, the reactive police intervention, the
absence of risk analysis and protection measures according to the needs of the defenders, and the privatization
of the security measures are some of the difficulties that the mechanism presents1174.
860. The Office of the Special Rapporteur reiterates that FEADLE should adopt a specific protocol that
establishes the principles and legal obligations of the persons in charge of investigating crimes against freedom
of expression and set a common standard on how to conduct a timely, diligent, independent, and transparent
investigation of these cases, in accordance with international human rights standards and best practices, and in
consultation with civil society.
861. According to information provided to this Office, FEADLE has initiated 1,140 investigations, of which it
has assigned a total of 163 investigations1175, this in regard to the inquisitorial criminal justice system. A total of
23 investigation files would have been prosecuted for the cases related to the accusatory criminal justice system
that came into force in 2016. Of the 10 sentences derived from the 1,140 investigations that FEADLE has started,
at least 6 of them have been for crimes inwhich a public servant is involved, according to the nature of the crime
committed, which would allow this link. This means this figure represents that in at least 60%1176 of the
sentences some official had some degree ofparticipation in the commission of crimes against journalists orpress
personnel.
D. Murders, attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
862. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes with concern the persistence of murders against journalists
in Mexico, a figure that rose in relation to 2018, a painfulindicator of violence against communicators in various
regions of the country. During 2019, 11 journalists and communicators were murdered: Nevith Condes, on
August 24 in Tejupilco1177, South of the State of Mexico; Rogelio Barragán, on July 30 in Morelos1178; Edgar
Alberto Nava, on August 2 in Guerrero1179; Jorge Celestino Ruiz, on August 2 in Veracruz1180; Norma Sarabia, on
June 11 in Huimanguillo, Tabasco1181; Francisco Romero on May 16 in Playa del Carmen, Quintana Roo1182;
Telesforo Enriquez on May 3 in San Agustín Loxicha, Oaxaca1183; Santiago Barroso, on March 15 in San Luis Río
Colorado, Sonora1184; Reynaldo López, on February 16 in Hermosillo, Sonora1185; Jesús Eugenio Ramos, on
1173 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Press Releases Mexico 2019.
1174 Artículo 19. Protocolo de la impunidad en delitos contra periodistas. Análisis de investigaciones sobre delitos contra la Libertad de
Expresión Ch. 1 P. 17.
1175 Procuraduría General de la República de México. Subprocuraduría de Derechos Humanos, Prevención del Delito y Servicios a la
Comunidad.Informe estadístico de la FiscalíaEspecial de para la Atención aDelitos cometidos contra laLibertad de Expresión.México:FEADLE,
p. 7.
1176 Artículo 19. Informe estadístico de la Fiscalía Especial de para la Atención a Delitos cometidos contra la Libertad de Expresión.
1177 Animal Político. August 24, 2019. Asesinan al periodista Nevith Condés Jaramillo, en Tejupilco, Estado de México.
1178 CNN Español. July 31, 2019. Encuentran muerto a periodista mexicano Rogelio Barragán.
1179 PubliMetro. August 2, 2019. Periodista Édgar Alberto Nava es asesinado en Guerrero.
1180 Univisión. August 3, 2019. Asesinan a otros dos periodistas en México en menos de 24 horas.
1181 France 24. June 12, 2019. Asesinan a la periodista Norma Sarabia en Tabasco, sur de México.
1182 INFOBAE. May 16, 2019. Asesinaron al periodista Francisco Romero en Playa del Carmen.
1183 Aristegui Noticias. May 3, 2019. Asesinan a periodista indígena en Oaxaca. DW. May 2, 2019. Asesinan a fundador de radio comunitaria
indígena en el sur de México.
1184 Jornada. March 17, 2019. Asesinan a balazos al periodista sonorense Santiago Barroso. Proceso. May 16, 2019. Asesinan al periodista
Santiago Barroso en la puerta de su casa.
1185 Animal Político. February 17, 2019. Asesinan en Sonora al locutor Reynaldo López; el comunicador Carlos Cota resultó herido. Univisión.
February 17, 2019. Asesinan a tiros al locutor Reynaldo López, el tercer periodista muerto en México en 2019.
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February 9 in Emiliano Zapata, Tabasco1186; and José Rafael Murúa, on January 19 in Mulegé, Baja California
Sur1187, who were allegedly murdered due to the journalistic and communicational work theywere carrying out.
863. The cases of journalists and communicators who had security measures by the Mechanism for the
Protection of HumanRightsDefenders and Journalists, suchas FranciscoRomero, areparticularly important1188.
It is of concern to this Office that the cases of Rogelio Barragan, Jorge Celestino Ruiz, and Norma Saravia, had
lodged complaints that the Mechanism would have been negligent at the time of assessing the situation when
the journalists would have requested the protection1189.
864. In accordance with principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR,
"[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material
destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict
freedom of expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their
perpetrators, and to ensure that victims receive due compensation."
865. In addition, in a 2005 joint statement, the Special Rapporteurs of the IACHR and of the ACHPR, affirmed
that “[this kind of] crimes have an inhibitory effect on freedom of expression that is increasing when
governments do not investigate these crimespromptly or when the perpetrators are not prosecuted.”
E. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
866. During 2019, various organizations, the media, and human rights organizations1190 in Mexico
denounced and recorded more than a hundred attacks against journalists and communicators demonstrating
that far from disappearing, violence in the country has been sophisticated using digital harassment and
disinformation campaigns as a tool1191.
867. Death threats and harassment are common practices in Mexico. For example, on January 29, a
ministerial police officer from Guerrero pointed an assault rifle at a group of about 10 reporters in the
subdivision of the Single Union of Public Servants of the State of Guerrero [Sindicato único de Servidores Públicos
del Estado de Guerrero] (SUSPEG) in Chilpancingo, while covering an operation1192. Along the same lines, on
February 10, police officers from the municipality of Nezahualcóyotl assaulted three photographers from El
Reforma, Pásala, and El Gráfico when they documented the finding of a lifeless person in the Ampliación Ciudad
Lago neighborhood1193. On March 26, the reporter Cristián Papalotzin López, from La Prensa digital media, was
detained, threatened, and forced to broadcast a live interview against his will by the auxiliary president of the
San Francisco Atexcatzinco community in Tlaxcala1194. On May 4, this office was informed about the arbitrary
detention and cruel and inhuman treatment by elements of the Municipal Secretariat of Public Security and
Traffic of Benito Juárez, Quintana Roo against the reporter of the Novedades newspaper, Eric Galindo1195. On July
4, security agents from the Investigation Department of the Attorney General's Office would have confiscated
equipment and assaulted journalist Beda Peñaloza from the media A fondo in the State ofMexico1196.
868. Another illustrative incident about this kind of aggressions was against journalist and human rights
defender, Lydia Cacho1197, with the raid of her home, the theft of work equipment and journalistic documents,
in addition to the poisoning of her pets, on July 21.
869. In addition, among the hundreds of complaints, the physical attacks perpetrated against Martin
Valtierra, director of the Contrastes de Comondú digital media1198, are to be noted. On January 29, he was hit with
1186 Aristegui Noticias. February 9, 2019. Asesinan al locutor Jesús Eugenio Ramos en Tabasco; Fiscalía inició investigación. El Heraldo.
February 10, 2019. Fiscalía de Tabasco investiga homicidio del periodista Jesús Ramos.
1187 BBC Mundo. January 22, 2019. Rafael Murúa, el primer periodista asesinado en México en 2019. El País. January 22, 2019. Asesinado un
periodista en Baja California Sur, el primero en México de 2019.
1188 Periodistas Desplazados. August 9, 2019. Pierden’ expediente de Francisco “Ñaca-Ñaca” Romero.
1189Reversos. June 17, 2019. La FEADLE, el mecanismo de protección y reporterossin frontera responsables por omisión de la muerte de Norma
Saravia. Diario Contrapeso Ciudadano.August6, 2019. Investigan a SSP deVeracruz por suspender protección a periodista asesinado.Zenzotle
400. July 31, 2019. En evidencia el inútil Mecanismo de Protección de Periodistas; Rogelio Barragán había pedido ayuda, pero en la SEGOB ni
siquiera le devolvieron la llamada. Artículo 19. May 16, 2019. Asesinato de Francisco Romero, cuarto periodista asesinado con medidas de
protección del Mecanismo.
1190 Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas Mexicanos. July 16, 2019. Se incrementan las agresiones a periodistas en el Estado de México.
1191 Reporters Without Borders. March 13, 2019. Impunidad de los crímenes contra periodistas en México: RSF anuncia su comunicación
oficial a la Corte Penal Internacional. DW. August 2, 2019. Asesinato de periodistas: en México, la prensa es la única fuente de justicia.
1192“Agent of @FGEGuerrero identified as Romel El Vampiro with his weapon threatened reporters who were covering operation headed by
director of Ministerial Police Esteban Maldonado Palacios, an individual with a dark background, yesterday in #Chilpancingo #Guerrero”. June
30, 2019. @EzequielFloresC
1193 La Jornada. February 10, 2017. Policía agrede a fotógrafos en Nezahualcóyotl.
1194 La Prensa de Tlaxcala. March 26, 2019. Presidente de San Francisco Atezcatzingo, intenta limpiar su nombre del fraude a 255 personas.
1195 Soy Barrio. May 5, 2019. Maltratan y detienen policías a periodista de Novedades. Impedian que grabara.
1196 Poder Edomex. July 7, 2019. Condena azucena Cisneros agresiones contra periodistas. Reporteros en Movimiento. Facebook. July 5, 2019.
La reportera Beda Peñaloza muestra fotos de los ministeriales que le robaron su equipo ayer en Ecatepec, la FGJEM guarda silencio.
1197 Forbes México. July 22, 2019. Saquean casa de Lydia Cacho y envenenan a sus mascotas. Animal Político. July 22, 2019. Saquean casa de
la periodista Lydia Cacho y envenenan a sus mascotas.
1198 El Sudcaliforniano. January 29, 2019. Captan el momento en que agreden a batazos a Martín Valtierra. El Sol de México. January 30, 2019.
Atacan a batazos a periodista sudcaliforniano, Martín Valtierra.
198
baseball bats by strangers outside his home in Baja California. On March 22, Hiram Moreno, from the Evidencias
news site, survived a gun attack in Oaxaca1199. On June 17, Oswaldo Müller and the Canal 6 Telediario team were
attacked by civilians during a live broadcast in the municipality of Nezahualcóyotl in front of municipal
guards1200. On June 26, Juan Manuel Vega of the magazine Dígalo sin Miedo1201 survived an attack with firearms
in the municipality of Reyes la Paz in the State of Mexico.
870. On the other hand, this Office was also informed about kidnappings of communicators and press
personnel. Such as the case of the investigative reporter of La Crónica de Hoy, Daniel Blancas1202, who was
deprived of liberty by armed subjects on February 1 in Hidalgo. Another case of kidnapping was against the
judicial reporter Marcos Miranda, who would have received threats for his work as editor of the portal Noticias
a Tiempo, and was kidnapped on June 10 by armed men in the city of Boca del Río, Veracruz1203. The state
governor, Cuitláhuac García, informed of his release a few days after the fact.
871. According to public information, the director of the digital media La Prensa de Tlaxcal, Alberto Amaro
Jordán1204, reported a firearm attack and the presence of an individual taking photographs in front of his home
between August 29 and September 2.
872. During 2019, according topublic information, journalist Ana Luisa Cantoral of digital media Página 31205
received a death threat on April 10 in Oaxaca, and on July 1 in Tezoyuca, State of Mexico, Claudia Bautista
Justo1206, of the station La Unik radio also received a deaththreat.
873. Violence against women journalists is another worrying pattern in Mexico, this Office has reported
stereotype-based attacks against different women journalists, who have suffered all kinds of attacks related to
their gender status. On May 14, the Z Noticias Zacapu reporter and broadcaster, Alejandra Jiménez García1207,
reported having been the victim of threats with a gender and sexual violence component by unknown
individuals in Panindícuaro, Michoacán. Along the same lines, the reporter Monserrat Ortiz of the ADN401208
media was threatened with being raped and killed after the publication of a report on gender violence.
Communicator Alicia Blanco1209, wife of Pedro Tamayo, a journalist murdered in 2016, reported on April 29 that
she had been the victim ofpersecution by a groupof armed subjects aboard a car after leaving a legal hearing in
Cosamaloapan, Veracruz. In the same vein, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the allegations
of the reporter in Morelia (Michoacan), Mitzi Yanet Torres1210, that the police had assaulted her with blows, and
she would have been detained and threatened with sexual violence.
874. According to public knowledge, the newspaper El Piñero de la Cuenca in Oaxaca, denounced to different
media outlets that since May 24 it has been the victim of a smear campaign that allegedly would have been
carried out from the Facebook page, “El Voceador de la Loma”, publicly accusing the newspaper of extortion1211.
According to information provided by the newspaper, the campaign began after the media conducted an
interview where it questions the municipal president of the town of Loma Bonita about the purchase of land.
Along the same lines, the director of the media, Roberto Hernández, and his son, Roberto Polo Hernández
González, received death threats through different platforms on social networks linked to municipal officials in
Tuxtepec1212. Along the same lines, journalist Carlos Abad, denounced that through the same WhatsApp and
Facebook profiles that they used with the Hernández family, he would have also received a death threat.
1199 Sin Embargo. March 20, 2019. El periodista Hiram Moreno es atacado a balazos en Oaxaca; por fortuna, salió con heridas leves. Eje Central.
March 21, 2019. Periodista Hiram Moreno sobrevive a ataque armado en Oaxaca.
1200 El Universal. June 17, 2019. Captan agresión a reporteros en cobertura de accidente vehicular en Neza. La Prensa. June 17, 2019. Agreden
a reportero de Telediario cuando hacia enlace en vivo desde Nezahualcoytl.
1201 MSN Noticias. June 26, 2019. Balean a reportero de Los Reyes La Paz. Cuestión Polémica. July 15, 2019. A la opinión pública: No queremos
periodistas asesinados en Edomex.
1202 Aristegui Noticias. February 6, 2019. Periodista fue secuestrado y golpeado por presuntos huachicoleros en Hidalgo. Excélsior. February 5,
2019. López Obrador se solidariza con periodista secuestrado por huachicoleros.
1203 CNN Español. June 13, 2019. México: rescatan a Marcos Miranda, periodista que había sido secuestrado en Veracruz. Univisión. June 13,
2019. "Gracias a Dios estoy vivo": así fue el rescate del periodista Marcos Miranda, secuestrado en el sur de México.
1204 Co-Nexiones. October 9, 2019. Condena la confederación de periodistas de Tlaxcala las agresiones que sufrió el periodista Alberto Amaro
Jordán en Apizaco. Codigo Tlaxcala. September 5, 2019. Amenazan a Alberto Amaro.
1205 Proceso. April 11, 2019. Reportera de Oaxaca denuncia amenazas de muerte.
1206 Síntesis de Guerrero. July 15, 2019. Se incrementan las agresiones a periodistas en el Estado de México.
1207 La Jornada/Facebook. May 23, 2019. Periodista de la radiodifusora Z de Zacapu, y los portales Noticias de Hoy LP, y Notivisión de Quiroga,
denunció amenazas en su contra, tras reportear sobre cambios de uso de suelo e incendios provocados, en Zacapu #Michoacán. Noticias TM.
May 30, 2019. Periodista Alejandra Jiménez pide protección tras recibir amenazas de muerte por denunciar incendios provocados en Michoacán.
1208 ADN 40. February 5, 2019. Reportera de adn40 es amenazada tras exhibir a agresor de mujeres. Proceso. February 5, 2019. Periodista
recibe amenazas tras reportaje sobre violencia a mujeres; la CNDH y PGJ-CDMX intervienen.
1209 Centro PRODH. April 30, 2019. Denuncian intimidación armada contra Alicia Blanco, esposa del asesinado periodista Pedro Tamayo.
Artículo 19. April 29, 2019. Sujetos armados persiguen a la periodista Alicia Blanco en Cosamaloapan, Veracruz.
1210 “Mitzi Yanet Torres, 34, is a reporter at #Morelia, #Michoacán. On Tuesday she reported an attempted rape. The police who came to her
"help" assaulted and detained her for no reason. The medical expert said she "had no blows," just like the judge who handled her case. Look at
her face. #México”. Twitter account of Verónica Calderón. @veronicalderon August 21, 2019. 5.29 P.M
1211 Sin Embargo. April 14, 2019. Artículo 19 denuncia uso de cuentas ligadas a funcionarios para amenazar a periodistas en Oaxaca.
1212 Artículo 19. April 13, 2019. Amenazan de muerte a reporteros desde cuentas ligadas a funcionarios municipales de Tuxtepec, Oaxaca . El
Piñeiro. April 12, 2019. Funcionarios y comando de bots del gobierno de Tuxtepec, orquestaron ataques y amenazas contra reportero Carlos
Abad.
199
875. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information on death threats andphysical aggressions
against the Mexican journalist and columnist of the Washington Post, Carlos Loret de Mola1213, after the
publication of the documentary Mar de sombra, where he reports the so-called "Cartel de la Totoaba" by the
indiscriminate fishing and slaughter of the vaquita marina and other species.
876. According to the Special Rapporteurs' observation, in their Special Report on the Situation of Freedom
of Expression in Mexico 2018, “it is necessary that the risk assessment methodologies include a differentiated
approach that takes specific risks that certain groups of journalists face into account, including women
journalists and indigenous journalists. The Government should also take additional actions to include digital
security among the risk assessments carried out by the Mechanism and provide, where appropriate, digital
protection measures, such as the secure management of personal communications data. Likewise, the
Mechanism should effectively deal withphysical aggressionsperpetrated by state officials, as well as other forms
of institutional violence against journalists (namely discredit and criminalization campaigns)”.
F. Stigmatizing statements
877. On April 24, the editorial director of the newspaper Diario Reforma, Juan E. Pardinas, received death
threats and harassment by unknown subjects, they would also have started a smear campaign towards the
media that he directs under the hashtag #NarcoReforma1214. The incident would have occurred three days after
the statements made by President Lopez Obrador in one of the mañaneras against the Diario Reforma. “Las
Mañaneras”, is the name by which the morning press conferences offered by the President of the Republic are
known, although they have been described as a signal of opening for the press by the new government, they
have also been used to attack different media and criticaljournalists.
878. This Office has documented dozens1215 of stigmatizing statements against journalists and members of
the press from authorities in different states1216, which has led civil society organizations that protect the
journalistic exercise to issue statements asking the government to lower the level of confrontation with the
media1217.
879. On April 15, President López Obrador told reporters: "If you overstep, you know, don't you? What
happens, don't you? 1218" The next day, he made a clarification, explaining that he was referring to society holding
accountable journalists who unfairly criticized his government. Along the same lines, the Mexican president has
used the term "fifí" on several occasions to refer to what he says is known as the conservativepress.
880. “Ah, the fifi press (…) are conservatives with the appearance of liberals. They are specialists in
simulation1219”.
881. “I did not invent the term fifi, it was used to characterize those who opposed President Madero. The fifis
were those who burned the house of the Maderos, they were those who made a celebration in the streets when
the military killed Gustavo Madero1220”.
882. On February 24, during the national meeting on Tourism held in Chetumal, Quintana Roo, Laura
Beristáin, mayor of the municipality of Solidaridad, accused the media belonging to the companies Grupo Cantón
and Grupo Quequi of being “journalistic hitmen”1221 indicating that they would publish false data about violence
in her municipality.
883. On July 22, in another mañanera, President Lopez Obrador mentioned the media1222, including the
newspaper El Proceso and Reforma1223, indicating that he did not like the coverage that they made to his
government, by saying: “Well, the magazine Proceso for example, it was not good to us”, within the framework
of a questioning by reporter Arturo Rodríguez about the operation of the sale of Fertinal1224. As a result, the
president said, without showing evidence, that the media did not report the looting policy of the so-called neoliberal period. In addition, he added that magazine edits for conservatism to remain, not to transform: “It is very
1213 “I have received physical aggression and death threats over the stories on the Totoaba Cartel that has #Vaquita on the brink of extinction”.
Twitter account of Carlos Loret de Mola. @CarlosLoret March 28, 2019. 6.19 P.M. Diario de Yucatán. March 29, 2019. “No voy a matar a
Carlos Loret, le voy a tumbar los dientes”
1214 Diario Contrapeso Ciudadano. April 27, 2019. Críticas de AMLO desata amenazas de muerte contra Pardinas. CNN. April 26, 2019. Tras
amenazas de muerte, Gobierno ofrece protección a director del Periódico Reforma.
1215 TV Pacífico. August 19, 2019. Comisión de Derechos Humanos reprocha expresiones de rechazo y descalificación de alcaldes hacia
periodistas y medios.
1216 New York Times. August 7, 2019. AMLO y la prensa mal portada. Animal Político. June 3, 2019. El acoso a la prensa en América Latina.
1217 DW. August, 2019. Periodistas en México: "El discurso de AMLO envalentona a otros funcionarios públicos".
1218 Big Bang México. April 15, 2019. AMLO a periodistas: “si se pasan, ya saben lo que les pasa”. MSN. April 15, 2019. AMLO le pide a los
periodistas que sean prudentes; “si se pasan, ya saben”.
1219 Zenit Noticias / Youtube. March 13, 2019. Son unos hipócritas a la prensa fifi Lopez Obrador.
1220 El Heraldo. May 26, 2019. Esta es la definición de fifí según AMLO.
1221 Tabasco Hoy. February 26, 2019. Oculta edil inseguridad a Presidente. Sin Embargo. February 27, 2019. Alcaldesa de Quintana Roo llama
“sicarios periodísticos” a medios locales; Artículo 19 pide no estigmatizar.
1222 Official AMLO website. July 22, 2019. Versión estenográfica de la conferencia de prensa matutina del presidente Andrés Manuel López
Obrador.
1223 New York Times. August 7, 2019. AMLO y la prensa mal portada.
1224 Proceso. July 20, 2019. Salinas Pliego, el magnate que movió los hilos en la estafa Pemex-Fertinal.
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comfortable to say I am independent or say that journalism should not take sides or bet on the transformation. It is
analyzing reality, criticizing reality, but not transforming it. It is to edit itto affectthe transformations”1225. Hours
earlier, unidentified subjects forcibly entered the house of journalist Lydia Cacho1226, killed her two dogs and
stole files, cameras, digital memories, and a computer with material related to her investigations related to cases
of child abuse.
884. On November 4, President López Obrador once again criticized the coverage that some media made of
the operation thatthe Mexican armed forces carried outto capture Ovidio Guzmán, son of drug trafficker Joaquín
"Chapo" Guzmán, which was unsuccessful. During one of the morning conferences, the president recalled the
phrase of Gustavo Madero (brother of former President Francisco I. Madero), “they bite the hand of the one who
took the muzzle from them,” referring, he explained, to the time before the military to coupto kill Madero, when
the press would have insisted on attacking him.
885. Lopez Obrador said: “Hence a very strong phrase that I am going to say, I am going to say it because all
this helps. Do you know what Gustavo Madero came to say? "They bite the hand of the one who took the muzzle
from them." That was not forgiven, ever. That is why they were focused on him, first on Gustavo Madero and
then on his brother. I don't wantthat ever to happen again. That is one of the most shameful stories of journalism
and politics in Mexico.” In that context, the Mexican president asked the media to act ethically and be rigorous
with information and called for them to stop what he considers to be yellow press and a media show. "The
media," he said, "must be regulated through means and in this case, it has to be society, it has tobe citizens”
1227.
886. Also, Lopez Obrador said was the victim of a “dirty war orchestrated by the national and international
media (…) I remember almost eight columns of EL PAÍS, in Spain, after there was an election in Mexico, with a
headline: 'Obrador is a ballast”1228.
887. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that with their
statements they are not damaging the rights of those who contribute to public deliberation through the
expression and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, the media, and human rights organizations,
and must pay attention to the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their expressions do not
constitute, in the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights
of those who intend to contribute topublic deliberation through the expression and diffusion of their thought.”
G. Social Protest
888. On May 21, the Mexican Senatepassed four laws that would regulate the operation of the national guard,
a police security body in the country, which would criminalize publicprotest1229. The lawspassed, would contain
articles with a crowd control perspective and not a facilitation and protection of the exercise of human rights in
the context of demonstrations and assembly. This Office was specifically informed about articles 16 and 40,
which maintain a perspective of crowd control and not of facilitation and protection of the exercise of human
rights in the context of demonstrations and assembly. In the same way, article 27 of the initiative prohibits the
use of firearms or lethal weapons against "demonstrations or peacefulpublic meetings with a lawful purposes",
without setting a definition for such concept. Through press releases and statements, several international
organizations indicated that the ambiguity of some articles of the law, as well as the discretionary power
conferred on police authorities to decide in which cases to act or not, encourages arbitrariness and human rights
violations.
889. This Office was informed about the decision of the Tabasco State Congress, which approved a reform to
the state criminal code that seeks topunish those whoprevent the execution of anypublic orprivate project and
those who block streets and roads1230. This reform, which entered into force on August 1, imposes jail sentences
on those who prevent "the free movement of people and vehicles, machinery, specialized equipment, or similar
for the execution of public and private works, and works on the roads and means of communication".
1225 Proceso. July 23, 2019. “Despóticas muestras de intolerancia”, las declaraciones de AMLO contra Proceso: Coparmex. Expansión Política.
July 22, 2019. AMLO critica (otra vez) a la prensa que no apoya la "transformación".
1226 True, the levels of violence and cruelty increase to the same extent thatimpunity protectsthem. Thank you for your solidarity. My journalistic
investigations are safe abroad; copies were sent, nobody will steal the truth. #AquíNadieSeRinde Cuenta de Lydia Cacho @lydiacachosi. July 22,
2019. 6.56. P.M.
1227 El Mañanero Diario. November 4, 2019. Lo más sonado de la semana #7: “Le muerden la mano a quien les quitó el bozal”, le dice AMLO a
los medios. El universal. November 7, 2019. Manos, bozales y perros. Animal Político. November 6, 2019. No veo a periodistas como enemigos,
sino como adversarios, dice AMLO.
1228 El País. November 6, 2019. López Obrador carga contra EL PAÍS tras ser cuestionado por su actitud hacia la prensa crítica.
1229 AP. May 23, 2019. México aprueba leyes de actuación de la Guardia Nacional. Infobae. May 21, 2019. Senado aprobó las leyes secundarias
de la Guardia Nacional; ONG's temen más violaciones a los derechos humanos.
1230 Gatopardo Revista. August 7, 2019. Tabasco, del Éxodo por la Democracia a la Ley Garrote. El Diario. August 20, 2019. Relatores de ONU
critican reforma que penaliza protestas en estado mexicano.
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890. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the excessive use of public force and attacks
against journalists1231 during the demonstration of women on August 12 in Mexico City, which was held through
a public call following the allegations of at least three cases of rape by police in the capital1232.
891. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the political and social critical expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly”
and that “the exercise of the right of assembly to through social protest must not be subject to authorization by
the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder itsrealization”.
892. Likewise, the 2013 joint declaration on violence against journalists in the context of social
demonstrations, indicates that “[the] State has a duty to guarantee that journalists and communicators, who are
carrying out their informative work in the context of a public demonstration, are not detained, threatened,
assaulted, or limited in any way in their rights for exercising their profession.
H. Subsequent Liabilities
893. In 2019, an action under the figure of moral damage for the payment of millions was filed against
researcher and analyst Sergio Aguayo1233, journalist Humberto Padgett1234, driver Pedro Ferriz de Con1235,
lawyer Roberto Saucedo, and columnist Arnoldo Cuellar1236 in Mexico. Padgett, after a long process, overcame
the lawsuit, while the Ferriz Con, and Cuellar processes were still open at the close of this this AnnualReport.
894. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has noted with concern the conviction against Aguayo, according
topublic knowledge information, magistrates of the sixth civil court revoked the sentence that the journalist had
already won in March and gave the reason to the former governor of the State of Coahuila, Humberto Moreira.
The ruling concludes that Aguayo "has caused moral damage to the plaintiff Humberto Moreira Valdés, affecting
his honor", so he is condemned to the "publication or disclosure of the conviction at his expense, in the
newspapers Reforma and Siglo of Torreón, and on the personal twitter account of the defendant Sergio Aguayo
Quezada, being in said media and formats where the facts and opinions that constituted the damage to moral
were disseminated”. In addition, he must pay Moreira 10 million Mexican pesos “for punitive damages”, in
addition to the payment of “expenses and costs (the expenses that must be paid in a judicialprocess) generated”,
which were not specified1237.
895. On May 31, journalists from Uniradio, Sonia de Anda and Daniel Iglesias, as well as reporters from the
Weekly Zeta, Eduardo Villa and Isaí Lara1238, received information about the lawsuit for alleged moral damage
committed by them and various people against the private security company Seguritech Privada SA de C.V. in
Tijuana, Baja California, regarding a civil process established inMexico.
896. Also in Baja California, on June 6, the Third Criminal Judge of Tijuana, notified the AFN Tijuana media1239
to “take down and delete web servers, web pages, social networks, digital files, and other sections where they
could store information from Rogelio 'N' 1 (…)”. The data referred to derived from the publication of a 2011
note, which contains the journalistic follow-up of events of public interest that occurred in the demarcation on
November 8 of the same year, when the murder of two people was madepublic.
897. According to information provided to this Office, following the report “Salinas Pliego, the magnate who
moved the threads of the Pemex-Fertinal scam” published by the magazine Proceso in July 2019, Ricardo Salinas
Pliego and his company Banco Azteca sued the weekly claiming1240 that this publication is part of a smear
1231 Noticias Milenio/Youtube. August 16, 2019. Agreden a reportera de MILENIO en manifestación de mujeres. Derechos Digitales. August 30,
2019. Represión contra mujeres periodistas y activistas en México.
1232 Milenio. August 12, 2019. "Nos nos cuidan, nos violan": protestan por violencia de policías contra mujeres. CNN. August 20, 2019. Abusos
de la fuerza pública, asesinatos y violencia: las razones por las que protestan las mujeres en México.
1233 El Sol de México. October 11, 2019. Sergio Aguayo pagará 10 mdp a Humberto Moreira tras perder juicio. Juzgado Décimo Sexto Civil de
la Ciudad de México. Moreira Valdés Humberto contra Sergio Aguayo Quezada. Toca: 957/2019.
1234 Aristegui Noticias. June 18, 2019. Pierde Eruviel Ávila juicio vs el periodista Humberto Padgett. Tercer Tribunal Colegiado de Circuito de
lo Civil en el Segundo Circuito (Amparo Directo 184/2019 and Amparo Directo 185/2019) formed by judges Juan Carlos Ramírez Gómora,
Victorino Hernández Infante and Isaías Zárate Martínez.
1235 Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito en la Ciudad de México. El Financiero. February 25, 2019. Tribunal acreditó
que Pedro Ferriz de Con me causó daño moral: Moreira.
1236 El Proceso. October 10, 2018. Inicia juicio contra activista y periodista acusados de daño moral por el propietario de Canal TV8 en
Guanajuato.
1237 Tribunal Superior de Justicia de México. Toca 957/2019. Aristegui Noticias. October 14, 2019. Esta es la sentencia contra Aguayo, en la
que lo condenan a pagar 10 mdp por “daño moral” a Moreira.
1238 Uniradio Noticias. June 1, 2019. Demanda de Seguritech atenta contra la libertad de expresión: CCSPBC. Artículo 19. June 8, 2019. Una
demanda de daño moral y una orden de eliminación de contenido buscan restringir a la prensa en Tijuana, BC.
1239 Somos el Medio. June 10, 2019. Restringen contenidos a la prensa en Tijuana tras una demanda de daño moral y una orden de eliminación.
1240 Poplab. October 23, 2019. Este es el reportaje que Ricardo Salinas Pliego no quiere que leas. 62º Civil Court of Mexico City Ricardo Salinas
and Banco Azteca sue Proceso for “moral damage”.
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campaign that threatens honor and good reputation. The appeal filed by the lawyers of Salinas Pliego would
have taken time to be heard because there was a prior censorship order1241.
898. The Office of the Special Rapporteur reminds the State of Mexico, that in its 2018 Special Report, the
Special Rapporteurs recommended that the State “[to] repeal the Printing Crimes Act of 1917 and reform the
criminal codes of the federal entities in order to eliminate crimes that criminalize freedom of expression, and to
refrain from using other provisions of criminal law to punish the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression.”
Also, "to reform the civil codes of the federal entities to guarantee the protection of honor through civil
procedures, stipulating limits and criteria for sanctions, in accordance with international standards." Finally, it
stressed that the role of SEGOB and the Mechanism should be key in this regard”.
I. Source Confidentiality
899. On March 21, according to public information, the Ministry of Public Security of Michoacán would have
asked the digital media Changoonga.com of Morelia1242 to reveal personal data of a citizen who provided
information on an alleged case of police abuse published on February 25 of 2019 in said medium. The media
also reported that it would have received calls and messages to reporters as a form of pressure and threats.
900. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that principle 8 of the Declaration of Principles establishes
that “every social communicator has the right to keep his/her source of information, notes, personal, and
professional archives confidential.” Likewise, remember that Article 13.3 of the American Convention
establishes that “the right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse
of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the
dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of
ideas and opinions.” Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states
that “prior censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or
information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must
be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition
of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
J .Legal Reforms
901. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has noted that on July 31, the Hidalgo State Congress approved the
elimination of so-called crimes against honor from the entity's laws1243. Legislators abolished the Sixth Title of
the Criminal Code of Hidalgo that eliminates articles 191 to 202 of the Criminal Code. This repeal was one of the
recommendations made by the Special Rapporteurs for freedom of expression of the UN and the OAS in their
joint 2018 report and would represent progress for freedom of expression, considering the context in which
crimes against honor are arbitrarily imputed to voices critical to different interests, constituting a censorship
mechanism.
902. Along these same lines, this Office was informed about the initiative of the Nayarit State Congress1244 to
repeal articles 217 and the content of the Seventh Title called Crimes Against Honor presented on October 24.
Nayarit is one of the few states that contemplates crimes against honor in its criminal legislation; which are
insults and defamation.
903. On May 9, Congress deputies of the State of Veracruz approved to reform article 298 of the Criminal
Code of said entity to sanction with one to five years in prison and a fine, to whoever photographs, films, or
disseminates images of a corpse or human remains1245. This reform contains a broad and ambiguous wording,
which could generate restrictive interpretations, as well as a discretionary and arbitrary application thereof, to
the detriment of the journalistic exercise.
904.This Office is concerned about the entry into force on August 1 of the reforms to the criminal law in
Tabasco, where protest is criminalized. According to public information, the so-called "Garrote Law" mandates
that those who prevent the free movement of people, vehicles, or machinery for the execution of public works
be punished with imprisonment and fines.
1241 Aristegui Noticias. October 23, 2019. Reportaje por el que demandó Salinas a ‘Proceso’, “muy bien documentado”; hubo orden de juez para
no hablar del juicio: Villanueva.
1242 Changooga. March 13, 2019. SSP Michoacán Presiona A Changoonga.com Para Entregar Información De Víctima. Artículo 19. March 21,
2019. Secretaría de Seguridad Pública de Michoacán presiona a medio para revelar fuente.
1243 Expansión Política. July 31, 2019. El Congreso de Hidalgo elimina los "delitos contra el honor".
1244 Todo Texcoco. October 25, 2019. Congreso de Nayarit derogará ’delitos contra el honor’. Matutino Gráfico. October 28, 2019. Propone
Polo despenalizar las injurias y difamación. El Independiente. July 31, 2019. Calumnia y difamación ya no son delitos.
1245 Artículo 19. May 16, 2019. Reforma al Código Penal de Veracruz pone en riesgo la labor periodística.
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K.Censorship of journalistic material / Prior censorship / Direct and indirectcensorship
905. Regarding the censorship of journalistic material, this Office was informed about the detention and
denial of entry permit to Mexico on January 17 to two international journalists seeking to cover the caravan of
migrants in Tijuana. According to available information, the Canadian photojournalist and documentary
filmmaker, Kitra Cahana and the AP agency photographer, Daniel Ochoa, were detained for 13 hours and
reported that theirphones were confiscated because the security force reportedly did not let them communicate
with their embassies1246.
906. On May 14, MVS Radio Tampico reporter, Cynthia Gallardo1247 of the site Ordenador, said they were
blocked for informational coverage by the municipal councilor of MORENA (National Regeneration Movement)
[Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional], Nelly Torres Benítez, while covering an event in the Municipal Electoral
Council in the same municipality, in Tamaulipas.
907. On May 28 in Chiapas, the independent reporter Damián Sánchez, reported having been obstructed in
its coverage by members of the NationalInstitute of Migration (INM) and Federal Police agents, who would have
prevented him from takingphotographs during a detention of migrants’ operation in Tapachula. Along the same
lines, the reporters José Torres, correspondent for the newsletter “Así las Cosas” and the journalist Alberto
Padilla of Animal Político, denounced that they would have beaten to evict them from the Migratory Station Siglo
XXI1248.
908. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Article 13.2 of the American Convention states that the
exercise of freedom of expression "shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent
imposition of liability." In the same vein, principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles provides that, “prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must be prohibited
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
L. Access to public information
909. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed about the signing of the “Agreement establishing
various actions for the transfer of historical documents related to human rights violations and political
persecutions linked to political and social movements, as well as acts of corruption that are in possession of the
dependencies and entities of the Federal Public Administration”, on February 281249. Although this signature
constitutesprogress for access topublic information, different organizations indicated that the decision still has
some ambiguities and indicate that it is necessary to establish protection mechanisms and processes of
documentary valuation with experts or auditors, independent of the obligatedsubjects.
910. According to different media, on April 4, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) in Mexico
issued two amparos sentences1250 with reference to the right to the truth about the cases of the massacres of San
Fernando and Cadereyta. In this way, it is possible that the National Institute of Transparency, Access to
Information and Protection of Personal Data [Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y
Protección de Datos Personales] (INAI), catalogs acts of serious human rights violations for the purpose of access
to information and it would no longer be necessary to wait for the determination of the National Human Rights
Commission to access such information in a givencase.
911. On April 20, the PODER Non-Governmental Organization, which specializes in transparency and
accountability, denounced a series of informational blockades carried out from March 27 to April 5 by the
Federal Commission for Protection against Health Risks [Comisión Federal para la Protección contra Riesgos
Sanitarios] (COFEPRIS). The organization said that the blockades happened when they requested interviews to
know in depth the list of ingredients in tobacco products that tobacco companies deliver to said institution and
also questioned the delay of Mexichem in the delivery of the remediation plan after the explosion of the Pajaritos
petrochemical complex.
912. Through the request of information made by a citizen after the murder of the journalist Norma Saraiva,
on June 12, the INAI reminded the Attorney General of the Republic (FGR) of Mexico of its obligation topublicize
the number of complaints, prior investigations, investigation files, and arrest warrants for crimes against
1246 Univisión. March 6, 2019. El gobierno tiene lista secreta de periodistas y abogados ligados a caravana migrante, según reporte. El País.
March 8, 2019. Estados Unidos vigiló a periodistas que cubrían la caravana migrante.
1247 Somos el Medio. May 21, 2019. Reportera de MVS radio es agredida por consejera de Morena.
1248 El Universal. August 27, 2019. CNDH abre expediente por agresión a dos periodistas. Proceso. August 27, 2019. La CNDH condena agresión
contra periodistas en desalojo de migrantes en Tapachula.
1249 SEGOB. February 28, 2019. Acuerdo por el que se establecen diversas acciones para la transferencia de documentos históricos relacionados
con violaciones de derechos humanos y persecuciones políticas vinculadas con movimientos políticos y sociales, así como con actos de corrupción
en posesión de las dependencias y entidades de la Administración Pública Federal.
1250 SCJN. Sentencia de amparos 661/2014 y 453/2015. La Silla Rota. April 8, 2019. ¿Dos caras de la misma sentencia? Aristegui Noticias. April
5, 2019. Inai determinará acceso a averiguación sobre masacres de San Fernando y Cadereyta: Corte.
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freedom of expression, injuries, torture, kidnapping, homicide, forced disappearance, violation of
correspondence, or disclosure of sources or secrets, committed against journalists and human rights defenders,
in 2017 and 20181251. Likewise, it indicated that they must report on the operational plan of work and the
percentages of compliance with the Mechanism for the Protection of Journalists and Human Rights Defenders,
as well as the number of complaints filed before the then Attorney General'sOffice.
913. Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR establishes that
“access to information held by the State is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.”
M. Internet and Freedom of Expression
914. On June 3, the Civil Society Organization Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity [Mexicanos Contra
la Corrupción y la Impunidad] (MCCI) denounced before the Attorney General's Office, the National Human
Rights Commission, and the Ministry of Interior, that its portal was victim of several attacks initiated on May 6
in order to damage its reputation, as reported to different media, the organization's portal would have been
hacked and intervened with fake news.
915. According to information provided by Civil Society Organizations in Tuxtepec1252, about 25 Facebook
profiles and 2 fan pages would have been detected from which false information about journalists is
disseminated. They also identified a pattern that has to do with the creation of fake Facebook accounts, as well
as the dissemination of images and threats through WhatsApp groups, mainly after a media outlet publishes
notes where municipal public officials are questioned about the use they make of public resources.
916. Along the same lines, the WhatsAppcompany and the Citizen Lab of the University of Toronto published
on October 29, that more than 1,400 people, in at least 20 countries around the world, were attacked with
Pegasus malware by exploiting a vulnerability on the instant messagingplatform. They also identified more than
one hundred members of civil society, journalists, activists, and human rights defenders attacked in this way,
being Mexico one of the countries that would have reported greater vigilance in the first months of 2019.
Although the company has not disclosed the exact figure or the identity of the affected people, it said it
communicated with them according to a notification to inform them about the high probability of having been
targeted by an attack1253.
917. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information on a series of attacks against different
journalists originated by robots, known as bots, through hashtags on social networks #PrensaSicaria
#PrensaProstituida, and #PrensaCorrupta1254. These aggressions occurred after the morning press conference
of President Lopez Obrador on October 31, where thepresident made a series of stigmatizing statements against
the press, as this Office has already noted in the corresponding section of this Annual Report. Within this
framework, according to an analysis carried out by the Information, Infrastructure, and Technology Linking Unit
of the Ministry of Public Security of Mexico, the hashtags would have been used by 28,161 users, and generated
around 34 million reactions1255.
N. Communications Surveillance
918. On March 20, the Canadian Citizen Lab, together with the organizations Social TIC, R3D, and Artículo 19,
presented the research report detailing how Griselda Triana was attacked with the Pegasus spying software in
the days after the murder of her husband Javier Valdez, in 2017. According to the document, the software would
have allowed a thirdparty to have access to, and even control, most of Triana'sphone features1256. In June 2017,
different media outlets in Mexico reported for the first time that the federal government had bought Pegasus
spy software from the Israeli security company NSO Group. Different civil society organizations stated that,
although so far it is impossible to determine the exact origin of the attacks with spyware, their research points
to a grouplinked to the Mexican Government. The Mexican Government headed by then President Enrique Peña
Nieto repeatedly denied accusations that it was spying on journalists, activists, and human rights defenders.
1251 MVS Noticias. June 12, 2019. Ordena INAI a la fiscalía entregar información sobre delitos contra periodistas y defensores de DH. La
Jornada. June 12, 2019. Ordena Inai a FGR revelar datos sobre Protección a Periodistas.
1252 El Universal. April 14, 2019. Denuncian amenazas a dos reporteros de la Cuenca. Proceso. March 10, 2019. Periodistas de Oaxaca
denuncian a alcalde de Tuxtepec por presunto espionaje.
1253 Artículo 19. October 21, 2019. WhatsApp revela que Pegasus continuó operando en México en 2019.
1254 AristeguiNoticias.November 1, 2019. Considera AMLO que ataques en redes a periodistasson genuinos, pero acepta indagar bots(mientras
no le cueste al gobierno).
1255Radio y Televisión Mexicana. November 5, 2019. Acusan a opositores en guerra de bots. Of all those who joined the hashtags #HitmenPress
#ProstitutedPress #CorruptPress, more than 7,200 are bots... what was notsaid, is that the main ones are related to @MorenaPartyMx. Twitter
account of journalist Stephanie Ochoa. @StefyOchoa. November 4, 2019. 11.42. A.M.
1256 Arístegui Noticias. March 20, 2019. Tras asesinato de Javier Valdez, usaron spyware Pegasus contra su viuda Griselda Triana. Citizen Lab.
March 20, 2019. Wife of Journalist Slain in Cartel-Linked Killing Targeted with NSO Group’s Spyware.
205
919. According to information provided by different media worldwide, in March 2019 the US Department of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (CBP) would have created a database of people “suspected” of being
“organizers, coordinators, and instigators”, and of journalists who covered the last caravan of Central American
immigrants that arrived in Tijuana in Mexico last 2018. The published documents bear the seal of the
International Liaison Unit, which coordinates intelligence between the United States and Mexico1257. The
anonymous source that would have leaked the information indicated that this database is shared by CBP, the
immigration police (ICE), the border patrol, and the FBI.
920. On May 23, the president of the Public Broadcasting System of Mexico, Jenaro Villamil stated that media
companies and journalists who obtained contracts during the government of Enrique Peña Nieto should explain
"what kind of services they provided." On the matter, the Special Rapporteurs recommended in the Special
Report that the State should carry out an “independent investigation process on the acquisition and use of
malware (including ‘Pegasus’)”. They also emphasize that “an investigation of this type must be independent of
the federal government and the governments of the federal entities that, presumably, have purchased or used
the spy program, and include experts from academic organizations and society civil, even, potentially, from
foreign countries. Meanwhile, in any investigation that is ongoing, the rights of those who are subject to
surveillance actions must be respected, which includes their security and privacy.” Finally, they recommend
“establishing a legal framework to protect people from arbitrary or clandestine interference in their privacy,
including the protection of journalistic sources in accordance with international standards on the subject”. In
this sense, “State agencies involved in surveillance must establish guarantees and judicial supervision measures,
within the permissible limits in a democratic society”. In addition, “Mexico should consider the possibility of
creating an independent body to effectively supervise the State's surveillance tasks”.
O. Government advertising
921. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed about the publication of May 23 where the
newspaper Reforma published a list with the names of 36 journalists and their companies, who would have
received the amount of 1,081 million Mexican pesos in government advertising during the past government of
the former President Enrique Peña Nieto. The information generated controversy, questions, and doubts, which
is why, through an open letter to the president, signed on May 31, the website Publicidad Oficial, created by
organizations and journalists, requested the government to repeal the previous Social Communication General
Law1258, the drafting of a preferred law by initiative of the Executive, and the opening of a broad debate with an
open parliament process to approve a new law. The draft was presented in October 2018 under the name of the
Citizen Initiative of the General Law of Government Advertising and it contemplates clear, objective, and
transparent criteria for the distribution of government advertising in accordance with the provisions of the
Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of Mexico and international standards on the matter.
922. According to public information, within the austerity plan of the new government, a 50% reduction in
spending on government advertising was proposed. During the Enrique Peña Nieto six-year term, the budget
was of almost 10 billion pesos annually, which according to different media outlets, the lack ofproper regulation
would have allowed millions of pesos to be used to promote public figures and skew the information that civil
society would consume in addition to generating an inhibitory effect for the free journalisticexercise.
923. Principle 13 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states, “the exercise
of power and the use of public funds by the State, the granting of customs duty privileges, the arbitrary and
discriminatory placement of official advertising and government loans; the concession of radio and television
broadcast frequencies, among others, with the intent to put pressure on and punish or reward and provide
privileges to social communicators and communications media because of the opinions they express threaten
freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited by law." Also, according to the 2007 joint declaration
on diversity in broadcasting, the Special Rapporteurs, of the UN, IACHR, OSCE, and ACHPR, indicated that
“measures must be implemented to ensure that government advertising is not used as a means for political
interference in the media”. Also, in the 2018 joint declaration on independence and diversity of the media in the
digital era, the Special Rapporteurs point out that “[States] must establish effective systems to ensure
transparency, impartiality, and non-discrimination in the media’s access to State resources, including
government advertising.
1257 Los Angeles Times. March 11, 2019. Estados Unidos rastreó a activistas de inmigración, periodistas y abogados. ¿Es legal?.
1258 #MediosLibres. October 2018. Iniciativa ciudadana con proyecto de decreto por el que se expide la ley general de publicidad oficial.
Publicidad Oficial MX. May 31, 2019. Carta Abierta a AMLO.
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24. NICARAGUA
924. Throughout 2019, the Nicaraguan government maintained apattern of repressive measures and actions
to restrict in a systematic way the exercise ofprotest, the exercise of independent journalism, and the actions of
human rights defenders. In that context, the main journalists of the country remained for several months in exile,
the government controls the main private media that have been seized, also the duopoly of the television and
radio in Nicaragua, in addition to the practice of discriminatory allocation of government advertising, which is
reserved exclusively for the official media and those of the Ortega family. On the other hand, there was a
continuous harassment and surveillance against journalists, especially in the cities of Bluefields, León, Masaya
anda Matagalpa. Additionally, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that the Executive controls the
import and delivery of paper, machinery, equipment, and spare parts for written, radio, and television media,
and much of the paper to print the newspaper LA PRENSA, the newspaper Hoy, El Nuevo Diario, and Metro are
held by the General Directorate of Customs Services [Dirección General de Servicios Aduaneros] (DGA). As
reported, due to the above, in September the newspapers Metro and El Nuevo Diario announced that they were
closing, as well as the printed edition of the weekly satirical supplement El Azote. Likewise, the Nicaraguan
government keeps equipment and facilities of Confidencial, Niú, Esta Semana y Esta Noche, and 100% Noticias
remain confiscated for a year.
925. On the other hand, the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur observe with great concern the
situation of impunity characterizing the serious crimes committed against journalists and the media in the
context of the socialprotests that were carried out inNicaragua in 2018. According to information available, due
to the application of the Amnesty Law, approved in June 2019, the investigations related to these crimes would
have been archived. Thus, for example, it was reported that investigations into the fire of Radio Darío, and the
murder of journalist Ángel Gahona, would have been archived. Finally, on June 11, journalists Lucia Pineda and
Miguel Mora were released under the Amnesty Law, after being detained for almost 6 months on charges of
alleged terrorist offenses and hate speech. According to the information available, the accusation against them
would still be in place even though the trial would have been suspended.
926. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observes with great concern the situation of impunity in which the
serious crimes committed against journalists and the media would be found in the context of the 2018 social
protests. As reported, due to the application of the Amnesty Law approved in In June 2019, the investigations
related to these crimes have been shelved. Thus, for example, it was informed that the investigations into the
Radio Darío fire and the murder of the journalist Ángel Gahona had beenshelved.
A. Political control and undue interference in the media
927. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has repeatedly noted in its Annual Reports, as well as in the 2018
Report “Serious violations of human rights in the framework of social protests in Nicaragua”, the existence of a
duopoly of television media and radio stations in Nicaragua. According to the available information, most of the
audiovisual media is under the political control of the presidential family or a businessman related to the
government1259; and therefore, these media are biased or their journalists face obstacles to perform their work
independently. In addition, the mentioned state media would also be part of the government propaganda
machinery.
928. On the other hand, the Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that the equipment and facilities of
Confidencial, Niú, Esta Semana y Esta Noche, and of 100% Noticias remain confiscated since December 2018,
despite the fact that in March 2018, within the framework of the National Dialogue, the government committed
to “reviewing the decisions taken by the State in relation to the properties affected in the context of the events
that occurred as of April 18, 2018, in order to return of these assets when appropriate, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law”1260.
929. As reported, in relation to Confidencial, Niú, and Esta Semana y Esta Noche, the administrative and legal
remedies available were filed to demand the return of the property confiscated1261 by the State and for
compensation for the moral and economic damages caused1262. However, since December 14, 2018, the national
police occupies the editorial. Likewise, the complaint filed on these events before the Attorney General's Office
did not prompt any investigations and the appeals filed against the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of
Managua were not decided1263. In this regard, in a statement dated September 20, theState indicated, among
1259 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). August 5, 2019. Nicaragua: A crackdown in four parts; Inter American Press Association (IAPA).
Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Nicaragua. October 3, 2019
1260 Hoy. March 30, 2019. Firman acuerdo para que Ortega respete los derechos y garantías de los nicaragüenses; AP News. March 29, 2019.
Nicaragua: Gobierno y oposición firman acuerdo sobre presos;La Prensa. September 9, 2019. Periodistas independientes demandan al régimen
orteguista que restituya las libertades públicas; El Nuevo Diario. August 8, 2019. Cosep y Amcham exigen devolución de bienes de Confidencial
y 100% Noticias.
1261 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. December 14, 2018. UN and IACHR Experts on FoE condemns attacks, raids
and censorship against journalists in Nicaragua.
1262 Confidencial. June 13, 2019. Confidencial: seis meses bajo asalto y confiscación.
1263 CNN en español. August 8, 2019. Empresarios denuncian violación a la libertad de expresión y el derecho de empresa en Nicaragua; Voa
Noticias. August 8, 2019. Propietarios de medios confiscados en Nicaragua piden su devolución.
207
other things, that the amparo writs filed were under study and resolution, and would currently be pending
decision by the Supreme Court of Justice1264.
930. According to Carlos Fernando Chamorro, owner and director of these media, the official version of the
events is in a document dated February 19 signed by the Director General of the police that was presented to
the Court of Appeals. On this occasion, said Director General would have indicated that by “attacking and
occupying Semana and Confidencial” he was fulfilling orders from the Ministry of the Interior to take possession
of the property and assets of the NGO Communication Research Center [Centro de Investigación de la
Comunicación] (Cinco) which had its legal status stripped by the National Assembly on December 12, 2018 and
of which the journalist is a member of the Board of Directors. Regarding the above, Chamorro indicated that “the
State aggression against Promedia [producer of Esta Semana y Esta Noche], Invermedia [producer of
Confidencial], and Cabal [environmental services consulting company], cannot be justified under the protection
of arbitrary cancellation of the status of said NGO, because there is no binding relationship between both
institutions”1265.
931. In turn, with respect to the 100% Noticias media, according to public knowledge information, its
facilities were raided by the police onDecember 21, 2018, and its director Miguel Mora and the press chief Lucia
Pineda were arrested for alleged terrorist crimes and hate speech that were never proven1266. Despite the two
journalists having been released on June 11 along with 55 protesters under the Amnesty Law, the channel's
facilities remain closed to date and the accusation against them would continue in force despite the trial being
suspended1267.
932. As reported, in this case, actions would also have been filed before the Supreme Court of Justice and the
Court of Appeals of Managua1268. On the 100% Noticias Channel, in a communication dated September 20, the
Nicaraguan State indicated that its occupation would have been carried out within the framework of a criminal
investigation and in accordance with the legal system. Likewise, it affirmed that “the scope of the Amnesty Law
and its generic effects include the closing of the proceedings, the immediate release, and the cancellation of the
criminal record, but not the return of the properties or instruments with which the crime was carriedout”1269.
B. Violence and attacks against journalists and themedia
933. According to information received by the IACHR and its Special Rapporteurship, a continuous
harassment, siege,intimidation and surveillance against journalists was recorded inNicaragua. According to the
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro Foundation [Fundación Violeta Barrios de Chamorro], from April 2018 to April
2019, 1,080 cases of press freedom violations were identified; and until July 30, at least 90 Nicaraguan
journalists have had to go into exile as a result of pressure from theGovernment1270.
934. Additionally, in August, this Office of the Special Rapporteur together with UN Special Rapporteurs
expressed their concern regarding reprisals against Radio Darío personnel, as well as the repression of other
communication workers in Nicaragua. They also indicated that there would be indications of a systematic and
continuing repression of the media, with journalists being silenced, assaulted, and receiving death threats; they
also stressed that in an unstable context, such as Nicaragua, the work of the media is of the utmost importance
to strengthen the civic space1271. This Office notes that, in a communication dated September 17, the State of
Nicaragua indicated, among other things, that it would reject the accusations, threats, and harassment against
the personnel of Radio Darío, as well as the allegations of raids in the premises or new location where this radio
would operate1272.
1264 Communication from the State of Nicaragua dated September 20, 2019. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression; Despacho 505. October 4, 2019. Régimen no devolverá 100% Noticias y Confidencial queda en manos de la Corte.
1265 Confidencial. June 13, 2019. Confidencial: seis meses bajo asalto y confiscación; El Nuevo Diario. August 8, 2019. Cosep y Amcham exigen
devolución de bienes de Confidencial y 100% Noticias.
1266 Univisión. December 22, 2018. "Urgente, hay paramilitares dentro del canal": allanan una televisora en Nicaragua y acusan a su director
de incitar al terrorismo; La Prensa. April 4, 2019. Miguel Mora y Lucía Pineda entre los diez casos más emblemáticos en el mundo de reporteros
que están encarcelados; Voa Noticias. January 30, 2019. Periodistas nicaragüenses enviados a juicio por “terroristas”.
1267 El Nuevo Diario. August 8, 2019. Cosep y Amcham exigen devolución de bienes de Confidencial y 100% Noticias; Consejo Superior de la
Empresa Privada (COSEP). August 23, 2019. COSEP y AmCham exigen devolución de 100% Noticias y Confidencial.
1268 La Prensa. September 9, 2019. Periodistas independientes demandan al régimen orteguista que restituyan las libertades públicas; Knight
Center for Journalism in the Americas. September 10, 2019. Independent journalists in Nicaragua demand press freedom, including return of
newsrooms and delivery of printing materials.
1269 Communication from the State of Nicaragua dated September 20, 2019. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression; Despacho 505. October 4, 2019. Régimen no devolverá 100% Noticias y Confidencial queda en manos de la Corte.
1270 Fundación Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. August 30, 2019. FVBCH, IFEX-ALC y SIP presentan ante el Comité de Derechos Humanos de la
ONU Informe Alternativo sobre el estado de la Libertad de Expresión en Nicaragua; Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Report to the
75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Nicaragua. October 3, 2019; Confidencial. August 22, 2019. Las voces que vencen la censura desde Costa
Rica.
1271 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Press release R212/19 Nicaragua: Must stop reprisals against journalists,
say human rights experts..
1272 Communication dated October 17, 2019 sent by the State of Nicaragua to the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.
Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
208
935. On the other hand, this Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that, according to information ofpublic
knowledge, due to the government's policy of persecution of independent media in the country, various events
were registered, such as: the closure of a television channel, the end of several television programs, and at least
two stations would have been harmed repeatedly1273. Up next are some of the cases that were reported this year.
936. According to the information available, in March, David Quintana, director and journalist of the digital
portal Boletín Ecologico, would have been a victim of police harassment because of his work as a journalist1274.
Likewise, Sergio León, director of La Costeñísima, would have been subjected to intimidation and harassment by
police operatives outside the radio on March 1 and April 181275. In addition, in March, Marlon Powell Sánchez, a
journalist who had the radio show “El dedo en la llaga” [The finger in the wound], would have been detained and
beaten in detention. Powell Sánchez would be charged with the crimes of terrorism, fire, aggravated robbery,
and obstruction of public services to the detriment of the Attorney General's Office (PGR) and the Public
Ministry. As reported, the journalist would have spent 53 days in the former Directorate of Judicial Assistance
[Dirección deAuxilio Judicial](DAJ) and subsequentlywould have been transferred to the La Modelo Penitentiary
System, where he indicated that he would also have been subjected to torture1276. In June, Powell Sánchez would
have been released under the Amnesty Law1277.
937. In addition, as reported, in April, government supporters would have vandalized the home of journalist
Wilber Benavides Fonseca, who would work for a local television channelin Managua. Benavides Fonseca would
have returned to the country in the week prior to these events1278. In addition, on April 10, the newspaper La
Prensa indicated that police and paramilitaries would have threatened the graphic reporter, Norwin Mújica de
León. As reported, these people would have warned him of a “revenge” against him and against Eddy López
Hernández, correspondent for La Prensa inLeón1279.
938. According to information of public knowledge, in August, journalists from the Association of
Independent Journalists and Communicators of Nicaragua [Asociación de Periodistas y Comunicadores
Independientes de Nicaragua] (PCIN), who would be exiled in Costa Rica, would have reported death threats and
cyberbullying against them, their families, and the media Esta Semana and Nicaragua Actual. These attacks
would have been carried out by alleged sympathizers of the regime of President Daniel Ortega and Rosario
Murrillo. As reported, these threats would have intensified in recent times1280. Additionally, according to the
PCIN, Radio Mi Voz in León of journalist Álvaro Montalván, who would be exiled in Costa Rica, would also be
subject to constant harassment; as well as Ed Sanles Alemán, administrator of the Notiweb Bluefields space1281.
In turn, the La Prensa journalist, Emiliano Chamorro along with former political prisoner Byron Estrada had
allegedly been held and interrogated by the “anti-riot police” of the Directorate of Special Operations [Dirección
de Operaciones Especiales] (DOEP) for more than two hours, when they were returning to Nicaragua after having
attended the "unity march" held in San José, Costa Rica. As reported, Chamorro’s journalistic notes would have
been photographed and his camera was checked1282.
1273 France 24. September 28, 2019. Nicaragua: Dejan de circular dos periódicos y un medio digital y acusan al Gobierno de Daniel Ortega;
Confidencial. September 28, 2019. Cierre total de El Nuevo Diario y Metro: “Nos tomó por sorpresa”; La Prensa/EFE. September 27, 2019. El
Nuevo Diario, Metro y Maje dejan de circular por crisis en Nicaragua
1274 Canal 10. March 25, 2019. Asedio y persecución contra periodista David Quintana; El Nuevo Diario. March 26, 2019. Periodista Quintana
teme ser encarcelado.
1275 Confidencial. 20 de abril de 2019. Policía persiste en asedio al periodista Sergio León, de Bluefields; Diario Las Américas. 19 de abril de
2019. Denuncian retención de periodista y asedio a emisora de radio en Nicaragua; El Salvador. 19 de abril de 2019. Denuncian retención de
periodista y asedio a emisora en Caribe de Nicaragua; Canal 10. 19 de abril de 2019. Director de radio La Costeñísima denuncia asedio por
parte de la policía; Confidencial. 1 de marzo de 2019. Hostigamiento policial a La Costeñísima, en Bluefields; La Prensa. 19 de abril de 2019.
Orteguismo mantiene asedio policial contra Sergio León, propietario de la radio La Costeñísima; El Nuevo Diario. 18 de abril de 2019. Vuelven
a colocar pintas en instalaciones de Radio La Costeñísima.
1276 Confidencial. April 20, 2019. Policía persiste en asedio al periodista Sergio León, de Bluefields; Diario Las Américas. April 19, 2019.
Denuncian retención de periodista y asedio a emisora de radio en Nicaragua; El Salvador. April 19, 2019. Denuncian retención de periodista y
asedio a emisora en Caribe de Nicaragua; Canal 10. April 19, 2019. Director de radio La Costeñísima denuncia asedio por parte de la policía;
Confidencial. March 1, 2019. Hostigamiento policial a La Costeñísima, en Bluefields; La Prensa. April 19, 2019. Orteguismo mantiene asedio
policial contra Sergio León, propietario de la radio La Costeñísima; El Nuevo Diario. April 18, 2019. Vuelven a colocar pintas en instalaciones
de Radio La Costeñísima.
1277 EFE. June 10, 2019. Un periodista detenido es liberado en Nicaragua antes de la visita de la SIP; Inter American Press Association (IAPA).
June 13, 2019. Miguel Mora y Lucía Pineda conversan en Managua con la SIP tras ser liberados.
1278 El Nuevo Diario. April 29, 2019. Periodista que regresó del exterior se siente bajo asedio; “DENUNCIATION: Under cover of the night and
as criminals, fanatics of the Ortega regime graffitied the walls of my house today Friday 04/26. I hold the CPCs in my community
responsible if something happens to me or my family. 1/2 #SOSNicaragua”. Twitter account of Wilmer Benavides Fonseca @chepitillo1.
April 26, 2019.
1279 La Prensa. April 10, 2019. Amenazas de policías y paramilitares orteguistas contra periodistas de LA PRENSA y fotógrafo de León.
1280 Confidencial. August 10, 2019. Periodistas exiliados denuncian amenazas de muerte; Voa Noticias. August 13, 2019. Periodistas
nicaragüenses en el exilio denuncian amenazas; 100% Noticias. August 7, 2019. Periodistas independientes condenan amenazas y acoso.
1281 Despacho 505. August 9, 2019. Periodistas exiliados denuncian amenazas de muerte y asedio contra susfamilias; La Mesa Redonda. August
7, 2019. PCIN condena amenazas y hostigamiento contra periodistas nicaragüenses exiliados en Costa Rica; 100% Noticias. August 7, 2019.
Periodistas independientes condenan amenazas y acoso.
1282 Confidencial. August 12, 2019. Antimotines retienen a excarcelado político y periodista en Peñas Blancas; La Prensa. August 12, 2019.
Antimotines retienen e interrogan a periodista de LA PRENSA Emiliano Chamorro y al excarcelado político Bayron Estrada.
209
939. In turn, according to the information available, in September, Kathia Reyes, a journalist for Canal 10,
would have been intimidated by government supporters while she was covering an event in Chinandega1283.
Also, on September 1, the newspaper La Prensa reported six days of permanent police harassment with a police
patrol stationed from 7am to 7pm in front of their building, withpolice officers who would monitor the area and
their staff1284. Similarly, on September 6, a new attack against Radio Darío would have been registered in León,
where a groupof motorized vehicleswould have had destroyed their surveillance cameras and forced their door.
The radio’s walls would have also been vandalized with offenses and threats the previous night1285.
Subsequently, on September 26, police officers and government mobs would have attempted to enter their
facilities by force. The foregoing would have happened a day after Aníbal Toruño, owner of the radio,
participated in a public hearing before the IACHR together with Sergio León of La Costeñísima and Carlos
Chamorro of Confidencial1286. As reported, Toruño would have returned to Nicaragua at the end of August after
9 months in exile1287.
940. On the other hand, on September 26, Radio Corporación would have denounced that its main antenna
inTipitapa would have had a copper ring stolen by two unidentifiedpeople,which would have caused the station
to not be heard in some areas of the country1288. Similarly, the Radio Camoapa Estéreo of the department of
Boaco, would also have been subject to attacks on September 14 and 15, when the attempt to damage its
transmitter and take down the antenna would have been registered. Later,in October, this radio would also have
denounced an alleged energy boycott against it, with the suspension of the electric service of for up to 5 hours
per day1289.
941. This Office of the Special Rapporteur also observes that during the public hearing of the IACHR on
“Compliance with precautionary measures for the protection of independent journalists in Nicaragua1290”, held
on September 25, the representation and beneficiaries of the precautionary measures (Carlos Chamorro1291,
Anibal Toruño1292, and Sergio León1293) indicated that they would continue to be exposed to risk events due to
their work as independent journalists in the current context, characterized by the closure of democratic spaces.
They stressed that the government would continue to restrict the exercise of the freedom of expression of
independent journalists, denounced the lack of guarantees for the exercise of freedom of the press, and
described new episodes of harassment, threats, and intimidation against independent journalists. They also
demanded that confiscated media had not been returned and denounced the harassment by indirect means in
the country, such as the blocking of paper and ink for newspapers, as well as inspections related to the fiscal
power of the State1294.
942. Additionally, in October, it was reported that Jacdiel Manuel Rivera Cornejo, a Canal 10 correspondent,
was threatened with imprisonment by the Departmental Chief of Transit Police in Madriz, while recording
interviews about a traffic accident in which a policeman would have died1295. In the same month, government
supporters would have tried to burn a house where Canal 21, an independent channel of a Christian nature,
would operate. As reported,it would be the third time they would suffer such attacks1296. Other journalists who
reported having been subjected to harassment and intimidation in that month were: Juan Francisco Dávila, a
1283 La Prensa. September 23, 2019. Periodista de Canal 10 sufre intimidación de simpatizante Orteguista mientras realizaba cobertura en
Chinandega
1284 La Prensa. September 1, 2019. De 7:00 a 7:00, seis días de permanente acoso policial al diario LA PRENSA.
1285 El Nuevo Diario. September 8, 2019. Nuevo ataque contra Radio Darío, en León: Destruyen cámaras de vigilancia y fuerzan la puerta; La
Prensa. September 8, 2019. VÍDEO: Así fue como fanáticos orteguistas realizaron las pintas contra Radio Darío, en León; Confidencial.
September 7, 2019. Orteguistas pintan amenazas en radio Darío y la vivienda de su propietario.
1286 Confidencial. September 27, 2019. Turbas y policíasintentan ingresar por la fuerza a Radio Darío; La Prensa. September 26, 2019. Policía
Orteguista intenta entrar por la fuerza a las instalaciones de Radio Darío en León.
1287 Confidencial. September 5, 2019. Anibal Toruño demanda seguridad para periodistas; La Prensa. August 29, 2019. Jaime Arellano y Aníbal
Toruño regresan a Nicaragua después de nueve meses en el exilio.
Canal 10. September 26, 2019. Radio corporación denuncia sabotaje; El Nuevo Diario. September 21, 2019. Radio Corporación denuncia
sabotaje contra torre de transmisión; Onda Local. September 27, 2019. Organizaciones condenan cierre de los periódicos El Nuevo Diario y
Metro; La Prensa. September 25, 2019. Radio Corporación denuncia sabotaje a su antena principal.
1289 Onda Local. September 16, 2019. PCIN condena ataques a Radio Camoapa; La Lupa. October 2, 2019. Boicot energético contra radio
Camoapa; El Nuevo Diario. September 15, 2019. Desconocidos ingresan a Radio Camoapa y causan daños materiales; Despacho 505. October
2, 2019. Radio Camoapa denuncia boicot energético; La Prensa. September 16, 2019. Denuncian dos sabotajes consecutivos a emisora
comunitaria Radio Camoapa; Radio Camoapa Estéreo. September 15, 2019. Denuncia pública.
1290 IACHR. 173 Period of Sessions. September 25, 2019. Nicaragua: Medidas Cautelares de periodistas.
1291 IACHR. Resolución No. 91/2018. Medidas Cautelares No. 1606-18. Carlos Fernando Chamorro Barrios y otros respecto de Nicaragua
(Trabajadores del “Confidencial”). December 21, 2018..
1292 IACHR. Resolución No. 47/2018. Medidas Cautelares No. 693-18. Anibal Toruño Jirón y otros integrantes de la Radio “Darío” respecto
de Nicaragua. July 2, 2018..
1293 Despacho 505. September 25, 2019. Periodistas denuncian incumplimiento del Estado a medidas cautelares de la CIDH; Knight Center.
September 30, 2019. Nicaraguan journalists tell IACHR that the State has not complied with precautionary measures for their protection..
1294 IACHR. Audiencia No. 14. Cumplimiento de medidas cautelares de protección en favor de periodistas independientes en Nicaragua.
Anexo Comunicado de Prensa 173 Periodo de Sesiones. No date.
1295 100% Noticias. October 12, 2019. Comisionado de la Policía amenaza con cárcel a corresponsal de canal 10;
1296 100%Noticias. October 14, 2019. Fanáticos orteguistas intentan quemar una casa donde funciona un canal independiente en Somoto.
210
journalist for Radio ABC Estéreo and Canal 10 in Estelí1297; Henry Briceño Portocarrero, from the municipality of
San Rafael del Sur, southeast of Managua1298; Denis José Garcia, correspondent for Radio Corporación in Somoto
and host of the “Primero Noticias” news on Canal 21 on cable also in Somoto. As reported, Garcia would have
been subject to harassment by thepolice twice in October, and the last time he would have had to leave his home
for safety reasons1299. Wilmer Benavides, from the digital media Actuality with Andean Dino1300; Denis José
Garcia, correspondent for Radio Corporación in Somoto and conductor of the “First News” news on Channel 21
on cable also in Somoto. As reported, Garcia would have been subject to sieges by the police twice in October,
and in the last time he would have had to leave his home for security1301.
943. In addition, in November, a resurgence of attacks against independent journalists in Nicaragua was
reported. In this sense, it was reported that in less than 72 hours, six attacks would have been recorded that
would include attacks, robberies and threats1302. In this regard, some of the journalists who reported having
been subjected to sieges and intimidation in that month were: Carlos Eddy Monterrey, in Bluefields, would have
been subject to siege and intimidation by the police, to avoid attending the stellar hearing of After the News,
from La Costeñisima. As reported, from October 31 to November 5, the journalist and his family would have
been harassed and besieged five times by police. He indicated that riot police were located with their rifles on
the sides of their house and along the street1303.; Joseling Rojasjournalists of Canal 10 and María Gómez, a
journalist for Article 66, who covered a protest in Managua1304; the journalist and the director of Notimatv,
Sandra Martínez and Eduardo Montenegro. In addition, the headquarters of this media in Matagalpa would also
have been attacked by government supporters1305; journalists Claudia Rivas de Despacho 505 and Lidia López
de La Prensa, who were threatened by police officers in Masaya1306; Roberto Mora Cárcamo, ABC Estéreo
journalist, who would have been threatened with death1307; Geovanny Shifman Article 66 reporter, in
Managua1308; Hassel Ruiz 100% News journalist1309. Additionally, it was informed that the facilities of Radio
Corporation and Channel 10 would have dawned on November 15 surrounded by orteguista police1310; Tania
López, a journalist in León who would have been robbed and intimidated by motorized groups. According to the
journalist, she would have been several opportunities besieged, assaulted and stripped of her work team1311. On
the other hand, it was informed that in November the government would have started using the channel 15
signal that belonged to the 100% News media. On the matter, 100% News indicated that, of the programming
that was made public, the channel would have a high content of partisan political court, despite the information
by the government officials that it would be cultural andeducational1312.
1297 100% Noticias. October 7, 2019. Paramilitares intimidan y roban equipo a periodista de Esteli; La Prensa. October 7, 2019. Policías y
paramilitares rodean la Catedral de Estelí durante procesión de la Virgen del Rosario.
1298 Artículo 66. October 1, 2019. Periodista Henry Briceño denuncia asedio y persecución policial en San Rafael del Sur.
1299 La Prensa. October 16, 2019. Periodista de Radio Corporación huye de su casa en Somoto por acoso policial y paramilitar; 100% Noticias.
October 16, 2019. APN condena asedio contra corresponsal de Radio Corporación Denis García; El Confidencial/EFE. October 16, 2019.
Periodista huye de su casa en Nicaragua por asedio policial, denuncia emisora; Radio Corporación. October 16, 2019. Denunciamos asedio e
intimidación policial contra nuestro corresponsal..
1300 El Independiente. October 31, 2019. Periodistas denuncian ante CPDH agresión de la Policía Orteguista; Nicaragua Investiga. October
30, 2019. Policías agreden a periodistas que cubrían protestas en un centro comercial privado de Managua
1301 La Prensa. October 16, 2019. Periodista de Radio Corporación huye de su casa en Somoto por acoso policial y paramilitar; 100% Noticias.
October 16, 2019. APN condena asedio contra corresponsal de Radio Corporación Denis García; El Confidencial/EFE. October 16, 2019.
Periodista huye de su casa enNicaragua por asedio policial, denuncia emisora;Radio Corporación. 16 de octubre de 2019. Denunciamos asedio
e intimidación policial contra nuestro corresponsal.
1302 La Prensa. November 17, 2019. Dictadura de Daniel Ortega recrudece agresiones contra los periodistas independientes en Nicaragua.
1303 100% Noticias. October 31, 2019. Policía asedia vivienda del periodista Carlos Eddy Monterrey en Bluefields; 100% Noticias. 6 de
noviembre de 2019. Periodista Eddy Monterrey denuncia constante asedio policial; La Prensa. 5 de noviembre de 2019. CIDH demanda al
régimen Orteguista cesar ‘ataques y asedio’ contra la prensa independiente
1304 La Prensa. November 5, 2019. CIDH demanda al régimen Orteguista cesar ‘ataques y asedio’ contra la prensa independiente; Artículo 66.
5 de noviembre de 2019. CIDH condena ataques de policías del régimen contra periodistas de Canal 10 y Artículo 66; Artículo 66. 5 de
noviembre de 2019. Dictadura orteguista pretende imponer a periodistas independientes la "ley del bozal"
1305 100% Noticias. November 6, 2019. Policía intenta robar celular a periodista de Notimatv; 100% Noticias. November 16, 2019.
Simpatizantes Orteguistas atacan sede de NotimaTV; Despacho 505. November 16, 2019. Agresión y asedio contra propietario de Notimatv.
1306 Despacho 505. November 15, 2019. Agreden a periodistas y no dejan pasar medicina del padre Edwin Román en Masaya; La Mesa
Redonda. November 15, 2019. Agreden a periodistas mujeres de La Prensa y Despacho 505; 100% Noticias. November 15, 2019. Fanático
orteguista destruye teléfono de periodista de La Prensa en las afueras de la iglesia San Miguel
1307 La Prensa. November 17, 2019. Dictadura de Daniel Ortega recrudece agresiones contra los periodistas independientes en Nicaragua.
1308 Artículo 66. November 10, 2019. Policía orteguista patea a reportero de Artículo 66 mientras cubría protesta de opositores; La Prensa.
November 10, 2019. Polícia Orteguista reprime otro plantón de autoconvocados en Metrocentro
1309 100% Noticias. November 12, 2019. Fanáticos orteguistas amenazan a trabajadora de 100%Noticias
1310 100% Noticias. November 15, 2019. Canal 10 y Radio Corporación asediados por la policía orteguista; La Prensa. November 15, 2019. Así te
contamos la jornada de asedio policial de este viernes a la iglesia San Miguel Arcángel de Masaya
1311 100% Noticias. November 16, 2019. Turbas sandinistas roban a periodista de Canal 10 en León; La Prensa. November 17, 2019. Dictadura
de Daniel Ortega recrudece agresiones contra los periodistas independientes en Nicaragua; 100% Noticias. September 21, 2019. Periodista de
Radio Darío, Tania López denuncia asedio en su contra
1312100% Noticias. November 14, 2019. Gobierno empieza a usar la señal de canal 15 que pertenecía a 100% Noticias
211
944. De acuerdo con la información disponible, también en noviembre regresó a Nicaragua el periodista
Carlos F. Chamorro, director de Confidencial. Elperiodista regresó alpaís después de pasar casi 11 meses exilado
en Costa Rica debido a las amenazas y hostigamientos en su contra1313. Más recientemente, el 5 de diciembre, el
camarógrafo de Notimatv, Brayan Zeledón, reportó que su teléfono personal fue dañado por un presuntopolicía
mientras cubría un juicio en Matagalpa. De acuerdo con la información disponible, el agresor sería el mismo que
asediaría a Eduardo Montenegro, director de este medio, y al equipo1314. Además, el 12 de diciembre, fue
reportado que la periodista Castalia Zapata y el fotógrafo Luis Alemán Canal 12, el periodista Ismael López de la
agencia Reuters y el fotógrafo Oscar Navarrete de La Prensa habrían sido agredidos mientras cubrían una
protesta en Managua1315.
945. The IACHR recalls that “[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social
communicators, as well as the material destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of
individuals and strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the State toprevent and investigate such
occurrences, topunish theirperpetrators, and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.” The IACHR has
affirmed that violence against journalists not only violates the freedom of thought and expression of the affected
person, but also affects the collective dimension of this right. The acts of violence that are committed against
journalists (term understood under a broad definition, from a functional perspective) or people who work in
the media, and that are linked to their professional activity, violate the right of these people to express and
impart ideas, opinions, and information, as well as undermine the rights of citizens and societies in general to
seek and receive information and ideas of anykind1316.
C. Impunity regarding the media and journalists
946. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur observe with great concern the situation of impunity
characterizing the serious crimes committed against journalists and the media in the context of the social
protests that were carried out in Nicaragua in 2018. On this matter, 12 In June, the Commission, through a press
release, said that the ambiguity of the content of this Law and its scope of application could lead to impunity for
serious human rights violations committed in the country, which have been widely documented. In addition, it
couldprevent the establishment of truth, justice, reparation, guarantees of non-repetition and restrict the rights
and guarantees of Nicaraguan society contained in the ACHR1317. On this occasion, the IACHR also underlined
the ambiguity of the provision of the Law that states that “the beneficiaries […] must refrain from perpetrating
new acts that constitute repetitive behaviors of the crimes contemplated herein,” otherwise the established
benefit could be revoked. In this regard, it emphasized that this ambiguity would allow beneficiaries to be
subject to further arrests for exercising their political rights to peaceful assembly, as well as their rights to
freedom of association and freedom of expression1318.
947. In this regard, this Office of the Special Rapporteur notes with extreme concern that the above, in
addition to maintaining a situation of impunity in Nicaragua, could also restrict and criminalize the exercise of
freedom of expression of journalists and communicators who have been released under this Law, due to the
aforementioned provision. These would be the cases, for example, of Lucía Pineda and Miguel Mora of 100%
Noticias, and Marlon Powell Sánchez, of the radio program El dedo en la llaga, who would have been released in
June within the framework of the application of these regulations. Next up are some of the cases that have been
reported to this Office of the Special Rapporteur.
948. In August, the Office of the Special Rapporteur together with UN Special Rapporteurs expressed their
concern regarding reprisals against Radio Darío personnel, as well as the repression of other communication
workers in Nicaragua. In this regard, the Office of the Special Rapporteur is concerned that in a communication
dated October 17 sent to this Office, the Nicaraguan State indicated, among other things, that the police
investigations in relation to the fire at this radio station that occurred on April 21, 2018, were administratively
archived due to the Amnesty Law in the country1319.
949. On the other hand,in relation to the murder of journalist Ángel Gahona in the framework of the protests
in Bluefields, on April 21, 2018, it was informed that this case would have been closed, and therefore, the
1313 Confidencial. November 25, 2019. “Regreso a hacer periodismo en Nicaragua”; El País. November 25, 2019. El periodista Carlos Fernando
Chamorro regresa a Nicaragua tras 10 meses en el exilio.
1314 La Prensa. December 5, 2019. Supuesto policía le quiebra el teléfono a un camarógrafo de un medio independiente de Matagalpa durante
cobertura periodística.
1315 El Comercio/AFP. December 12, 2019. Policía golpea a opositores y periodistas en protesta en Nicaragua; DW. December 12, 2019. Policía
golpea a opositores y periodistas durante protesta en Nicaragua..
1316 I/A Court H.R.. Case of Vélez Restrepo and Family v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of
September 3, 2012. Serie C No. 248. Para. 142-149; IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Special Study on the Status
of Investigations into the Murders of Journalists during the 1995-2005 Period for Reasons that may be Related to their Work in Journalism.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.131. Doc. 35. March 8, 2008. Para. 67.
1317 IACHR. June 12, 2019. IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Passing of the Amnesty Law inNicaragua.
1318 IACHR. June 12, 2019. IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Passing of the Amnesty Law inNicaragua.
1319 Communication dated October 17, 2019 sent by the State of Nicaragua to the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.
Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.
212
investigation into his murder also, because of a decision to archive the case by the Criminal Chamber of the Court
of Appeals of Managua under the Amnesty Law1320. Therefore, the two young people who were convicted in
August 2018 as perpetrators of the crime were released, who the journalist's family would consider not
responsible for the acts1321. This Office also observes that, according to Carlos Chamorro, of Confidencial, the
Public Ministry has not yet ordered an investigation into the complaint he presented on December 19, 2018, to
investigate the National Police for the commission of crimes of "robbery, damage to property, breaking and
entering, and usurpation of private property." As reported, to date these crimes would remain in impunity1322.
950. In view of the foregoing, the IACHR reiterates that according to its repeated jurisprudence and that of
the Inter-American Court, the obligations to investigate, identify, and punish those responsible for serious
human rights violations are inalienable. In the same vein, the Inter-American Court established that amnesty,
statute of limitations, and exclusion of liabilityprovisions that intend toprevent criminalprosecution, as well as
any obstacle of domestic law through which it is intended to prevent the investigation and sanction of those
responsible for serious human rights violations are inadmissible for contravening non-derogable rights
recognized by International Human Rights Law. Amnesty laws that are incompatible with the ACHR have no
legal effects1323.
951. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that in regard to justice and impunity for crimes
against journalists and the media, both the IACHR and the Inter-American Court have repeatedly referred to the
chilling effect of these crimes against journalists and other media professionals, as well as those against citizens
who attempt to report abuses of power or illegal acts of any nature. Therefore, this Office recalls that these
crimes can lead to silencing and self-censorshipof communicators if in these cases the possible link between the
crimes and the exercise of journalistic activity is not determined or ruled out completely and expeditiously.
D .Direct and indirect censorship
952. According to information received by the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur, since August
2018, the General Directorate of Customs Services (DGA) has kept paper,ink, and other newspaper materials in
Nicaragua. As it was informed, the government committed to release the paper and other supplies for the
newspapers,1324 and the Customs and Administrative Tax Court [Tribunal Aduanero y Tributario Administrativo]
(TATA) ruled in favor of the newspaper La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario, ordering the delivery of their confiscated
supplies. Nevertheless, according to the information available, the DGA would ignore the ruling in favor of these
newspapers, without providing any explanation about it1325. Due to this lack of material, it was reported that
several newspapers had to reduce their format, such as La Prensa and Hoy; or close, like the Nuevo Diario, its
associated newspaper Metro and the digital media Maje. In this regard, civil society organizations claim that
through this administrative censorship the government would seek to affect the operability of newspapers and
restrict their operation1326.
953. With regards to La Prensa,it was indicated that in order to continue with itsprintpublication,it reduced
its number of pages from 36 to 8, and it went from having 100 journalists to 35. Likewise, this newspaper
reported that as of October 13, its Sunday version would become tabloid in order to save paper1327. Likewise,
the newspaper Hoy, which would also be of the La Prensa Publishing Group, started circulating with 6pages and
its digital version was closed in October1328. In this regard, they informed that “the print version of the
newspaper maintains its circulation and digital news can be found on the [La Prensa] website”
1329. In addition,
in October, the printed edition of El Azote, a weekly satirical supplement, was closed due to lack of paper. As
reported, on October 6, this magazine indicated that "After almost 25 years, the weekly El Azote reaches itslast
1320 La Mesa Redonda. June 12, 2019. Glen Slate sobre asesinato de Ángel Gahona: “Todo el pueblo de Nicaragua sabe que no fuimos nosotros”;
La Prensa. September 9, 2019. Tribunal de Apelaciones de Managua cierra el caso del asesinato del periodista Ángel Gahona..
1321 Despacho 505. April 21, 2019. Exigen justicia para Ángel Gohona, a un año de su asesinato; Onda Local. April 21, 2019. Un año después,
asesinato del periodista Ángel Gahona continúa impune; La Prensa. April 21, 2019. Padre del periodista Ángel Gahona, asesinado hace un año,
sigue demandando justicia.
1322 Confidencial. June 13, 2019. Confidencial: seis meses bajo asalto y confiscación.
1323 IACHR. June 12, 2019. IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Passing of the Amnesty Law in Nicaragua.
1324 El Nuevo Diario. April 26, 2019. Alianza Cívica: El Gobierno de Nicaragua se ha burlado de los acuerdos; La Prensa. March 29, 2019.
Régimen orteguista firma acuerdo que restablece los derechos ciudadanos en Nicaragua.
1325 Nicaragua Investiga. October 12, 2010. La Prensa reduce a tamaño tabloide su edición dominical; Confidencial. October 13, 2019. La
Prensa reduce su tamaño ante bloqueo de materias primas; The SanDiego Union-Tribune/Associated Press. October 17, 2019. Medios críticos
al gobierno de Daniel Ortega en agonía.
1326 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). January 16, 2019. SIP condena censura administrativa contra diarios en Nicaragua.
1327 Nicaragua Investiga. 12 de octubre de 2010. La Prensa reduce a tamaño tabloide su edición dominical; Confidencial. 13 de octubre de
2019. La Prensa reduce su tamaño ante bloqueo de materias primas; The San Diego Union-Tribune/Associated Press. 17 de octubre de 2019.
Medios críticos al gobierno de Daniel Ortega en agonía.
1328 LA Prensa. August 4, 2019. Washington Post: "Ortega estrangula a LA PRENSA"; 100% Noticias. October 7, 2019. Periódico HOY en
Nicaragua cierra versión digital; La Vanguardia/EFE. October 7, 2019. Diario popular de Nicaragua apaga su versión digital, ahogado por la
crisis; The Washington Post. August 4, 2019. Nicaragua’s Ortega is strangling La Prensa, one of Latin America’s most storied newspapers..
1329 Hoy. October 7, 2019. Diario HOY suspende publicación en su sitio web.
213
edition" claiming that its closure is a result of "the crisis caused by the excessive ambition of power and money
from the couple”1330.
954. In turn, with respect to El Nuevo Diario, its associated newspaper Metro and the digital media Maje,
these announced their definitive closure on September 27. Through a statement on its Twitter account, El Nuevo
Diario, which would be 40 years old in 2020, informed that "it has decided to discontinue its publication, due to
economic, technical, and logistical difficulties that make its operation unsustainable”1331. As reported, in July,
only 20% of the confiscatedpaper and some other supplies would have been delivered, which would have been
insufficient for its maintenance1332. As reported, due to the closure, more than 100 workers of the newspaper
would have become unemployed1333. Previously, in December 2018, the popular newspaper Q’Hubo would also
have closed due to lack ofpaper1334.
955. On the other hand, it was informed that the Nicaraguan government would maintain the practice of
discriminatory allocation of government advertising, which would be exclusively destined to the Ortega family
media; the media also would be discriminated against with the granting of operating licenses, as well as the use
of tax control and social security as an economic pressure mechanism against these independent media1335. In
addition, in June, journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro, would have denounced that his program “Esta Semana”
and Confidencial Nica would have been victims of an attempt of censorship in social networks. According to
Chamorro, Canal 13, which reportedly belonged to Daniel Ortega's family, would have accused them of an alleged
violation of their property rights1336.
956. Given the foregoing, the IACHR recalls that, in accordance with Article 13.3 of the American Convention,
the right to freedom of expression “may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of
government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the
dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of
ideas and opinions”.
957. Additionally, the IACHR reiterates that Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles states that “prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must be prohibited
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.” In turn, Principle 13 indicates that “the exercise of power and the use of public funds by the state,
the granting of customs duty privileges, the arbitrary and discriminatory placement of official advertising and
government loans; the concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies, among others, with the intent
toput pressure on andpunish or reward andprovide privileges to social communicators and the media because
of the opinions they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be explicitly prohibited bylaw".
E.Internet and freedom of expression
958. The Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that social networks and the Internet continue to be an
alternative means through which people can disseminate information of public interest and express ideas and
opinions of all kinds. Particularly in the context that Nicaragua is going through, that is of vital importance,
considering that severalNicaraguan journalists are in exile and use these digitalinitiatives to continue informing
1330 Diario Las Américas. October 7, 2019. Revista satírica del diario La Prensa en Nicaragua deja de circular por falta de papel; Infobae.
October 6, 2019. Censura en Nicaragua: el diario La Prensa cerró su suplemento de humor porque el régimen de Daniel Ortega tiene retenido
su papel.
1331 Knight Center. September 27, 2019. Nicaraguan editorial group closes El Nuevo Diario and two other newspapers due to economic
difficulties; Twitter account of El Nuevo Diario (@elnuevodiario). September 26, 2019; Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Report to
the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Nicaragua. October 3, 2019; El País. September 27, 2019. El segundo periódico más importante de
Nicaragua echa el cierre agobiado por la crisis política.
1332 Alianza Metropolitan News/EFE. September 27, 2019. Dos periódicos y un medio digital dejan de circular por las presiones de Ortega; El
Nuevo Diario. September 2, 2019. PEN Internacional pide a gobierno de Nicaragua entregar papel y tinta retenida a El Nuevo Diario.
1333 Nicaragua Investiga. September 27, 2019. Más de 100 trabajadores al desempleo debido a cierre de El Nuevo Diario en Nicaragua; 100%
Noticias. September 27, 2019. La despedida de los periodistas de El Nuevo Diario en la sala de redacción; La Prensa. September 27, 2019. Los
periódicos El Nuevo Diario y Metro anuncian su cierre; 100% Noticias. September 30, 2019. Cardenal Breneslamenta cierre de El Nuevo Diario;
Confidencial. September 28, 2019. Cierre total de El Nuevo Diario y Metro: “Nos tomó por sorpresa”.
1334 Alianza Metropolitan News/EFE. September 27, 2019. Dos periódicos y un medio digital dejan de circular por las presiones de Ortega;
Confidencial. September 28, 2019. Cierre total de El NuevoDiario y Metro:“Nostomó por sorpresa”; El Nuevo Siglo. December 21, 2018. Diario
Q'Hubo de Nicaragua cierra por falta de materia prima.
1335 Report for the Nicaragua Universal Periodic Review by Coalición IFEX-ALC, AMARC-ALC y SIP dated September 15, 2019. Available at:
Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion; Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Report to the 75th
General Assembly of the IAPA. Nicaragua. October 3, 2019; El Nuevo Diario. June 13, 2019. SIP: Devuelvan insumos a los periódicos; Voa
Noticias. September 30, 2019. ¿Qué sucede con los medios independientes en Nicaragua?
1336 Confidencial. June 19, 2019. Carlos F. Chamorro: Dictadura intenta censurar medios digitales; El Nuevo Diario. June 20, 2019. Carlos
Fernando Chamorro denuncia intento de censura.
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Nicaragua, as is the case of Despacho 505 that would report from Spain and Nicaragua Actual from Costa Rica1337.
As indicated, from Costa Rica there are reportedly currently be 23 initiatives or information platforms1338.
959. Despite the important role that these digital initiatives have developed, this Office of the Special
Rapporteur notes that in 2019 these and the websites of the independent media in Nicaragua would continue to
be subject to cyber-attacks. In this regard, it was reported that Notimatv in Matagalpa, La Costeñísima in the city
of Bluefields, Trinchera de la Noticia, La Prensa, Radio Corporación, and El Nuevo Diario had been subject to such
attacks in 20191339. In this regard, in May, the newspaper La Prensa reported a cyber-attack against its website,
which, according to the information available, would be a “[a] massive attack that is known as DDOS' which
generates thousands of robots or fake users who try to enter the attacked page in order to block the entrance of
legitimate users and collapse the site”. According to the available information, the attacks would also have been
directed to the newspaper Hoy, as well as to LA PRENSA Club1340. Additionally, in July, the journalist Sergio León
of La Costeñísima would have been under cyber-attacks, and the Nicaragua Actual platform had reported Viva
Nicaragua Canal 13 for trying to block their Facebookaccount1341.
960. Given the above, the IACHR reiterates that Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles states that “prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic communication must be prohibited
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
F. Prohibition and illegality of protests
961. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur also express their grave concern about the
persistence of restrictions on the exercise of the social protest of the Nicaraguan population and the repression
of those who exercise their right to peaceful assembly. On the matter, it was informed that on March 23, the
police reissued a public statement in which it banned any type of protest demonstration, noting that the
“National Police will not allow any activity that alters public order or threatens the constitutional right to work,
free mobilization, the physical integrity of people, families, and public and private property”1342. Additionally,
this year, information was also received on reporters and journalists who had been subjected to attacks while
covering social protests in the country. Below are some of the cases that were reported.
962. On March 16, in the framework of the march for the release of all the people detained in the protests in
Nicaragua, journalist Marlen Chow was arrested and members of the Directorate of Special Operations or antiriot police had attacked journalists andprotesters who were inside the parking lot of the FISE Bank of Managua,
where they would have taken refuge. In this context, the reporter Cinthya Torres, of the newspaper La Prensa,
would have been physically and verbally assaulted by the agents, who tried to snatch and destroy her phone, at
the time she recorded live on her social network; the cameraman of Canal 12, Luis Alemán and his partner
Marcos Medina would also have been attacked by a group of uniformed men. Likewise, the graphic reporter of
the international AFP agency, Luis Sequeira, would have been beaten by anti-riot agents, who would have
stripped him of his camera, which they would have thrown on the ground and broken, while he was recording
one of the arrests1343. On the other hand, it was informed that on April 17, the Artículo 66 journalist, Abixael
Mogollón, would have been detained by the police while covering a demonstration in Managua. He would have
also been beaten and robbed1344. The journalist would have been releasedlater1345.
963. On the matter, the IACHR recalls that holding meetings, demonstrations, andprotests is a central activity
of many associations and organizations. And in this regard, the States have a duty to provide the necessary
1337 Nicaragua Investiga. February 4, 2019. Periodistas nicas exiliados en España informan a través de nuevo sitio web; Voa Noticias. July 29,
2019. Periodistas nicaragüenses exiliados rompen la censura; Confidencial. August 22, 2019. Las voces que vencen la censura desde Costa Rica.
1338 Confidencial. August 22, 2019. Las voces que vencen la censura desde Costa Rica; YouTube/ República 18. August 19, 2019. Voces que
vencen la censura: República 18.
1339 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Nicaragua. October 3, 2019; La Prensa. May
19, 2019. Maras cibernéticas: así son los ciberataques que el orteguismo usa en Nicaragua.
1340 El Periódico. May 5, 2019. Diario La Prensa de Nicaragua denuncia ataque cibernético contra su sitio web; La Prensa. May 5, 2019. Atacan
sitio web del diario La Prensa; Confidencial. May 5, 2019. Diario La Prensa sigue bajo ataque cibernético.
1341 La Prensa. July 26, 2019. El periodista Sergio León denuncia ciberataque al sitio web de La Costeñísima; Despacho 505. July 27, 2019.
Ciberataque del régimen contra medios críticos, Nicaragua Actual y La Costeñísima denuncian boicot; Deybi Zamora Aráuz/Facebook. July 28,
2019. Nicaragua Actual denuncia el boicot que hace Viva Nicaragua Canal 13.
1342 Policía Nacional de Nicaragua. Nota de Prensa No. 09-2019. March 23, 2019; IACHR. April 5, 2019. Press Release 090/19 IACHR
Condemns Continuing Acts of Repression in Nicaragua during Negotiating Table Talks.
1343 IACHR. April 5, 2019. Press Release 090/19 IACHR Condemns Continuing Acts of Repression in Nicaragua during Negotiating Table
Talks.
1344 La Prensa. April 17, 2019. Así te contamos la manifestación "Todos somos abril"; Radio Corporación. April 17, 2019. Liberan a periodista
de Artículo 66 tras ser secuestrado por la Policía Orteguista.
1345 La Prensa. April 22, 2019. Policía Orteguista golpeó, persiguió y reprimió en Semana Santa; Facebook/ Artículo 66. No date. #ENVIVO
Liberan a nuestro periodista de Artículo 66, Abixael Mogollón, quien había sido secuestrado cuando cubría una manifestación cívica.
#Artículo66 #DerechoAInformar; Confidencial. April 18, 2019. Periodista de Artículo 66 denuncia robo y tortura de parte de la Policía; El
Nuevo Diario. April 17, 2019. Periodista de Artículo 66 denuncia robo y golpiza por la Policía.
215
means to carry out their activities freely; protect them when they are threatened to avoid attacks on their life
and integrity; refrain from imposing obstacles that impede the performance of their work, and seriously and
effectively investigate violations committed against them, fighting impunity1346. The IACHR has considered that
the exercise of the right of assembly through social protest should not be subject to authorization by the
authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its realization1347. Legal requirements that provide a basis
for a meeting or demonstration to be prohibited or limited, for example, through the requirement of a prior
permit, are not compatible with the right of assembly1348 or freedom of expression under the legal interAmerican framework. Similarly, spontaneous demonstrations and protests must not be prohibited by law and
must be exempted from any notification regime.
964. In this regard, the IACHR reiterates that "in democracy, States must act on the basis of the legality of
public protests or demonstrations and on the assumption that they do not constitute a threat to public order."
In this regulatory context, restrictions on the right to participate in meetings and public demonstrations must
be considered exceptional and subject to strict compliance with certain requirements, in accordance with
Articles 13, 16, and 23 of the American Convention. This presumption of legitimacy of public protests must be
clearly and explicitly established in States’ legal systems and applied to all without discrimination. If the legal
provisions are not clear, they should be clarified or, where appropriate, interpreted in favor of those who
exercise the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom ofexpression1349.
G.Access to public information
965. Según el Informe “Situación actual del derecho humano de acceso a la información pública”, publicado
en octubre por la organización Transparencia Nicaragua, existiría en Nicaragua un progresivo deterioro del
derecho de acceso a la información. En este sentido, fue reportado que, de las 64 instituciones que habrían sido
analizadas, solamente tres cumplirían “medianamente” los requerimientos establecidos en la Ley de Acceso a la
Información Pública. Afirmó que este derecho, que ya sería violentado, principalmente, desde 2007, vendría
empeorando desde el año 20181350 .
966. Al respecto, la CIDH recuerda al Estado de Nicaragua que el principio 4 de la Declaración de Principios
sobre Libertad de Expresión de la CIDH establece que “[e]l acceso a la información en poder del Estado es un
derecho fundamental de los individuos. Los Estados están obligados a garantizar el ejercicio de este derecho.
Este principio sólo admite limitaciones excepcionales que deben estar establecidas previamente por la ley para
el caso que exista un peligro real e inminente que amenace la seguridad nacional en sociedades democráticas”.
1346IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
161
1347 IACHR. Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 129.
1348 In said report, the IACHR found as a restriction incompatible with the right to assemble legislation that required a police permit that had
to be requested ten days prior to any public event, assembly, election, conference, parade, congress or sport, cultural, artistic or family event.
Cfr. CIDH, Informe Anual 1979-1980, October 2, 1980, ps. 119- 121.
1349 IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of the
State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019. Paras. 800-8011.
1350 100% Noticias. October 31, 2019. Dictadura continúa violando ley de acceso a la información pública; La Prensa. 31 de octubre de 2019.
Régimen orteguista continúa violando Ley de Acceso a la Información Pública, denuncia Transparencia Nicaragua
216
25. PANAMA
967. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observed a constant use of criminal and civil
proceedings against journalists and the media that investigate and publish acts of alleged corruption, which
could generate a climate of self-censorship for the press. Along these lines, this Office has accounted for around
40 directors, journalists and press personnel with legal proceedings. Likewise, it has taken note of the validity
of article 195 of the Criminal Code that punishes with deprivation of liberty, or its equivalent in fine days, the
crimes of libel and slander when they are committed through a media outlet, spoken or written, or using a
computer system. In addition, there would be no limit for civil compensation claims for these causes.
A. Progress
968. On December 13, 2018, following the lawsuit filed by Televisora Nacional (TVN Media) against article
254 of the Electoral Code, the Supreme Court of Justice of Panama declared unconstitutional the prohibition of
publications on opinion polls within 20 calendar days before the general elections1351. The Electoral Court
reduced the ban to 48 hours before the elections1352.
969. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has previously held that norms that prevented the publication of
surveys 10 days before the elections constituted instances of prior censorship, incompatible with the provisions
of article 13 (2) of the Convention. 1353 In this regard, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has stated that “the
norms that regulate the criteria under which the surveys are governed should always tend to strengthen the
free flow of information”1354.
B. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
970. The Epasa editorial group, which prints the Panamá América, Critica, and Día a Día newspapers,
reported being a victim of pressure and threats of raids by the Public Prosecutor's Office after that editorial
group exposed in its publications the violation to the right of access to information of citizen’s given the lack of
response by the State entity to their requirements1355. On September 20, the Public Prosecutor's Office would
have denied the above through a statement1356.
971. On January 2, Ecuadorian journalist Ligia Arreaga was arrested upon leaving the Puerto Armuelles
police station and detained for 24 hours after trying to interview the justice of peace Ulzana Valdés, who asked
her to hand over her photographic equipment while she covered an event of highpublic interest in the province
of Chiriquí1357. According to the information available, so far the Ombudsman would keepher case open1358.
972. On March 17, the photographer of the digital platform “Claramente”, Mauricio Valenzuela, reported
having been physically assaulted andpart of his equipment destroyed by supporters of the Cambio Democrático
party and the president of the National Assembly, Yanibel Ábrego, during the coverage of an electoral event in
the community of Cirí de Los Sotos, in Capira1359.
1351 TVN Noticias. December 13, 2018. Corte declara inconstitucional la veda electoral en la publicación de encuestas; La Estrella de Panamá.
February 15, 2019. TE debe establecer plazo de veda electoral, dice la Corte.
1352 La Estrella de Panamá. April 1, 2019. Panamá presenta su informe ante la SIP ; La Prensa. February 16, 2019. TEfija veda para encuestas
a 48 horas de las elecciones. ; “We begin the period of reflection and absence of electoral propaganda, prior to, and during, the day of the
#PanamaElections”. Twitter account of Tribunal Electoral @tepanama. May 3, 2019- 1:05AM ; En segundos. May 3, 2019. Panamá entra en
veda y periodo de reflexión previo a las elecciones de 5 de mayo.
1352 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Panama.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117 – 2003, para. 113. The Office ofthe Special Rapporteur referred in this report to articles 177 and 178 ofthe Panamanian
Electoral Code that stated, respectively, the obligation to register polls on electoral preferences in the Electoral Tribunal before their
disclosure, and the prohibition of publishing said polls 10 days before of the election or electoral consultation..
1353 CIDH. Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión. Informe sobre la situación de la libertad de expresión en Panamá.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117 – 2003, párr. 113. La Relatoría hizo referencia en este informe a los artículos 177 y 178 del Código Electoral panameño
que establecían, respectivamente, la obligación de registrar las encuestas sobre preferencias electorales en el Tribunal Electoral antes de su
divulgación, y la prohibición de publicar dichas encuestas 10 días antes de la elección o consulta electoral.
1354 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Panama.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117 – 2003, para. 111.
1355 IAPA.October 5, 2019. Reportto the 75th General Assembly ofthe IAPA. Panama; La crítica. September 20, 2019. Procuradora de Panamá
quiere silenciar diarios de Epasa.
1356 Ministerio Público. Comunicado. September 20, 2019. Available at ; https://ministeriopublico.gob.pa/mp-no-pretende-realizarallanamiento-a-medios/; IAPA. October 5, 2019. Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Panama.
1357 DW. January 3, 2019. Detienen a una periodista en Panamá por grabar a una juez; “#Alert | Ecuadorian journalist Ligia Arreaga was
arrested on January 2 for 24 hours in the district of Barú, # Panama, while conducting investigations into the alleged violation of #hhrr due
to the arrival of the transnational @DelMonte to the country”. Twitter account of Fundamedios @FUNDAMEDIOS. January 7, 2019 10:39AM.
1358 Monitor Civicus. January 20, 2019. Expresión ; DW. January 4, 2019. Liberan en Panamá a la periodista Ligia Arreaga ; Telemetro. January
2, 2019. Jueza de Paz de Barú ordenó el arresto de periodista ligia Arreaaga.
1359 La Prensa. March 18, 2019. Seguidores de Yanibel Ábrago atacan a periodistas ; “Fórum de Periodistas por las libertades de Expresión e
Información on the assault against journalist Mauricio Valenzuela in the Community of Cirí de Los Sotos, Capira during the coverage of a
political event of deputy Yanibel Abrego” Twitter account of Fórum de periodistas @fperiodistaspma. March 17, 2019 9:05AM ;La Estrella
de Panamá. March 17, 2019. Fotógrafo denuncia spuesta agresión de presuntos activistas de la diputada Yanibel Ábrego ; TVN Noticias.
217
973. According to the information available, on April 26, the director of Radio Panamá, Edwin Cabrera,
denounced that he would have received racist attacks by the deputy of the National Assembly, Mayín Correa,
after he refused to grant an interview to the station1360.
974. On August 20, the representative of the National Assembly of Panama, Zulay Rodríguez, during an
interview accused the staff of the newspaper La Prensa of being involved in the cover-up of former President
Juan Carlos Varela and various members of the Public Prosecutor's Office, regarding theirpossible participation
in the case of the construction company Odebrecht1361. Subsequently, Rodríguez would have continued issuing
opinions on her social networks discrediting the work of the La Prensamedia1362.
975. According to public information, on October 31, alleged conversations of former President Juan Carlos
Varela (2014-2019) came to light on the Verelaleaks.com page, in which his participation in an operation
between government officials to carry out attacks against journalists and media executives who criticized his
mandate would be exposed1363. Among the affected journalists are Álvaro Alvarado, Atenógenes Rodríguez,
Sabrina Bacal, and the commentator Juan Carlos Tapia. As well as others of the television network TVN, who
would have been identified by the negative coverage made on the government of the formerpresident1364.
976. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation, of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
977. With regard to violence against journalists and other persons due to the exercise of freedom of
expression, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has emphasized, based on inter-American doctrine and
jurisprudence, the importance of three positive obligations emanating from the rights to life, to personal
integrity, and freedom of expression. Namely: the obligation to prevent, the obligation to protect, and the
obligation to investigate, prosecute, and sanction those responsible for these crimes. As the Office of the Special
Rapporteur has pointed out, these obligations complement each other: in order for a free, robust, and
unrestricted democratic debate, it is necessary to combat violence against journalists through a comprehensive
policy of prevention, protection, andprosecution”1365.
C. Subsequent Liabilities
978. This Office has received information that on May 10, the 4th sub-regional Primary Care Prosecutor's
Office admitted the complaint filed by Carlos Pimentel against the newspaper Mi Diario belonging to the La
Prensa corporation, due to the alleged commission of crime against honor, following the publication of this
media of the death of a minor1366.
979. According to available information, between March and July of this year, the fourth sub-regional
Primary Care Prosecutor opened nine complaints for the alleged commission of crimes against honor in its
slander and insults modality presented by former President Ricardo Martinelli against around 40
communicators1367, executives, and owners of the Corporation La Prensa (Coprensa), of the newspaper La
Estrella1368 and Radio Panama1369, owned by the Spanish conglomerate Grupo Prisa, which would be awaiting
sentencing1370. The sum amounts to US$5 million for provisional amount for the damage.
March 18, 2019. Mauricio Valenzuela interpondrá denuncia tras ser agredido por activistas de Yanibel Ábrego ; La Prensa. March 17, 2019.
Equipo de “Claramente” denuncia que fue agredido por activistas de Yanibel Ábrago.
1360 Twitter account of Edwin Cabrera @EdwinECabreraU. April 26, 2019.
1361 Monitor Civicus. September 5, 2019. Asociaciones de periodistas advierten de las decisiones políticas que afectanla libertad de expresión
en Panamá.
1362 Twitter account of Consejo Nacional de Periodismo @CNP_Panama August 22, 2019 7:47AM.
1363 Prensa Latina. November 7, 2019. Varelakeaks, nuevo escándalo de alto perfil estremece Panamá.
1364 Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. November 26, 2019. Leaked messages allegedly show former Panamanian president tried
to influence media coverage through executives. Twitter account of Consejo Nacional de Periodismo @CNP_Panama. November 21, 2019
11:31AM.
1365 IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 31.
1366 Estudio Jurídico Mejía y Asociados. Report for Office of the Special Rapporteur 2019.
1367 The media and individuals sued are: Corporación La Prensa, Mi Diario, Radio Panamá, Hilde Sucre, Mariel Ledezma, Annette Planells,
Mariano Mena, Alberto Velásquez, Sabrina Bacal, Rolando Rodríguez, Rita Vásquez, Diego Quijano, Cesar Tribaldos, Lorenzo brego, Sonia
Navarro, Martha Concepción, Enrique Breathwite, Juan Manuel Díaz, Guillermo Chapman, Horacio Icaza, Aurelio Barria, Olmedo Rodríguez,
Eliana Morales, Rafael Luna, RodrigoNoriega, Juan Luis Batista, Cecilia Fonseca, Victoria Isabel Cardiel, Maria Mercedes de Corró, Mónica Palm,
Ricardo Bermúdez, Carlos Vargas, Aleida Samaniego, Rafael Calvo, Yolanda Saldoval, Daniel Domínguez, Juan Carlos Planells, Carolina Sánchez,
Mary Triny Zea and Ereida Prietto..
1368 La Estrella de Panamá. March 21, 2019. Martinelli se querella contra periodistas de ‘La Estrella'.
1369 EFE. December 6, 2019. Un expresidente de Panamá demanda a radio del Grupo Prisa por 5 millones dólares.
1370Estudio Jurídico Mejía y Asociados. Report for Office of the Special Rapporteur 2019. La Prensa. September 4, 2019. CNP y Fórum
rechazan amenazas a periodistas. Forum de Periodistas. December 12, 2019. Informe sobre la libertad de expresión en Panamá..
218
980. According to the available information, the complaints made against the journalists Mariano Mena,
Alberto Velásquez, Mariela Ledezma, Annette Planells, as well as the one initiated against the vice president of
Informative Affairs of TVN Media, Sabrina Bacali, would continue pending processing. All of the complaints are
for the alleged commission of the conduct provided for in article 195 of the Criminal Code against Martinelli1371.
981. Different regional civil society organizations reiterated their rejection against harassment of journalists and
expressed concern about the trend of criminalization and abuse of the judicial system through criminal and
civil means as a method of self-censorship of the media and their operators1372.
982. OnNovember 15, the Office of the Special Rapporteur waspart of a conference organized by the National
Journalists Association and the Forum of Journalists of Panama where the Special Rapporteur expressed grave
concern about the use of criminal lawsuits to prosecute and harass members of the press In Panama. He also
recalled the inter-American standards on the matter1373.
983. The Inter-American Court has established, as regards the possible civil liability, that civil sentences
regarding freedom of expression must be strictly proportioned so as not to cause an inhibitory effect on this
freedom, since “the fear of a civil sanction, given the claim [...] of an extremely high civil reparation, it can clearly
be as or more intimidating and inhibiting for the exercise of freedom of expression as a criminal sanction, since
it has the potential to compromise the personal and family life of who denounces a public official, with the
obvious and disvaluable result of self-censorship, both for the affected and for other potential critics of the
actions of a public servant”1374.
984. The Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court determined that in a democratic society
public offices must have a higher threshold of tolerance for criticism, because “they have voluntarily exposed
themselves to more demanding scrutiny and because they have an enormous capacity to dispute information
through their power of public reach”1375. In this regard, the Inter-American Commission stated that “[the] type
of political debate that gives rise to the right to freedom of expression will inevitably generate certain critical or
even offensive speeches for those who hold public office or are intimately linked to the formulation of public
policy”1376.
985. Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression adopted by the Inter-American
Commission in 2000, “the protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions
in those cases in which the person offended is apublic official". That is, the use of criminal mechanisms topunish
the discourse in matters ofpublic interest, and especially related topublic or political officials, does not respond
to a pressing social need that justifies it, is unnecessary and disproportionate, and can be a means of indirect
censorship, given its discouraging effect on the debate on matters of public interest.
D .Social Protest
986. According to public information, on March 20, a group of retired persons were attacked by members of
the Crowd Control unit of the National Police during the clashes that took place in the context of the protests in
demand of the increase in labor benefits offered by the government1377.
987. On October 22, a group of students and employees of the University of Panama would have been
attacked by elements of the Riot Police while protesting against the constitutional reform that would modify the
operation of the higher education system1378.
988. In the following days, various civil society groups representing the rights of the LGBTI community,
unions, and independent politicians, who demanded the withdrawal of constitutional reforms, would have
joined the protests and a broad and participatory process would be promoted1379. On October 30, attacks with
1371 IAPA. October 5, 2019. Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Panama..
1372 TV Noticias. November 7, 2019. SIP muestra preocupación por múltiples demandas contra periodistas panameños.
1373 Acento. November 16, 2019. La libertad de expresión, en el centro de la crisis latinoamericana.
1374 I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009.
Serie C No. 193, Para.129.
1375 I/A Court H. R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Serie C No. 177, para. 86-88; I/A Court H. R., Case of Palamara
Iribarne v. Chile. Judgment ofNovember 22, 2005. Serie C No. 135, Para. 83; I/A CourtH. R., Case of“The Last Temptation of Christ”(Olmedo
Bustos et al) v. Chile. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Serie C No. 73, Para. 69; I/A Court H. R., Case of IvcherBronstein v. Peru. Judgment of
February 6, 2001. Serie C No. 74, para. 152 and 155; I/A Court H. R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Serie
C No. 111, Para. 83; I/A Court H. R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Serie C No. 107, para. 125 - 129; I/A Court
H. R., Case of Claude Reyes et al v. Chile. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Serie C No. 151, Para. 87; I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v.
Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Serie C No. 193, Para. 115
1376 IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of"Desacato" Laws with the American Convention onHuman Rights.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995..
1377 TCN Noticias. March 20, 2019. Jubilados se enfrentan con unidades de la PN por aumento.
1378 Twitter account of Telemetro Reporta @TReporta. October 22, 2019. ; Prensa Latina. October 22, 2019. Protestas en Panamá por
subsidios a universidades privadas.
1379 The San Diego Union Tibune. November 8, 2019. AP Explica: Protestas ante reforma constitucional en Panamá.
219
chemical agents were reportedly used against protesters of the same cause1380. The deputy director of the
National Police would ensure at a press conference that the police did not use firearms to deal with the
situation1381. According topublic information, by November 2, at least 93 arrests ofprotesters would have been
recorded, using excessive force by state agents1382.
989. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly”
and that “the exercise of the right of assembly through socialprotest must not be subject to authorization by the
authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its realization”1383.
E. Legal Reforms
990. On March 29, Law No. 81 "On personal data protection" was published1384. The law regulates the
principles, rights, obligations, and procedures regarding the protection of personal data and includes measures
to prevent cybercrime1385.
991. On July 30, the draft bill 063 was presented to the National Assembly, which seeks to impose sanctions
on those who disseminate visual material of traffic accidents, quarrels, or tragedies on social networks1386.
992. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that in the 2011 joint declaration on freedom of expression
and the Internet, the Special Rapporteurs of the UN, OSCE, IACHR, and ACHPR mentioned that “States have the
obligation to promote universal Internet access to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of
expression. Internet access is also necessary to ensure respect for other rights, such as the right to education,
health care and work, the right of assembly and association, and the right to freeelections”1387.
F .Freedom of expression in electoral contexts
993. On May 5, general elections took place to elect around 1,721 positions of popular election. According to
the information available, the electoral process took place peacefully and in a civicenvironment1388.
994. According to the information available, the Electoral Court would have announced in a meeting with
journalists on May 3 its decision to restrict the coverage of candidates when they exercise their right to vote,
informing that it would be their press team who would be responsible for supplying the media evidence of said
event1389.
995. The Electoral Court denounced on March 22 that it would have received complaints from candidates in
the general elections to whom various media outlets demandedpayment to be interviewed in regular broadcasts
on the grounds of the prohibition of donating electoral advertising1390. In this regard, the Electoral Court said
1380 Monitor Civicus. October 31, 2019. Las reformas constitucionales incitan a las protestas en Panamá; Telesur. October 30, 2019. Policía
de Panamá reprime protestas contra reformas ; Xinhuanet. October 30, 2019. Persisten tensiones tras aprobación de proyecto para reformar
Constitución de Panamá.
1381 Twitter account of Policía Nacional @Protegeryservir . October 31, 2019. ; Telemetro. October 31, 2019. La Policía Nacional asegura que
no utilizó armas de fuego durante protesta.
1382 Nodal. November 2, 2019. Panamá: continúan las protestas contra las reformas constitucionales ; France 24. November 1, 2019. Las
reformas a la Constitución de Panamá que cauzan rechazo en la ciudadanía ; VOA Noticias. October 31, 2019. Protestas en Panamá contra
reformas constitucionales ; EFE. November 1, 2019. Otra jornada de protesta con detenidos contra la reforma constitucional en Panamá ; El
periódico. November 7, 2019. Miles de panameños salen a protestar en contra de la reforma constitucional..
1383 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
1384 El Capital. March 30, 2019. Promulgan Ley 81 de Protección de datos personales en Panamá.
1385 Asamblea Nacional. Proyecto de Ley 665. Available at: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/10/2018_P_665.pdf
1386 Asamblea Nacional. Proyecto de Ley 063. Available at
https://www.asamblea.gob.pa/APPS/SEG_LEGIS/PDF_SEG/PDF_SEG_2010/PDF_SEG_2019/2019_A_063.pdf . Panamá América. August 2,
2019. Censurar a “taquilleros” atentaría contra la libertad de expresión ; En segundos. July 31, 2019. Cuestionan anteproyecto que busca
censurar publicaciones en redes
1387 The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access
to Information. June 1, 2011. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet.
1387 OEA. Comunicado de prensa. Misión de Observación electoral de la OEA felicita al pueblo y a las autoridades electorales panameños por
una jornada electoral exitosa. Available at: https://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-023/19.
1388 OEA. Comunicado de prensa Misión de Observación electoral de la OEA felicita al pueblo y a las autoridades electorales panameños por
una jornada electoral exitosa. Disponible para consulta en: https://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C023/19
1389 Panamá América. May 4, 2019. Restringen labor periodística para las elecciones.
1390 Tribunal Electoral. Comunicado Aclaración para los medios de comunicación y comunicadores sociales. Available at:
https://www.tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/aclaracion-para-los-medios-de-comunicacion-y-comunicadoressociales/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=Twitter
220
that both during the ban and during the campaign period, candidates can offer interviews without breaking the
electoral rules1391.
996. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that “electoral processes are closely linked to freedom of
expression and information, since in order for citizens to carry out their decisions at the time of voting it is
essential that they have as much information as possible. For this, it is crucial that facts, ideas, and opinions
circulate freely. Without a doubt, the most common way for citizens to inform themselves today is through the
mass media”1392.
1391 En segundos. March 22, 2019. TE advierte sobre comunicadores que piden coímas a candidatos.
1392IACHR. Annual Report 2005. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI Freedom of
Expression and the Electoral Process: The Case of Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 77 February, 2006. Para. 2
221
26. PARAGUAY
997. Throughout 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observed a context of political polarization in
Paraguay that led to the development of social protests, in which there were incidents between protesters and
State security agents, as well as attacks against journalists who provided coverage . This Office documented
speech by high level authorities of the State that seeks to delegitimize the protests against the government and
link them with alleged destabilization plans. It draws the attention of this office the increase in threats,
intimidation, aggressions and legal actions aimed at criminalizing the work of journalists who disseminate
information of high public interest. Similarly, the Office of the Special Rapporteur noted with concern the
dismissals of media journalists. Finally, this Office highlights the advances in the protection of the right of access
to information, although it observed regulatory reforms that could be regressive in thisarea.
A. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
998. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has noted a tendency to commit aggression against journalists in
Paraguay during the coverage of events, which occurs in the context of a marked political polarization of great
controversy over issues of public interest1393. This pattern extends to threats to journalists for publications or
opinions, both by state actors and individuals1394, as well as attacks during the coverage of social protests or
events where the Police deploys the use of force1395.
999. Among the documented cases are: on March 19, Denilso Sánchez, mayor of the city of Captain Bado,
department of Amambay, interrupted in the cabin of the Ñu Vera Radio and verbally assaulted the radio host
Milciades Ruíz while he was conducting his program, for a series of criticisms against the municipal
administration. Also, the radio hostdenounced that the Mayor carried a weapon on hiswaist1396.
1000. This Office also documented the aggressions suffered by journalists of ABC Color on June 6 when they
attempted to interview the then Senator Dionisio Amarilla outside of Congress, in a context in which he was
being subjected to a process of"loss of endowment" for alleged traffic of influence. Several followers of the then
congressman assaulted the journalists with shoves, blows, and spitting1397.
1001. Another event that is of particular concern to this Office are the statements of the Ombudsman, Miguel
Godoy, published on March 10 in his social network, againstthe journalist Enrique Vargas Peña, of ABC Cardinal,
suggesting a physical confrontation to "take out" the "anger". This publication would have been the result of a
verbal crossover that both would have had in a radio interview on March 7, where the journalist would have
questioned him strongly for his performance in a particular case, while the official would have also replied with
harsh words. Subsequently, Godoy would have indicated that the intention of his statementswas to demonstrate
that the journalist, and the media in which he works,have the intention to remove him fromoffice1398.
1002. In turn, according to the information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, between January
and June 2019, a total of 11 episodes of violation of freedom of the press were recorded, which consisted of
physical aggressions, threats, harassment through social networks, and of legal actions that have been initiated
with the purpose of criminalizing the dissemination of information of high public interest. The information
emphasizes the participation of public officials in these violations, as well as political supporters1399.
1003. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
1393 CDEHOT. January 20, 2019. Llaman de vendido y agreden a patadas a periodista; C9N. January 29, 2019. Periodista del C9N fue agredido
en la sesión de CDE;ABC Color. June 9, 2019. Intentan agredir a periodista;RDN. August 21, 2019. Fuerte cruce verbal entre titular de la UIP y
periodista;RDN. May 29, 2019. Senador confiesa querer golpear a periodista y niega soborno;Vanguardia. March 29, 2019. Kelembu hostiga a
trabajadores de prensa; Vanguardia. April 9, 2019. Edil hostiga a periodistas.
1394Hoy. February 12, 2019. Tras polémica entrevista a TheFenders, Sebas denuncia amenazas: "Te voy a romper la cara"; EPA. February 13,
2019. Sebas Rodríguez asegura que recibe amenazas; ABC Color. April 23, 2019. Amenazan al corresponsal; Nordeste Ahora May 10, 2019.
Denuncian ataque a una radio de Mayor Otaño; ABC Color. October 10, 2019. Patoteros de intendente de Otaño atacan una emisora.
1395ABC Color. March 6, 2019. Policías y reportero heridos en desalojo en Luque; Última Hora. March 6, 2019. Policías agreden a fotógrafo de
Última Hora durante desalojo.
1396 Extra. March 20, 2019. Intendente de Capitán Bado entró armado a una radio y amenazó a periodista; ABC Color. March 19, 2019.
Intendente de Capitán Bado atropelló radio, según radialista; Telefuturo. March 20, 2019. Intendente entró armado a una radio y amenazó a
periodista.
1397 ABC Color. June 6, 2019. Seguidores de Amarilla agreden a periodistas; cn9. June 6, 2019. Seguidores de Dionisio Amarilla agreden a colega
de ABC; RDN. June 6, 2019. Seguidores de Amarilla agreden a periodistas; ABC Color. June 7, 2019. Repudian agresión de hurreros a periodistas.
1398ABC Color. March 11, 2019. Defensor amenaza con “hacer pelota” a periodistas; Ñanduti. March 11, 2019. Defensor del Pueblo lanzó desafío
a EVP para “probar” complot en su contra; Hoy. March 10, 2019. Defensor del Pueblo vuelve al "fulcontac" y desafía a EVP: "Avisame y nos
sacamos la acumulación de bronca".
1399 Sindicato de Periodistas del Paraguay. Registro de ataques a la libertad de prensa del SPP. Information sent on October 30, 2019.
Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion.
1399Tiempo central. August 13, 2019. Violenta represión sobre Acceso Sur es tendencia en Twitter; 780am. October 1, 2019. Defensores del
Jardín Botánico denuncian represión policial; NPY. October 16, 2019. Dirigente de paseros es arrestada en Encarnación; ADN Paraguayo.
October 16, 2019. Represión a tomateros: “El garrote es la respuesta que el gobierno nos da y esa no es la solución”; Radio1000. October 22,
2019. Ministro justifica reacción policial: ‘no son budas con solpán’; ABC Color. October 28, 2019. Con marchas en 8 departamentos, FNC
protesta contra medidas del Gobierno.
222
expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators,
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
B. Social Protest
1004. The Office of the Special Rapporteur documented a series of social protests in different months of the
year in contexts of political polarization in Paraguay, where there were incidents between the Police and
protesters that led to attacks and detentions1400. Of particular concern is the violence against journalists by
protesters and by State security agents.
1005. As of July 25, within the framework of a political controversy afteran agreement between the
governments of Paraguay and Brazil that would have been signed secretly went public, several protests were
carried out in different cities in the country in demand for a political trial of President Mario Abdo Benítez. On
July 25, several groups of young people protested at night in front of the residence of the President of the
Republic where the police repressed and detained some protesters who were released hours later1401. Also, in
the context of these protests, other incidents were registered in August where repressions by the Police were
also reported1402.
1006. The Office of the Special Rapporteur is concerned about a statement issued by the Ministry of Interior,
indicating the intention to file a criminal complaint against protesters for resorting to violence against the Police.
In particular, the statement points to the name of Stiben Patron, who, according to what was published,
"physically and verbally assaulted a police officer." Also, the then Minister of the Interior, Juan Ernesto
Villamayor, said in the statement that the complaint would be directed “against those who have called for the
uprising, for the armed uprising, who have called on the armed forces to stand up in arms and the police forces
as well. Here there are already crimes committed and the Attorney General’s Office has to intervene…”1403.As
well, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has observed that President Abdo holds a speech aimed at questioning
social protests under the assumption that there is a "destabilization plan" of the opposition, which would seek
to overthrow him1404.
1007. On the other hand, in the context of a protest by the taxi drivers' union, held in July, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur was informed that journalists were injured by gunshot shots by state security agents, as well
as attacks by protesters against journalists who were doing the coverage. In this sense, a chronicler named
Dalma Benítez reported having been the victim of sexual assault by one of the protesters1405. Likewise, it was
reported that eight of the taxi drivers were charged in the framework of the protest for "disturbance to public
peace" and "resistance”1406.
1008. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed of a resolution issued on September 27 by Rubén
Rojas, mayor of the city of Hernandarias, department of Alto Paraná, who sought to reject and prevent a march
of the LGTBI collective in Paraguay. However, the police said they did not have the power to prevent the
march1407. On September 29, the march took place and there were incidents and acts of violence by so called
"pro-life"groups1408.
1009. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible, in principle, the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of
1400 Última Hora. July 25, 2019.Aprehendidos tras manifestación frente a MburuvichaRóga; La Nación. Acuerdo de Itaipú: Repudio y represión
frente a MburuvicháRoga; RDN. July 26, 2019. Reprimen a jóvenes manifestantes frente a MburuvichaRóga; Extra. July 26, 2019. Guarará por
acuerdo del Gobierno con Brasil.
1401
1402 Hoy. August 12, 2019. Alta tensión: pro y anti juicio político embarcan a peligroso martes 13 de protestas; Telefuturo. August 12, 2019.
Incidentes en manifestación contra acuerdo sobre Itaipú; Telefuturo. August 14, 2019. Violenta represión a manifestantes en Ciudad del Este;
La Unión. August 14, 2019. Represión a manifestantes en Ciudad del Este; Ñandutí. August 14, 2019. Represión policial en CDE: “Ellos pararon
porque se quedaron sin balas”; Guía del Este. August 21, 2019. Policía detiene a dos manifestantes contra el Gobierno en CDE.
República del Paraguay. Ministerio del Interior. August 12, 2019. Ministerio del Interior presentará denuncia contra agresores de policías y
promotores de violencia.
1404 Última Hora. October 26, 2019. Presidente acusó que adversarios buscan un muerto para tumbarlo; ABC Color. October 25, 2019. Desde el
Gobierno insisten con plan de desestabilización.
1405Extra. July 24, 2019. Protesta de los taxistas dejó policías y periodistas heridos; Paraguay.com. July 23, 2019. Varios periodistas agredidos y
heridos en medio de manifestación; La Nación. July 23, 2019. Reportero del Grupo Nación fue herido con balines de goma; EFE. July 23, 2019.
La Fiscalía paraguaya imputa a taxistas detenidos en las protestas contra Uber; Fopep/Facebook account. July 23, 2019. Available at:
https://www.facebook.com/194659127214966/posts/2889905281023657?s=1133997416&sfns=mo
1406RDN. July 23, 2019. Imputan a taxistas por perturbación de la paz pública y resistencia; 780am. July 24, 2019. Taxistas con arresto
domiciliario; ABC Color. July 24, 2019. Juez decreta arresto domiciliario para ocho taxistas.
1407 Última Hora. September 28, 2019. Polémica por prohibición de marcha LGBT en Hernandarias; ABC Color. September 27, 2019. Intendente
prohíbe una marcha LGBT en Hernandarias.
1408 ABC Color. September 30, 2019. Marcha LGBT: intendente justificó agresión de los “provida”; Hoy. September 29, 2019. Amedrentan y
agreden a activistas durante marcha LGBTI en Hernandarias: hay heridos.
223
assembly”1409 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly through social protestmust not be subject to
authorization by the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its realization”1410.
1010. Likewise, the 2013 Joint Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social
demonstrations indicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and their
guarantee is a necessary condition for existence and functioning of a democratic society. A State may impose
reasonable limitations on demonstrations in order to ensure their peaceful development or disperse those that
become violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, and
proportionality. In addition, dispersing a demonstration must be justified by the duty to protect people, and the
safest and least harmful measures for protesters should be taken. The use of force in public demonstrations
must be exceptional and in strictly necessary circumstances in accordance with internationally recognized
principles”1411.
C. Protection Mechanisms
1011. Although in 2016 a bill to protect journalists was presented, the last study of this initiative was in
September 20171412. However, this Office takes note of a meeting that took place due to an incident in which a
journalist was assaulted at the time he was covering a judicial eviction on March 6 in the city of Luque, which
led to Government authorities and representatives of the journalistic union to agree to strengthen the
institutional framework of the Interinstitutional Bureau for the Protection of Journalists1413.
1012. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have defined some of the requirements forprotection
mechanisms to be effective. For example, to emphasize: 1) the importance of guaranteeing the necessary
personnel and financial resourcesfor the adequate implementation of the mechanism; 2) the need to ensure
effective coordinationamong the entities responsible for the implementation of measures of prevention,
protection, and prosecution; 3) the need to adequately define protective measures called for in themechanism
and the procedure for their adoption; 4) the need to guarantee the full participation ofjournalists, civil society,
and beneficiaries in the implementation and operation of the mechanism; and 5)the benefits of seeking support
from the international community for the mechanism’s operation1414.
D. Stigmatizing statements
1013. The Office of the Special Rapporteur documented some stigmatizing statements against the work of the
press and particularly against some journalists and media outlets covering various topics of public interest1415.
In particular, Senator Paraguayan Cubas denounced in an interview that several journalists receive money to
silence acts of corruption1416.
1014. According to the information received, a councilor from the municipality of Ciudad del Este, named
Celso Miranda, would have been the protagonist of various situations of stigmatization against journalists
covering the sessions of the Municipal Board. As published, he constantly threatens to initiate legal actions
against journalists, disqualifies the press, prevents them from fulfilling their work, and asks officials not to give
public information to the digital mediaVanguardia, which at different times published complaints of corruption
in the municipal administration1417.
1015. The existence of a context of marked confrontation, in which there are constant disqualifications and
stigmatization, creates a climate thatprevents a reasonable andplural deliberation on allpublic affairs. While it
is true that the tension between the press and governments is a normal phenomenon that derives from the
natural function of the press and that occurs in many States, it is also true that an acute polarization closes the
spaces for calm debate, and it does not help neither the authorities nor the press to better fulfill their role in a
1409IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197..
1410IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
1411United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
1412 República del Paraguay. Sistema de Información Legislativa. D-1642344.
1413 IP. April 5, 2019. Gobierno garantiza a gremios voluntad de fortalecer protección a trabajadores de prensa.
1414IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Violence Against
Journalists and Media Workers). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 149. Doc. 50. December 31, 2013. Para. 81; IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Office of the
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II: 2010 Special Report on Freedom of Expression in Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
5. March 7, 2011. Para. 712.
1415 In the context of protests carried outin July in the country's capital against the operation of electronic platforms for alternative transport
services, a taxi union leader said that journalists who allegedly were in favor of these platforms should be shot for being "inhuman"; also, in
that same context, he made several statements in favor of a local guerrilla group. 780am. July 10, 2019. Taxista alaba al EPP y pide
fusilamiento a periodistas; Hoy. July 10, 2019. Taxistas hacen loas al EPP, escrachan a concejala y piden fusilar a periodistas
1416 RDN. July 16, 2019. Payo afirma que periodistas reciben dinero de la Corte y de políticos; El Trueno. June 16, 2019. Payo afirma que
periodistas reciben dinero de la Corte y de políticos.
1417ABC Color. April 17, 2019. Kelembú, más prepotente que nunca con periodistas; Vanguardia. April 9, 2019. Edil hostiga a periodistas.
224
vigorous, deliberative, and open democracy. In these cases, it is the State's task, given its national and
international responsibilities, to contribute to a climate of greater tolerance and respect for the ideas of others,
even when they are offensive or disturbing1418.
1016. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that with their
statements they are not damaging the rights of those who contribute to public deliberation through the
expression and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media, and human rights defenders
organizations, and must take into account the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their
expressions do not constitute, in the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful
pressure on the rights of those who intend to contribute to public deliberation through the expression and
diffusion of their thought”1419.
E. Subsequent Liabilities
1017. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes that the use of criminal law continued to be recurrent during
2019 in Paraguay as a measure to self-censor the press and journalists from the free exercise of their work.
Likewise, this Office documented situations in which public officials were reprimanded for statements that the
government would perceive as contrary or not in accordance with the truth1420. Likewise, this Office notes with
deep concern the launching, at the end of October, of a criminal judicial action for defamation and slander by
Pedro Chávez, mayor of the city of Mayor Otaño, Itapúa department, against a youth leader who publicly
denounced a series of acts of alleged corruption of the Mayor1421.
1018. Former Senator Dionisio Amarilla initiated a criminal complaint at the end of May against the journalist
of ABC Color, Juan Carlos Lezcano, for alleged acts of defamation, insult, and slander. The complaint was filed
after the journalist published a video recording where the former official appeared along with a group of
businessmen who would have bribed Lezcano to stop publishing a series of complaints against the managers of
a company that tendered with the State. This publication also motivated the political prosecution and removal
of the then SenatorAmarilla. In the context of the legal action presented, he requested that the media stop
publishing on the facts related to his person in the performance of his duties as aparliamentarian1422.
1019. Similarly, the president of Conmebol, Alejandro Domínguez, initiated a criminal complaint for
defamation, slander, and insult in June, against journalist Marcos Velázquez, for a series of public complaints
made by the communicator, among which he described the representative as "corrupt”1423.
1020. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed of the presentation of a criminal complaint against
journalist Jorge Emmanuel Cabral for the dissemination of a video of an interview conducted by the journalist
to a childthat unleashed a series of jokes on social networks against the minor. Likewise, in accordance with
what has been published, the Office of the Ombudsman for Children would have required a precautionary
measure against journalists and against any person sharing that filming, images, or data that lead to the
identification of the child1424.
1021. On the other hand, this Office was informed that the Public Ministry, through its Specialized Unit of
Computer Crimes, issued a statement on April 2 warning that the “misuse” of social networks could lead to
criminal proceedings. After the enunciation of different assumptions, the press releaseindicated, in regards to
“shared content”, thatalthough freedom of expression is guaranteed, it is not an “exception” that allows “to
violate the rights of others, for example: when contents that harm third parties are sent or forwarded, whether
in person, family or company”1425.
1418 IACHR. Annual Report 2014. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of
the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 13. March 9, 2015. Para. 65.
1419I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
1420Hoy. July 19, 2019. Por tuitear “desastre ko Marito” fue sancionada: “Es un eñecalma”, dice la castigada; La Nación. No date. Sanción para
funcionaria que comentó “Desastre ko Marito”; RDN. August 28, 2019. Ministro justifica destitución de directora; Última Hora. August 28, 2019.
Mazzoleni acusa a directora destituida de mentir sobre falta de insumos; ABC Color. September 25, 2019. Sargento de Aviación arrestada por
publicar un meme del Presidente.
1421ABC Color. October 29, 2019. Intendente y seccionalero de Otaño querellan a menor, líder estudiantil.
1422ABC Color. May 29, 2019. No logró “desinflar” y ahora recurre a querella; Última Hora. May 29, 2019. Dionisio Amarilla querella a
periodista por calumnia; Ñandutí Diario Digital. May 29, 2019. Dionisio Amarilla presenta querella contra el periodista ‘Juanki’ Lezcano; ABC
Color. May 29, 2018. Dionisio Amarilla pide censura a la prensa; Escrito de querella del senador Dionisio Amarilla contra periodista Juan
Carlos Lezcano. Available at: Archives of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expresion; ABC Color. June 3, 2019. Amarilla
intima por videos.
1423 RDN. June 22, 2019. Presidente de la Conmebol querella a periodista.
1424 ParaguayNoticias. May 22, 2019. Periodista afronta denuncia penal por difusión de video de un menor; ABC Color. May 23, 2019. Presentan
denuncia contra video de entrevista a niño; RDN. May 23, 2019. Niño es víctima de bullying a causa de video viralizado; Vanguardia. May 24,
2019. Imputarían a bloguero por exponer a escolar; Radio1000. May 23, 2019. Presentan denuncia ante la Fiscalía contra un hombre que grabó
vídeo a menor de edad.
1425 República del Paraguay. Ministerio Público. April 2, 2019. Mal uso de las redes sociales y la tecnología puede derivar en procesos penales
225
1022. In October, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information about the detention made to a
citizen who shouted “traitor” to President Abdo Benítezby the National Police in Ciudad del Este. The agents
justified this proceeding by arguing that the person would not have identified himself when he was required to
show his identity document. However, after a few hours he was released1426.
1023. Finally, the Office of the Special Rapporteur learned of the Agreement and Judgment No. 89 of October
14 issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay that resolved to reject an
unconstitutionality action promoted by the newspaper ABC Color against two judicial decisions issued in 2010
and 2011 respectively that condemned the media to a sum of money of more than thirty-five thousand dollars
for a publication that criticized a sentence handed down by Judge Carmelo Castiglioni in a case ofpublic interest,
that initiated a civil action of damages in20071427.
1024. Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “privacy
laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and dissemination of information of public interest. The
protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in those cases in which
the person offended is apublic official, a public person, or aprivate person who has voluntarily become involved
in matters of public interest. In addition, in these cases, it must be proven that in disseminating the news, the
social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that false news was disseminated,
or acted with gross negligence inefforts to determine the truth or falsity of such news.”
1025. Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: “[p]ublic
officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information." In
addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to sanction expressions related to
public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as information or expression on
matters of public interestand violates the right to freedom of expression1428.
F. Censorship of journalistic material / Prior censorship / Direct and indirect censorship
1026. The Office of the Special Rapporteur documented some worrying situations in which attempts were
made to take down from the Internetpublications referring to the defense of the rights of the LGTBI1429 collective
and matters of highpublic interest. Among the reported situations, this Office received information that a group
of journalists from the editorial office of the newspaper Ultima Hora rejected through a press release
aninstruction from the publishing house that led to the removal of an article related to the march of LGTBI pride
from social networks1430. However, this Office observes that the article “March of LGBTI Pride in Asunción will
defend the plurality of families”, dated June 25, 2019, is available on the online page of the indicatedmedia1431.
1027. On the other hand, according to the information received, on June 13 in the capital of the country a group
violently broke up the development of a play called “The Madness of the Marshal”, considering that it contains
scenes offensive to a historical figure from the country1432. Also, the main actor ofplay reported having received
death threats1433.
1028. Also, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observes that in the context of the mass protests against the
Government during the month of August, authorities responsible for the security of the President of the Republic
proceeded to dismantle the filming cameras of the Grupo Nación that were located in a nearby downtown
building to the President's government premises for security reasons. After the fact went public, the decision
was reversed1434.
1426 780am. October 22, 2019. Gritó “vende patria” a Abdo y fue detenido por la policía; La Unión. October 23, 2019. Joven critica que por gritar
‘vendepatria’ a Abdo policías lo hayan tratado como delincuente.
1427 República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. Corte Suprema de Justicia. Acción de inconstitucionalidad en el Juicio:"Carmelo Augusto Vicente
Castiglioni Alvarenga C/ AbcColor y Otros S/ Indemnización". Año: 2011 -N° 1602.-. Available at: https://www.csj.gov.py/jurisprudencia/#;
ABC Color. October 16, 2019. Corte condena a ABC por criticar fallo judicial que blanqueó a expresidente;
1428IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions
and Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015.
1429Hoy. February 1, 2019. Última Hora censura y luego recula: reponen comentario de periodista sobre discriminación; “It is the second time
in the year that Última Hora daily censors in a public way. The first was an article about Bristol, by FerBoccia. This position is inconceivable
for a medium that suffered prohibitions, censorship and even closure during the dictatorship. Aren't they ashamed?”. Twitter account of
Eduardo Quintana @EdQuintana. June 28, 2019; ABC Color. August 27, 2019. Denuncian censura al género en la enseñanzapública.
1430Facebook account of PeriodistasÚH. June 28, 2019. Available at
https://www.facebook.com/UHNoSeCalla/photos/a.1376185052466912/2300144963404245/?type=3&theater;El Trueno. No date.
Periodistas de Última Hora rechazan decisión editorial de eliminar noticia sobre «orgullo gay»; Hoy. June 28, 2019. Periodistas de Ultima Hora
acusan 'censura' de Dirección sobre tema LGTBI; Hoy. June 30, 2019. Disidencia entre periodistas de ÚltimaHora sobre ‘censura’ de nota LGTBI..
1431 Última Hora. June 25, 2019. Marcha del Orgullo LGBTI en Asunción defenderá la pluralidad de lasfamilias.
1432 Última Hora. June 14, 2019. Pese a incidentes, actor seguirá con la obra teatral Las locuras del Mariscal; ABC Color. June 14, 2019.
Incidentes en estreno de la obra teatral “Las locuras del Mariscal”.
1433 Crónica. June 14, 2019. Amenazaron al “Mariscal”; La Nación. June 14, 2019. Polémica por la obra de teatro “Las Locuras del Mariscal”;
Extra. June 13, 2019. Irrumpen obra de teatro "Las locuras del Mariscal" por considerarla una ofensa.
1434 Hoy. August 23, 2019. El Gobierno aplica censura y ataca la libertad de expresión; La Nación. August 23, 2019. Censura a GEN: ¿Quién
ordenó? Asesor dice que no fue el presidente.
226
1029. Article 13.2 of the American Convention explicitly states that the exercise of freedom of expression
cannot be subject to prior censorship. Additionally, principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression enshrines that “[p]rior censorship, direct or indirect interference in, or pressure exerted upon any
expression, opinion, or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic
communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as
the arbitrary imposition of information, and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate
the right to freedom of expression.”
G. Access to public information
1030. The Office of the Special Rapporteur learned of the publication, on August 7, 2019, of Law 6355 that
modifies the legal framework that regulates the presentation of affidavits onproperties, assets, and income of
public officials in Paraguay. The regulations stipulate in its Art. 12 that the publication of the data contained in
the document that states the affidavit can only be “obtained the respective jurisdictional authorization”1435. This
Office noted that the enactment of this law occurred in a context in which a legal action to access public
information on affidavits of senior public officialsresulted in a favorable judicial decision was filed1436. Likewise,
the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay must resolve an action of unconstitutionality presented previously on
the publicity of the affidavits1437.
1031. The Office of the Special Rapporteur welcomes the approval and enforcement of Law 6299, which
establishes the obligatory nature of the publicity and live broadcast of the sessions of the Supreme Court of
Justice, the Council of the Judiciary,the Jury for the Judgment of Judges, and the Council of Ministers of the
Executive Power1438. However, this Office received information on the development of a session of the Council
of the Judiciary on June 10 in which the score for the election of a list for the highest judicial instance of the
country had to be evaluated; the session was declared reserved, claiming the protection of the honorability of
the candidates. This led to lawyers from the Institute of Environmental Law and Economics [Instituto de Derecho
y Economía Ambiental] (IDEA) to take legal action so that the proceedings or the film's records are made public.
Although the judicial decision issued a precautionary measure for the publicity of the records, the measure
would not have been complied with as required1439.
1032. In addition, the implementation of the aforementioned law would have encountered difficulties in the
Supreme Court of Justice since the live transmission of all sessions of the Constitutional Chamber would impede
the efficient study of all pending cases1440, a situation that prompted Minister Gladys Bareiro de Módica to
request to the legal secretariat of the Judicial Branch the presentation of an action of unconstitutionality against
the law with so that said law would not be mandatory for the Constitutional Chamber. Nevertheless, after an
action of theIDEAcivil society organization that requested a political trial of the minister who proposed the
measure1441, the Court gave up the filing of the actionof unconstitutionality1442.
1033. The Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on a series of judicial decisions favorable to
access to information1443. Some of the issues resolved were sworn statements of senior public officials1444 and
the lifting of bank secrecy obligations1445. In addition, this Office documented a series of judicial decisions
1435 República del Paraguay. Gaceta Oficial. Ley 6355. August 7, 2019.
1436Última Hora. July 12, 2019. Revelan las declaraciones juradas de Benigno y Correa vía judicial; ABC Color. June 26, 2019. Fallo ordena
publicar DD.JJ.
1437 Última Hora. June 30, 2019. La CSJ debe resolver recusaciones y tema declaración jurada; ABC Color. July 14, 2019. La Corte sigue sin
resolver sobre declaraciones juradas; La Nación. September 2, 2019. Esperan pronunciamiento de la Corte sobre declaración jurada.
1438 República del Paraguay. Gaceta Oficial. Ley 6299. May 2, 2019.
1439 Instituto de Derecho y Economía Ambiental (IDEA). No date. Campaña «la transparencia se pelea»; Última Hora. June 14, 2019. Consejo
elabora terna, pero debe publicar sesión secreta; ABC Color. June 12, 2019. Piden actas sobre “cocinada” en la sesión secreta de terna para la
Corte; ABC Color. June 28, 2019. Apelan rechazo de amparo contra terna oficialista para la Corte.
1440 República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. July 18, 2019. Resoluciones del Acuerdo de la Sala Constitucional.
1441Instituto de Derecho y Economía Ambiental (IDEA) / Twitter account. “From IDEA we ask for the impeachment of Gladys Bareiro de
Módica and we officially make this statement to the public, because we work for transparency in Paraguay and we believe that we should
not take a step back in the construction of a fair and democratic country”. @InstIDEA. July 17, 2019; Judiciales.net. July 17, 2019. Corte
accionará contra transmisión de sesiones.
1442 Última Hora. July 23, 2019. Corte desiste de presentar acción contra sesiones en vivo; La Nación. No date. Televisación de sesiones
continuará, la Corte desiste de acción.
1443República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. Dirección de Transparencia. Available at: https://www.pj.gov.py/transparencia-documentos;
ABC Color. March 11, 2019. Fallo pro acceso a la información..
1444República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. Dirección de Transparencia. Available at: https://www.pj.gov.py/transparencia-documentos;
Última Hora. July 12, 2019. Revelan las declaraciones juradas de Benigno y Correa vía judicial; ABC Color. June 26, 2019. Fallo ordena publicar
DD.JJ.
1445República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. Dirección de Transparencia. Available at: https://www.pj.gov.py/transparencia-documentos; 5
Días. July 9, 2019. Deberán dar datos sobre caso Ara..
227
contrary to this1446. Ofparticular concern is a judicial decisionthat denied the claim ofthe head of the civil society
organization Tedic, Maricarmen Sequera, on information regarding the processing of personal data by the
agencies responsible for the security ofpersons after the enforcement of a biometric surveillance system by the
Police1447. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was informed that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice is pending resolution of the case1448.
1034. On the other hand, the Office of the Special Rapporteur takes note of a series of activities carried out in
the Judiciary that aim to constantly train judicial magistrates in the field of freedom of expression, access to
public information, and protection of journalists1449. Likewise, civil society continues to collaborate with these
types of activities, which has contributed to the introduction of inter-American standards in judicial decisions
in cases of high public interest1450.
1035. Finally, the Office of the Special Rapporteur notes the increasing use of the law on access to public
information in Paraguay, with more than 22,000 requests for public information since it was put into operation
in 20151451. However, it is observed that various public institutions continue with unfounded or arbitrary
refusals, whether due to lack of response, incongruous orpartial responses, which leads to those affected having
to file legal actions1452. Regarding the various consultations made during 2019, this Office learned of request No.
24122 of August 30 which wasanswered on September 23 related to “Data on violence against journalists” in
which the Public Ministry informed that during 2019 there were: 3 reports of aggression against journalists; 10
accusations for crimes of “disturbance to public peace and resistance”, “disturbance to public peace and
coercion”; and 4 journalists "protected" by the "Witness Protection and Protection VictimsProgram”1453.
H. Other relevant situations
1036. According to the information received, at the end of April a group of journalists were fired after the
disclosure of a list of names of journalists who would have received money from a public agency of the customs
sector to cover up acts of corruption. This caused several of the communicators to be fired from their jobs1454.
On the other hand, at least 22 journalists would have been fired in August from ABC Color,without prior notice
and arbitrarily. According to what was reported, several of the communicators dismissed would have been
reaching the 10-year work seniority that grants stability1455.
1446 República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. Dirección de Transparencia. Available at: https://www.pj.gov.py/transparencia-documentos
1447 República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. Dirección de Transparencia. Available at: https://www.pj.gov.py/transparencia-documentos;
ABC Color. August 31, 2019. Rechazan amparo contra MDI..
1448 Tedic. September 16, 2019. ¿Quién vigila al vigilante? reconocimiento facial en Asunción.
1449 República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. March 12, 2019. Decisiones de la plenaria de la Corte Suprema de Justicia; República del Paraguay.
Corte Suprema de Justicia. June 25, 2019. Decisiones de la plenaria de la Corte Suprema de Justicia; República del Paraguay. Corte Suprema
de Justicia. July 18, 2019. Capacitan a jueces y operadores en Caacupé.
1450 República del Paraguay. Ministerio de Justicia. March 19, 2019. Buscan perfeccionar portal de acceso a la información pública; República
del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. March 21, 2019. Conversatorio sobre Acceso a la Información Pública; República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial.
May 30, 2019. Decisiones de la plenaria de la Corte Suprema de Justicia; República del Paraguay. Poder Judicial. Dirección de Transparencia.
Available at: https://www.pj.gov.py/transparencia-documentos
1451 República del Paraguay. Portal Unificado de Información Pública.
1452 Alianza Regional para la Libre Expresión e Información. Saber Más X: Desafíos y restricciones del Acceso a la Información Pública.
September 28, 2019.
1453 Portal Unificado de Información Pública. Solicitud #24122. Available at:
https://informacionpublica.paraguay.gov.py/portal/#!/ciudadano/solicitud/24122
1454 La Nación. April 30, 2019. Filtraron nombres de periodistas que aparecieron en una agenda; Última Hora. April 29, 2019. Filtran lista de
periodistas que estarían implicados en esquema de corrupción; Hoy. May 2, 2019. Tras escándalo de supuesta "lista coimera" el SNT deja sin
pantalla a Mario Bracho; Hoy. April 30, 2019. Rajan a Víctor Pesoa y Gabriela León de Telefuturo;EPA. May 4, 2019. Gaby León confirmó su
desvinculación de Telefuturo.
1455 La Nación. August 9, 2019. “Basta de despidos”, reclaman periodistas; El Trueno. 9 de agosto de 2019. Denuncian despidos masivos en ABC
Color; Ñanduti. August 9, 2019. Denuncian masivos despidos injustificados en ABC Color; Ñanduti. August 12, 2019. Masivos despidos
injustificados son “ilegales”, denuncian sindicalistas.
228
27. PERU
1037. Throughout 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the constant use of judicial
harassment against investigative journalism in Peru through criminal law figures (slander, insult and
defamation) as a mechanism to pressure journalists and communicators, which could have an inhibitory effect.
Among other cases, several criminal actions against the journalists Paola Ugaz, Pedro Salinas and the site Ojo
Público stand out. 1038. Likewise, the removal of the director of the National Institute of Radio and Television
(IRTP) aroused concern in journalists and organizations as apossible attempt at greater governmentalinfluence
from the public media. In addition, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on bills presented
in Congress that would seek to establish state controls on information and conditions to the press, as well as
other attempts to regulate and sanction digital communication and the flow of information in social networks,
impose the so-called right to be forgotten in different circumstances and regulate the use of personal data.
A.Progress
1038. On April 10, the liberal bench of the Congress of the Republic of Peru presented the bill “Law for
establishing civil procedures of rectification and punishment for infringements against honor”, which would
seek to decriminalize crimes against honor, repealing Title II of the Criminal Code, so that the sanction is
exclusively economic and not prison, allowing the establishment of civil procedures for the right of reply and
rectification1456. Up until the close of this Annual Report, the legislative initiative would remain pending debate
at the Justice Commission of Parliament1457.
1039. On May 21, the Committee on Transportation and Communications approved the pre-opinion on seven
bills, by which they propose the "Law regulating government advertising" to regulate contracts of government
advertising with private media1458. Up until the close of this Annual Report the initiative would be pending
presentation by congress 1459.
1040. According to public information, on August 1, the Sixth Criminal Chamber for Released Prisoners
Proceedings acquitted journalist Rafael Romero of the crime against honor, in the form of aggravated
defamation, against businessman Baruch Ivcher, for the statements made in his publication "Captura
internacionalpara Baruch Ivcher",inwhich he linked the media director to alleged acts of money laundering1460.
B. Impunity
1041. The Permanent Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice declared void the sentence that
acquitted Daniel Urresti of the murder of journalist Hugo Bustíos and ordered a new oral trial1461. On October 4
of 2018, the National Criminal Chamber acquitted Urresti of being co-author of the crimes against life, physical
integrity, health, and murder with great cruelty by explosion, to the detriment of journalist Hugo Bustíos, and
murder in degree of attempt to the detriment of Eduardo Rojas Arce. According to different human rights
organizations, the murder of Bustios -during the time of terrorism in 1988- has gone unpunished for 31 years.
1042. After 35 years, the murder of the journalist of La República, Jaime Ayala, who disappeared at a base in
the Peruvian Navy after filing a claim for the raid of his mother's house during the time of terrorism, would still
be unpunished. Ayala entered the Navy base, but never left. Several witnesses, including former marines, would
have declared that Ayala was tortured and killed1462.
1043. In addition, this Office has received information about impunity in the murder of journalist David
Choquepata, murdered in 2016 in his own radio booth. The prosecution would have archived the investigation
of the crime1463.
C. Attacks and assaults on journalists and themedia
1044. On December 10, the National Press Association of Peru denounced the assassination of radio Laser of
San Lorenzo broadcaster, Sonia Alvarado for causes possibly linked to her journalistic work. The body of the
1456 Proyecto de Ley. Ley que establece los procedimientos civiles de rectificación y de sanción de las infracciones contra el honor. Expediente
No 4184/2018-CR. Available at: http://www.congreso.gob.pe/pley-2016-2021
1457 Senado del Perú. Proyecto de Ley No. 4184/2018-CR. La Republica. July 17, 2019. Consejo de la Prensa Peruana destaca Proyecto para
fortalecer la libertad de expresión ; El Comercio. April 25, 2019. Presentan proyecto de ley para despenalizar los delitos contra el honor ; Ideele
Radio. April 11, 2019. La Bancada Liberal presento un proyecto para sacar los delitos de opinión del Código Penal.
1458 Senado del Perú. Proyectos de Ley 3100/2017-CR, 3107/2017-CR, 3109/2017-CR, 3142-2017-CR, 3223/2018-CR, 4147/2018-CR y
4258/2018-CR. Dictamen 2018-2019. Comisión de transportes y Comunicaciones. May 2019. Available at:
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/Docs/comisiones2018/Transportes/files/expedientepl3107/predictamenpublicidadestatalv02.pdf
1459 Perú 21. May 23, 2019. Consejo de la Prensa Peruana saluda el dictamen que busca regular la publicidad estatal : El Comercio. May 22,
2019. Ley que regula la publicidad estatal en manos del pleno del Congreso : La Republica. May 22, 2019. Consejo de la Prensa Peruana aclara
que a libertad de expresión no ha sido alterada.
1460 Expreso. August 21, 2019. Poder Judicial absuelve a periodista Romero.
1461 Andina. April 12, 2019. Corte Suprema anula absolución de Urresti por caso Bustíos y ordena nuevo juicio.
1462 Ojo Público. September 10, 2019. Reporte a la SIP 2019: Congreso, querellas e impunidad judicial son enemigos de la prensa. Crónica Viva.
August 4, 2019. Jaime Ayala, la incesante lucha de Rosa Pallqui por justicia y verdad.
1463 Ojo Público. September 10, 2019. Reporte a la SIP 2019: Congreso, querellas e impunidad judicial son enemigos de la prensa.
229
communicator was collected with traces of blows and strangulation in the province of Datem del Marañón,
department of Loreto (northeast of the country). The reporter was missing since Saturday, December 7.
Although the Police of Peru does not know the motive for the murder, according to information provided by the
investigators,the main suspect would be her ex-partner, Felipe CáceresRodríguez, withwhom she hadproblems
and who had threatened her severaltimes. The national newspaper LaRepública saidAlvaradowas investigating
a timber traffic network in the region, in which her ex-partner would be involved. He would have already been
detained1464.
1045. The Office of the Special Rapporteur urges the Peruvian State to investigate these crimes in a complete,
effective, and impartial manner, clarify their motives, and judicially determine the relationship they might have
to the investigations that this journalist carried out. In this sense, it is essential that the authorities investigate
these facts without ruling out the hypothesis of the link to journalistic activity and freedom of expression.
1046. According to public information, on March 5, the journalist of the Correo newspaper, Ericka Alvarado,
would have been attacked by a member of the National Police of Peru (PNP), who would have confiscated her
work equipment preventing her from covering the events that occurred outside the North Police Station in
Chiclayo1465.
1047. On March 27, Carlos Orozco García, director of the magazine “La Hualina” in the province of Huarochirí,
reported having been the victim of harassment by the mayor of San Lorenzo de Quinti, Jesús Lozano Sotil, after
he published his research on the illiteracy rate in the San Lorenzo de Quinti district. According to the available
information, the mayor would have demanded thatthe journalist withdraw the published information, given the
refusal of this request, individuals close to the local authority would have started to threaten the journalist by
telephone and on social networks1466.
1048. On April 5, journalist Juan Manuel Valerio Luyo reported having been attacked by the sister of the mayor
of the province of Cañete, Maritza Adela Díaz De la Cruz, due to hispublications about the work of the provincial
mayor of Cañete, Segundo Constantino Díaz de la Cruz. During the attack, the woman would have threatened the
journalist and his family,insisting that she would initiate criminal proceedings against him1467.
1049. On May 7, the journalist of the magazine Alerta Región Ica, Alfredo Jaime Magallanes, denounced the
attack by an unknown individual after attempting to interview the provincial mayor of Chincha, Armando
Huamán Tasayco. According to the information available, during the assault against the journalist, the individual
would have said multiple times: "don’t mess with themayor”1468.
1050. On May 15, the graphic reporter of the newspaper El Comercio, Alessandro Currarino, denounced the
excessive use of force and chemical agents by elements of the Special Services Unit (USE) of the PNP, while
covering the transfer of the former mayor of Lima, Susana Villarán, to the Criminal Prison Annex for Women of
Chorrillos1469.
1051. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the aggressions and threats towards the
journalists of Panamericana TV, Elizabeth Chambi Mamani and Fredy Puma Mamani and the journalist of Fama
TV, Máximo Lanza, in the province of San Román (Juliaca), presumably due to their investigations on
irregularities in the management of the Puno government. According to the information available, on May 21,
the mobile line of the channel would have received messages accusing Chambi of acting on behalf of certain
power groups, while on May 23 a defamation campaign against the journalist via Facebookwas denounced1470.
1052. According to information from different Peruvian media, on June 14 people from the “La Resistencia”
movement started a protest in front of the Institute of Legal Defense, IDL-Reporters facilities [Instituto de
Defensa Legal IDL-Reporteros] to harass the journalist and media director, Gustavo Gorriti, regarding the
investigations of the Lava Jato and the National Council of the Magistracy (CNM) cases. According to the report
of the journalist, thiswould not be the firsttime he would have been harassed, since in April Peruvian authorities
and various public officials such as the congressman, Héctor Becerril and the former Foreign Minister, Luis
González, had made statements blaming him for the suicide of former president Alan García, which occurred on
April 171471.
1053. On October 18, Panamerican Television correspondent Luigi Alberto Rodríguez Tasso denounced illtreatment and obstruction of possible coverage, abuse, and impediment of information coverage by the PNP
1464 ANP. December 10, 2019. ANP expresa consternación y exige justicia para Isabel Alvarado, periodista asesinada en Loreto. Reporters
Without Borders (RSF). December 13, 2019. Radio journalist murdered in northeastern Peru .
1465 TV Cosmos/ Youtube. March 6, 2019. Chiclayo: Periodistas protestan por agresión a colega ; Diario Ecos Huacho/ Facebook. March 6,
2019. Policía arrebata teléfono celular a periodista.
1466 Cronica viva. March 27, 2019. ANP exige el cese de hostigamiento a periodista en Huarochiri.
1467 Crónica Viva. May 27, 2019. ANP rechaza ataques y amenazas a periodistas de Juliaca.
1468 Sétima Revista. December 9, 2019. ANP condena agresión a periodista y demanda no quede impune.
1469 Crónica Viva. May 21, 2019. ANP rechaza el abuso policial contra reportero gráfico en lima.
1470 Crónica Viva. 27 de mayo de 2019. ANP rechaza ataques y amenazas a periodistas de Juliaca.
1471 Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. April 1, 2019. Defense of the journalistic investigation can be more complex than the
investigation itself, says journalist Gustavo Gorriti. IDL. November 5, 2019. ‘La Resistencia′ agredió a periodista tras audiencia por caso
Arbitrajes. La República. March 16, 2019. Gustavo Gorriti denunciará ataque a la libertad de prensa ante organismos internacionales.
230
mayo, Jenny Linares González, while covering the celebrations for the anniversary of the Chincha province, in
the district of Pueblo Nuevo1472.
1054. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation, of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
1055. Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: “[p]ublic
officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information." In
addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to sanction expressions related to
public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as information or expression on
matters of public interest, and violates the right to freedom of expression.
D. Social Protest
1056. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the excessive use of force by agents of the National
Police of Peru (PNP) towards journalists and communicators who would be covering socialprotests.
1057. Among the cases reported to this Office are the following. On May 30, during the demonstrations against
the tolls of the Panamerican Highway in the Lima district of Lima, the journalist of the Diario Municipal digital
site, Xiomara Soto, was attacked bypolice officers from the green squad while covering the violent actions of the
PNP. According to the information received by this Office, Soto would have been taken to a mobile unit making
excessive use of public force with the aim of transferring her to the Police Station in the area and proceeding to
her detention, where she was held for four hours1473.
1058. On July 15 in Arequipa, within the framework of protests against the execution of the Tía María mining
project, different journalists reported the excessive use of force by the Police but also denounced attacks by the
protesters, who harassed them by telling them:"Sold out press, corrupts"
1474, on July 25, in the same protests, the
journalist of radio La Ribereña, radio La Luz, and Canal 8, Jhony Castro Quispe, and Juan José Santy, denounced
the confiscation of their work material by the PNP.
1059. Also, in demonstrations in the context of the mining project Tía María, on August 5, the journalistic team
of Radio Yaraví, formed by Alexander Cornejo and Juan Cervantes, as well as the communicators of the
newspaper La República, Robert Orihuela and Oswald Charca, would have been threatened by protesters1475.
1060. According to public information, on August 9, journalists and photojournalists of the newspaper La
República John Reyes Mejía, Caretas magazine, Fabiola Granda and Adrián Moscoso Arriola, Diario Exitosa, Diego
Vertiz, and Canal N and América Televisión, Lourdes Paucar, would have been attacked by PNP agents while they
were covering the outdoor demonstrations at the headquarters of the Judiciary in Lima when they were in
covering the hearing in which the Permanent Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court would evaluate the appeal
filed by Keiko Fujimori, Jaime Yoshiyama, Pier Figar, and Luis Mejía Lecca1476.
1061. On September 10, according to public knowledge, the movement of protesters "La Resistencia", would
have attacked the director of IDL, Glatzer Tuesta and the legal team headed by Carlos Riverael, within the
framework of the protests organized before the development of the first defamation complaint hearing filed by
the IDL legal team against Javier Villa Stein1477.
1062. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly”
and that “the exercise of the right of assembly through socialprotest must not be subject to authorization by the
authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its realization.”
1063. The 2013 Joint Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social demonstrations,
notes that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and their guarantee is a necessary
condition for the existence and functioning of a democratic society. A State may impose reasonable limitations
on demonstrations in order to ensure their peaceful development or disperse those that become violent,
provided that such limits are governed by the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. In addition,
1472 ANP Perú. November 19, 2019. ANP exige respeto al trabajo de la prensa en Chincha.
1473 Union de Trabajadores de Prensa de Buenos Aires. June 1, 2019. Detienen a la periodista Xiomara Soto Portillo : Mano Alzada. May 30,
2019. Periodista es detenida ilegalmente en protesta por peajes.
1474 La República. June 29, 2019. Tía María, la otra cara del conflicto.
1475 La República. August 10, 2019. Tía María: Asociación de Periodistas respalda a comunicadores agredidos durante protestas. La República.
June 29, 2019. Tía María, la otra cara del conflicto.
1476 Crónica Viva. June 10, 2019. APN rechaza agresiones a periodistas en exteriores del Poder Judicial en Lima.
1477 IDL reporteros. September 11, 2019. Encuentros con La Pestilencia. IDL reporteros. June 16, 2019. La pestilencia.
.
231
dispersing a demonstration must be justified in the duty ofprotection ofpeople, and the safest and least harmful
measures for protesters should be used. The use of force in public demonstrations must be exceptional and in
strictly necessary circumstances in accordance with internationally recognizedprinciples.1478”
E. Subsequent Liabilities
1064. On April 4, the 15th. Criminal Court of Lima, presided by Judge Isabel Aurora Flores, opened a criminal
proceeding and ordered the preventive embargo of property owned by the executive director of the
investigative journalism site, Ojo-Público.com, Óscar Castilla and of the journalist from La República, Edmundo
Cruz, for the alleged commission of the crime of defamation against Miguel"Eteco" Arévalo, after the publication
of a series of investigations that linked him to the organization of drug trafficking networks andpossible money
laundering in Alto Huallaga1479. This would constitute the fourth process initiated by Arévalo against both
journalists, and the tenth against various journalists and media directors1480.
1065. This Office recalls that, of the four legal proceedings raised by Eteco since 2016, three were rejected. On
December 13, the judiciary acquitted journalists Castilla and Cruz in the libel suit filed by Árevalo Ramírez. Along
these lines, a criminal proceeding would still be ongoing since 2018, the most important, as reported by those
affected, which would correspond to the OjoPúblico embargo and the defendant's assets. In the same case, the
director of La República, Gustavo Mohme, and the journalists César Romero and Ricardo Uceda, also sued by
Arévalo, were also acquitted1481.
1066. On April 22, the First Unipersonal Court of Piura issued a conviction that would require the payment of
a monetary amount for civil reparation against the journalist Pedro Salinas for the alleged crime of defamation,
after the Archbishop of Piura and Tumbes and member of the Sodalicio de Vida Cristiana (SVC), José Antonio
Eguren Anselmi, had filed a criminal complaint against Salinas for the publication of an investigation and the
statements made by the journalist in interviews in which he linked the Archbishop to the commission of crimes
of a sexual nature and traffic of goods1482. On April 24, the archbishop would have withdrawn the complaint1483.
1067. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information that on May 17 the first hearing was held
againstthe director of the barranca.pe portal, Yofre López,who was sued for the crime of defamation by Superior
Judge Juana Caballero García, after the journalist questioned the judge’s decision to revoke the pre-trial
detention of a high-ranking public figure1484.
1068. On March 8, the secretary of the Fifth Civil Court of Chiclayo, Karim Sánchez Mendoza, filed a defamation
complaint against the journalist and director of the weekly Expresión, Rosa Chambergo Montejo, due to a
journalistic investigation that would present the relationship of the secretary of the court to facts of alleged
falsification of documents1485. According to available information, on May 14 the defense of Chambergo Montejo
would have presented its discharges before the court. Until the closing of this annual report, no response would
have been recorded1486.
1069. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received worrisome information about the situation of the
journalist Paola Ugaz Cruz, who would be the subject of a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Deputy
Prosecutor Heldy Huaylinos Silva, of the Third Provincial Corporate Criminal Prosecutor's Office of Piura, who
would have indicated that Ugaz would have incurred in the commission of the crime of false declaration in court
after having denied having a professional link to the Al Jazeera chain, that produced the report “The sodalitium
scandal”1487. On the matter, the complaint was presented by the then general manager of the Miraflores Perú
(IMP S.A.C.) real estate agency, Carlos Alberto Gómez, since the production of the documentary investigation
would link some members of the religious community to the commission of crimes of a sexual nature and would
1478 United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion ofthe Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
1479 Ojo Público. April 21, 2019. Case “Etco”: jueza dicta embargo de Ojo Público y amenaza con órdenes de captura ; La
Republica. April 20, 2019. Caso “Etco”: juzgado dicta embargo de periodistas de Ojo público y La Republica.
1480 Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. April 24, 2019. Judge gives order to freeze assets of Peruvian media outlet
Ojo Público and two investigative journalists; SERVINDI. April 24, 2019. ¿Persecución a la prensa? Dictan embargo contra
periodista.
1481 Ojo Público. December 13, 2019. Poder Judicial absuelve a periodistas de OjoPúblico y La República en demanda de acusado de narcotráfico.
La República. December 13, 2019. Absuelven a periodistas querellados por denunciar a acusado de narcotráfico.
1482 Perú 21.December 2, 2019. Pedro Salinas: “Caso Sodalicio es una herida abierta”; Aciprensa. April 9, 2019. Perú: condenan
a periodista Pedro Salinas por difamar a arzobispo de Piura.
1483 Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. April 24, 2019. Archbishop withdraws complaint after Peruvian journalist
is sentenced for defamation due to opinion column.
1484 Prensa al día. May 16, 2019. Magistrada querella a periodista en su propio distrito judicial.
1485 Instituto Prensa y Sociedad. May 30, 2019. Perú: secretaria de juzgado querella a periodista Rosa Chambergo.
1486 El Comercio. September 9, 2019. SIP: los principales puntos del informe sobre intento de afectación a la libertad de
expresión
1487 La Razón. December 7, 2019. MML niega tener información acerca de Ugaz en sus archivos; WALAC. April 25, 2019.
Arzobispo de Piura también desiste querella contra la periodista Paola Ugaz
232
argue that the real estate company was linked to the Sodalicio de Vida Cristiana with an alleged land
trafficking1488. She would also have been sued by the Fuerza Popular parliamentarian, Luciano Revoredo for
alleged aggravated defamation.
1070. In August, former president Ollanta Humala's lawyer, investigated for corruption offenses under the
Lava Jato case, said he would call media executives as witnesses in the event of a possible trial against him.
Humala is investigated for money laundering for allegedly receiving Odebrecht campaign contributions from
the illegal “Caja2”: “Almost 85% was spent on TV and newspaper advertising. If the tax hypothesis is that money
was laundered,” said the lawyer1489.
1071. Also, according to public knowledge information, on October 27, the journalist of Radio Programas de
Perú, Josefina Townsend, would have been dismissed from the media without justification. Along these lines, the
media banned her from admission, claiming that various social sectors would have made known their
disagreement with the interviews made by the journalist in her program that would touch on political issues
about militants of the Fujimorist bloc in Peru1490.
1072. This Office has received information on the dismissal of the president of the National Institute of Radio
and Television (IRTP), Hugo Coya, on December 11491. According topublic information, the dismissal would have
arisen on the orders of the Minister of Culture, Francisco Petrozzi, due to his dissatisfaction with the material
broadcasted by the TV Perú channel after the decision of the Constitutional Court of Peru to release Keiko
Fujimori1492. To this dismissal would be added the resignations of Carolina Leonor Albornoz Falcón, who was a
member of the Board of Directors and David Ponce de León Gómez, who would chair the Press Management of
the IRTP1493.
1073. The IACHR and the Inter-American Court have repeatedly pointed out that States have a more limited
scope to impose restrictions on the right to freedom of expression “whenever it concerns expressionspertaining
to the State, to matters of public interest, to public officials in exercise of their functions or candidates who will
holdpublic positions, or to individuals voluntarily involved in public affairs, as well as topolitical discourse and
debate”1494. These are subjected to a greater degree of public scrutiny and criticism, which is justified by the
public interest nature of the activities they carry out, because they have voluntarily exposed themselves to more
demanding scrutiny and because they have an enormous capacity to dispute the information through their
power of public reach”1495.
F. Stigmatizing statements
1074. The Fuerza Popular legislator and president of the Constitutional Commission of Congress, Rosa Bartra,
during her participation in an event of the "La Resistencia" movement (known for its demonstrations in favor of
Fujimorism) said that the congress would resume complaints against some members of the independent press,
attacking the columnist of the newspaper La República and RTV journalist, Rosa María Palacios, due to her
statements about certain political actors related to Fujimori. According to the available information, the
legislator would urge the members of the group to continue their attacks against the opposition and the press,
calling them "terrorists"1496.
1488 IPYS. April 12, 2019. Caso Sodalicio: Juicio contra periodista Paola Ugaz estrasladado a Lima. Café viena. September 26, 2019. Paola Ugaz
y su corona judicial ; Crónica viva. June 20, 2019. ANP exige cese de hostigamiento fiscal y judicial a periodista PaolaUgaz;
1489 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Peru October 2019. Coral Gables, Florida..
1490 La Republica. March 30, 2019. Medio local indica que salida de Josefina Townsend fue ‘estrategia’; Utero.Pe. March 30, 2019. Los últimos
días de Josefina Townsend en RPP, la historia detrás del reciente escándalo de censura en el Perú ; Educación en Red. March 29, 2019. JOSEFINA
TOWNSEND: RPP retira a periodista tras hacer pasar incómodos momentos a políticos poderosos
1491 Boletín de Normas Legales del diario El Peruano. Resolución Suprema N° 019-2019-MC. Available
at: https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/download/url/dan-por-concluida-designacion-y-designan-miembro-del-consejo-resolucionsuprema-n-013-2019-mc-1832420-1
1492 La República. December 2, 2019. Petrozzi tras cesar a Hugo Coya de IRTP: “El presidente no me lo ha ordenado" ; Gestión. December 1,
2019. Destituyen a Hugo Coya de la presidencia ejecutiva del IRTP y designan en su reemplazo al periodista Eduardo Guzmán.
1493 La República. December 2, 2019. Funcionaria del IRTP presenta su renuncia tras destitución de Hugo Coya ; El Comercio. December 3,
2019. Relator de la CIDH: "Es preocupante que la motivación haya sido de algún modo imponer una línea más gobiernista"
1494 IACHR. Annual Report 1994. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995; IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression. Annual Report 2009. Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51. December 30, 2009. Para. 100 ; I/A Court H. R. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru.
Judgment of February 6, 2001. Serie C No. 74.; I/A Court H. R. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Serie C No. 107;
I/A Court H. R. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Serie C No. 111; I/A Court H. R. Case of Palamara Iribarne
v. Chile. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Serie C No. 135; I/A Court H. R. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Serie C No.
177.
1495 IACHR. Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Annual Report 2009. Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51. December 30, 2009. Para.
40.
1496 La República. July 20, 2019. "Salgan a las calles", exige Bartra a grupo de choque fujimorista. July 20, 2019. Fujimorista Rosa Bartra a ‘La
Resistencia’: “Ustedes no son trolls y no han venido por un táper”. Informate Perú. July 20, 2019. “¡Salgan más a las calles!”, exige Rosa Bartra
a grupo de choque fujimorista.
233
1075. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that with their
statements they are not damaging the rights of those who contribute to public deliberation through the
expression and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media, and human rights organizations, and
must pay attention to the context in which they express themselves to ensure that their expressions do not
constitute, in the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights
of those who intend to contribute topublic deliberation through the expression and diffusion of their thought”.
G. Legal reforms
1076. According to public information, on May 3, a member of the parliamentary group Cambio 21 presented
to the Congress of the Republic of Peru the draft Law regulating the misuse of social networks, which would
seek, among other things, to increase to four years the minimum penalty and seven the maximum for the crime
of defamation, and aggravate it if it is committed through books,press, social networks, and other similar means.
According to the information available, the project is still pending discussion byCongress1497.
1077. In September, the Fuerza Popular parliamentary group encouraged the signing of the agreement for the
Commission of Control of Congress that would involve the creation of a work team to investigate the pollsters
about the methodology they use, with the aim of determining if there are payments prior to conducting these
survey studies that could influence the final results, confirm the anonymity of the respondents, and supervising
their general functioning to detect possible cases of advertising manipulation1498.
1078. The Office of the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that all restrictions on freedom of expression, including
those affecting expression on the Internet, must be established clearly and precisely by law, be proportional to
the legitimate objectives sought, and based on a judicial determination through contradictoryprocedures.
1079. In accordance with principles 10 and 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of
the IACHR, this Office recalls that “the protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through
civil sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a publicperson or a private person
who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest" because public officials "are subject to
greater scrutiny by society." In addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to
sanction expressions related to public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as
information or expression on matters of public interest, and violates the right to freedom of expression.
H. Censorship
1080. On April 2, the HBA news reporter, Juan José Santy Cusiatán, reported having been censured at the
premises of the Regional Government of Arequipa by an employee of the unit that would have ordered security
agents to stopthe journalist's recording while covering a fire. Subsequently, the staff of the Regional Government
of Arequipa would have asked HBA news to remove the video of the events from itspublications1499.
1081. Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “prior
censorship, direct or indirect interference, in or pressure exerted upon any expression, opinion, or information
transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual, or electronic communication must be prohibited
by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as the arbitrary imposition of
information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate the right to freedom of
expression.”
1497 Congreso de la Republica del Perú. Proyecto de ley No. 4275. Available at:
http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/2016_2021/Proyectos_de_Ley_y_de_Resoluciones_Legislativas/PL0427520190503..pdf ;
Gestión. May 9, 2019. SIP rechaza iniciativa en Perú para penalizar difamación en redes sociales.
1498 Gestión. September 4, 2019. Consejo de la Prensa Peruana expresa preocupación por investigación a encuestadoras ; Perú 21. September
4, 2019. Comisión de Fiscalización aprobó investigar metodología de empresas encuestadoras.
1499 Cronica Viva. April 3, 2019. ANP condena agresión a periodista en Arequipa
234
28. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
1082. The Office of the Special Rapporteur highlights the Special Rapporteur received information on threats
against journalists from criminal groups linked to drug trafficking. The office notes that on the instructions of
the Executive Branch and the coordination of the Attorney General's Office, all the necessary protection would
have been offered to the journalists involved. Also, a television journalist denounced, through a letter, that the
attorney general would be conducting a campaign of harassment against him for the publication of public
procurement contracts that would involve him. This Office also wish to emphasize that the Constitutional Court
(TC) of the Dominican Republic declared unconstitutional some of the articles contained in the Law on Political
Parties, Groups and Movements, and the Electoral Law, which containedprovisions which threaten the freedom
of expression in electoral contexts as it contemplated sentences of up to 10 years in prison for crimes of
defamation and libel against candidates andpolitical parties and 3 to 10 years for violations of ethical, legal and
constitutional norms on the use of print media , electronic and digital.
A. Impunity
1083. Along these lines, this Office has taken note of the judgment issued on June 21 by the Collegiate Court of
the Monseñor Nouel province, in which those accused of participating in the murder of journalist Blas Olivo,
perpetrated on April 13, 2015, were sentenced to 30 and 20 years inprison1500.
B. Progress
1084. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of different judgments issued by the TC that
annulled legal provisions that contained strong penalties and restrictions on the exercise of freedom of
expression.
1085. According to public information, on May 21, the TC resolved the unconstitutionality action filed on
August 13, 2018 by Namphi A. Rodríguez, Héctor Herrera Cabral, and the Press and LawFoundation, considering
that section six of article 44 of the Law of Political Parties, which sanctions the dissemination of “negative
messages” against candidates through the Internet “is unnecessary and excessively burdensome”, since it
presents social networks as more risky than other media, considering penalties higher than those established
by crimes of defamation and insult in the "offline world"1501. Along the same lines, on September 16, the TC
resolved the unconstitutionality action filed on March 19 by the Press and Law Foundation, declaring article 284
of the Organic Law No. 15-19 of the Electoral Regime, not in accordance to the Constitution, which established a
penalty of three to 10 years in prison for defamation crimes againstpoliticians1502.
1086. On July 22, the TC declared the unconstitutionality of article 45, paragraph III of the Law on Political
Parties, reaffirming the right of association of the parties by establishing the statutes as the primary source of
the internal order of political organizations1503. On August 21, by means of judgment TC-0332/19, it ratified the
criteria of the previous ruling1504. On August 28, through the press release 39/19, the TC declared the
unconstitutionality of eight provisions of the Law on Political Parties, considering that “they undermined the
rights to free expression and dissemination of thought, free association, and equal conditions, as well as the
violation of the principles of reasonableness, of association, of equity, of internal democracy of the parties and
their militants, and the right to vote and to stand forelection”1505.
1087. On November 29, the TC reportedly declared during the public hearing held in the Supreme Court of
Justice (SCJ), the state of deliberation of the pending files relating to Law 33-18 and Organic Law 15-19 of
Electoral Regime, declaring them in a state of urgency1506.
1500 Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas. June 25, 2019. Six men sentenced in murder of Dominican journalist who was killed in
2015. Sétima Revista. June 21, 2019. República Dominicana: Condenan a 6 acusados de la muerte de periodista Blas Olivo . Sarah Pepen. June
21, 2019. ¡Justicia! 20 y 30 años de prisión para acusados de matar al periodista Blas Olivo. Contacto hoy. June 21, 2019. Condenan a seis
acusados de la muerte de un periodista dominicano.
1501 Tribunal Constitucional. May 21, 2019. Sentencia TC/0092/19. Available at:
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/consultas/secretar%C3%ADa/sentencias/tc009219/ . El Nacional. May 27, 2019. TC cuestiona
penas delitos electrónicos por difamación.
1502 Tribunal Constitucional. September 16, 2019. Sentencia TC /0348/19. Available at:
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/consultas/secretar%C3%ADa/sentencias/tc034819/ . Diario Libre. September 30, 2019.
Tribunal Constitucional declara inconstitucional artículo de Ley Electoral castigaba con prisión la difamación a políticos ; Diario Libre. June
10, 2019. Interponen recurso inconstitucionalidad contra Ley de Régimen Electoral ; Ahora Noticias RD. March 25, 2019. Fundación Prensa y
Derecho recurre ante el Tribunal Constitucional la nueva Ley Electoral
1503Tribunal Constitucional. July 22, 2019. Sentencia TC/0214/19. Available at:
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/consultas/secretar%C3%ADa/sentencias/tc021419/
1504Tribunal Constitucional. August 21, 2019. Sentencia TC/0332/19. Available at:
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/consultas/secretar%C3%ADa/sentencias/tc033219/
1505Tribunal Constitucional. August 28, 2019. Comunicado 39/19. Available at:
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/consultas/secretar%C3%ADa/comunicados-casos-aprobados/3919/
1506Tribunal Constitucional. November 29, 2019. TC declara de urgencia expedientes sobre Ley de Partidos, Agrupaciones y Movimientos
Políticos ; Telediario América. November 29, 2019. TC declara de urgencia expediente sobre Ley de Partidos, Agrupaciones y Movimientos
Políticos.
235
1088. Finally, on August 30, 2019, the Second Chamber of the Superior Administrative Court of the Dominican
Republic, issued a ruling in favor of the Dominican Association of Broadcasting Companies, Inc (ADORA)
whereby it would order the Central Electoral Board (JCE) to allow advertising messages of a political nature in
radio and television media during the current pre-campaign or internal campaignperiod1507.
C. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
1089. According to public information, on May 10, the journalist of the newspaper El Día, Teresa Casado,
reported having complained against the alleged drug trafficker, Sidney Rafael Matías Pérez, who would have
sent threatening emails after the communicator questioned the decision of a judge granting him freedom and
imposing periodic presentation as a precautionary measure to Matías Pérez1508.
1090. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social
communicators, as well as the material destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of
individuals and strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the State toprevent and investigate such
occurrences, to punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation”1509.
D. Social Protest
1091. According to public knowledge information, on June 24, within the framework of the protests called by
the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) against a possible constitutional reform that would allow
President Danilo Medina to opt for a third consecutive term, violent clashes reportedly occurred among agents
of the National Police, the Armed Forces (FFAA) and protesters1510. In this regard, eight people were injured by
chemical elements,including Congress Deputy Henry Merán,who reported being affected by the chemical agents
used by the National Police and the Ministry of Defense1511. On July 23, President Medina would announce the
repeal of the constitutional reform project1512.
1092. On September 18, an excessive use of force was reported as a result of the use of chemical agents,
gunshot and pellets wounds in the framework of the demonstrations of the “Unidos por un Seibo mejor”
movement, headed by the priest Miguel Ángel Gullón,in the community of Candelaria, to demand improvements
in health, education, and construction work in the community1513; which left a balance of 12 protesters injured
and five arrested. According to public information, on October 31, Dominican missionary Miguel Ángel Gullón
and volunteer María Moreno were arrested in front of the National Palace1514. Subsequently, on November 4,
new repressions were reported against protesters at the hands of the Police and the armed forces of the
country1515.
1093. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for defending human rights, and
essential for the critical political and social expression of the activities of the authorities. The Commission has
pointed out that “it is inadmissible in principle the criminalization in itself of demonstrations on public roads
when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and the right of
1507Gobernanza Digital. August 21, 2019. TRIBUNAL ORDENAA LAJCE PERMITIR LA PUBLICIDAD POLÍTICA EN RADIO Y TELEVISIÓN; Acento.
September 3, 2019. El Tribunal Superior Administrativo y la libertad de comunicación ; En segundos. August 20, 2019. Tribunal Superior
Administrativo ordena a la JCE permitir publicidad en radio y TV ; Hoy Digital. August 20, 2019. Tribunal Superior Administrativo ordena a la
JCE permitir publicidad política en radio y tv ;
1508 El Diario. May 10, 2019. Narco dominicano amenaza a periodista, y autoridades toman drástica medida ; El día. May 10, 2019. Un
narcotraficante amenaza a periodista de EL DÍA; Al momento. May 11, 2019. Autoridades disponen protección para periodista es amenazada
por narco; El Nuevo Diario. May 10, 2019. Periodista se querella contra narcotraficante la amenazó por correo electrónico; El Caribe. May 10,
2019. SNTP repudia amenaza de supuesto narco a periodista Teresa Casado
1509 IACHR. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. 2000.
1510 NODAL. June 27, 2019. Rep. Dominicana: nueva marcha contra reforma constitucional para la reelección de Medina ; Resumen
Latinoamericano. July 21, 2019. República Dominicana. Protestan contra reforma que permitiría reelección ; La Prensa. June 26, 2019. Cientos
de dominicanos salen a las calles a protestar contra la reelección de Medina.
1511 Listin Diario. June 24, 2019. Disturbios en el Congreso: al menos un diputado afectado por gases lacrimógenos; Canal de Noticias de los
Dominicanos. June 25, 2019. FINJUS califica de inaceptables las acciones frente al Congreso Nacional; NODAL. June 25, 2019. República
Dominicana: protestas, represión y división en el oficialismo por posible reforma constitucional para la reelección de Medina; EFE. June 25,
2019. Lesionan a diputados dominicanos en una protesta contra la reforma de la reelección.
1512 NODAL. July 23, 2019. Rep. Dominicana: presionado por las protestas, Medina desiste de la reforma para la reelección; Monitor Civicus.
October 21, 2019. REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA: REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL SUSCITA PREOCUPACIÓN POR LAS INSTITUCIONES
DEMOCRÁTICAS; Noticias SIN. July 17, 2019. Proyecto de reforma constitucional no fue depositado hoy en el Senado
1513 El nuevo Diario. September 18, 2019. Anuncian cese de huelga en El Seibo y liberación de cinco jóvenes; Listin Diario. September 18, 2019.
Primer día de huelga por 48 horas afecta comercio en El Seibo; Diario libre. September 18, 2019. Doce heridos en ataque a bombazos a
sacerdote y grupo de manifestantes en El Seibo; Diario Libre. September 17, 2019. Enfrentamientos entre policías y manifestantes dejan 11
heridos durante huelga en El Seibo
1514 Vide Nueva Digital. October 31, 2019. El misionero español Miguel Ángel Gullón ha sido detenido por defender a losindígenas de El Seybo ;
Religión Digital. November 1, 2019. El misionero español Miguel Ángel Gullón y varias familias campesinas, desalojados por la fuerza en
Dominicana
1515 CLACSO. November 1, 2019. Los desalojados de El Seibo ; Canal de Noticias de los Dominicanos. November 4, 2019. Peregrinos de El Seibo
continúan protesta hasta recibir respuesta de las autoridades ; Acento. October 31, 2019. Campesinos de El Seibo fueron trasladados por la
fuerza a las 2:30 de la madrugada
236
assembly”1516 and that “the exercise of the right of assembly to through social protest must not be subject to
authorization by the authorities or to excessive requirements that hinder its materialization”1517.
1094. The 2013 Joint Declaration on violence against journalists in the framework of social demonstrations
indicates that the rights of assembly and freedom of expression “are fundamental and their guarantee is a
necessary condition for existence and functioning of a democratic society. A State may impose reasonable
limitations on demonstrations in order to ensure their peaceful development or disperse those that become
violent, provided that such limits are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality. In
addition, dispersing a demonstration must be justified in the duty of protection of people, and the safest and
least harmful measures for protesters should be used. The use of force in public demonstrations must be
exceptional and in strictly necessary circumstances in accordance with internationally recognized principles”
1518.
E. Subsequent Liabilities
1095. This Office was informed in September, aboutthe closure of the “El Jarabe”program of journalist Marino
Zapete, who denounced the interference of the judicial body due to pressures from the Attorney General of the
Republic, Jean Alain Rodriguez, and his the sister, Maybeth Rodríguez. In December, Zapete denounced, through
a letter, that the prosecutor would be carrying out a campaign of harassment against him, after the publication
by the journalist on TV of contracts between the Attorney General's sister, Maybeth and the Ministry of Public
Works, in violation of what is established by the Public Procurement and Contracting Law1519. On December 11,
the conciliatory hearing would have been postponed due to lack of due notice1520.
1096. Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression adopted by the Inter-American
Commission in 2000,indicates that “[t]he protection of aperson’s reputation should only be guaranteed through
civil sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official". That is, the use of criminal
mechanisms to punish the discourse in matters of public interest, and especially related to public or political
officials, does not respond to a pressing social need that justifies it, is unnecessary and disproportionate, and
can be a means of indirect censorship, given its chilling effect on the debate on matters of public interest.
1097. Principle 11 of theDeclaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that: “[p]ublic
officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as "desacato laws," restrict freedom of expression and the right to information." In
addition, the IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to sanction expressions related to
public officials is disproportionate when it comes to protected speech, such as information or expression on
matters of public interest, and violates the right to freedom of expression.
F. Freedom of expression in electoral contexts
1098. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the creation by the plenary of the Central Electoral
Board (JCE), on February 22, of the Electoral Observatory of Social Networks, created for the purpose of
monitoring deliberate misinformation related to electoralprocesses1521. According to the information available,
the Communications Department determined that the observatory would identify proselytizing publicity and
attempts to disseminate deliberate misinformation on electoralprocesses1522.
1099. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that “[e]lectoral processes are closely linked to freedom of
expression and information, since in order for citizens to carry out their decisions at the time of voting it is
essential that they have as much information as possible . For this, it is crucial that facts, ideas, and opinions
circulate freely. Without a doubt, the most common way for citizens to inform themselves today is through the
mass media”1523
1516 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197
1517 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139
1518 United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion ofthe Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests
1519 El faro. October 5, 2019. Cierre del programa de Marino Zapete es presentado en la Asamblea 75 de la SIP; El día. October 7, 2019. Caso de
Marino Zapete y amenazas a Casado son presentados en la SIP; Diario Libre. September 27, 2019. Marino Zapete anuncia salida del aire de su
programa por supuestas “presiones”
1520 Hoy Digital. December 11, 2019. Posponen audiencia contra Marino Zapete por demanda de hermana del Procurador ; Listin Diario.
December 11, 2019. Aplazan para el 19 de diciembre audiencia por demanda contra Marino Zapete; Canal de Noticias de los Dominicanos.
December 11, 2019. Cuarta Sala Penal DN aplaza demanda a Marino Zapete por difamación.
1521 Junta Central Electoral. February 22, 2019. Acta 07/2019. Available at:
https://jce.gob.do/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?EntryId=12346&Command=Core_Download&language=es -
ES&PortalId=1&TabId=190
1522 Acento. March 25, 2019. Internet Society afirma Observatorio de Redes Sociales vulneraría libertad de expresión; Digital Policy Law. March
26, 2019. Sociedad de Internet en RD rechaza Observatorio de Redes Sociales de la JCE; Diario Libre. March 17, 2019. Observatorio Electoral
solo vigilará las redes sociales; Diario Libre. March 15, 2019. JCE crea un Observatorio Electoral de Redes Sociales
1523 IACHR. Annual Report 2005. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI Freedom of
Expression and the Electoral Process: The Case of Opinion Polls and Exit Polls. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 77 February, 2006. Para. 2
237
29. SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
1100. Although the Freedom of Information Act waspassed in 2018, it would not have been implemented yet.
According to the government, this is due to the lack of resources for the development ofprotocols and the hiring
of personnel. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Justice declared in March 2019 that rules 26 and 38 of
the Law on Public Service were contrary to the Constitution and, therefore, invalid, since they prevent the
participation of public officials in political party activities.
A. Access to public information
1101. In a May 18 interview with theSt. Kitts and Nevis Observer,AttorneyGeneral Vincent Byron explained
why the Freedom of Information Act, enacted in 2018,1524has still not been implemented, citing a lack of
government funding to developprotocolsand hire staff. He additionally stated that a “profound cultural change”
among public servants in the area of government transparency was needed to ensure the proper
implementation of the law.1525
1102. This Office reiterated that “The State has a duty to implement access laws adequately. This [entails] at
least three actions. First, the State must design a plan that allows for the real and effective satisfaction of the
right of access to information within a reasonable time period. This obligation [entails] a duty to budget the
necessary funds to be able to progressively meet the demand that the right of access to information will
generate.”1526 “Second, the State must adopt laws, policies, and practices to adequately preserve and manage
information.”1527 “Third […], the State should adopt a systematic policy for training the public officials who will
be satisfying the right of access to information in all of its facets.”1528
1103. It additionally notes that Principle 4 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
establishes that, “Access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have
the obligation to guarantee the full exercise of this right. This principle allows only exceptional limitations that
must be previously established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in
democratic societies.”
B. Censorship
1104. According to information gathered by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, on May 14 security staff from
the Basseterre Magistrate’s Court barred the press from covering a hearing in the case ofAlkiviades David, a
Greek businessman accused of drug trafficking, possession, and intent to distribute. A reporter from the St. Kitts
and Nevis Observer stated that journalists were denied entry to the hearing, and that he had been “physically
pushed out of the building by an employee.”1529
1105. According to Principle 9 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,“The
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the state to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.”
1106. Additionally, Article 13.2 of the American Convention explicitly states that the exercise of freedom of
expression may not be subject to prior censorship; and Principle 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expressionestablishes that, “Prior censorship, direct or indirect interference in or pressure exerted upon any
expression, opinion or information transmitted through any means of oral, written, artistic, visual or electronic
communication must be prohibited by law. Restrictions to the free circulation of ideas and opinions, as well as
the arbitrary imposition of information and the imposition of obstacles to the free flow of information violate
the right to freedom of expression.”
1524IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report ofthe Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II(Evaluation ofthe State
of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019. Para. 948.
1525 St. Kitts & Nevis Observer. May 18, 2019. EXCLUSIVE: Cultural change needed with Freedom of Information: AG.
1526 IACHR. Annual Report 2011. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (The right of access
to public information in the Americas). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69. December 30, 2011. Para. 313.
1527 IACHR. Annual Report 2011. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (The right of access
to public information in the Americas). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69. December 30, 2011. Para. 314.
1528 IACHR. Annual Report 2011. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (The right of access
to public information in the Americas). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69. December 30, 2011. Para. 315.
1529 St. Kitts & Nevis Observer. May 14, 2019. Media barred from Alki David hearing; WIC News. May 15, 2019. St. Kitts and Nevis journalists
locked out of court hearing involving Greek billionaire.
238
C. Other relevant situations
1107. During 2019, there was also a debate on the constitutionality of the Public Service Act of 2011, due to
the possible violation of the rights to freedom of expression and association. Rule 38 of that law stipulates that,
“a public officer shall not engage in party political activity at any time.”1530
1108. Leon Natta Nelson, a Ministry of Finance employee,filed a lawsuit claiming that rules 36 and 38 of the
Public Service Code prevented him from participating in a political organization and running as a candidate for
the St. Kitts-Nevis Labour Party, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The High Court of Justiceruled on
March 25 that rules 36 and 38 of the Public Service Code were inconsistent with the Constitution of St. Kitts and
Nevis and were therefore null and void.1531On April 3, Attorney General Vincent Byron stated that they would
take the necessary actions to revise thePublic Service Act.1532
1530 ILO. Saint Kitts and Nevis. Public Service (Conduct and Ethics of Officers). May 15, 2014.
1531 High Court of Justice. Leon Natta-Nelson v. The Attorney General of Saint Christopher and Nevis. March 25, 2019..
1532 TimesCaribbean. April 4, 2019. St.Kitts-Nevis Team UnityGovernment commences review of unconstitutional“Douglas Law” Public Service
Act of 2011; St. Kitts & Nevis Observer. April 4, 2019. Public Service Act of 2011 may be unconstitutional
239
30. SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
1109. An alleged corruption case involving the highest authorities resulted in a series of requests for
financial compensation and threats of legal action against members of the opposition and the press.
A. Subsequent liability
1110. An alleged case of corruption reportedly involving Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves led to a series of civil
actions against members of the opposition and the press.1533According to the information gathered, as of the
date of closure of this report, the Prime Minister has not gone to court on any matter.
1111. This Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that Principle 11 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression states that, “Public officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that
penalize offensive expressions directed at public officials, generally known as ‘desacato laws,’ restrict freedom
of expression and the right to information.”
1112. The Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court have established that in a democratic
society public officials must have a higher threshold of tolerance for criticism, because “they have exposed
themselves voluntarily to heightened scrutiny, and because they have an enormous capacity to call information
into question through theirpower to appeal to the public.”1534In this regard, the Inter-American Commission has
said that, “The sort of political debate encouraged by the right to free expression will inevitably generate some
speech that is critical of, and even offensive to those who hold public office or are intimately involved in the
formation of public policy.”1535Therefore, as affirmed in Principle 10 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expression, “The protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in
those cases in which the person offended is a public official.”
1533 Searchlight. November 22, 2019. PM demands apology and compensation from leader of the opposition; News 784. August 2, 2019.
LAWSUIT: SVG opposition leader could add to Gonsalves retirement fund.
1534 I/A Court H. R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Serie C No. 177, para. 86-88; I/A Court H. R., Case of Palamara
Iribarne v. Chile. Judgment ofNovember 22, 2005. Serie C No. 135, Para. 83; I/A CourtH. R., Case of“The Last Temptation of Christ”(Olmedo
Bustos et al) v. Chile. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Serie C No. 73, Para. 69; I/A Court H. R., Case of IvcherBronstein v. Peru. Judgment of
February 6, 2001. Serie C No. 74, para. 152 and 155; I/A Court H. R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Serie
C No. 111, Para. 83; I/A Court H. R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Serie C No. 107, para. 125 - 129; I/A Court
H. R., Case of Claude Reyes et al v. Chile. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Serie C No. 151, Para. 87; I/A Court H. R. Case of Tristán Donoso v.
Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Serie C No. 193, Para. 115.
1535 IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of"Desacato" Laws with the American Convention onHuman Rights.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
240
31. SAINT LUCIA
1113. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received complaints about the use of the defamation
figure as a strategy of senior public officials to persecute journalists, television media and members of civil
society in Saint Lucia.
A. Subsequent liability
1114. During 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteurhas received complaints about the use of defamation
as a strategy to persecute journalists and members of civil society in Saint Lucia.Television host Richard
Frederick accused Prime Minister Allen Chastanetof trying to silence him, after the Prime Minister filed a
defamation lawsuit against Frederick and television channel MBC. In a press release dated November 12, the
Prime Minister’s communications officer, Nicole McDonald, denied these allegations, explaining that Chastanet
went to court to defend her name and reputation following remarks Frederick had made on the programHow
can I help you?According to the information available, at the time of writing this report, the case had not been
adjudicated.1536As noted in the 2016 annual report of this Office of the Special Rapporteur, Prime Minister
Chastanet had already threatened journalists with defamation suits in the past.1537
1115. Also, on December 5, 2018, Castries Mayor Peterson Francis filed a defamation lawsuit against Choice
News Now and Christopher Hunte, host of Politically Incorrect, after Hunte accused the mayor of
corruption.1538On 17 April, the High Court of Justice ruled on certain procedural issues, dismissing both parties’
motions.1539However, according to the information available, the case has still not been adjudicated on the
merits.
1116. This Office recalls that Principle 10 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
establishes that“Privacy laws should not inhibit or restrict investigation and dissemination of information of
public interest. The protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in
those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private person who has
voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest. In addition, in these cases, it must be proven that in
disseminating the news, the social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that
false news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the truth or falsity of such
news.”
1117. The IACHR has repeatedly held that the application of criminal law to punish speech about public
officials is disproportionate when it concerns protected speech, such as information or speech on matters of
public interest, and violates the right to freedom of expression.1540It has also stressed that the use of criminal
law topunish speciallyprotected speech is not only a direct limitation on freedom of expression, but can also be
seen as an indirect method of restricting expression due to its inhibiting effect on the free flow of ideas, opinions,
and information that may be critical or offensive. The simple threat of criminal prosecution for critical
expressions on matters of public interest can give rise to self-censorship because of its chilling effect. In the
words of the IACHR, “Considering the consequences of criminal sanctions and the inevitable chilling effect they
have on freedom of expression, criminalization of speech can only apply in those exceptional circumstances
when there is an obvious and direct threat of lawless violence. […] use of its coercive powers to restrict speech
lends itself to abuse as a means to silence unpopular ideas and opinions, thereby repressing the debate that is
criticalto the effective functioning of democratic institutions. Laws that criminalize speechwhich does not incite
lawless violence are incompatible with freedom of expression and thought guaranteed in Article 13, and with
the fundamentalpurpose of the American Convention of allowing andprotecting the pluralistic, democratic way
of life.”1541
1118. The Office of the Special Rapporteurrecalls that criminal law is the most restrictive and severe means
of establishing liability for unlawful conduct, particularly when custodial sentences are imposed. Therefore, the
use of criminal proceedings must comply with the principle of minimum intervention, due to the nature of
criminal law as a last resort. In a democratic society, punitive power can be exercised only to the extent strictly
necessary toprotect essential legallyprotected interests from the most serious attacks that might undermine or
1536 Saint Lucia News Now. November 12, 2019. Communications Officer denies PM on campaign to silence Richard Frederick; Pride News.
November 13 2019. St Lucia Government defends PM’s decision to take legal action against television talk show host; St. Lucia Times. November
12, 2019. Communications Officer denies PM on campaign to silence Richard Frederick.
1537IACHR. Annual Report 2016. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of
the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. Doc. 22/17. March 15, 2017. Para. 1020.
1538 St. Lucia Times. December 7, 2018. Mayor Sues Christopher Hunte, Choice TV for defamation; St. Lucia News Online. December 18, 2018.
Castries mayor sues talk show host.
1539 High Court of Justice of Saint Lucia. Peterson Francis v. Christopher Hunte and Choice News Now. April 17, 2019..
1540IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions
and Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 2015..
1541IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of"Desacato" Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights.
Title V Conclusion. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
241
endanger them. Anything to the contrary leads to the abusive and unnecessary exercise of the punitive power
of the State.
1119. In addition, Principle 11 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression states that,
“Public officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at
public officials, generally known as ‘desacato laws,’ restrict freedom of expression and the right to information.”
B. Stigmatizing statements
1120. According to the information available, on June 11 Economic Development Minister Guy Joseph refused
to answer a question from journalist Janeka Simonabout a conflict in Parliament. The minister said that he would
not answer the question because he did not consider Janeka Simon to be a journalist and accused her of being a
politician “posing as an objective journalist.”1542
1121. The Office of the Special Rapporteurrecalls that public officials have a duty to ensure that their
statements do not undermine the rights of those who contribute to the public discourse through the expression
and dissemination of their thoughts, such as journalists, media outlets, and human rights organizations, and
should be sensitive to the context in which they speak, so as to ensure that their statements do not constitute, in
the words of the Court, “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who
seek to contribute withpublic deliberation through the expression and [dissemination] of their thoughts.”1543
1542Loop. June 11, 2019. Joseph refuses questions from reporter he claims is a politician; The Voice. June 13, 2019. Guy Joseph versus politican
in disguise?; The Star. June 16, 2019. Did Janeka Simon’s “all reporters are political actors” confirm Guy Joseph’s assertions?; HTS. June 11,
2019. Guy Joseph accuses news reporter of being a politician.
1543I/A Court H. R. Case Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie C
No. 194. Para. 139.
242
32. SURINAME
1122. According to information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, several journalists have
pointed out the need for a Law on Access to Public Information as a tool for journalists to do their job, and have
denounced that political actors provide erroneous information.
A. Access to public information
1123. In its 2018 Annual Report, this Office of the Special Rapporteurhighlighted the lack of transparency and
context of corruption in Suriname.1544According to the information available, on May 3, World Press Freedom
Day, journalist B-Cham Chandrallal alleged that certain politicians provide misinformation to journalists and
called for the enactment of a Public Access to Government Information Act [Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur].
Carla Boetius, president of the Suriname Journalists Association [SurinaamseVereniging van Journalisten], said
the law is "an important tool for journalists to do their job.”1545Nita Ramcharan, the Association’s founder and
former president, expressed concern over the lack of transparency in the country, and said it was an “urgent
requirement” for such a law to be passed.1546At a press conference on May 16, in response to statements by
journalists about limited access to government information, President Desiré Delano Bouterse promised to
improve communication between the government and the press.1547
1124. In addition, the National Assembly [De NationaleAssemblee] asked the government to implement the
Anti-Corruption Law, which was passed in 2017. It noted that the necessary decrees have not yet been issued
and that the Anti-Corruption Committee provided for in the law has not yet been established.1548
1125. Principle 4 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression establishes that, que
“Access to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.” In keeping with the principle of maximum disclosure, the law should ensure the broadest and most
effective access to public information possible, and exceptions should not become the general rule in practice.
Furthermore, exceptions should be interpreted narrowly and any doubts should be resolved in favor of
transparency and access.
1126. The IACHR has stated that, “The right to access to public information and the principle of transparency
of state management, protected by Article 13 of the Convention, have been recognized as one of the main tools
in the fight against corruption.” In this regard, it has informed the States that “the lack of transparency in public
management facilitates corruption and impedes citizen oversight and scrutiny of the press on criticalissues such
as public procurement and budget management, in particular about expenses in infrastructure and social
programs; lobbying activities; conflict of interests and public employment systems, as well as the financing of
political parties and political campaigns.”1549
1127. According to IACHR Resolution 1/18 on Corruption and Human Rights, the IACHR has urged the States
to “Strengthen their capacities to proactively guarantee access to public information, essential to the fight
against corruption, and strengthen their active transparency and accountability mechanisms in relation to
expenditures and investments in infrastructure, financing of election campaigns and transparency in the
operations of political parties.”It has also recommended creating active transparency obligations for
information needed for effective accountability and the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to: (a)
systems for public sector vacancy announcements, hiring, employment and salaries; (b) conflict of interest
prevention mechanisms; (c) government contracting, budget management and infrastructure investments; (d)
lobbying; (e) identity of corporations and individuals involved in private sector corporate governance and
corporate ownership; and (f) the financing of election campaigns and the operations of political parties.1550
1544 IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter II (Evaluation of the
State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 30. March 17, 2019. Para. 965.
1545 DWT Online. May 4, 2019. ‘Persvrijheidonderdruk’;
1546 DWT Online. November 22, 2019. ‘Journalistiekheeftiets te verdedigen’; SurinameHerald. November 22, 2019. Ramcharan: “Suriname is
gewoonbraakterreinvoorjournalisten om tewerken”.
1547SurinameHerald. May 21, 2019. Boutersebelooftverbeteringcommunicatie met pers.
1548 Suriname Herald. March 25, 2019. DNA vraagtinvullingtegevenaanAnticorruptiewet; benoeminganticorruptiecommissieblijft op
zichwachten..
1549 IACHR. Resolution 1/18. Corruption and Human Rights. March 16, 2018
1550 IACHR. Resolution 1/18. Corruption and Human Rights. March 16, 2018.
243
33. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
1128. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and its Special Rapporteur have noted with
concern the validity in the legal system of Trinidad and Tobago of the Sedition Law, sanctioned in 1920 by the
British colonial government. This Office has received information on the application of said law on different
occasions as a way to hinder the exercise for freedom of expression and the work of the press, trade unions and
civil society, accusing them of committing “seditious acts” or having "Seditious intentions."
A. Subsequent liability
1129. During 2019, Trinidad and Tobagosaw a renewed debate surrounding the validity of the Sedition
Act,1551which punishes any person or publication for committing “seditious acts” or communicating with
“seditious intent.”1552According to available information, police appeared at theradio station Jaagrition April 18
with a search warrantto verify the authenticity and obtain a copy of a recording that had been broadcast by the
station on April 16, on suspicion of possible sedition. Maharaj, the radio station’s general manager, brought a
legal action to challenge the law, claiming that it violates the rights to freedom of thought and expression,
freedom of the press, and the expression of political opinions.1553This Office observes that, at the time of this
writing, the case has not yet been adjudicated.
1130. At the same time, the minority leader of the Tobago House of Representatives, Watson Duke, was
arrested on August 26 and charged with violating the Sedition Act. His arrest was prompted by his November
16, 2019 speech to union members at TSTT, the national telecommunications company, regarding possible
layoffs at the Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA). Duke had reportedly said that, “the day they come for us
in WASA, we are prepared to die and the morgue would be picking up people.”Duke was ultimately released by
thePort-of-Spain Magistrates’ Courton August 31 on a bond of TT$ 250,000 (approximately US$ 36,000).1554
1131. On the anniversary of Trinidad and Tobago's independence, August 31, the Media Association of
Trinidad & Tobago (MATT) called for the repeal of the Sedition Act, claiming that it is used by the State to restrict
freedom of expression.According to the MATT, the law defines the term “seditious intent”broadly,“potentially
criminalizing journalists, media houses, public interest activists, trade unionists, artists, bloggers and assorted
social media commentators.”MATT notes that invoking theSedition Actin such cases “already serves to
intimidate into silence those wishing to express strong opinions on the social, economic and political
circumstances of the society.”1555
1132. Regarding this matter, Prime Minister Keith Rowley stated on August 28 that the police have taken an
oath requiring them to comply with all the laws of the country, no matter how old those laws are.1556However, on
September 5, at a post-Cabinet news briefing, Rowley stated that he was open to amending the law.1557Attorney
General Faris Al-Rawilater announced that the law is under review by the Law Revision Committee, but clarified
that it should not be repealed.1558
1133. This Office of the Special Rapporteurrecalls that Principle 11 of the IACHR’sDeclaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression states that, “Public officials are subject to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize
offensive expressions directed at public officials, generally known as ‘desacato laws,’ restrict freedom of
expression and the right to information.”
1134. In their2010 “Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the
Next Decade,”the Special Rapporteurs of the UN, IACHR, OSCE, andACHPR, stated that, “The retention of
antiquated legal rules—such as sedition laws or rules against publishing false news—which penalise criticism
of government,” are illegitimate “mechanisms of government control over themedia.”1559
1551 Trinidad &Tobago Guardian. September 2, 2019. Should free speech boundaries be extended?; Trinidad & Tobago Newsday. September 1,
2019. MATT: State using Sedition Act to constrain free speech; Global Voices. September 9, 2019. Sedition charge against union leader sparks
debate about freedom of speech in Trinidad and Tobago;
1552 Ministry of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs. Sedition Act. 1920.
1553 Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. April 18, 2019. Sat under investigation for sedition; Global Voices. September 9, 2019. Sedition charge
against union leader sparks debate about freedom of speech in Trinidad and Tobago; Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. September 17, 2019. No
support for Sat’sseditionchallenge.
1554 Global Voices. September 9, 2019. Sedition charge against union leader sparks debate about freedom of speech in Trinidad and Tobago;
Trinidad and Tobago Guardian. August 28, 2019. DPP weighs case againstDuke; Saturday Express. August 27, 2019. Under police guard, Duke
gets visitors.
1555 Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. September 1, 2019. MATT: State using Sedition Act to constrain free speech; Wired 868. August 31, 2019.
MATT: Sedition Act potentially criminalisesjounaliss, activists, etc; gov’t should review and repeal.
1556 Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. August 31, 2019. PM suggests repealing all old laws; Loop. August 31, 2019. Rowley on Sedition Act: TTPS
must carry out the law as it exists.
1557 Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. September 7, 2019. Ramesh: Govt must review sedition act; Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. September 5,
2019. Rowley “open” to amending the Sedition Act.
1558Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. September 17, 2019. Govt begins review of Sedition Act; Global Voices. September 30, 2019. Gobierno de
Trinidad y Tobago reconsiderará ley de sedición.
1559 The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
244
1135. Additionally, in their 2015Joint declaration on freedom of expression and responses to conflict
situations, de 2015, the Special Rapporteurs of the UN, IACHR, OSCE, and ACHPR said that, “All criminal
restrictions on content – including those relating to hate speech, national security, public order and
terrorism/extremism – should conform strictly to international standards, including by not providing special
protection to officials and by not employing vague or unduly broad terms.”
B. Access to public information
1136. The government of Trinidad and Tobago proposed an amendment to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) on June 7, extending the deadline for responding to requests for information from 30 to 90 days. In
response, a number of organizations held a forum on June 15, where they said that such an amendment would
frustrate the work of the free press and prevent the public from “accessing information in a timely
manner.”1560The government ultimately withdrew the proposed FOIA amendment on June 17.1561
1137. Principle 4 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression establishes that, “Access
to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual. States have the obligation to
guarantee the full exercise of this right. Thisprinciple allows only exceptional limitations that must bepreviously
established by law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic
societies.”In keeping with the principle of maximum disclosure, the law should ensure the broadest and most
effective access to public information possible, and exceptions should not become the general rule in practice.
Furthermore, exceptions should be interpreted narrowly and any doubts should be resolved in favor of
transparency and access.
C. Social protest
1138. TheOffice of the Special Rapporteurreceived information about the arrest of two protesters at
Scarborough Market on June 21, during a demonstration calling for Keith Rowley’s administration to stepdown.
According to available information, the two people were released on bond. The police chief justified the arrests
by stating that the necessary permits for the demonstration had not been obtained.1562
1139. Also, on October 18, activist Nazma Muller was arrested while demonstrating outside Parliament,
calling for the enactment of medical marijuana legislation. Muller was reportedly arrested under section 49 of
the Summary Offences Act for the use of “violent language” and “breach of the peace.”1563The activist was
released on bond that night.
1140. The IACHR has reiterated that social protest is a fundamental tool for the work of defending human
rights, and essential for expressing political and social criticism of the activities of public authorities. The
Commission has stated that, “It is, in principle, inadmissible to punish demonstrations in public places as such
when they are held in the framework of the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly”1564and that “The
exercise of the right to freedom of assembly through social protest must not be subjected to a permit from the
authorities or to excessive requirements that prevent it from happening.”1565
Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access
to Information. February 3, 2010. Tenth anniversary joint declaration: ten key challenges to freedom of expression in the next decade.
1560 Global Voices. June 19, 2019. Public pressure forces Trinidad & Tobago government to drop amendment to Freedom of Information Act;
Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. June 11, 2019. Govt backs down on FOIA changes; Trinidad & Tobago Newsday. June 9, 2019. Ramesh for forum
on freedom of information.
1561 Global Voices. June 19, 2019. Public pressure forces Trinidad & Tobago government to drop amendment to Freedom of Information Act;
Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. June 11, 2019. Govt backs down on FOIA changes; Trinidad & Tobago Newsday. 18 de junio. Govt removes FOIA
clause; Stabroek News. June 19, 2019. Trinidad gov’t backs down on freedom of info changes.
1562 Loop. June 23, 2019. Two arrested in Tobago during protest; Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. June 22, 2019. Two arrested at Kia’s Tobago
protest; Loop. June 26, 2019. Top Cop: Protests permitted in T&T once within the law..
1563 Global Voices. October 25, 2019. Cry of “Free the [bleeping] weed” leads to arrest of Trinidadian cannabis advocate; Trinidad & Tobago
Newsday. October 19, 2019. Marijuana activist charged for obscene language outside Parliament; Trinidad & Tobago Guardian. October 20,
2019. Ganja activist on obscene language charge.
1564 IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
1565 IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
245
34. URUGUAY
1141. The Office of the Special Rapporteur noted that, within the framework of the presidential and
parliamentary elections in Uruguay, complaints were made regarding the dissemination of deliberate
disinformation campaigns.1566 Along these lines, around 70 media, institutions and civil society organizations
launched an information verification program called Verificado.uy, whichplayed a leading role in the verification
of information.
1142. Likewise, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has taken note of the approval of the decree that approves
the Open Government Action Plan, which would propose reforms to Law No. 18.381 on the Right to Access to
Public Information (UAIP) to update the obligations of transparency of government and non-state public
agencies.
1143. This Office also highlights the progress regarding several judicial decisions that protected freedom of
expression and ordered to file criminal complaints for and a right of reply requested by political actors against
various media outlets within the framework of a debate on the participation of these leaders in the military
dictatorship (1973-1985).
A. Progress
1144. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has received information on progress in jurisprudential matters.
For example, on January 7, the presidency of the Republic of Uruguay issued the decree approving the Open
Government Action Plan, which would propose reforms to Law No. 18.381 of Right of Access to Public
Information, through aparticipatoryprocess between public,private institutions, academia, and civil society1567.
The Action Plan indicates that the Unit for Access to Public Information (UAIP) and civil society have detected
“difficulties that hinder the exercise of the law, which are directly related to the scope of the norm, exceptions,
and institutional design of the control body, and that must be analyzed in a participatory and consensual way”
1568.
1145. On May 22, Judge Carlos Negro issued a resolution ordering to archive the criminal defamation
complaint that the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Claudio Feola1569, initiated on May 11 against
Sarandí Radio journalist Gabriel Pereyra, due to the opinion issued by the communicator about the general's
statements regarding those arrested and disappeared during the military dictatorship1570. In this regard, the
Prosecutor's Office understood that Pereyra's comments are framed within freedom of the press and referred
to a topic of “obvious public interest”1571.
1146. The Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights (IACHR) and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have
taken note of the “Seminar on the Impacts of the Friendly Settlement Procedure before the IACHR in the national
regulatory development of Uruguay”1572. On June 11, the Uruguayan State sent information on compliance with
the friendly settlement and the approval by the IACHR, which would comply with one of thepoints of the friendly
settlement agreement between the government and journalist David Rabinovich, who filed a petition because
his right to access public information was affected1573. This Office recalls that, Rabinovich's case was key in the
process topass a Law on Access to Public Information. In October 2007, the IACHR received a petition presented
by Rabinovich, with the support of the Uruguayan Press Association (APU) and the Institute of Legal Studies of
Uruguay (IELSUR), arguing that his freedom of expression and access to public information had been violated.
Rabinovich had requested, as a journalist, access to the minutes and transcripts of recordings of a session of the
Budget Commission of the San José Departmental Board. The information was notprovided1574.
1147. On November 4, the Criminal Court of Appeals resolved favorably the appeal made by the newspaper
La República, Montevideo Portal, and Radio Uruguaya, against the decision of the Judge of Criminal First Instance,
Dolores Sánchez, on a right of reply requested by the security adviser of the Cabildo Abierto party, Antonio
Romanelli, who accused the newspaper for the dissemination of a public letter from 41 former political
1566 Inter American Press Association (IAPA). Report to the 75th General Assembly of the IAPA. Uruguay. October 3, 2019. Verificado
Uruguay. December 4, 2019. Verificado.uy, primera fase culminada. El país. June 21, 2019. Las ‘fake news’ ensucian la campaña electoral en
Uruguay.
1567 Dirección Nacional de Impresiones y Publicaciones Oficiales. January 24, 2019. Decreto N° 1/19. Available at:
https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos-originales/1-2019
1568 Centro de Archivos y Acceso a la Información. May 3, 2019. Cinco años de amenazas, obstáculos y juicios a periodistas.
1569 IFEX. May 14, 2019. Uruguay: Jefe del Ejército denuncia por difamación a periodista.
1570 Fiscalía General de la Nación. Comunicado. May 23, 2019. Available at: http://www.fiscalia.gub.uy/innovaportal/file/8145/1/feolapereira-definitivo.pdf ;IFEX. May 14, 2019. Uruguay: Jefe del Ejército denuncia por difamación a periodista
1571 Centro de Archivos y Acceso a la Información. May 24, 2019. CAinfo saluda decisión de fiscalía de archivar juicio contra periodista ; La
diaria. May 23, 2019. Archivan denuncia de Feola contra Gabriel Pereyra. Centro de Archivos y Acceso a la Información. May 14, 2019. CAinfo
repudia denuncia penal por difamación presentada por el Jefe del Ejército contra periodista.
1572 Centro de Archivos y Acceso a la Información. August 27, 2019. La CIDH homologó acuerdo entre el Estado Uruguayo y el periodista
Rabinovich sobre acceso a la información pública.
1573 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. June 12, 2019. Press Release 148/19 IACHR Welcomes Progress Made by
Uruguay to Comply with Friendly Settlement Concerning Petition 1227-07, David Rabinovich.
1574 IACHR. July 16, 2019. Report No. 103/19 Petition 1224-07 Friendly Settlement Report David Rabinovich
Uruguay.
246
prisoners, in which they indicated the treatment they suffered when he was a guard in the Libertad prison
between 1978 and 19791575. According to the information available, the Court revoked the first instance
judgment and gave the reason to the defendant media, arguing that in the case there are no grievances,
inaccuracies, falsehoods, or contempt, nor was the intention to harm the complainant in his person or in his
activity1576.
B. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
1148. On January 3, the Canal 10 journalist, Willam Daliuto, reported having been blocked from covering an
activity convened on violence against women, at the Valizas bus station (Rocha)1577. On March 12, the Cerro
Largo journalist, Silvia Techera, would have reported labor harassment and verbal aggressions by the
coordinator of the Melo Carnival organization linked to various activities of the Departmental Administration,
Juan Pimental1578.
1149. Principle 9 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR states that “[t]he
murder, kidnapping, intimidation of, and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the material destruction
of communications media violate the fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
expression. It is the duty of the State to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to punish their perpetrators
and to ensure that victims receive due compensation”.
C. Legal Reforms
1150. The Office of the Special Rapporteur expresses its concern that the Uruguayan Senate once again
rejected the bill that regulates government advertising, which has been presented as a complex issue to resolve
in the country. For their part, civil society organizations have condemned the fact, since they expressed that it
would be appropriate that in Uruguay there is a legal framework that regulates the production, planning,
contracting, distribution, and allocation of government advertising so that in this way the country can meet
international standards on freedom of expression. Likewise, the initiative seeks to eliminate the discrimination
suffered by the media in the interior of the country that would receive a very small percentage of government
advertising1579.
1151. Principle 13 of the Declaration of Principles states that “[t]he exercise of power and the use of public
funds by the state, the granting of customs dutyprivileges, the arbitrary and discriminatoryplacement of official
advertising, and government loans; the concession of radio and television broadcast frequencies, among others,
with the intent to put pressure on and punish or reward and provide privileges to social communicators and
communications media because of the opinions they express threaten freedom of expression, and must be
explicitlyprohibited by law. The media has the right to carry out their role in an independent manner. Direct or
indirect pressures exerted upon journalists or other social communicators to stifle the dissemination of
information are incompatible with freedom of expression.
1575 Centro de Archivos y Acceso a la Información. October 1, 2019. CAinfo expresa preocupación por el fallo judicial que atenta contra la
libertad de expresión; Sudestada. September 30, 2019. Medios apelan fallo judicial que hizo lugar a derecho de réplica de asesor de Manini
1576 Montevideo Portal. November 4, 2019. Tribunal de Apelaciones revocó sentencia y dio razón a medios denunciados por Romanelli
1577 CAinfo. IFEX. PADF. May 2019. Periodismo y libertad de expresión en Uruguay Quinto Informe de Monitoreo de Amenazas. Montevideo
Portal. May 3, 2019. En un año hubo 18 amenazas a la libertad de expresión de los periodistas en Uruguay.
1578 Diario Uruguay. March 14, 2019. La periodista Silvia Techera fue hostigada en el carnaval de Melo y la APU no calla ante inadmisible
acoso laboral. CAinfo. IFEX. PADF. Mayo 2019. Periodismo y libertad de expresión en Uruguay Quinto Informe de Monitoreo de Amenazas .
1579 CAinfo. September 10, 2019. CAinfo lamenta que Senado no aprobó proyecto sobre publicidad oficial. La Diaria. September 11, 2019.
Proyecto sobre publicidad oficial no fue aprobado en el Senado.
247
35. VENEZUELA
1152. Throughout 2019, the serious violations of the right to freedom of expression in Venezuela continued
to deepen, in the context of an intensification of the political and social conflict. Violence against journalists and
media workers, exercised in many cases by members of the security forces themselves, increased during events
of public interest, such as protests, political acts or legislative debates. Numerous journalists were arbitrarily
detained by members of the Police or intelligence services while carrying out their work or covering
demonstrations, and were repeatedly forced to erase journalistic material. According to the information
received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, the police and military security forces would have repressed
the demonstrations by using tear gas, water cannons and royal bullets to disperse the protesters, which would
have resulted in hundreds of people wounded, detained, and dozens of deaths.
1153. In addition, a pattern of censorship was observed in Venezuela, through the systematic blocking of
websites of news media, social networks or streaming services ordered by state authorities and executed by the
public Internet provider, CANTV. In addition, there were recurring failures in internet connectivity due to
damage to the telecommunications infrastructure and interruptions in the electric power service. In addition,
the National Telecommunications Commission (Conatel) ordered the blocking of international news channels of
television services for subscribers, ordered the closure of stations and ordered the suspension of the
transmission of certain programs.
1154. The Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on several cases of arbitrary detentions, and
criminal proceedings carried out against journalists in alleged reprisal for their informative work,in many cases
without the guarantees of due process. Arbitrary detentions and the subsequent application of vague, ambiguous
and disproportionate criminal regulations that restrict freedom of expression to silence opinions or critical
information on the political and economic situation facing the country, both against journalists, State officials,
politicians, opponents, or citizens who express themselves through social networks.
A. Attacks, threats, and intimidation against journalists and themedia
1155. Throughout 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on numerous acts of
physical aggression, threats1580, detentions, robberies or confiscation of communicators' work equipment,
perpetrated by security forces, groups of armed civilians, or private individuals, with the intention of silencing
journalists, intimidating them, or limiting their coverage in various contexts1581.
1156. On May 17,journalist Pableysa Ostos, an AFP correspondent, was reportedly intimidated by a security
officer while collecting information about the gas shortage in Ciudad Guayana1582. On May 24, an official of the
Merida State Police would have phoned and verbally harassed the director of the Mérida Digital information
portal, Judith Vega, for having published information about the escape of prisoners, which he understood to be
false1583. On June 25, a sympathizer of the ruling party would have attacked the cameraman of the Venezolanos
Por la Informacióndigital media, on the outskirts of the Federal Legislative Palace, during a session of the
National Assembly1584.
1157. In addition, numerous attacks and harassment against journalists during the coverage of socialprotests
would have been recorded. For example, journalist Dayana Krays, of Venemundo Web and Caraota Digital, was
reportedly threatened with firearms by groups of armed civilians while covering protests in Caracas on March
311585.Journalists Raily Luján and Gregory Jaimes and the graphic reporter Juan Peraza would have been
harassed by armed civilians when they were covering a protest of oil workers who went on a hunger strike in
demand of payment of wages. Journalists of the Crónica Unoportal, Carmen Inojosa and Luis Morillo, were also
reportedly harassed1586. Reporters Marinelid Marcano, a correspondent for El Pitazo in Anzoátegui state, and
Virginia Serrano, of El Tigrense newspaper, would have been intimidated by an unknown individual, who would
have recorded and taken photographs of them while they were covering an opposition rally1587.On May 24,
reporters Freddy Villamizar and Luzfrandy Contreras, of Noticias TRT, and Manuel Cardozo, of Ecos del Torbes,
1580Activist and president of the organization Control Ciudadano, Rocío San Miguel, reported on Twitter that she has received threats from
strangers through phone calls and text messages. Espacio Público. August 13, 2019. Amenazan vía telefónica a Rocío San Miguel; El Impulso.
August 15, 2019. Nuevo ciclo de amenazas recibe la doctora Rocío San Miguel #15Ago.
1581In September two press teams were prevented from covering hospital centers in the cities of Maracaibo and Barquisimeto. IPYS
Venezuela. October 7, 2019. Balance Semanal IPYSve | Agresiones y hechos intimidatorios fueron el patrón de la censura en septiembre.
1582 Twitter account of SindicatoNacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). May 18, 2019; Espacio Público. May
18, 2019. Intimidan a periodista Pableysa Ostos en Puerto Ordaz.
1583Espacio Público. May 24, 2019. Funcionario policial hostiga a periodista Judith Vega.
1584Espacio Público. June 25, 2019. Simpatizante de Nicolás Maduro ataca a periodista en la AN.
1585 Twitter account of Dayana Krays (@Dayanakrays). March 31, 2019.
1586 Tal Cual. June 20, 2019. Colectivos agreden a periodistas durante protesta de extrabajadores petroleros; Espacio Público. June 21, 2019.
Equipo de La Patilla fue hostigado por civiles armados durante una protesta; Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la
Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). June 20, 2019.
1587 El Pitazo. May 11, 2019. Oriente y Guayana protestaron con poca participación;Espacio Público. May 14, 2019. Intimidan a dos periodistas
en Anzoátegui.
248
would have been attacked with tear gas and pellets thrown by Táchira Police officials, while covering a protest
over the shortage of Gasoline in the region1588. On September 21, Jhonathan Bello, cameraman of the digital
television channel Venezolanos por la Infomación (VPITv), was reportedly injured by a rock thrown by groups of
civilians who attacked a march of the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, on San Martín de Caracas
Avenue1589.
1158. The Office of the Special Rapporteur learned that the practice of arbitrarily detaining journalists while
carrying out their informative work in social demonstrations or other events of public interesthas continued. On
several occasions, reporters were released after members of the security forces erased the material recorded or
confiscated the work equipment1590. For example, on May 16, journalists Mayker Iriarte, Mariana de Barros, and
Héctor Sánchez, of Vivo Play and TV Venezuela, Maoly Aldana, of Venevisión, and their cameraman and technician
team, and Romel Gorosabel, producer of Caracol TV, would have beendetained by officials of the Bolivarian
National Intelligence Service [Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional] (Sebin) when they covered the news
of the disappearance of Commissioner Iván Simonovis, in Caracas. The troops would have held them for more
than three hours, during which they remained incommunicado and without their identity documents1591.On June
13, officials of the Bolivarian National Guard [Guardia Nacional Bolivariana] (GNB) would have held journalist
Jhonattam Petit for a few minutes while he was covering a protest by relatives of a group of people who were
missing at sea, in Falcon state. Officials would have released him after confiscating his cellphone, with images of
the protest1592. Photographer Ronald Peña and driver Félix Morais, from El Pitazo, were reportedly arrested by
Sebin officials when they were taking photographs outside the Petróleos de Venezuela headquarters in Caracas.
Officials would have released them after deleting the material they had recorded1593. Officials of the Anzoátegui
Regional Police would have detained journalist José Félix Millán, of Radio Fe y Alegría, and confiscated his
cellphonewhen he was reporting on the shortage of gasoline in the region1594.The reporter of the
channelVenezolanos por la Información (VPITV), Mariángel Moro, and her cameraman, would have been
threatened with firearms by police officers when they covered the care of deceased or injured prisoners at the
Jesús María Casal Hospital, after a riot occurred in the police dungeons of the Páez municipality, in Acarigua,
Portuguesa state. Due to the intimidation, the reporters had to pull out from the place and erase the material
they had recorded1595. On August 14, Colombian journalist Paula Thomas would have been detained for two
hours by GNB officials, while she was taking photographs in the border area between Colombia and
Venezuela1596.
1159. On August 28, journalists from Globovisión, Venezolanos por la Información (VPITV), and Venevisión
were evicted by officials of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) when they were covering a protest of carriers
at the headquarters of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), in Maturin, Monagas state. Reporter Ana Rodríguez and
cameraman Edgar Hernández, from VPITV, were also reportedly threatened by GNB officials1597. On August 31,
the security team of the opposition leader and self-proclaimedpresident of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, would have
1588Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). May 24, 2019; 800 Noticias. May 24,
2019. Varios periodistas heridos durante protesta por gasolina en Táchira.
1589 Twitter account of VPItv (@VPITV). September 21, 2019; IPYS. October 7, 2019. Balance Semanal IPYSve | Agresiones y hechos
intimidatorios fueron el patrón de la censura en septiembre.
1590On August 15, journalist Lisbeth Miquilena was reportedly detained for two hours by Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) members while
taking photographs in a gym in the city of Tubores, Nueva Esparta state. The police reportedly forced her to erase the registered material.
IPYS Venezuela. August 27, 2019. Balance Semanal; Espacio Público. August 15, 2019. GNB detiene a periodista por fotografiar un gimnasio
vertical. On October 4, three individuals identified with caps of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) reportedly inter cepted
the vehicle of the New Digital Press team and forced the reporters to get off, delete the recorded photographs and leave the area, in Puerto
Ordaz, Bolívar state. Espacio Público. October 4, 2019. Funcionarios atacan e intimidan a equipo reporteril de Nueva Prensa Digital. In
October, security personnel reportedly intimidated journalist Luisángela Delgado and photojournalist Ángel García, from Diario Primicia ,
when they intended to cover a traffic accident involving officers of the Special Actions Forces (Faes). Several armed officials reportedly
surrounded the reporters and forced them to delete the material they had registered. Espacio Público. October 4, 2019. Funcionarios
intimidan a periodistas del Diario Primicia; Crítica. October 7, 2019. Funcionarios del Faes intimidan a periodistas del Diario Primicia.
1591 Efecto Cocuyo. May 16, 2019. Liberan a periodistas detenidos frente a la residencia de Simonovis; Infobae. May 16, 2019. El servicio de
inteligencia chavista retuvo durante más de 3 horas a 5 periodistas en las puertas de la casa del preso político liberado por Juan Guaidó Iván
Simonovis.
1592Tal Cual. June 13, 2019. Detienen al diputado Eliezer Sirit y al periodista JhonattamPetit en Falcón; Caraota Digital. June 14, 2019. GN le
quitó celular a periodista que cubría protesta de familiares de los 32 desaparecidos en alta mar; Espacio Público. June 17, 2019. GNB retiene a
periodista en el estado Falcón.
1593Espacio Público. June 12, 2019. Sebin detiene al equipo de El Pitazo en Caracas.
1594El Universal. June 15, 2019. CNP Anzoátegui denuncia agresiones de la policía contra trabajadores de la prensa; Espacio Público. June 14,
2019. Funcionarios de PoliAnzoátegui detienen y roban a periodista;
1595800 Noticias. May 24, 2019. Policías de Portuguesa amenazaron a equipo de VPI; Noticiero Digital. May 24, 2019. Policía de Acarigua
amenazó a periodista para que borrara videos.
1596Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). August 14, 2019; 2001. August 14,
2019. GN liberó a periodista colombiana detenida en la frontera mientras tomaba fotos; IPYS Venezuela. August 27, 2019. Balance Semanal
IPYSve | Desconexión en telecomunicaciones venezolanas afecta flujo informativo..
1597 El Nacional. August 28, 2019. GNB amenazó a periodistas de VPI durante protesta de trabajadores de Pdvsa; EsCaracas. August 28, 2019.
Lo que hizo la GNB contra periodistas de VPI durante protesta de trabajadores de Pdvsa; Espacio Público. August 29, 2019. GNB desaloja a
periodistas durante una protesta en Pdvsa.
249
assaulted several journalists covering the route he was taking in the Mercado Libre of Maracay, Aragua state1598.
On September 23, a group of armed civilians would have threatened the workers of Radio Mundial 860 AM and
Radiodifusora Cultural del Táchira 1190 AM in San Cristóbal, Táchira state. Agents of the National Police and of
the Táchira state would have appeared at the station after the radio director denounced the situation on the air.
Radio Mundialhad been out of the air for a month after vandalism groups stole their broadcast equipment in
early August1599.
1160. La Relatoría Especial reitera que el principio 9 de la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de
Expresión de la CIDH señala que “[e]l asesinato, secuestro, intimidación, amenaza a los comunicadores sociales,
así como la destrucción material de los medios de comunicación, viola los derechos fundamentales de las
personas y coarta severamente la libertad de expresión. Es deber de los Estados prevenir e investigar estos
hechos, sancionar a sus autores y asegurar a las víctimas una reparaciónadecuada”.
B. Arbitrary detentions and judicial harassment
1161. The Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on several cases of arbitrary detentions and
criminal proceedings carried out against journalists in alleged reprisal for their informative work. On February
25, Univisión journalist Jorge Ramos and five other members of his work team were arrested in the presidential
palace of Miraflores. They were subsequently expelled from Caracas. In addition, their work equipment would
have been confiscated. The team was at the headquarters of the Presidency to interview President Nicolás
Maduro, but during the interview the president reportedly got angry by the questions asked, which were linked
to the humanitarian crisis that the country is undergoing and the lack of democratic guarantees. Due to this, the
interview was reportedlyinterrupted, and the reporters would have been detained, interrogated, and then
expelled1600.
1162. American journalist Cody Weedle, who collaborates with the Local 10 television channel in Miami, and
the Venezuelan guide who helped him in his work, were reportedlydetained on March 6 by counterintelligence
agents, who would have raided their homes in Caracas. The agents would have filed a court order issued by a
military court and seized Weddle work equipment. Both would have been released hours later1601.
1163. On March 12, after spending 24 hours in detention, journalist Luis Carlos Díaz, who works for the Unión
Radio station in Caracas andproduces journalistic content on social networks, was released. He would have been
detained on March 11 by intelligence agents, who would have subsequently searched his home and confiscated
his computers and phones. Díaz would have been accused of “instigation to commit crimes” and would be
prevented from leaving the country1602. On March 29, the IACHR granted precautionary measures to Díaz and
his family and urged the Venezuelan State to take the necessary measures to ensure that he can carry out his
journalistic activities without fear of being a victim of intimidation or threats1603. At the end of November, the
Prosecutor's Office had not yet presented evidence supporting a formal accusation against Díaz, for which his
defense would have requested the conclusion of the investigation1604. On December 9, a court decided to extend
the term for the investigation of the Prosecutor's Office for one year1605.
1164. On March 30, journalist Danilo Alberto Gil from NotiRedVe media was reportedly detained by police
officers from Lagunillas, municipality of Zulia state, when he was covering an opposition protest. At the time of
the arrest, Gil was recording images of an alleged police attack against the protesters and an attempt by police
officers to arrest the opposition politician and member of the Venezuelan National Assembly Juan Carlos
Velazco. Gil would have been released on April 1 after being accused of resistance to authority and would have
been prevented from leaving the country1606.
1598 Twitter account of Colegio Nacional de Periodistas de Aragua (@cnparagua). August 31, 2019; Diario de Los Andes. September 3,
2019. Equipo de seguridad del diputado Guaidó agredió a ocho periodistas en el estado Aragua; VTV. September 1, 2019. Periodista de Aragua
agredida por equipo de seguridad desmiente a Guaidó
1599Twitter account of diario LaNación (@lanacionweb). September 2, 2019; Efecto Cocuyo. September 23, 2019. Civiles armados atacan torre
de transmisión de radios en Táchira; Espacio Público. September 23, 2019. Civiles armados amenazaron al personal de dos emisoras de radio
en Táchira;
1600 Twitter account of Univision Noticias (@UniNoticias). February 25, 2019; Noticias Telemundo. February 26, 2019. Detienen y deportan a
periodista de Univisión en Venezuela; El País. February 26, 2019. Venezuela retiene en Miraflores al periodista Jorge Ramos y le requisa su
entrevista a Maduro; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Venezuelan authorities must return equipment to Jorge Ramos, Univision crew.
1601Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). March 6, 2019. Venezuelan counterintelligence agents detain U.S. freelancer, Venezuelan fixer;
Local 10. March 6, 2019. Venezuelanauthoritiesrelease Local 10 reporterCodyWeddle; CNN. March 6, 2019. Liberan al periodista
estadounidense CodyWeddle, quien habría sido detenido por las fuerzas de seguridad venezolanas; EFE. March 6, 2019. Liberan a CodyWeddle,
periodista de canal de EE.UU. detenido en Venezuela.
1602 BBC. March 13, 2019. Luis Carlos Díaz: decretan libertad condicional al periodista venezolano detenido en Caracas por el Sebin; Twitter
account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). March 12, 2019; El Universal. March 12, 2019.
Luis Carlos Díaz fue liberado tras ser imputado por "instigación a delinquir"; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). April 5, 2019. Journalist
Luis Carlos Díaz released from detention, banned from leaving Venezuela.
1603IACHR. Medidas cautelares No. 250-19. Luis Carlos Díaz y su núcleo familiar respecto de Venezuela. March 29, 2019.
1604 IPYS. November 21, 2019. Exigen a la Fiscalía culminar investigación contra Luis Carlos Díaz por falta de pruebas
1605 Espacio Público. December 9, 2019. Luis Carlos Díaz tendrá un año más bajo injusta investigación
1606 Cuenta de Twiter de Espacio Público (@espaciopublico). 1 de abril de 2019; Cuenta de Twitter del Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores
de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). 30 de marzo de 2019 y 1 de abril de 2019; Cuenta de Twitter deNotiRedVe (@notiredve). 30 de
250
1165. On May 21, the organizations Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Human Rights Watch called
out Venezuelan authorities for the release of photojournalist Jesús Medina, who would reportedly be arbitrarily
detained since August 2018 due to his journalisticwork. Agents of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service
(Sebin) would have arrested Medina when he was working, together with a team of journalists, on a research
project at the Caracas hospital. On August 31, Medina would have been charged with several crimes, including
those of hate speech, illegal profit in acts of public administration, and association to commit crimes. Under
Venezuelan law, Medina's preliminary hearing - in which the Public Ministry must justify the formal charges -
should have been held within the first 45 days, international organizations denounced. However, the hearing
would have been postponed eight times and would still be pending. According to the director for the Americas
of Human Rights Watch, José Miguel Vivanco, “Jesus Medina's detention coincides with a pattern of arbitrary
detentions and harassment of opponents, critics, and anyone who dares to tellthe truth about what is happening
in Venezuela”1607. On September 18, the Office of the Special Rapporteur expressed in a statement its concern
about the situation in Medina and its prolonged stay in prison without being subjected to trial1608.
1166. Journalist Braulio Jatar would have been released on July 8 from his house arrest, upon receiving the
official notice of a criminal court in Nueva Esparta. Jatar would have been prosecuted for the crime of money
laundering. Although his arrest ended, the Court would have banned him from leaving the state of Nueva
Espartaand ordered him to appear before the court every 15 days. Local and international organizations say that
the process against the journalist is a reprisal for his coverage of the protests in Venezuela. Jatar was arrested
in Margarita Island in 2016 by Venezuelan police after covering andphotographing protests against Maduro for
his news mediaReporte Confidencial. After the arrest he was accused of money laundering, although for the
moment he has not been prosecuted. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle
Bachelet, had requested the release of Jatar and other notoriousprisoners during her June visitto Venezuela1609.
1167. On September 4, six employees of the Venezuelan Corporation of Military Industries [Compañía Anónima
Venezolana de Industrias Militares] (Cavim) were arrested and interrogated by officials of the General
Directorate of Military Counterintelligence [Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar] (Dgcim) and the
BolivarianNationalIntelligence Service (Sebin) after they held aprotest and reportlow wages andpoor working
conditions in the media1610.
1168. The graphic worker José Guillermo Mendoza, of the NGO Provea, was reportedly arrested on September
19 by members of the Bolivarian National Police (PNB) allegedly because he was carrying printed material from
the organization that the agents valued as "subversive." On September 20, he was released after spending 18
hours in detention; The material would have been returned1611.
1169. During the search of the Entorno Digital headquarters, journalists covering the operation were also
arrested1612. The correspondent Andrea Espinoza, the technicians Jhonatan Bello and Dangert Zorrilla, and the
driver Jonathan Azuaje, of the digital television VPI, and the journalists Miguel Dasilva and Roger Castillo, of the
newspaper Caraota Digital, were arrested by DGCIM troops, and released hours later, although his work teams
and personal cell phones would have been confiscated.1613
1170. The Office of the Special Rapporteur reiterates that principle 9 of the IACHR’s Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expressionestablishes that “[t]he murder, kidnapping, intimidation of and/or threats to social
communicators, as well as the material destruction of communications media violate the fundamental rights of
individuals and strongly restrict freedom of expression. It is the duty of the state toprevent and investigate such
occurrences, to punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due compensation.” In addition, the
State “has the duty to ensure that journalists and media workers reporting on public demonstrations are not
marzo de 2019; Comité para la Protección de Periodistas (CPJ). 4 de abril de 2019. La Policía venezolana detiene al periodista Danilo Gil
mientras cubría protestas y lo acusan de resistencia a la autoridad.
1607Comité para la Protección de Periodistas (CPJ). 21 de mayo de 2019. El CPJ y Human Rights Watch instan a Venezuela a liberar a Jesús
Medina; Cuenta de Twitter del Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). 31 de agosto de 2018.
1608 IACHR. Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 18 de septiembre de 2019. Relatoría Especial condena que
comunicadores Pedro Jaimes y Jesús Medina hayan cumplido un año en prisión en Venezuela, sin ser sometidos a juicio
1609Comité para la Protección de Periodistas (CPJ). 8 de julio de 2019. El periodista venezolano Braulio Jatar recibe libertad condicional y se
le prohíbe salir del país; Caraota Digital. 8 de julio de 2019. “Nos sacan de las jaulas y nos tiran una cadena al cuello”: Braulio Jatar tras
excarcelación; BioBio Chile. 5 de julio de 2019. Bachelet anuncia que Maduro liberó a periodista chileno-venezolano detenido desde 2016;
Cuenta de Twitter de Ana Julia Jatar (@anajuljatar). 8 de julio de 2019.
1610 El Carababoñeo. 4 de septiembre de 2019. Trabajadores de Cavim detenidos por funcionarios del Sebin en Maracay; Espacio Público. 12
de septiembre de 2019. Sebin detuvo a seis trabajadores de Cavim que exigían mejoras salariales.
1611Cuenta de Twitter de Provea (@_Provea). 20 de septiembre de 2019; El Estímulo. 20 de septiembre de 2019. Liberan a trabajador de
Provea detenido por imprimir “material subversivo”; Noticiero Venevisión. 20 de septiembre de 2019. Tras casi 24 horas detenido fue liberado
José Guillermo Mendoza; Crónica Uno. 20 de septiembre de 2019. Liberado trabajador que había sido detenido cuando portaba material gráfico
de Provea.
1612 Cuenta de Twitter de Hernán Porras Molina (@HernanPorras). 6 de diciembre de 2019; Entorno Inteligente. Sin fecha. Belén Tovar 11
días incomunicada en la DGCIM;El Impulso. 25 de noviembre de 2019. CNP denuncia que periodista Ana Belén Tovar permanece detenida e
“incomunicada” #25Nov; Espacio Público. 26 de noviembre de 2019. Ana Belén Tovar cumple una semana incomunicada
1613 14ymedio. November 20, 2019. Confiscan equipos y detienen a la gerente de un medio digital venezolano; VOA Noticias. 19 de noviembre
de 2019. Contrainteligencia militar de Venezuela libera a periodistas de VPITV y Caraota Digital detenidos; DW. 20 de noviembre de 2019.
Confiscan equipos y detienen a gerente de medio digital en Venezuela
251
arrested, threatened, assaulted, or limited in any manner in their rights as a result ofpracticing their profession.
Their work materials and tools must not be destroyed or confiscated by the authorities.” Moreover, “the
authorities must not stigmatize or stereotype demonstrators and their demands. They must refrain from making
generalizations based on isolated events or the conduct of particular groups"1614
.
1171. In this regard, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that the AmericanDeclaration enshrines in its
Article XXV the right of protection from arbitrary arrest which establishes that "no person may be deprivedof
his liberty except in the cases and accordingto the procedures established by pre-existinglaw”.In addition, it
indicates that "every individual who has been deprived ofhis liberty has the right to have the legality ofhis
detention ascertained without delay by acourt, and the right to be tried without unduedelay or, otherwise, to be
released." In this regard, the IACHR reiterates that a detention is arbitrary and unlawful when done outside of
the grounds and theformalitiesprescribed by law, when it is executed without observing theprocedures that the
law prescribes, and when there has been an abuse of thepowers of arrest, that is, when the arrest is made for
purposes other than thosethat the law prescribes and requires. Likewise, detention forimproper purposes is in
itself a sort of sentence without trial, or an unlawfulpenalty that violates the guarantee against imposition of
punishment withoutbenefit of trial; lastlythe term"arbitrary" is synonymous with irregular, abusive, or contrary
to law1615.
C. Social protest
1172. In a context where the political, social, and economic crisis is sharpening in Venezuela, massprotests by
opponents and supporters of the Government of Nicolás Maduro intensified throughout the country. According
to the information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, within the framework of these protests,
police and military security forces would have repressed the demonstrations through the use of tear gas, water
cannons, armored military vehicles, and real bullets to disperse opposing activists, which would have resulted
in hundreds of people injured and detained, and dozens of deaths. According to the Venezuelan Human Rights
Education-Action Program [Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos] (Provea), from
the beginning of the year until the end of April, 54 people died in the framework of social protests; 53 of them
as a result of bullet impacts. The responsibility of 80% of the deaths is attributed by the organization to police
officers and military and paramilitary forces1616.
1173. On January 23, the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, proclaimed himself interim
president of Venezuela. After the announcement, demonstrations against the Government of Nicolás Maduro
intensified. In response, Venezuelan authorities would have raided at least three newsrooms (Global TV, Noticia
Al Día, Aventura TV) and would have taken a television channel (Global TV) out of the air. In addition, two
journalists would have been arrested and their journalistic equipment confiscated, and numerous reporters
would have been forced to erase recorded journalistic material. Moreover, the authorities would have
interrupted the Internet service1617.
1174. The repression of demonstrations by police and military forces would have resulted in hundreds of
people injured and detained, and at least five dead (the number of deaths reached 16 according to the
Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict [Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social])1618.
1175. In the early hours of April 30, thepresident of theNational Assembly, JuanGuaidó, and opposition leader
Leopoldo López, summoned citizens to accompany protests and actions undertaken within the framework of a
plan called “Operation Freedom” [Operación Libertad], which would aim to remove the Government of Nicolás
Maduro. The organization Espacio Público recorded at least 17 cases of violations of freedom of expression
during the mobilization day. At least three journalists would have been injured during the coverage of the
protests, and several would have been held by agents of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (Sebin) and
the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB). Also, workers from different media outlets would have been harassed by
protesters1619.
1614United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion ofthe Rightto Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
1615 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 187.
1616 Twitter account of Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos (@_Provea). April 30, 2019; El Pitazo. May 7, 2019.
Colectivos: la cara de la represión en 2019; Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social. Muertes en protestas 2019 Provea/OVCS.
1617 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). January 24, 2019. Raids, media shutdowns and internet disruptions amid Venezuela crisis;
Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (IPYS). January 27, 2019. Especial IPYSve | El 23 y 24 de enero prevaleció la censura en Venezuela; Espacio Público.
January 23, 2019. Cobertura el 23 de enero dejó 15 casos contra la libertad de expresión; Netblocks. January 23, 2019. Major Internet
disruptions in Venezuela amidprotests.
1618BBC. January 24, 2019. Protestas en Venezuela: los muertos y detenidos que dejaron las manifestaciones en Venezuela; El País. January 24,
2019. Las protestas contra Maduro dejan al menos 26 muertos en cuatro días en Venezuela.
1619Espacio Público. May 1, 2019. Resumen especial de la jornada de protestas del 30 de abril de 2019; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
May 6, 2019. Challenges facing journalists trying to cover latest violence in Venezuela
252
1176. Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) troops would have repressedprotests in Caracas and several
states in the country, and would have used tear gas, water cannons, armored military vehicles, and real bullets
to disperse protesters, according to press reports1620.
1177. The repression of the security forces would have left a balance of more than 100 people injured and
dozens of arrests. In addition, in a demonstration in La Victoria, Aragua state, Samuel Méndez, a 24-year-old
protester, would have died. According to local pressreports, witnesses of the incident reportedly singled out as
responsible armed civiliangroups, who would have kidnapped, beaten, and shot Samuel Méndez in the chest1621.
1178. Several media circulated images of a tanker of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), allegedly
intentionally running over a group of protesting citizens, and armed civilian groups firing at protesters1622.
1179. On the other hand, during the day of protests the National Telecommunications Commission (Conatel)
would have ordered to block television services for subscribers ofBBC and CNN international channels1623.
Likewise, the Internet Observatory Ve Sin Filtrowould have verified the blocking of YouTube, Twitter, Instagram,
and Periscope platforms in the service provided by the state-owned companyCANTV1624.
1180. Theprotest continued on May 1st1625. The organization Espacio Públicodocumented on that day 12 cases
of violations of freedom of expression. Among them, there were several attacks on press workers who covered
the events by public order troops, as was the case of journalist Gregory Jaimes, wounded in the face by pellets
allegedly launched by members of the National Police1626. Internet access continued to be restricted by CANTV,
who kept access to YouTube blocked during Guaidó's speech1627.
1181. Again, as a result of the repression of police and military forces, scores of wounded were registered
among the protesters. A 27-year-old woman lost her life after being shot in the head during a demonstration in
Altamira, according to the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS)1628.
1182. On May 2, Yoifre Hernández Vásquez, 14, and Yosner Graterol, 16, died after being injured by security
forces during the demonstrations on April 30 and May 1. Also, a fifth person died at night in a clash between
opposition supporters and government forces in Santa Elena de Arenales, in the state of Mérida1629.
1183. La CIDH ha reiterado que la protesta social es una herramienta fundamentalpara la labor de defensa de
los derechos humanos, y esencial para la expresión crítica política y social de las actividades de las autoridades.
La Comisión ha señalado que “resulta en principio inadmisible la penalización per se de las demostraciones en
la vía pública cuando se realizan en el marco del derecho a la libertad de expresión y del derecho de reunión”1630
y que “el ejercicio del derecho de reunión a través de la protesta social no debe sujetarse a una autorización por
parte de las autoridades ni a requisitos excesivos que dificulten su realización”1631.
1184. Asimismo, en la Declaración Conjunta sobre violencia contra los y las periodistas en el marco de
manifestaciones sociales, adoptada en 2013, se indica que los derechos de reunión y libertad de expresión “son
fundamentales y su garantía es una condición necesaria para la existencia y el funcionamiento de una sociedad
democrática. Un Estado puede imponer limitaciones razonables a las manifestaciones con el fin de asegurar el
desarrollo pacífico de las mismas o dispersar aquellas que se tornan violentas, siempre que tales límites se
encuentren regidos por los principios de legalidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad. Además, la desconcentración
de una manifestación debe justificarse en el deber de protección de las personas, y deben utilizarse las medidas
más seguras y menos lesivas para los manifestantes. El uso de la fuerza en manifestaciones públicas debe ser
excepcional y en circunstancias estrictamente necesarias conforme a los principios internacionalmente
reconocidos”1632.
1620TheGuardian. May 1, 2019. Venezuela crisis: Maduro claims victory over 'deranged' coup attempt; Venezuela Analysis. Venezuela:
MilitaryUprising in Caracas (in Development).
1621 Twitter account of the Inter American Commission on Human Rights (@CIDH). April 30, 2019; Twitter account of Programa Venezolano
de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos (@_Provea). April 30, 2019; Efecto Cocuyo. May 1, 2019. Matan a Samuel Méndez en Aragua
durante protesta este #30Abr; El Pitazo. April 30, 2019. Asesinan a un joven durante protesta en La Victoria; Infobae. April 30, 2019. La
represión chavista dejó un muerto, más de 100 heridos y decenas de detenidos tras el alzamiento contra la dictadura de Venezuela.
1622 Reuters. April 30, 2019. Government vehicle runs over protesters in Caracas.
1623 CNN.May 1, 2019. CNN and BBC pulled off the air by Venezuela's government.
1624Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). May 1, 2019. Venezuelan authorities restrict internet, block outlets amid unrest..
1625 The New York Times. May 1, 2019. Venezuela, en ascuas durante las protestas del Día de los Trabajadores; BBC. May 2, 2019. Crisis en
Venezuela: tensión por manifestaciones a favor y en contra de Maduro tras el "levantamiento" de Guaidó y López.
1626 Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). May 1, 2019; El Tiempo. May 1,
2019. Las fotos de la represión del régimen de Maduro este primero de mayo.
1627Espacio Público. May 2, 2019. Jornada del 1ero de mayo: se agudizan las agresiones contra periodistas.
1628Twitter account of Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social (@OVCSocial). May 1, 2019.
1629Infobae. May 2, 2019. Ascienden a cuatro los muertos por la represión chavista: dos eran adolescentes de 14 y 16 años; CNN. May 3, 2019.
Al menos 5 muertos en la más reciente ola de protestas en Venezuela; Noticias ONU. May 3, 2019. La ONU eleva a cinco el número de muertos
por las protestas en Venezuela.
1630IACHR. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57. December 31, 2009. Para. 197.
1631IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011. Para.
139.
1632United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. September 13, 2013. Joint declaration on
violence against journalists and media workers in the context of protests.
253
D .Stigmatizing statements
1185. The mayor of Anzoátegui municipality, Cojedes state, would have signaled out, in a regional radio
program, journalist Luisana Suárez to be behind public demonstrations against the management of the local
government1633. On May 25, the Minister of Penitentiary Affairs, Iris Varela, would have called journalist
Sebastiana Barráez a “compulsive mythomaniac”, after she reported on alleged meetings between
representatives of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela [Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela] (PSUV) with
members of the Liberation Army National [Ejército de Liberación Nacional] (ELN) on the border1634.
1186. Venezuela's ambassador to the United Nations, Samuel Moncada, would have publicly assured to have
proof that journalist Nelson Bocaranda had been "bought" by foreign agencies. His accusations, made through
his Twitter account, were echoed through the portal of the Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs of
Venezuela1635.
1187. On August 11, during his radio program Contacto, the governor of the Yaracuy state, Julio León Heredia,
would have ordered the expropriation of the headquarters of El Diario de Yaracuy after accusing its owner,
Gianfranco Napolitano, of looting and robbing the State1636.
1188. La CIDH recuerda que los funcionarios públicos tienen el deber de asegurarse que con
suspronunciamientos no están lesionando los derechos de quienes contribuyen a la deliberación
públicamediante la expresión y difusión de su pensamiento, tales como periodistas, medios de comunicación
yorganizaciones defensoras de derechos humanos y deben atender al contexto en el cual se expresan
paraasegurarse que sus expresiones no constituyan, en palabras de la Corte, “formas de injerencia directa
oindirecta opresión lesiva en los derechos de quienespretenden contribuir a la deliberación pública mediantela
expresión y difusión de supensamiento”1637.
E. Subsequent Liabilities
1189. Karen Palacios, clarinetist of the National Philharmonic Orchestra of Venezuela, was arrested by officials
of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) on June 1, allegedly for "instigating hatred in
social networks", after she denounced on her Twitter account that she would have been expelled from the
orchestra for having signed in favor of the presidential referendum backed by the opposition in 2017. Palacios
would have been released on July 16, after spending 45 days in detention, although she would have received a
release card authorizing her release on June 181638.
1190. On June 4, the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela would have rejected an appeal from the journal La
Patilla and ordered the payment of 30,000 million bolivars (about US$ 5 million) as compensation to the former
vice president of Venezuela Diosdado Cabello, in the framework of a civil lawsuit for defamation that the official
initiated after the media reproduced the publication of an investigation of the Spanish newspaper ABC in which
the high-ranking official was linked with drug trafficking and illicit business. The Court raised the amount of
compensation that had been set in first instance1639. According to the coordinator of the Central American and
South American Program of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Natalie Southwick, “the exorbitant
compensation imposed on La Patilla is nothing more than a barely concealed attempt to bankrupt and close a
critical media”1640.
1191. On June 27, firefighters Carlos Varón and Ricardo Prieto were dismissed from their positions, in
September 2018 they were arrested for making a humorous video comparing President Nicolás Maduro with a
donkey1641. The firefighters were charged with the crimes provided for in articles 20 and 21 of the so-called "law
against hate", but these charges would have been later exchanged for crimes of offense to the President and
1633Las Noticias de Cojedes. June 26, 2019. Residentes De Apartadero Rechazan Señalamientos De Alcaldesa Flor Rivas Contra Periodista
Luisana Suárez.
1634Espacio Público. May 27, 2019. Iris Varela hostiga a la periodista SebastianaBarráez.
1635Noticias 24. August 12, 2019. Samuel Moncada:Nelson Bocaranda es un agente al servicio de Estados Unidos; Ministerio del Poder Popular
para Relaciones Exteriores. August 13, 2019. Embajador Moncada revela archivos que vinculan aNelson Bocaranda como espía de EEUU.
1636 2001. August 11, 2019. Gobernador Julio León ordena expropiar la sede de "El Diario de Yaracuy" (+Video); CNVE24. August 11, 2019. ¡No
circulaba por falta de papel! León Heredia ordenó expropiar “El Diario de Yaracuy”.
1637 I/A Court H. R. Case of Perozo et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Serie
C No. 195. Para. 151. See I/A Court H. R. Case of Ríos et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
January 28, 2009. Serie C No.194. Para. 139.
1638 Infobae. July 17, 2019. Liberaron a la clarinetista venezolana encarcelada por denunciar en las redes que el régimen de Maduro la despidió
por razones políticas; El Estímulo. July 16, 2019. Excarcelan a la clarinetista Karen Palacios detenida por criticar al gobierno de Maduro; El
Nacional. July 14, 2019. Karen Palacios continúa detenida a pesar de tener boleta de excarcelación.
1639IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
30. March 17, 2019. Para. 1041.
1640El Nacional. June 4, 2019. TSJ ordena a La Patilla que pague Bs 30.000 millones a Diosdado Cabello; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
June 7, 2019. Venezuela's Supreme Court orders La Patilla to pay US$5m in damages to Cabello.
1641Espacio Público. 26 de julio de 2019. Destituyen de sus cargos a los bomberos de Mérida; El Pitazo. 26 de julio de 2019. Destituyen a
bomberos acusados por video satírico sobre Nicolás Maduro.
254
public instigation to hate, established in articles 147 and 285 of the Criminal Code. On October 31, 2018, both
were released on parole underperiodic presentation every 30 days and a ban on leaving the stateof Merida1642.
1192. On July 18, agents of the Bureau for Scientific, Criminal, and Forensic Investigations[Cuerpo de
Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas] (CICPC) reportedly arrested journalist Wilmer Quintana
García for the alleged crime of "instigation to hate" provided in the Law Against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence
and Tolerance, forpublishingon hisFacebookprofile complaints about alleged acts of corruption in theprovision
of public services in the state of Guárico. A court would have ordered his arrest on July 11, after the governor of
Guárico, José Manuel Vásquez, filed a complaint against him due to the publications. Quintana was director of
the now out of circulationweekly La Verdad and host of the opinion program En Portada. OnAugust 19, the State
and Municipal Court of First Instance in Control FunctionNo. 3 would have ordered the journalist's house arrest
after he was detained for 37 days. The measure would have been granted after Quintana suffered a heart attack
while in detention for which he had to be urgently transferred to a medical center. On September 9, the Third
Criminal Control Court of San Juan de los Morros would have ordered the release of the journalist and would
have banned him from publishing complaints about alleged corruption cases in the Guárico state1643.
1193. On August 13, the Fifth Court of Military Control would have sentenced the general secretary of the
Ferrominera del Orinoco union (Sintraferrominera) and coordinator of the Intersectorial of Workers of
Guayana, Rubén González, to five years and nine months in prison for the crimes of “insult of guards”and“insult
to the National Armed Forces”. Gonzalez was arrested on November 29, 2018, when he was returning from a
protest march against measures taken by the governmentin Caracas. For months, the union leader had been
leading labor protests in Bolívar state and, days before his arrest, he had denounced the detention of nine iron
state workers while protesting their labor rights. During an assembly of workers in August 2018, in Ciudad Piar
(Bolívar state), officials of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) had tried to arrest Gonzalez, but the workers
would have prevented it. Later, the Military Prosecutor 43 would have filed charges against him for resisting
arrest.After being imprisoned for almost nine months, González was convicted and was ordered to serve his
sentence at the Penitentiary Center of the East, in Maturín, known as "La Pica". In 2009 González had already
been imprisoned for protests and in 2011 he was sentenced to nine years in jail by a court in Bolívar. However,
the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) overturned the sentence against him and ordered his release. Trade union,
social and human rights organizations in Venezuela demanded the release of Gonzalez and denounced that his
conviction criminalizes social protest and seeks to silence dissenting voices. They also questioned the use of
Military Justice to judge civilians. Gonzalez's organizations and relatives reported that he has received cruel and
inhuman treatment during his detention1644.
1194. The tweeter Pedro Patricio Jaimes continues to be detained after more than a year and a half without
having been put on trial and without having a conviction1645. Jaimes was arrested by officials of the Bolivarian
National Intelligence Service (Sebin) on May 10, 2018 after he published on the Twitter account @AereoMeteo
information about the route of thepresidentialplane that transferredNicolás Maduro to the Aragua state. Jaimes
Criollo would have been accused of endangering the security of the nation and has since been under pre-trial
detention1646. According to the information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur, several
irregularities were reported in the case. The preliminary hearing would have been postponed seven times and
the trial hearing was suspendedthree times; In addition, the detainee has reported being in inhuman detention
conditions, which would have caused severe health problems. On October 4 of that year, the Inter-American
Commission granted precautionary measures for Jaimes1647. In September, the Office of the Special Rapporteur
expressed concern about the prolonged stay in prison of the communicator and about the application of norms
that arbitrarily criminalize the exercise of freedom of expression1648.
1642Clarín. September 17, 2018. Detienen a dos bomberos en Venezuela por comparar a Maduro con un burro; Twitter account of Espacio
Público (@espaciopublico). September 14, 2018; El País. September 19, 2018. Hasta 20 años de prisión por burlarse de Maduro en las redes
sociales.
1643 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). August 12, 2019. Venezuelan authorities detain Wilmer Quintana for Facebook posts under antihate law; El Nacional. July 18, 2019. Cicpc detuvo al periodista Wilmer Quintana por «incitación al odio»; Twitter account of Espacio Público
(@espaciopublico). July 18, 2019; Qué pasa en Venezuela. September 12, 2019. AUDIENCIA/ Esto fue lo que se decidió hacer con Wilmer
Quintana.
1644Efecto Cocuyo. August 13, 2019. Tribunal militar condena a casi 6 años de prisión a sindicalista Rubén González; Alberto News. No
date. Provea: “Rubén González ha sido perseguido durante 10 años por defender a los trabajadores”; Infobae. August 15, 2019. Los
venezolanos exigen la liberación de Rubén González, sindicalista condenado por la justicia militar tras reclamar mejoras salariales; El Pitazo.
August 13, 2019. Tribunal militar condena a sindicalista Rubén González a cinco años de cárcel; Civils Derechos Humanos. August 14,
2019. 100 organizaciones sindicales y sociales: Sentencia al sindicalista Rubén González por tribunal militar reitera ausencia de democracia y
política estatal para criminalizar la protesta pacífica.
1645CNVE24. May 10, 2019. ¡A un año de su detención! Madre de Pedro Jaimes: “Que alguien me explique si hizo algo grave… yo sé que no”
(+Video); Crónica Uno. May 13, 2019. Pedro Jaimes cumplió un año de detención arbitraria por tuitear información pública; Espacio Público.
October 10, 2019. Un aficionado a la aviación recluido en el Sebin.
1646IACHR. Annual Report 2018. Report of the Office of The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.
30. March 17, 2019. Para. 1.044.
1647IACHR. RESOLUCIÓN 78/2018. Medida cautelar No. 688-18. Pedro Patricio Jaimes Criollo respecto de Venezuela. October 4, 2018.
1648IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. September 18, 2019. Press Release R232/19 Office of the Special Rapporteur
condemns that communicators Pedro Jaimes and Jesús Medina have served one year in prison in Venezuela without being convicted.
255
1195. La CIDH ha sostenido que “[e]l tipo de debate político a que da lugar el derecho a la libertad de expresión
generará inevitablemente ciertos discursos críticos o incluso ofensivos para quienes ocupan cargos públicos o
están íntimamente vinculados a la formulación de la política pública”1649. Por lo tanto, como se afirma en el
principio 10 de la Declaración de Principios, “[l]a protección a la reputación debe estar garantizada sólo a través
de sanciones civiles, en los casos en que la persona ofendida sea un funcionario público”. Es decir, el uso de
mecanismos penales para castigar el discurso en asuntos de interés público, y en especial relacionado con
funcionariospúblicos opolíticos, no responde a una necesidad social apremiante que lo justifique, es innecesario
y desproporcionado y puede ser un medio de censura indirecta dado su efecto desalentador sobre el debate
relativo a asuntos de interéspúblico.
1196. El principio 11 de la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión de la CIDH establece que:
“[l]os funcionariospúblicos están sujetos a un mayor escrutiniopor parte de la sociedad. Las leyes que penalizan
la expresión ofensiva dirigida a funcionarios públicos generalmente conocidas como ‘leyes de desacato’ atentan
contra la libertad de expresión y el derecho a la información”. Además, la CIDH ha sostenido repetidamente que
la aplicación del derecho penal para sancionar expresiones referidas a funcionarios públicos es
desproporcionada cuando se trata de un discurso protegido, como la información o expresión sobre asuntos de
interés público, y viola el derecho a la libertad de expresión1650.
F. Prior censorship
1197. The Bolivarian National Police (PNB) would have arrested four people who acted and producedthe
theatrical comedy Two policemen in distress [Dos policías en apuros] for the alleged crime of“usurpation ofpublic
function”, because they usedpolice uniforms as clothing and sought to “ridicule and misrepresentthe true police
functions,”according to what the PNB published on its Twitter account. They were released a day later and were
instructed not to use again police uniforms1651.
G. Direct or indirect censorship
1198. According to the information received by the Office of the Special Rapporteur,throughout 2019 the
National Telecommunications Commission (Conatel) continuedordering, in an irregular manner, the closure of
stations, along with searches and confiscation of transmission equipment and the removal from air of certain
informativeprograms and of opinion.
1199. For example, in April Conatel would have ordered the closure of the Ambiente96.1 FM radio station in
the Guárico state, after officials of the entity inspected its facilities and confiscated its transmitting equipment,
computers, and processors. Officials would have argued that the company's articles of incorporation had
irregularities. From the station they assured that they have been carrying out procedures before the Conatel for
seven years to correct the documents and had not obtained an answer1652. Also, that month Conatel would have
ordered the closure of the Radio Criolla 92.9 FM station, located in the Elorza Municipality, because it did not
have the necessary permits to operate. The owner of the station, José Galindo, would have assured to have the
documentation in order and that the closure is due to political reasons for the critical coverage of the municipal
mayor's management1653.In May, Conatel would have ordered the closure of the LaMega Hertz 96.5 station,
located in the Biruaca Municipality, Apure state, and confiscated its equipment. The radio producer denounced
that Conatel carried out a permanent control of the contents that were broadcasted1654. In June, Conatel would
have ordered the closure of the Radio Plus station in Maturín, Monagas state, after inspecting its facilities and
confiscating transmitters, computers, and radio cabin equipment. The measure would affect the transmissions
of the 94.9 FM radio, the TvPlus channel, and the cable TV service provider Planet Cable. The TvPlus channel
reporter and Globovisión correspondent, Jhonny Ulloa, would have been forced to leave the headquarters while
the inspection was being carried out, presumably for reporting about the inspectionon his WhatsApp status1655.
In July, Conatel would have ordered that the program “Diálogo en la voz de los pensionados y jubilados” be taken
off the air, which was broadcasted on the TV Rio channel, in the Heres municipality, Bolívar state, presumably
1649 IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato" Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. Doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
1650 IACHR. Annual Report 2015. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter V (Conclusions
and Recommendations). OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 48. December 31, 20152015.
1651 Twitter account of Policía Nacional (@CPNB_VE). August 5, 2019; Espacio Público. August 6, 2019. Excarcelan a actores detenidos por
usar uniformes de la PNB.
1652 El Pitazo. April 17, 2019. Conatel silenció a la emisora Ambiente 96.1 FM en Guárico; Noticiero Digital. April 17, 2019. Conatel ordena el
cierre de Ambiente 96.1 FM en Guárico..
1653 Espacio Público. April 25, 2019. Atacan las rejas de seguridad de Radio Criolla 92.9 FM; Espacio Público. May 8, 2019. En dos días, Conatel
cierra dos emisoras en Apure; El Doral News. No date. Conatel ordena el cierre de Radio Criolla 92.9 FM en Apure.
1654 Espacio Público. May 8, 2019. En dos días, Conatel cierra dos emisoras en Apure; El Pitazo. May 6, 2019. Conatel cierra emisora La Mega
Hertz 96.5 FM de Apure.
1655 El Pitazo. June 8, 2019. ¡OTRA MÁS! CONATEL CIERRA RADIO PLUS 94.9 FMEN MONAGAS; El Pitazo. June 7, 2019. Conatel cierra y confisca
23 equipos de TvPlus radio en Maturín; Espacio Público. June 7, 2019. Conatel saca del aire a Radio Plus 94.9 FM enMonagas.
256
due to the use of the words “regime” and "shortage" during an interview with former constitutionalist Diógenes
Jiménez on July 81656.In August, Conatel would have closed and confiscated the equipment of the Z 89.1 FM
station located in Valera, Trujillo state, for allegedly not having a license1657; Conatel would have confiscated the
equipment of theSúper Estación 107.3 FM station, in San Felipe state Yaracuy, because it would be operating
with the expired concession1658; also, the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) would have confiscated the
transmission equipment from the RBI 90.9 FM radio station in Ureña1659. The “Bajo la Lupa” opinion program
would have been removed from the Unicable TV programming allegedly due to pressure from Conatel1660. On
October 1, Conatel officials would have confiscated the transmission equipment of the Médano Radio 95.5 FM
station, presumably for not having a concession to operate1661.
1200. The deputy for the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Psuv) to the Legislative Council of the Táchira
state, Nellyver Lugo, would have requested the Permanent Commission of Politics, Justice, Citizen Security,
Human Rights, and Border, the National Telecommunications Commission (Conatel), and to the Public Ministry
(MP) to initiate an investigation against the digital media Táchira Noticias, Táchira Norte, Reporte.V, Noticias
Tachirenses, Crónica Policial, Fogón Informativo, and El Pitazo, for the alleged dissemination of violent videos
and images, after said media outlets reported anevent inwhich a 16-year-old lost his sight because of the actions
by state security forces1662.
1201. The programDossier, broadcasted by the state television channelVenezolana de Televisión (VTV), would
not have aired twice, in August and September, allegedly by order of government authorities, as reported by its
host, Walter Martinez1663.
1202. El Principio 5 de la Declaración de Principios señala que “la censura previa, interferencia o presión
directa o indirecta sobre cualquier expresión, opinión o información difundida a través de cualquier medio de
comunicación oral, escrito, artístico, visual o electrónico, debe estar prohibida por la ley. Las restricciones en la
circulación libre de ideas y opiniones, como así también la imposición arbitraria de información y la creación de
obstáculos al libre flujo informativo, violan el derecho a la libertad deexpresión”.
1203. El Principio 13 de la Declaración de Principios señala que “la utilización del poder del Estado y los
recursos de la hacienda pública; la concesión de prebendas arancelarias; la asignación arbitraria y
discriminatoria de publicidad oficial y créditos oficiales; el otorgamiento de frecuencias de radio y televisión,
entre otros, con el objetivo de presionar y castigar o premiar y privilegiar a los comunicadores sociales y a los
medios de comunicación en función de sus líneas informativas, atenta contra la libertad de expresión y deben
estar expresamente prohibidos por la ley. Los medios de comunicación social tienen derecho a realizar su labor
en forma independiente. Presiones directas o indirectas dirigidas a silenciar la labor informativa de los
comunicadores sociales son incompatibles con la libertad de expresión”.
H. Access to public information
1204. Officials of the National Assembly would have repeatedly blocked the entry of journalists to cover
legislative sessions. In instances where reporters would have managed to enter the Federal Legislative Palace,
with the help of opposition legislators, they would have suffered aggressions and tussles1664.
1205. At least four times during the month of May and three times during June, officials of the Bolivarian
National Guard (GNB) would have denied media access to the National Assembly to cover regular sessions. The
blockade would have begun on May 7, after the president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, made a call to
favor a popular uprising against President Nicolás Maduro. The National Assembly is the last government body
controlled by the Venezuelan opposition. Every Tuesday, the day the Assembly has its instance of legislative
debate, the troops, who would act under the orders of Major General Leonardo César Malaguera Hernández,
would surround the facilities of the entity and prohibit journalists from entering the building, while insulting
1656El Nacional. July 12, 2019. Conatel suspendió programa luego de que un invitado dijo régimen y escasez; Espacio Público. July 11, 2019.
Conatel saca del aire un programa de TV por mencionar las palabras “régimen” y “escasez”.
1657Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). August 7, 2019; IPYS Venezuela.
August 12, 2019. Balance semanal.
1658 Espacio Público. August 12, 2019. Conatel incautó los equipos de Súper Estación 107.3FM en Yaracuy; El pitazo. August 15, 2019. Conatel
cierra otra emisora en el estado Yaracuy.
1659 Twitter account of journalist Williams Amaya (@williamsAmaya). August 14, 2019; IPYS Venezuela. August 27, 2019. Balance semanal;
Espacio Público. August 15, 2019. Militares cargaron con los equipos de RBI 90.9 FM en Ureña.
1660Twitter account of Bajo La Lupa (@BajoLaLupaFM). August 28, 2019; Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa
de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). August 27, 2019.
1661 Espacio Público. October 3, 2019. Conatel saca del aire a Radio Médano 95.5 FM.
1662 2001. July 9, 2019. Constituyentistas piden investigar a medios digitales tachirenses por supuesto contenido amarillista; Noticiero Digital.
July 9, 2019. Piden investigar a medios tachirenses por contenido amarillista; Espacio Público. July 10, 2019. Diputada del CLET ordena
investigación contra varios medios en Táchira.
1663 El Pitazo. August 16, 2019. Periodista Walter Martínez denuncia censura impuesta por Jorge Rodríguez a programa de VTV; Espacio
Público. August 16, 2019. Walter Martínez es censurado por Jorge Rodríguez en VTV; Espacio Público. October 4, 2019. Walter Martínez es
censurado por Gustavo Cedeño.
1664 Four press workers were reportedly assaulted phisically while covering the National Assembly during September. IPYS. October 7, 2019.
Balance Semanal IPYSve | Agresiones y hechos intimidatorios fueron el patrón de la censura en septiembre
257
and harassing the journalists1665. On June 4, after four weeks without being able to access the Federal Legislative
Palace, press workers would have entered, with the support of opposition representatives who confronted the
GNB1666.
1206. Elprincipio 4 de la Declaración de Principios sobre Libertad de Expresión de la CIDH establece que “[e]l
acceso a la información en poder del Estado es un derecho fundamental de los individuos. Los Estados están
obligados a garantizar el ejercicio de este derecho. Este principio sólo admite limitaciones excepcionales que
deben estar establecidaspreviamente por la leypara el caso que exista un peligro real e inminente que amenace
la seguridad nacional en sociedades democráticas”. Teniendo en cuenta el principio de máxima divulgación, la
ley debe garantizar el acceso efectivo y más amplio posible a la información pública, y las excepciones no deben
convertirse en la regla general en la práctica. Además, el régimen de excepciones debe interpretarse
restrictivamente y toda duda deberá resolverse por la transparencia y el acceso.
I .Internet and freedom of expression
1207. During 2019, obstacles to free communication through the Internet were deepened in Venezuela. Cyberattacks, blockages to websites, social networks, or streaming services ordered by state authorities and executed
by public and private telecommunications companies, and recurring connectivity failures due to damage to
telecommunications infrastructure have limited the possibility of Venezuelans to transmit and receive relevant
information on matters of high political and social interest. On the other hand, the digital rights of citizens and,
in particular, of journalists at the time of carrying out their work, were affected due topower cuts that happened
on several occasions in different regions of the country1667.
1208. According to a monitoring carried out by the Press and Society Institute Venezuela [Instituto Prensa y
Sociedad Venezuela] (IPYS), there were 140 cases of violations of citizens' digital rights between January and
Augustin Venezuela1668. In those eight months, blockades (37), Internet access restrictions (69), attacks (30),
expression restrictions (3), and regulatory restrictions (1) were recurrent. The organization also found that
between January and July, 881 blockades occurred on digital platforms. The main affected were the information
portals and the greatest number of blockages occurred from the connections of CANTV, Movistar, Digitel, Inter,
and Movilnet. These providers of Internet services, private and state-owned, “applied the same censorship
practice when exercising intermittent, temporary, and other continuous blockages,” said IPYS, based on data
from its Digital Rights monitoring system, in cases reported by the Netblocks Internet observatory and through
the OONI Explorer tool. According to the evidence collected by the organization, atleast 48 webpages of national
and foreign media, whose contents have a high impact in the country, were arbitrarily censored 434 times in
Venezuela, in the first seven months of 2019. The most pages Restricted were those of the media NTN24,
VIVOplay, El Pitazo, VPItv, El Nacional, Aporrea, andNoticia al día1669.
1209. In that regard, the Office of the Special Rapporteur received information on several episodes of
blockades and attacks on news websites. Thus, for example, the information portal Runrun.es would have
suffered a cyber-attack on May 25 that kept access to the page blocked. The attack was carried out after the
portal published a research paper on the performance of the Special Actions Forces of the Bolivarian National
Police in Caracas1670. On June 19, the news portals El Pitazo and Efecto Cocuyo would have been blocked by
operators CANTV, Movilnet, and Digitel, following an order from the National Telecommunications Commission
(Conatel). El Pitazo would also have been blocked by Movistar on June 171671 and would have suffered a cyberattack on September 291672. On June 26, the CANTV company would have blocked access to the website
www.vamosbien.com, linked to thepresident of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó1673. In August, the Instagram
1665 Infobae. May 7, 2019. Colectivos chavistas amenazaron a los diputados y la Guardia Nacional bloqueó el acceso de la prensa al Parlamento;
El Estímulo. May 7, 2019. GNB impide ingreso a periodistas a la sesión de la Asamblea Nacional; Efecto Cocuyo. May 28, 2019. Sntp rechaza
prohibición de acceso de la prensa a la AN por quinta vez en un mes; AFP. May 7, 2019. Media denied access to the Venezuelan National
Assembly; Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). May 21, 2019; Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ). June 26, 2019. Soldiers block press access to Venezuelan parliament; Espacio Público. May 21, 2019. GNB impide
nuevamente el acceso de los periodistas a la AN; Espacio Público. May 15, 2019. GNB bloquea el acceso de los periodistas a la Asamblea Nacional.
1666 Twitter account of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Prensa de Venezuela (@sntpvenezuela). June 4, 2019; Efecto Cocuyo. June 4,
2019. Entre forcejeos trabajadores de la prensa entran al Parlamento con apoyo de los diputados; El Nacional. June 10, 2019. Diputados
apoyarán la entrada de la prensa a la AsambleaNacional.
1667 IPYS. September 13, 2019. Balance semanal.
1668 IPYS. October 7, 2019. Conectividad en riesgo: 140 violaciones a los derechos digitales en lo que va de 2019; IPYS. August 23, 2019. Balance
Especial IPYSve | 881: la lista de la censura digital en Venezuela.
1669 IPYS. October 7, 2019. Conectividad en riesgo: 140 violaciones a los derechos digitales en lo que va de 2019; IPYS. August 23, 2019. Balance
Especial IPYSve | 881: la lista de la censura digital en Venezuela
1670 Espacio Público. May 29, 2019. Runrunes sufre un nuevo ataque informático; Tal Cual. May 27, 2019. Runrunes es víctima de ataques
cibernéticos tras reportaje sobre las FAES.
1671 El Estímulo. June 19, 2019. El Pitazo y Efecto Cocuyo sufren bloqueo por parte de Conatel; Infobae. June 21, 2019. Denuncian a Movistar
Venezuela por bloquear medios independientes en internet por instrucciones del régimen de Maduro; El Pitazo. June 21, 2019. Periodistas de El
Pitazo protestaron contra bloqueo de su dominio ordenado por Conatel.
1672 Espacio Público. October 4, 2019. Portal web El Pitazo sufrió nuevo ataque.
1673 Venezuela Al Día. June 26, 2019. Cantv bloquea el sitio VamosBien.com de Guaidó en su primer día de funcionamiento.
258
account of the newspaper La Verdad de Vargas was blocked by the social network twice, under the argument of
breach of conditions1674. In September, the portal of the Centro de Noticias Venezuela 24would have registered
more than 12,000 cyber-attacks on its web platform in 72 hours, which mainly affected the display of political
news reports1675.
1210. The journalistic coverage of the National Assembly sessions would also have been obstructed by the
selective blocking of web search and video streaming services by the state-owned telecommunications company
CANTV. The organizationEspacio Público recorded 11 cases of blockades to online platforms (mainly YouTube
and Periscope) during May. The blockades would occur, in addition to during the sessions of the legislature1676,
at times of coverage of conflicting situations or during speeches by the opposition leader to the government Juan
Guaidó1677.
1211. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that all limitations on freedom of expression, including those
that affect expression on the Internet, must be established by law in a clear and precise manner, must be
proportionate to the legitimate purposes pursued, and must be based on a judicial decision resulting from a
contradictory process. In this regard, Internet legislation should not include broad and vague definitions, or
disproportionately affect legitimate websites and services. States should keep in mind that while freedom of
expression can be restricted to achieve legitimate objectives, such as crime prevention or the protection of the
rights of others, such limitations must be drafted clearly and precisely and affect the minor possible degree the
right to freedom of expression. Any measure that affects the expressions that circulate on the Internet, should
be conceived with the specific purpose of preserving the unique capacity of this medium to promote freedom of
expression through the free exchange of information and ideas instantly and at low cost, regardless of
borders1678.
J. Other relevant situations
1212. On January 9, Migration officials at Simón Bolívar de Maiquetía Airport would have prevented entrance
to the country to Danish reporter Kristoffer Toft, who is collaborating with the Caracas Chronicles1679. Also, on
October 7, the Administrative Service of Identification, Migration, and Foreigners [Servicio Administrativo de
Identificación, Migración y Extranjería](Saime) would have denied entry to the country to British journalist John
Carlin, author of the book The Human Factor [El Factor Humano]on the process of social reconciliation in South
Africa led byNelson Mandela, who would attend the conference Mandela and the road to peace, possible horizons
for Venezuela[Mandela y el camino a la paz, horizontes posibles para Venezuela], organized by the Institute for
Integral Transitions [Instituto para las Transiciones Integrales](IFIT)1680.
1213. Civil society organizations denounced that the state media Telesur would have made a coverage with
“disinformation features by omitting information sources and contrasts” on the blackouts that occurred in
March in Venezuela. As reported by IPYS Venezuela, the channel “limited itself to citing official spokespersons,
used in an selfish and incomplete way the documentary sources, and omitted any analysis, opinion, report, or
background that supported the criticism for lack of maintenance, conclusion of works, or failures caused due to
the inability of Corpoelec staff”1681.
1214. Journalist Rubén Marcano would have received a citation by the Bureau for Scientific, Criminal, and
Forensic Investigations (Cicpc) of the Computer Crimes Division for the alleged dissemination of prohibited
material on his website www.superdato.com.ve, which disseminates equestrian content1682.
1674 Twitter account of La Verdad de Vargas (@LaVerdadVargas). August 21, 2019; IPYS. August 27, 2019. Balance semanal.
1675 Twitter account of Centro de Noticias Venezuela 24 (@cnve24). September 16, 2019; IPYS. October 7, 2019. Conectividad en riesgo: 140
violaciones a los derechos digitales en lo que va de 2019.
1676For example, according to monitoring carried out by Netblocks organization, on August 20, during an extraordinary session of the
National Assembly, the state Internet provider CANTV reportedly blocked search and streaming services preventing access to the broadcast
of the legislative meeting. Twitter account of NetBlocks.org (@netblocks). August 20, 2019; Espacio Público. August 21, 2019. CANTV bloquea
servicios de Google durante la sesión de la AN.
1677 Espacio Público. May 29, 2019. CANTV sigue bloqueando Youtube durante lassesiones de la AN; Espacio Público. Bloquean Youtube durante
sesión de la Asamblea Nacional; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). June 26, 2019. Soldiers block press access to Venezuelan parliament.
1678 IACHR. Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression. UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression and the IACHROAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. Joint Declaration. January 20, 2012..
1679 Twitter account of KristofferToft (@toft_kristoffer). January 9, 2019; Twitter account of Instituto Prensa y
Sociedad (@ipysvenezuela). January 9, 2019.
1680 Espacio Público. Gobierno impide la entrada a Venezuela al periodista inglés John Carlin; IPYS. October 11, 2019. John Carlin: mi objetivo
al viajar a Venezuela siempre fue buena voluntad.
1681 Instituto Prensa y Sociedad (IPYS). June 21, 2019. Reporte Especial IPYSve | Apagones y desinformación en Telesur.
1682Espacio Público. June 17, 2019. Funcionarios de seguridad amenazan con encarcelar a periodista.
259
CHAPTER III: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. As on previous occasions, the Office of the Special Rapporteur closes its Annual Report with a chapter
of conclusions and recommendations. The objective of this practice is to begin a fluid dialogue with Member
States that will enable the Americas to emerge as an example in the area of respect, protection, and promotion
of the right to freedom of expression.
A. Violence against Journalists and the Media
2. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes with extreme concern e the indicators of violence against
journalists for reasons related to the work they perform, which remain the same. At least 27 journalists and
press workers were killed in the Americas in 2019 for reasons allegedly related to the exercise of journalism.
There were murders of journalists in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Mexico. These
crimes demonstrate the persistence of patterns of violence in several States of the region, while in others,
journalists face greater vulnerabilities amid increasinglypolarized contexts that have seriously deteriorated the
environment in which journalists can perform their jobs.
3. Once again, the Office of the Special Rapporteur expresses its deep concern about the risk that
journalists must face due to the work they perform. Faced with this situation, this Office has warned on other
occasions that many journalists choose to stop investigating and disseminating information of high public
interest to their local communities to avoid a reprisal against their life or their physicalintegrity, or that of their
family members.
4. Is a matter ofparticular concern the increase in stigmatization and discredit against journalists by highlevel authorities. Despite repeated recommendations by the IACHR, authorities persist in the use of speeches
that seek to disqualify and undermine the journalistic work of journalists, community communicators, media,
human rights defenders, and civil society organizations for reasons related to the exercise of the right to freedom
of expression. This practice has been constant in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, but this Office is also
concerned that it has become a systematic practice in the United States, Brazil, and El Salvador following the
constant statements against the press and against women journalists based on their gender that seek to
undermine their fundamental role of informing and transmitting opinions.
5. Likewise, this Office notes with alarm the increase in acts of violence, aggression, threat, intimidation,
and various types of harassment towards journalists, but also towards community communicators and popular
communicators who exercise their right to freedom of expression in contexts of fights for the defense of human
rights in their communities.
6. The general situation of insecurity and lack of guarantees on the part of the State for the work of
journalists, reporters, documentary filmmakers, and members of the press in coverage of social protests and
citizen demonstrations is of special attention for this Office. In the context of a regional situation of social
protests, this Office has registered that dozens of journalistswere subjected tophysical attacks and faced various
types of impediments, whether by the actions of the Police, parastatal groups, or protesters; likewise their
equipment and work items were also damaged, suffering confiscation, destruction, ortheft.
7. This Office urges state authorities to contribute decisively to the construction of a climate of tolerance
and respect in which allpeople can express their thoughts and opinions without fear of being attacked,punished,
or stigmatized for it.
8. With regard to this point, as in previous years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends
Member States to:
A. Adopt adequate preventive mechanisms in order to avert violence against media workers,
including the public condemnation of all acts of aggression, omitting any statement that may increase
the risk for journalists; the respect for journalists’ right to keeptheir sources of information; the training
of public officials, particularly police and security forces, and, if necessary, the adoption of operation
manuals or guidelines on the respect for the right of freedom of expression, determining appropriate
sanctions proportionate to the damage done; as well as the development of accurate statistics on
violence against journalists.
B. Adopt the measures necessary to guarantee the security of those who are at special risk by
virtue of exercising their right to freedom of expression, whether the threats come from state agents or
private individuals. Measures or protection programs must be suitable and sufficient for its purpose,in
accordance with the views expressed in this report.
C. Carry out serious, impartial, and effective investigations into the murders, attacks, threats, and
acts of intimidation committed against journalists and media workers, in accordance with this report.
This entails the creation of specialized units and special investigative protocols, as well as the
identification and exhaustion of allpossible case theories related to the professional work of the victim.
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D. Bring to trial, before impartial and independent tribunals, allthose responsible for the murders,
attacks, threats, and acts of intimidation based on the exercise of freedom of expression, remove legal
obstacles to the investigation and punishment of these crimes, and provide the victims and their family
members ample participation during the investigation and prosecution, as well as adequate
compensation, and eliminate gender barriers that obstruct access to justice.
E. Adopt the necessary measures so that media workers in situations of risk who have been
displaced or exiled can return to their homes in conditions of safety. If these persons cannot return, the
States must adopt measures so that they can stay in their chosen place in conditions of dignity, with
security measures, and with the necessary economic support to maintain their work and their family
lives.
F. Adopt specific, adequate and effective measures to prevent attacks and other forms of violence
perpetrated against women journalists, andprosecute and punish those responsible. States must adopt
effective measures to encourage reporting of cases of violence against women journalists and combat
the impunity that characterizes those crimes.
G. Encourage democratic debate throughpublic declarations,practices, andpolicies that promote
tolerance and respect of allindividuals, under equal conditions, whatever their thoughts or ideas.
H. Exhort the authorities to refrain from making public statements or using state media outlets to
carry out public campaigns that can encourage violence against individuals because of their opinions.
In particular, avoid statements that could stigmatize journalists, media outlets, and human rights
defenders.
B. Social Protest
9. 2019 was a year marked by numerous social protests and citizen demonstrations in different countries
of the region. The Office of the Special Rapporteur notes with grave concern a high number of deaths, hundreds
of wounded and detained, in addition to cruel and degrading treatment that has left repression through
excessive use of force by police and military bodies in different protests and demonstrations public events in
the region, in a framework where dialogue is not privileged as a solution. In specific alarm the situation
experienced in Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Brazil, Panama, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. Also, Cuba
and Nicaragua where repression persists that even prevents the development of protest and public
demonstrations by declaring them illegal or criminalizing them before they takeplace.
10. The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur followed with extreme concern the situation of
Ecuador (October 5 to 16) and Chile (October 18 to 27), where fundamental freedoms were abolished as a result
of the use of the exception regimes. This Office has condemned the excessive use of force by joint tasks of Police
and the military who would have used ballistic and non-ballistic projectiles and chemical agents to disperse
mass demonstrations in both countries where reports of killings, torture, and mutilations against several
protesters were reported.
11. This Office again expresses the recommendation to adopt regulatory frameworks aimed at protecting
and facilitating the exercise of social protest. The Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that States should not
fail to take into account that when faced with institutional frameworks that do not favor participation, or in the
face of serious barriers to access to more traditional forms of mass communication, public protest can become
the only means that really allows discontented sectors of the population, but not aligned with political parties,
and discriminated or marginalized groups in the public debate to make their point of view heard and influence
public debate.
12. In relation to this point, as in previous years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends Member
States to:
A. Guarantee the legitimate exercise of social protest and prevent the application of
disproportionate restrictions that can be used to inhibit or suppress critical or dissident expressions.
In order to be consistent with international obligations on human rights, any national regulation
affecting the right to social protest must meet requirements of legality, necessity andproportionality.
B. Initiate the necessary legislative reforms to eliminate from the legal system requirements for
the previous authorization or permission to carry out demonstrations and protests in public spaces,
and expressly establish the general presumption in favor of the exercise of this right.
C. Ensure protection of individuals and refrain from stigmatizing or stereotyping protesters and
their demands, avoiding generalizations based on the behavior of particular groups or isolated events.
If security forces must act in a demonstration, they shall use the safest and least harmful measures to
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individual rights. The response of security forces should aim to protect and facilitate rights, not to
repress them. The general principles on the use of force, applied to the context of protests and
demonstrations, require that security operations be carefully and thoroughlyplanned bypersons with
specific experience and training for this type of situation.
D. In the context of positive obligations to guarantee the right andprotect the person exercising it
as well as third parties, States should establish specific rules and action protocols for security forces
acting in situations of social protest and public demonstrations. These guidelines should aim for police
agents to act in the knowledge that their obligation is to protect the participants in a public meeting,
demonstration or concentration, to the extent that it is the exercise of a humanright.
E. Guarantee that firearms are excluded from the devices used to control social protests. The ban
on carrying firearms and lead ammunition by officials who may come into contact with protesters has
been proven as the best measure of preventing lethal violence and deaths occurring in a context of
social protests. Operations may provide for the availability of firearms and lead ammunition
somewhere outside the range of the demonstration for those exceptional cases in which a violent
situation warranting such use occurs. In this extreme scenario, there shall be explicit rules regarding
who has the power to authorize their use and the ways in which this authorization is to be properly
documented.
C. Criminalization of expression and proportionality of subsequent liabilities
13. Despite the progress in terms of regulatory reforms to align inter-American standards with crimes that
seek to protect the honor and reputation of public officials, the Office of the Special Rapporteur expresses its
concern that in some countries of the region criminal offences that open the way for the criminalization of the
right to freedom of expression are still being used. Among the countries with a high prevalence are Peru, where
the journalist Paola Ugaz has at least five legal proceedings against her for aggravated defamation, due to her
investigations into Sodalicio, a Catholic organization that has been investigating since 2010. In the same vein is
Panama, where between March and July of this year the fourth sub-regional Prosecutor opened nine complaints
for the alleged commission of crimes against honor in its slander and insults modality presented by former
President Ricardo Martinelli against around 40 communicators, executives, and owners of the Corporation La
Prensa (Coprensa), of the newspaper La Estrella and Radio Panama, among others. In Brazil, Venezuela, and the
Dominican Republic, journalists were also subject to lawsuits, while in Mexico journalist Sergio Aguayo would
have been sentenced to pay half a million dollars for alleged moral damage to former PRI president Humbeto
Moreira.
14. Similarly, is of concern the persistence in the use of regulations contrary to inter-American standards
in Caribbean countries such as Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vicente, St. Lucia, and
Trinidad and Tobago
15. Finally, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observeswith concern the tendency to use criminal offences
such as “sedition”, “terrorism”, and “incitement to violence” in Bolivia, where it would seek to criminalize
protesters and activists, as well as social movements historically recognized by their disruptive methods of
social protest (road blockage and hunger strike) as evidenced by the cases registered with the group of coca
growers of the Chapare in Cochabamba and members of the Federation of Neighborhood Boards and CSTUCB in
La Paz.
16. In relation to this point, as in previous years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends Member
States to:
A. Promote the repeal of contempt (desacato) laws, whatever their form, given that these norms
are contrary to the American Convention and restrict public debate, an essential element of the practice
of democracy.
B. Promote the repeal of laws on criminal defamation, and in particular abstain from using
criminal proceedings to protect honor and reputation when information is disseminated about issues
of public interest, about public officials, or about candidates for public office. Protecting the privacy or
the honor and reputation of public officials or persons who have voluntarily become involved in issues
of public interest, should be guaranteed only through civil law.
C. Promote the inclusion of inter-American standards in civil legislation so that civil proceedings
against individuals who have made statements about public officials or about matters of public interest
apply the standard of actual malice, in accordance withprinciple 10 of the Declaration of Principles, and
are proportionate and reasonable.
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D. Promote the modification of ambiguous or imprecise criminal laws that disproportionally limit
the right to freedom of expression, such as those aimed at protecting the honor of ideas or institutions,
with the aim of eliminating the use of criminal proceedings to inhibit free democratic debate about all
issues of public interest.
D. Direct and indirect censorship
17. The Office of the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that,in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, the pattern of
articulated attack from the State towards journalists, media, and opposition activists is ongoing. In these States,
different forms of censorship of national and foreign media are verified, arbitrary arrests of journalists and
human rights defenders, as well as different forms of blockades of websites. Likewise, the Office of the Special
Rapporteur confirmed the stigmatization of the independent press.
18. The Office of the Special Rapporteur is concerned that some countries continue to resort to direct
censorship through the closure of the media or interference in the broadcasts of subscription channels. It has
been observed that Telecommunications regulators eliminated, or interrupted cable channels perceived as
critical in different countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, respectively. Member States must take
into account that Article 13 of the American Convention explicitly states that the exercise of freedom of
expression cannot be subject to prior censorship.
19. This Office has received complaints that some governments maintain the practice of allocating
government advertising expenses with the aim of punishing or rewarding the media based on their information
lines. In Bolivia, a draft Supreme Decree called “Recovery of freedom of expression in Bolivia” was presented, its
Article 7 would seek to reassign government advertising in an ambiguousmanner.
20. For the Office of the Special Rapporteur, it is necessary for Member States to have regulatory
frameworks that establish clear, transparent, objective, and non-discriminatory criteria for determining the
distribution of government advertising.
21. In relation to this point, as in previous years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends Member
States to:
A. Eliminate any norm that enables prior censorship by any state organ, and also any prior
condition that may imply censorship of freedom of expression, such as prior requirements of
truthfulness, timeliness, or impartiality of information.
B. Abstain from using public power to punish or reward media and journalists in relation to their
editorial stance or coverage of certain information, whether through the discriminatory and arbitrary
assignment of government advertising or other indirect means aimed at impeding communication and
the circulation of ideas and opinions.
C. Regulate these matters in accordance with the current inter-American standards on freedom of
expression.
D. Adopt legislation to regulate the State's authority to control and supervise the allocation of
public goods or resources related directly or indirectly with the exercise of freedom of expression. On
this point, the task is to adjust institutional frameworks with two central objectives: first, to eliminate
the possibility that State authority is used to reward or punish media outlets according to their editorial
positions, and second, to foster pluralism and diversity in the public debate.
E. Surveillance programs, Whistleblowers, and source confidentiality
22. Increasingly, the Office of the Special Rapporteur continued to receive information on a trend in the
region of practices aimed at monitoring those who manifest through social networks and the use of different
technologies to spy on journalists, social leaders, and politicians. In some countries such as Cuba, Colombia,
Chile, Nicaragua, Venezuela the implementation of control and surveillance strategies for citizens'
communications in social networkspersists.
23. On the use of surveillance technologies, through the purchase of Pegasus software to spy on journalists
and human rights defenders in Mexico, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recalls that, in its joint report with
the United Nations on Freedom of Expression in Mexico of 2018, it recommended the State to carry out an
independent investigation of the federal government and the governments of the federal entities that,
presumably, had bought or used the spy program, it also urged that experts from academic organizations and
civil society be included in the investigation. All potential buyers and users of Pegasus (and other possible spy
products) and all sources of information that can demonstrate the use of the spyware program must also be
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analyzed and investigated, as well as provide updated information to the public, periodically, on the state of the
investigation.
24. Regarding the reservation of journalistic sources, this Office received information on cases in Argentina
and Brazil, arguing that investigative journalism would be in danger as a result of some measures carried out by
judicial authorities, which would seek to identify the sources of journalistic material that would have served as
the basis for uncovering alleged corruption plots. Likewise, there would have been violations to source
confidentiality in Canada and the United States.
25. In relation to this point, as in previous years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends Member
States to:
A. Review their legislation to establish limits on the power to oversee private communications,
their necessity and proportionality, pursuant to the public’s universal rights and the principles of
international law that have been taken up in this report.
B. Ensure that the public can have access to information on programs for surveillance of private
communications, their scope and the existing controls to guarantee that they cannot be used arbitrarily.
In any case, States must establish independent control mechanisms to ensure the transparency and
accountability of these programs.
C. Abstain from punishing journalists, members of the media or members of civil societywho have
access to and disseminate reserved information about this type of surveillance programs, considering
it to be of public interest. Confidential sources and materials associated with dissemination of reserved
information must be protected by law.
D. Establish regulations to guarantee that individuals who expose wrongdoing, serious
maladministration, a breach of human rights, humanitarian law violations or other threats to the overall
public interest, for example in terms of safety or the environment, should be protected against legal,
administrative or employment related sanction, even if they have otherwise acted in breach of a binding
rule or contract, as long as at the time of the disclosure they had reasonable grounds to believe that the
information disclosed was substantially true and exposed wrongdoing or the other threats noted above.
F. Access to public information
26. Despite progress in the incorporation of standards of the inter-American system, in some countries
there are still challenges related to overcoming the culture of secrecy and having greater access to information
held by the State, statistics, figures, and data in these and others countries of the region. The Office of the Special
Rapporteur has noted with concern the increase in violations regarding the exercise of this right.
27. This Office noted the existence of some difficulties for people to access public information, institutional
barriers, and systematic breaches to the obligations emanating from inter-American standards.
28. In relation to this point, as in previous years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends Member
States to:
A. Continue promulgating laws that permit effective access to information andcomplementary
norms that guarantee its adequate implementation, in conformity with the international standards in
this area.
B. Guarantee effectively, both de jure and de facto, the right of habeas data of all persons, this
being an essential element of freedom of expression and the democratic system.
C. Encourage the effective and efficient implementation of norms on access to information,
adequately training public employees and informing the citizenry in order to eradicate the culture of
secrecy and provide citizens the tools to effectively monitor state activities, public administration and
the prevention of corruption, all essential to the democraticprocess.
D. Strengthen the institutional structure for supervision of the implementation of laws
regarding access to public information, pursuant to the highest standards in this field, such as those
adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS, in its Resolution AG/RES. 2607 (XL-O/10), by means of
which it adopts the “Model Inter-American Law on Access toInformation.”
E. Promote the widespread dissemination of information on the human rights of women and
how to uphold them, the mechanisms of protection available to women at potential risk of suffering
violence and how to access them, the programs for free legal assistance available to women victims of
violence and discrimination, and all other mechanisms for addressing these issues.
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F. Stepupefforts to move towards the effective implementation of comprehensive systems for
compiling information on discrimination and violence against women that incorporate information from
all State organs with authority in this area, especially the judicial systems. Based on the information
collected, States should produce complete statistics on violence and discrimination against women, as
well as other kinds of quantitative and qualitative information in this respect. Those statistics should be
updated periodically and should include information that is disaggregated at least by sex, gender
identity, age, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, and situation of disability so as to
make itpossible to construct an accurate image of the specific forms in which violence and discrimination
affect the women in most vulnerable situations. The statistical information produced should be
proactivelypublished.
G. Establish systematic policies for the education and training of state officials, in particular
judicial officers, on international standards in relation to access to information and violence and
discrimination against women. In addition, train the civil society organizations in the use of the
mechanisms available to make requests of information to the state.
G. Diversity and pluralism in Radio Broadcasting
29. Throughout 2019, the Office of the Special Rapporteur noted advances and setbacks regarding the
regulatory mechanisms to guarantee access to frequencies to community broadcasting persists,it also noted the
existence of obstacles for itsproper functioning, which continues to be a problem in several countries. The Office
of the Special Rapporteur observed again that in some countries of the region there is still a problem of
concentration of public or private media.
30. Among the improvement is the awarding of definitive licenses for FM radios to stations that had
Provisional Precarious Permits (PPP) by the National Communications Authority [Ente Nacional de
Comunicaciones] (ENACOM) of Argentina. Among the setbacks, this Office has noted with concern the draft
decree “recovery of freedom of expression in Bolivia” and the situation of the Radios of the Original Peoples
(RPOs) that would contain provisions incompatible with the inter-American standards on freedom of expression
and access to public information.
31. In this regard, the Office of the Special Rapporteur continued to emphasize the need for a technical body
independent of the Government to be the competent authority in the matter of broadcasting, which enjoys
autonomy in the face of political pressures, and which is subjected to all the guarantees of due process and a
rigorous judicial control. In this line, the Office of the Special Rapporteur observed that in several countries there
is a persistence of obstacles to implement open, public, and transparent licensing processes or frequencies,
subjectto clear andpre-established rules, and to strictly necessary, fair, and equitable requirements. In addition,
the Office of the Special Rapporteur reiterates that at this moment, the countries of the region are in the process
of transitioning from analogue to digital television, while others are just starting.
32. In relation to this point, as in previous years, the Office of the Special Rapporteur recommends Member
States to:
A. Ensure the existence of transparent, public, and equitable criteria for the allocation of radio
frequencies and the new digital dividend. These criteria must take into account the concentration of
ownership or control of communications media, and assign the administration of the radio electric
spectrum to an organ independent from political and economic interests, subject to due process and
judicial oversight.
B. Promote effective policies and practices that permit access to information and the equal
participation of all sectors of society so that their needs, opinions, and interests will be contemplated in
the design and adoption of public policy decisions. Additionally, adopt legislative and other measures
that are necessary to guarantee pluralism, including laws that prevent the existence of public or private
monopolies.
C. Legislate in the area of community radio broadcasting, in a manner that will produce an
equitable division of the spectrum and the digital dividend to community radio stations and channels.
The allocation of these frequencies must take into account democratic criteria that guarantee equal
opportunities to all individuals in the access and operation of these media in conditions of equality,
without disproportionate or unreasonable restrictions, and in conformity with Principle 12 of the
Declaration of Principles and the “Joint Declaration on Diversity inBroadcasting.”
33. Ensure that respect for freedom of expression, including media diversity according to editorial position
or type ofproperty,is ensured in the digital terrestrial transition process. To that aim, States should ensure that
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decision-making processes relating to the digital terrestrial transition take place in a transparent and fully
consultative manner, allowing for all stakeholders and interests to be heard.
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ANNEXES
267
DIRECTIVE 1/19
GUIDELINES ON THE ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS PROVIDED FOR
IN THE MANDATES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEURSHIPS OF THEIACHR
September 30, 2019
I. BACKGROUND AND MANDATE
1. The Special Rapporteurships are offices created by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (hereinafter "the Commission" or "the IACHR") in accordance with Article 15 of its Rules of Procedure,
with a specific mandate related to the fulfillment of the functions of promotion and protection of human rights
of the IACHR and with respect to topics of particular interest to that end.
2. Throughout its history, the Commission has identified thepromotion andprotection of the right
to freedom of expression, and of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights as fundamental issues for
the establishment and consolidation of the democratic rule of law and for that reason it has established Special
Rapporteurships about such matters1683.
3. The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (hereinafter "Office of the
Special Rapporteur") was created by the IACHR in October 1997 during its 97th Period of Sessions, with the
purpose of "strengthening the capacity of the IACHR’s to promote and protect full observance of this important
right in the Americas, and thus help to ensure its effective exercise."1684 Since its establishment, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur has also been endorsed by the member states of the Organization of American States
(hereinafter "OAS").1685
4. The Office of the Special Rapporteur was created as "a permanent office that operates
independently and has its own budget,"1686 with the mandate to "raise public awareness of the importance of
freedom of expression throughout the hemisphere. This is being done in the conviction that this basic rightplays
a fundamental role in the development and consolidation of democracy and in the protection of all other human
rights. The other purposes of the Office are: to make specific recommendations to Member States regarding
freedom of expression so that they can better take measures to support it, to draft specific reports and studies,
and to quickly respond to any petition or communication reporting violations of freedom of expression in an
OAS Member State."1687
5. On April 3, 2014, during the 159th Period of Sessions, the IACHR announced the identification
of the necessary resources "to implement the conversion of its Unit on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to
a Special Rapporteurship. This will enable the Commission to take a broader, deeper, and more cross-cutting
approach to these fundamental challenges. In the coming months, the Commission will proceed with the
selection of the Special Rapporteur."1688 With this, the IACHR began the process of creating the Special
Rapporteurshipon Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (hereinafter "ESCER"). During its 163rd
Period of Session in Lima, Peru, the IACHR appointed the first Rapporteur of that office, in accordance with the
1683 IACHR. Strategic Plan 2017-2021.
1684 IACHR. Annual Report 1998. Chapter II. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102. Doc. 6 rev. April 16, 1999.
1685 The Commission’s initiative to create a permanent Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression found full support
among the OAS Member States. Indeed, during the Second Summit of the Americas, the hemisphere’s Heads of State and Government
recognized the fundamental role of freedom of thought and expression, and noted their satisfaction over the creation of the Special
Rapporteurship. During the Third Summit of the Americas, held in Quebec City, Canada, the Heads of State and Government ratified the
mandate of the Office of the Special Rapporteur. Likewise, the OAS General Assembly has on various occasions expressed its support for
the work of the Office of the Special Rapporteur and entrusted it with follow-up or analysis of some of the rights that comprise freedom of
expression. See, Resolution 1932 (XXXIII-O/03), Resolution 2057 (XXXIV-O/04), Resolution 2149 (XXXV-O/05), Resolution 2121 (XXXVO/05), Resolution 2237 (XXXVI-O/06), Resolution 2287 (XXXVII-O/07), Resolution 2434 (XXXVIII-O/08), Resolution 2418 (XXXVIIIO/08), Resolution 2523 (XXXIX-O/09), Resolution 2679 (XLI-O/11), Resolution 2661 (XLI-O/11), Resolution 2727 (XLII-O/12), Resolution
AG/RES 2811 (XLIII-0/13), Resolution AG/RES. 2842 (XLIV-O/14), Resolution 2885 (XLVI-O/16), and Resolution 2908 (XLVII-O/17).
1686 IACHR. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 1998. Chapter I. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102.
Doc. 6 rev. 16 April, 1999.
1687 IACHR. Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 1998. Chapter I. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102.
Doc. 6 rev. 16 April, 1999.
1688 IACHR. December 7, 2016. Press Release R 183/16. IACHR Wraps Up its 159th Session.
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procedure established in Article 15 of its Rules of Procedure.1689 The IACHR gave a special character to this
Rapporteurship, making it a permanent office, with functional independence, operational structure and budget
of its own, with the mandate to "build standards and good practices in the area of economic, social, cultural and
environmental rights for the region. The ESCER Rappourtership will promote these rights through its technical
support to the IACHR in processing petitions and cases, precautionary measures, and hearings on the topic. It
also will prepare thematic and regional reports, will conduct official and academic visits and will provide
technical assistance to the States."1690 In the 2017-2021 Strategic Plan, the ESCER Rappourtership was included
as a pillar of the program of Special Rapporteurships, as well as setting up its functioning “in relation to all the
IACHR’s mandates, functions and mechanisms."
II. ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS FORESEEN IN THE MANDATES OF THE SPECIAL
RAPPORTEURSHIPS
6. As provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR1691, the Special Rapporteurships shall
exercise their functions in coordination with the Executive Secretary, who may in turn indicate the instances or
structure of the Executive Secretariat with which the Rapporteur shall coordinate for the various topics and
activities. They will also carry out their activities in coordination with Commissioners in charge of country and
thematic Rapporteurships in developing their mandate.
7. Since the Rules of Procedureprovide thatthe activities and functionsprovided for in the Special
Rapporteurships’ mandates shall be carried out in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and the guidelines
that the Commission might adopt1692, the purpose of this Regulation is to promote coherence and institutional
coordination in carrying out functions and activities of the Special Rapporteurs, in order to strengthen and
clarify their respective frameworks for action. This guideline is based on the norms established in the Rules of
Procedure of the IACHR, as well as the guidelines contained in the IACHR Manuals, the Protocols of Action of the
Special Rapporteurships, the institutional practice established, and the Strategic Plans of the IACHR.
A. Petition and Case System
8. In coordination with the Executive Secretariat, the Special Rapporteurships will assist the
Commission in the evaluation of petitions and cases, as well as in the preparation of the corresponding
reports1693. This is one of the most important functions of the Special Rapporteurships. Proper promotion of
individual petitions, in addition to providing justice for the specific case, allows to draw attention to
paradigmatic situations, and to promote the development of inter-American standards in the areas of the
mandates of the Special Rapporteurships1694.
9. Taking into account their respective mandates and work plans, Rapporteurships should
develop the relevant criteria for the identification of cases related to freedoms and rights under their mandate.
Promoting proper momentum. The Special Rapporteurships will coordinate with the Executive Secretariat and
the Deputy Executive Secretariats on petitions and cases, all matters pertaining to the study of petitions and
cases in their different procedural stages before the Commission and, as the case may be, before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, as well as the preparation and submission of draft reports.
1689 IACHR. July 5, 2017. Press Release R 090/17. IACHR Chooses Soledad García Muñoz as Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social,
Cultural, and Environmental Rights (ESCER).
1690 IACHR. Strategic Plan 2017-2021.
1691 Article 15.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR provides that:“Special rapporteurs shall perform their duties in coordination
with the Executive Secretary, who may delegate to them the preparation of reports on petitions and cases”, and Article 15.6 provides that
“[t]he thematic and special rapporteurs shall perform their activities in coordination with the country rapporteurs”
1692 In accordance with Article 15.7 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, “[t]he activities and functions provided for in the
Rapporteurships’ mandates shall be performed in accordance with the present Rules of Procedure and the guidelines, codes of conduct and
manuals that the Commission might adopt.”
1693 Article 15.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR provides that “Special rapporteurs shall perform their duties in coordination
with the Executive Secretary, who may delegate to them the preparation of reports on petitions and cases.”
1694 In fact, in the case of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, the development of this function over the
course of its twenty years has created important jurisprudence. The Office of the Special Rapporteur has advised the IACHR in the
presentation to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of individual cases on freedom of expression, which gave rise to emblematic
rulings of this Court. The strategy of promoting petitions and cases follows both chronological and potential strategic impact criteria.
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10. The Special Rapporteurships also assist the Commision in adopting precautionary measures
regarding their mandates, in coordination with the Executive Secretariat.
B. Promotion and Academic and Visits
11. The promotion of human rights constitutes one of the most effective mechanisms for their
enforcement and defense in the Hemisphere. Special Rapporteurships carry out promotional activities, such as
education, training, or dissemination activities, on the intersection between the inter-American system for the
protection of human rights and the rights related to their respective mandates. In particular, these offices
promote the training of state actors, civil society, and other stakeholders in the region.
12. In carrying out advocacy work, the Special Rapporteurships will also coordinate joint actions
with universities and educational centers, civil society, stakeholders, such as national training entities for state
officials, as well as with national human rights institutions, or other independent bodies in charge of the
promotion and defense of human rights related to the mandates of the SpecialRapporteurships.
13. The academic visits will also allow the Rapporteurships to be informed about the state of
freedom of expression and economic, social and cultural rights in the different Member States. These visits allow
to create an instance of dialogue between the different actors. During these visits, the Special Rapporteurships
may communicate with representatives of the State, non-governmental organizations, the media, and
individuals interested in the scope of their mandates.
C. Monitoring the Situation
14. The Special Rapporteurships also develop the monitoring of the status of freedoms and rights
under their mandate in the region, which is carried out through a wide network of contacts and diversity of
sources. In carrying out this function, the Special Rapporteurships provide the Commission with expert
knowledge on specific cases or situations that are relevant to the exercise of rights related to their mandates, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 15.8 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, which provides that
Rapporteurs "shall advise the plenary with respect to issues they have become aware of that may be considered
matters of controversy, grave concern or special interest for theCommission."
15. In carrying out this function and following consultation with the Commission, the Special
Rapporteurships send communications to the OAS member states based on Articles 41 of the American
Convention on Human Rights and 18 of the Statute of the IACHR, and issue press releases. These
communications and press releases refer to situations of special concern about persons or groups of people,
general trends and patterns that could constitute human rights violations in a particular country, or the content
of a regulation or legislation considered to be of concern. Communications or letters to States are also an
important input for the preparation of reports on the situation of the rights related to each mandate of the
Special Rapporteurships.
16. When the Special Rapporteurships request information from OAS member states or make
recommendations, the letters should be sent to the presidency of the IACHR and the country Rapporteur for
their comments, with a copy to the Executive Secretary before they are forwarded to the States. In the event that
it is decided to issue a press release, the draft of thepress release,in English and Spanish, must be sent in advance
to the president of the IACHR and if there is a country mentioned, the country Rapporteur Commissioner, with
a copy to the Executive Secretary, the relevant Deputy Executive Secretary and the Chief of Staff the Office of the
Executive Secretariat. In some particularly sensitive cases, the press release may be sent to the entire
Commission directive atthe request of thepresident. At thispoint, the IACHR's specialprotocol on press releases
follows.
D. On-site Visits
17. By invitation of theOAS member States, the SpecialRapporteurships alsoconducts on-site visits
to assess the human rights situation in the concerning country, in accordance with the corresponding rules of
270
the IACHR Rules of Procedure and the institutional practice1695. In particular, the Special Rapporteurships will
previously coordinate on-site visits with the Executive Secretariat and the respective country Rapporteurship.
18. Country visits are an essential means of obtaining direct and first-hand information on the
human rights situation related to the mandate of the Special Rapporteurs, and facilitate intensive dialogue with
all relevant State authorities,including those of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. They also enable
contact and information gathering from victims, victims' relatives, witnesses, national human rights institutions,
international and local NGOs, and other members of civil society or stakeholders, the academic community, and
officials of international agencies present in the concerning country. Country visits by the Special
Rapporteurships provide an opportunity to promote inter-American standards and sensitize national and
international actors on specific issues under consideration. This is done, among other things, through meetings,
briefings, press coverage, and dissemination of the report of the visit.
19. Special Rapporteurships may carry out visits to countries jointly or together with other
representatives of the international community, such as the Special Procedures mandates of the United
Nations1696.
E. Reports on the Situation of Rights in theHemisphere
20. Another important task of the Special Rapporteurships is the periodic preparation of reports
on the situation of the rights related to their respective mandates in the hemisphere, which will refer to general
or specific situations of human rights violations in the different States of the region, which includes identifying
the main threats to ensure their exercise and the progress that has been made in the different areas1697. These
periodic reports are tools for engaging in a constructive dialogue with OAS member states highlighting the
reported progress in legislative, administrative, or jurisprudential matters, but also drawing attention to the
problems and challenges faced during the relevant period. The reports include viable and feasible
recommendations based on the principles and standards of the inter-American human rightssystem.
21. Likewise, the Special Rapporteurships will elaborate chapters or provide inputs to the country
reports or the Annual Report of the IACHR, regarding issues related to their mandates.
22. For the drafting of these reports, the Rapporteurships will have the information obtained
during visits to the Member States, the information provided by governments and other agencies of the State
administration, publicly available official information, as well as all other information coming from civil society
organizations and individuals interested in the matter.
23. The reports are considered by the plenary of the Commission for approval and inclusion in the
Annual Report of the IACHR, which is presented each year to the OAS GeneralAssembly.
F. Public Hearings
24. The IACHR may convene public hearings on its own initiative or at the request of an interested
party, in accordance with Articles 61 to 70 of its Rules of Procedure. The hearings have the purpose of receiving
information from the parties with respect to a petition or case being processed before the Commission; followup to recommendations; or general or particular information related to human rights in one or more OAS
Members States.
25. The Special Rapporteurships participate actively in the public hearings convened by the IACHR
on the rights related to their respective mandates, preparing inputs, and making the interventions and the
1695 This practice is consolidated by the visits and following reports published by the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression on the situation of the right to freedom of expression in Paraguay (2001), Panama (2003), Haiti (2003), Guatemala (2004),
Venezuela (2004), Colombia (2005), Honduras (2009, 2010 and 2015), Venezuela 2015), and Chile (2016).
1696 In 2010 the Office of the Special Rapporteur carried out a visit to Mexico together with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Opinion and produced a special country report.
1697 For example, since its establishment, the Office of the Special Rapporteur has issued 19 annual reports on the situation of freedom
of expression.
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corresponding follow-up. These hearings are a fundamental tool within the monitoring and thematic
development tasks of the Special Rapporteurships because they allow them to receive inputs on the situation of
these rights in the region, to promote the application of international standards in the national legal systems, as
well as to know the work of civil society strategic actors.
26. In the process of selecting public hearings to be held at each session, the Special
Rapporteurships willprepare their opinion on the requests for hearings received. If the Special Rapporteurships
wish the Commission to convene a specificpublic hearing on issues related to the rights related to their mandate,
they may prepare a memorandum addressed to the Executive Secretariat of the IACHR, requesting that it
submits a request for hearing to the IACHR president. In working meetings and public hearings dealing with
matters related to the mandate of the Special Rapporteurships, the Office will coordinate with the Executive
Secretariat to ensure the assistance of the Rapporteur and other persons in charge of attending them. Likewise,
the Special Rapporteurships will elaborate the summaries on the background and topics to be addressed in those
hearings and meetings. In the case of hearings on a petition or case, the corresponding Special Rapporteurship
will also express its opinion on the reception of the testimonial or expert evidence eventually proposed.
G. Development of Expert Knowledge
27. The Rapporteurships also prepare thematic reports on those matters that require specialized
study. These reports are designed to lead to processes of discussion on issues and specific problems identified
in the region. Thematic reports will include recommendations on the implementation of legislative and
administrative reforms, or other public policies and measures to be adopted in the States of theAmericas.
28. The thematic reportsprepared by the Special Rapporteurships must be approved by the IACHR
before they are published and will adequately integrate suggestions of changes, recommendations on topics to
be addressed, as well as any other adaptation to the original texts that come from the members of the
Commission.
29. In carrying out this function, the Special Rapporteurships may also take part in joint statements
with other representatives of the international community, such as United Nations Special Procedures mandates
holder on human rights1698. When it comes to regional issues, statements are signed by the UN and OAS
rapporteurs. Joint declarations constitute a fundamental working tool for the Special Rapporteurships. The
Special Rapporteurships will keep the IACHR informed of the joint declarations they regularly adopt together
with other Special Rapporteurs.
H. Technical Advice and Public Policies
30. At the request of States, civil society, and other interested parties, the Special Rapporteurships
can generate projects and actions aimed at providing technical assistance, promoting the exchange of good
practices, compliance with standards and legislative adaptation, such as the generation of public policies
regarding issues related to their mandates. In this, as in its previous capacities, the Special Rapporteurships will
coordinate their efforts in the matter with those of the Executive Secretariat, through its relevant Deputy
Secretary. The Special Rapporteurships may also provide technical advice to the organs of the OAS in the areas
of its mandate. The Special Rapporteurships will previously inform the respective Country Rapporteurship and
the Executive Secretariat about the activities carried out in compliance with this function.
I. Work Plan
31. The Special Rapporteurships, under the leadership of their holders, must prepare a three-year
work plan to be presented and approved by the plenary of the IACHR, as a way of establishing, publicly defining,
and institutionalizing the axes and priorities of action during each one of the mandates of the Rapporteurships
and their respective Offices. The rapporteurs will adjust their work plans with the plenary of the Commission
for approval and submit a written report to the Commission on the work carried out, at least once a year, in
1698 For example, since its creation, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has participated in the preparation
of statements with other regional and UN rapporteurs for freedom of expression. Joint declarations are usually signed by the rapporteurs
of the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the OAS, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights. Similarly, the ESCER has participated in joint declarations with the UN Rapporteurships on adequate housing and on the right to
health.
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accordance with Article 15.6 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR1699.
32. In the process of setting up a new Special Rapporteurship, transitional plans and affirmative
measures that are necessary to ensure their implementation will be adopted.
J. Financing
33. The Special Rapporteurships have their own budget, financed by the funds they obtain
themselves, through donations from States, foundations, and particulars, as well as through participation in
competitive international cooperation processes. To date, Special Rapporteurships do not receive resources
from the Regular Fund of the OAS or the IACHR, nor does it impose on the Executive Secretariat of the IACHR
the task of obtaining the funds for its operation, what may be subject to reconsideration by the IACHR.
34. The Special Rapporteurships prepare or participate in the preparation of projects of
international cooperation according to the agenda or workplan that has been approved by the IACHR. Based on
this work plan, the Special Rapporteurships generate or contribute to the presentation of specific projects to
donors that are subject to the corresponding process within the OAS.
35. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Special Rapporteurships willparticipate in the coordination
instances that the Executive Secretariat has or that they promote in order to optimize the mobilization of funds
by the IACHR, always promoting dialogue and cooperation between the different areas.
K. Protocols of Institutional Action and CoordinationSpaces
36. In order to provide institutional coherence and pragmatic homogeneity when executing the
tasks and activities of the Special Rapporteurships in an effective and methodical way, the Special Rapporteurs
should adopt and follow up protocols of action and methodologies of work, under guidelines contained in the
IACHR regulations, this directive, the Commission manuals, and established institutional practice. To this end,
the Rapporteurships will be able to integrate into the initiatives of the Integrated Information Analysis and
Management Platform (IIAMP) of the IACHR for the elaboration of protocols for the production, organization,
analysis, and dissemination of information; methodologies for collection, registration, production, and
management of information; alliances with local observatories and panels on the prospect and situation
analysis, in accordance with the IACHR Strategic Plan.
37. Likewise, in agreement with the Executive Secretariat, the Special Rapporteurships will also
participate in coordination spaces or specialprograms of the IACHR, such as the Rapid and Integrated Response
Coordination Unit (SACROI), special follow-up mechanisms, the procedural delays program, the institutional
transparency program and those others in which their participation is relevant to ensure the good work and
coordination of the tasks of the IACHR.
Approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the 30th day of September 2019
(signed): Esmeralda E. Arosemena Bernal de Troitiño, Presidenta; Joel Hernández, Primer Vicepresidente; Antonia
Urrejola, Segunda Vicepresidenta; Margarette May Macaulay, Francisco José Eguiguren, Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva,
and Flávia Piovesan, Members of the Commission.
1699 Article 15.6 ofthe Rules of Procedure provides that:“Rapporteurs shall present their workplans to the plenary ofthe Commission
for approval. They shall report in writing to the Commission, at least annually, on the work undertaken”.
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GUIDE TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION REGARDING
DELIBERATE DISINFORMATION IN ELECTORAL CONTEXTS
OCTOBER 2019
On June 5, 2018, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States asked the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the
Department of International Law (DIL) and the Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO)
of the Organization of American States to develop a “Practical guide of recommendations to guarantee freedom
of expression and access to information from various sources on the Internet in electoral contexts, without
undue interference”.1700
With a view of conducting this process through stakeholder participation and collaboration, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur and DECO issued a call forproposals atthe end of 2018 seeking contributions and reflections
regarding the concern expressed by the States due to the dissemination of deliberately false information and
disinformation campaigns on social networks, as well as for the improper use of personal data during electoral
periods. The community was invited to “submit general comments or ongoing work” involving empirical studies
on the mass dissemination of false information, especially in electoral contexts, principles or standards
applicable to the problem, possible actions, and stakeholders involved. 19 contributions were received from 24
organizations or individuals.1701 Likewise, on January 31, 2019, the Special Rapporteur, Edison Lanza,
participated in a session of the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the OAS General Assembly where
the work plan to address the mandate to develop a guide on freedom of expression and the phenomenon of
1700 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE OAS, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. AG/RES. 2928 (XLVIII-O/18), (2018), 166.
1701
ID
The following contributions were received:
Organization/ Individual Country Date
1 Linterna Verde Colombia 17-12-2018
2 Misión de Observación Electoral MOE Colombia Colombia 10-01-2019
3 Juan Ortiz Freuler EEUU 30-01-2019
4 EFF EEUU 31-01-2019
5 Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) Argentina 31-01-2019
6 Coding Rights Brasil 31-01-2019
7 Fundación Karisma Colombia 31-01-2019
8 Hiperderecho Perú 31-01-2019
9 IPANDETEC Panamá 31-01-2019
10 R3D Mexico 31-01-2019
11 TEDIC Paraguay 31-01-2019
12 Intervozes Brasil 31-01-2019
13 Centro de Estudos Sobre Justiça de Transição Brasil 31-01-2019
14 Derechos Digitales Chile 31-01-2019
15 Defensoría del Público Argentina 31-01-2019
16 Centro Universitário Antônio Eufrásio de Toledo Brasil 31-01-2019
17 Colombia Diversa Colombia 01-02-2019
18 Access Now EEUU 04-02-2019
19 Funciple Colombia 07-02-2019
20 Dercom-UBA Argentina 11-02-2019
21 Eulália Camurça Brasil 18-02-2019
22 Privacy International Reino Unido 29-03-2019
23 UNESCO Regional 22-04-2019
24 Observacon Uruguay 07-08-2019
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deliberate misinformation in electoral contexts waspresented; During that session, contributions were received
from numerous States present.
In late April 2019 the Office of the Special Rapporteur and the Department of Electoral Cooperation and
Observation (DECO) of the OAS, with support from the National Electoral Institute of Mexico, organized a
meeting with 28 experts from the region who discussed the issue of disinformation andpossible State responses
to it over the course of two days. The Office of the Special Rapporteur and the OAS SSD thank the experts for
their invaluable contributions to this process, as well as the subsequent exchange to arrive at the document
presented here.1702
The panel of experts was formed in keeping with the “multiple stakeholders” model, which has been used to
address similar challenges.1703 This model seeks to create a space for deliberation in which different actors
interested in the topic are represented. Reasonable gender and geographical representation were also sought.
The panel was thus composed of civil society organizations, electoral authorities, experts, independent experts
and academics, Internet service providers, among them the main information exchange platforms (Google,
Facebook, and Twitter), fact-checking agencies present in the region, and research centers throughout the
hemisphere.
Within the framework of the meeting of experts, case studies on misinformation in electoralprocesses that took
place in three countries of the hemisphere were presented: the case of the 2016 United States election,
conducted by the Inter-American Dialogue; the case of the 2018 election of Brazil, by MacKenzie University; and
the case of the elections in Mexico also in 2018, by the National Electoral Institute and UNAM. The UNESCOOffice
for South America also presented for this panel the document Social Media and Elections which includes a
conceptual framework to address the challenges of misinformation, developed by expert Andrew Puddephatt.
For its part, DECO brought to the discussion contributions about the challenges related to misinformation that
have been documented in the electoral processes of the region.
Below is the Guide that summarizes the main findings of the process that was carried out, it establishes a
conceptual framework to address the phenomenon of the dissemination of deliberate misinformation and
includes recommendations addressed to States and other actors that can positively impact the combat of
misinformation.
The Guide is divided into three sections: I) Description of the phenomenon of misinformation in electoral
contexts. II) Systematization of inter-American human rights standards that should guide state responses in the
matter. III) Presentation of the recommendations that were requested by the OAS GeneralAssembly.
I. Disinformation, democracy, and electoral processes
Disinformation consists of the mass dissemination of false information (a) with the intent to deceive the public
and (b) with the knowledge of its falsehood1704. The phenomenon is of particular concern in electoral contexts
1702 The members of the panel of experts are: Alba Mora Roca (Verificado Mexico), Ailidh Callander (Privacy International), Andrew
Pudhepatt (Global Partners & Associates Ltd, UK), Brenda Santamaria (OAS Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation—DECO),
Caio Machado (Oxford Internet Institute), Carlos Cortes (Linterna Verde, Colombia), Cristina Tardaguila (Agencia Lupa, Brazil), Diogo Rais
(Mackenzie Presbyterian University, Brazil), Edison Lanza (OAS/IACHR Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression),
Eleonora Rabinovich (Google), Francisco Guerrero (OAS Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy), Gerardo de Icaza (OAS Department of
Electoral Cooperation and Observation—DECO), Guilherme Canela (UNESCO), Gustavo Gomez (OBSERVACOM), Hugo Rodriguez (Twitter
Latin America), Iñigo Fernandez (Facebook), Juan Ortiz Freuler (Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society, Affiliate), Lorenzo Cordova
(National Electoral Institute of Mexico), Danya Centeno García (R3D Mexico), Marcos Tourinho (Facebook), Maria Andrea Valles (Google),
Martin Becerra (Universidad de Quilmes, Cultural Industries Research Program), Michael Camilleri (Inter-American Dialogue, USA), Monica
Cruz (Verificado, Mexico), Ramiro Alvarez Ugarte (Specialist in Constitutional Law and Human Rights, UP/UBA, Argentina), Robe rta Braga
(Atlantic Council), Roberto Rock (Inter American Press Association), Veridiana Alimonti (Electronic Frontier Foundation).
1703 See, e.g., the recommendations of the European Commission’s High Level Expert Group. Cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION; NETWORKS,
CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online
disinformation. Directorate-General for Communication Networks, Content; Technology of the European Commission.2018
1704 This definition should be taken as provisional and for the purposes of this document. In the process of consultation with experts,
states and civil society, it was pointed out that the phenomenon of misinformation is inserted into a complex network of practices that seek
to shape the public debate, sometimes with the intention of impoverishing it. These types of practices present considerable challenges that
are likely to be addressed in the future. On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasize that the concept of “false information” refers
exclusively to facts that can be verified as true or false, or at least subjected to a contrast test. It does not refer to opinions or approximations
of editorial tone, which can be shocking or misleading or that, because they are opinions, are not susceptible to a judgment of finding or
truthfulness. Certain practices of malicious editing of true content could enter, in this sense, within this definition if that definition seeks to
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since—if effective—it could affect the legitimacy of a process that is critical to the functioning and very existence
of a democratic society.
Although disinformation has always been among us, in recent times it seems to have taken on new
characteristics thanks to the emergence of the Internet. Disinformation operates within the framework of a
decentralized network that has expandedpeople’s abilityto express themselves in the public sphere, with access
to minimal technological resources. This communication ecosystem presents tremendous opportunities for
expanding and strengthening the public discourse and for the circulation of informationof public interest.
The inter-American human rights system has concluded that freedom of expression is characterized as a right
with two dimensions: an individual one, which concerns the expression of one's thoughts, ideas, and
information; and a collective or social dimension, consisting of the right of society to procure and receive
information, to know the thoughts, ideas, and information of others and to be wellinformed. The Internet is one
of the technologies that has most enhanced the exercise of freedom of expression, given that it turned millions
of people who were passive recipients of information into active participants in the public debate.1705
However, this paradigm shift brought new dilemmas. For example, the challenges of the speed with which
information is currently produced and distributed, the volume of information that is generated thanks to the
exponential multiplication of sources, and the ability of information to expand horizontally in a "viral" way in
this decentralized network, along with the ability to direct messages to very specific demographic segments. In
this new technological reality, challenges such as “disinformation” require applying and reaffirming the
principles that guide, normatively, the inter-American system in order to establish how to protect the public
debate without affecting the exercise of fundamental freedoms.
The Panel of Experts concluded that disinformation flourishes in a particularly vigorous way in this ecosystem
and there are several elements or factors that seem to explain, enhance or feed the phenomenon. Although the
evidence in this regard is still scarce, insufficient, and often contradictory, some of these factors to be taken into
account, when analyzing the phenomenon of misinformation, are developed below:
Polarization. Several studies link the phenomenon of disinformation to political polarization. Some argue that
disinformation is the cause of polarization, as it appeals to people’s emotions and seeks to affect their behavior,
including voting behavior (such as so-called “voter suppression,” i.e., practices or strategies used to discourage
certain sectors of the population from participating in the electoral process)1706. Others argue that
disinformation is actually the effect of political polarization, as people lock themselves into narrow information
silos in which they only access information through the prism of their own ideologies or political positions
(spaces called “echo chambers”), whichprevents them from accessing divergentpoints of view.1707 Other studies
reject the notion that there is a significant link between politicalpolarization and disinformation. They maintain,
for instance, that polarization is the fault of political actors who encourage it, or the media, some of which have
embraced this polarizing logic for some time.1708
deceive the general public and falsifies the original content. This is the case, for example, of videos in which a person's speech slows down
to make them appear intoxicated, a practice that has been seen in the United States and
1705 Cf. IACHR, Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet. Washington D.C., Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression of the IACHR. 2016, para. 81.
1706 H. ALLCOTT; M. GENTZKOW, Social media and fake newsin the 2016 election, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 31, 2, 2017, 211-
236, retrieved on: October 15, 2018, from http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jep.31.2.211; V. BAKIR; A. MCSTAY, Fake news and the
economy of emotions: Problems, causes, solutions, Digital Journalism, vol. 6, 2, 2018, 154-175, retrieved on: March 6, 2019, from
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21670811.2017.1345645; A. GUESS;B. LYONS, Fake news, Facebook ads, and misperceptions,
2018, WORKING PAPER; Cf. G. PENNYCOOK; D. G. RAND, Who falls for fake news? The roles of analytic thinking, motivated reasoning, political
ideology, and bullshit receptivity, SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017, retrieved on: October 15, 2018, from
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3023545, 20182019.
1707 Cf. C. R. SUNSTEIN, #Republic: Divided democracy in the age ofsocial media, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Oxford, 2017, pp.
14-15.
1708 Cf. Y. BENKLER; R. FARIS; H. ROBERTS, Network propaganda: Manipulation, disinformation, and radicalization in American politics,
Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2018, p. 14; L. BOXELL; M. GENTZKOW; J. M. SHAPIRO, Greater Internet use is not associated with faster
growth in political polarization among US demographic groups, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114, 40, 2017, 10612-
10617, retrieved on: November 15, 2018, from http://www.pnas.org/content/114/40/10612; S. FLAXMAN; S. GOEL; J. M. RAO, Filter Bubbles,
Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 80, S1, 2016, 298-320, retrieved on: March 18, 2019, from
https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/poq/nfw006; A. MARWICK; R. LEWIS, Media manipulation and disinformation
online. Data & Society Research Institute. 2017, p. 20; F. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS ET AL., Should We Worry About Filter Bubbles? Rochester, NY..
Social Science Research Network. 2016.
276
Effects. Assuming that the phenomenon of disinformation is expanding, it is vitally important to determine its
effects. On thispoint, the data are also inconclusive: while some studies suggest that some people are more likely
than others to believe false information,1709 others find that a significant percentage of citizens retain the ability
to distinguish true from false information on their own.1710 Moreover, the effects may not be epistemic (leading
a person to consider what is false to be true) but rather may be linked to an emotional aspect of mobilizing
political identities to support or reject a particular political party or candidate.1711 In the electoral context,
existing research suggests that disinformation campaigns do not have significant effects,1712 others have found
that disinformation has an effect on the determination of the information agenda, with the existence of
disinformation being amplified in the media, and may even be connected with the erosion of trust in democratic
institutions1713.
Other incentives for disinformation practices. Many studies have sought to unravel what drives the phenomenon,
even involuntarily. Thus, it has been argued that the online advertising market, based on the mining of personal
data and the ability to target messages accurately and effectively, encourages disinformation as it is spread
through the same tools and techniques used by the advertising market.1714 In this regard, the use of personal
data for advertising purposes—largely permitted by outdated or limited data protection laws—appears to
create conditions that favor the phenomenon or make it more effective. It should be noted here that many of
these norms in the region could be outdated in relation to these new phenomena or their application could be
limited.1715
A relevant conclusion of the Panelis related to the need to include not only the platforms but also the actors who
promote advertising messages, including political parties, so that they act in an ethical manner when producing
and promoting truthful content and strictly abiding to the protection of personal data in accordance with the
regulations in the matter. In any case, for all actors,it is necessary to underline the duty to respect the principles
of quality, legality, purpose, and proportionality in the collection, transfer and use of personal data.
It is necessary to draw attention to the need to differentiate between advertising for commercial purposes and
electoral advertising: while the former is linked to the operation of a market for goods and services, the latter
relates to an essential process for democracy. The electoral process is fundamental for democracy and there
may be a legitimate interest of the state in establishing restrictions proportional to certain types of electoral
publicity within the framework of those processes. In this sense, certain types of advertising that may be
acceptable when it haspurely commercialpurposes may beproblematic in the context of electoralprocesses.1716
1709 Cf. G. PENNYCOOK; D. G. RAND, “Who falls for fake news?”, cit. See also G. PENNYCOOK; D. G. RAND, “Lazy, not biased”, cit.
1710 S. FLAXMANET AL.,“Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption”, cit., vol. 80; Cf. J. L. NELSON;H. TANEJA, The small,
disloyal fake news audience: The role of audience availability in fake news consumption, New Media & Society, vol. 20, 10, 2018, 3720-3737,
retrieved on: March 18, 2019, from https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818758715.
1711 M. BALMAS, When Fake News Becomes Real: Combined Exposure to Multiple News Sources and Political Attitudes of Inefficacy,
Alienation, and Cynicism, Communication Research, vol. XX, X, 2012, 1-25 (on the correlation between exposure to fake news and feelings of
cynicism and discouragement); Cf. FORUM, Comparative Responses to the Global Disinformation Challenges. International Forum for
Democratic Studies. 2018; S. VOSOUGHI; D. ROY; S. ARAL, The spread of true and false news online, Science, vol. 359, 6380, 2018, 1146-1151,
retrieved on: March 2, 2019, from http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146.
1712 Cf. H. ALLCOTT; M. GENTZKOW, “Social media and fake news in the 2016 election,” cit., vol. 31; A. GUESS; B. LYONS, “Fake news,
Facebook ads, and misperceptions,” cit.
1713 See L. Bandeira, D. Barojan, R. Braga, JL Penarredonda, M.F. Perez Arguello,“Disinformation inDemocracies: Strengthening Digital
Resilience in Latin America,” published on March 28, 2019 (where it is argued that polarization and misinformation mutually reinforce each
other, that misinformation produced an “agenda determination” effect on news coverage and that there were amplifying effects of
disinformation in the coverage of the phenomenon itself).
1714 D. GHOSH; B. SCOTT, Digital deceit: The technologies behind precision propaganda on the Internet. Washington D.C., New America.
2018, p. 3; A. MARWICK; R. LEWIS, Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online, cit., p.42.
1715 ACCESSNOW, Inputfrom Access Now on Disinformation in Electoral Contexts. AccessNow. 2019, p. 4;This point was made by several
contributors to the process. See ADC ET AL., Regional input from civil society organizations working in the area of human rights in the digital
environment. Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC), Coding Rights, Fundación Karisma, Hiperderecho, Ipandete, Red en Defensa de los
Derechos Digitales (R3D) & Tedic. 2019, pp. 10-12; P. INTERNATIONAL, Public Consultation: Disinformation in electoral contexts. Privacy
International’s Response. Privacy International. 2019, p. 3.
1716 It is necessary to point out that many data sources used by political campaigns for profiling are sources created for commerc ial
purposes, through the so-called "data brokers" and other actors. The variety of data they can access ranges from social media data to the
use of credit cards and TV consumption patterns. On this point, see, Chester, J., & Montgomery, K. C. (2017). The role of digital
marketing in political campaigns. Internet Policy Review, 6(4). Retrieved from https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/roledigital-marketing-political-campaigns.
277
Many of the States in the region already have more restricted electoral advertising standards than the rules that
regulate commercial advertising. However, advertising messages are also protected by the right to freedom of
expression and any restriction in this regard must be established through a law in a formal and material sense,
and must respect the conditions of necessity and proportionality that all state regulations intended to protect a
legitimate interest must comply with.
Internet virality. It should be noted that the phenomenon of Internet virality is not in itself problematic: on the
contrary, by taking advantage of the decentralized nature of the network, the circulation of information can
bypass controls or points of blockage or censorship, something especially valuable in the contexts of
authoritarian countries. However, when it comes to misinformation, it can be a factor that complicates the
approach to the phenomenon. There are studies that suggest that fake news circulates faster than the real news,
because they appeal to emotions and are - consequently - more attractive.1717 It has also been argued that social
networks offer a form of information exchange that is "epistemically valuable": a publication on a social network
is equivalent to a "testimony" given by another person, usually someone we know or appreciate for some reason
( that is why we "follow" or are his "friends", etc.). As human beings tend to accept what others transmit to us in
the form of testimony, it is possible to postulate that disinformation flourishes in social networks because it
takes advantage of an epistemologically valid procedure for most cases anduses.1718
Motivation. Finally, a core issue for understanding the phenomenon of disinformation concerns the actors
behind it. Existing research on the matter suggests that these actors are diverse, ranging from foreign States
seeking to influence elections in other countries toprivate actors motivated by economic reasons (who are hired
to deploy disinformation campaigns) or political reasons (who carry out such campaigns to influence elections).
In addition, these interested parties that voluntarily promote disinformation campaigns take advantage of the
actions of other actors who unwittingly promote the phenomenon, such as the highly segmented digital
advertising system, media that unwittingly disseminate false information, political parties, or candidates that
repeat false information in negative campaigns, and soon.
Despite the lack of conclusive elements on its effects, it seems clear that the deliberate spread of false
information impoverishes the public debate and makes it harder for citizens to exercise their right to receive
information from various sources, and in the end it is an obstacle to participating in Democratic decisions. This
document recognizes the legitimate concern of the states, civil society, and private actors involved, as well as
the importance of adopting proportionate measures aimed at combating misinformation, in line with
international obligations regarding the protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the functioning
of the democratic system.
II. Disinformation and the Standards of the Inter-American Human RightsSystem
The paradigm shift in the information flow of democratic societies was accompanied by the emergence of new
actors. That is the case of intermediaries and platforms operating on the Internet seem to play central roles in
the new information ecosystem. These actors have had a positive impact on their development, by facilitating
access to information that we do not know (in the case of search engines), offering the necessary infrastructure
to participate in the public debate (such as Internet service providers) or offer platforms where it is possible to
share information, ideas, and access content produced by third parties (as is the case with media consumption
platforms or social networks). These services, managed by the private sector, have become important actors,
partly as a result of the concentration - in market terms - prevalent in these services.1719
1717 Cf. S. VOSOUGHI Y OTROS, “The spread of true and false news online”, cit., vol. 359.
1718 R. RINI, Fake News and Partisan Epistemology, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol. 27, 2, 2017, p. 5, retrieved on: March 2,
2019, from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/670860.
1719 See S. HUBBARD, Fake News is a Real Antitrust Problem. CIP Antitrust Chronicle. 2017, 2 ("Two corporations have an outsized
control on the flow of information worldwide. Google accounts for roughly 80 percent of global Internet searches, and its search market
share exceeds 90 percent in most European countries. 4 Facebook dwarfs all other social networks, with two billion active monthly users").
See also OBSERVACOM, OTT Regulation. Key points for the democratic regulation of «Over-the-Top» services so as to ensure a free and open
Internet and the full exercise of digital rights and freedom of expression. Observacom. 2017, 3:
"In a scenario centralized by the traditional media, it was clear that the market on its own did not guarantee the fundamental diversity,
pluralism and freedom of expression needed by democracy. With the emergence of the Internet, it seemed that part of the rationality that
gave meaning and foundation to democratic regulation might have been lost. In fact, some important players in the digital ecosystem claim
that regulation of the Internet is not only dangerous but should not exist, as it is no longer necessary or possible. However, after the initial
phase of more decentralized and open network operation, new bottlenecks formed and the Internet embarked on a growing centralization
among just a few actors of the digital ecosystem that has affected its potential to serve all of humanity: this was underlined by the creator of
the World Wide Web, Tim Berners Lee. The trend towards concentration and threats to freedom of expression on the Internet show that
278
Through their role as intermediaries in the flow of information on the Internet, these actors operate as traffic
“control nodes.” Their decisions have a significant impact on the public debate, and so a number of
governments—especially authoritarian ones—have tried topressure them to helpshape the flow of information
according to their interests. It has also been noted that the companies themselves, by moderating the content
circulating on their platforms according to their own terms of service and “community” rules, make decisions to
suppress or reduce the flow of content that affects and shapes the public debate. Currently, and as a result of
challenges such as intentional disinformation and hate speech, many of these companies are going through
processes to review the criteria they use to moderate content, the internal procedures they use for this purpose,
and the selection of information generated andpresented to users, based on the use of algorithms. This dynamic
of public pressures and private actions is exacerbated by concentration: the more powerful the actor that
operates as an intermediary, the more attractive it becomes to those who wish to pressure it and the more
impact its decisions have.
Given the fundamental role of these actors as intermediaries, modern democratic States have sought to exempt
them from the liability that might arise from content created by thirdparties and distributed on their platforms.
Thus, the 2017 Joint Declaration of the Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression of the OAS, OSCE, and UN noted
that intermediaries “should never be liable for any third party content relating to those services unless they
specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey an order adopted in accordance with due process
guarantees by an independent, impartial, authoritative oversight body (such as a court) to remove it and they
have the technical capacity to do that".1720
On the other hand, Article 13.2 of the American Convention admits thepossibility of establishing responsibilities
beyond freedom of expression to protect the reputation and rights of others, public order, morals, and public
health. In that sense, the dissemination of deliberate misinformation could damage the reputation of a candidate
or public person or possibly other more diffuse interests such as the democratic process or the public's trust in
democratic institutions.
It is here that the State's responses must be analyzed in detail, because in different places it is proposed to apply
the regime of subsequent liabilities to punish those who disseminate misinformation. In that sense, both the
Commission and the Inter-American Court have established that the application of criminal norms for the
protection of reputation, honor, or the private life of public officials or persons aspiring to hold public office - in
cases in which the public interest is involved - constitutes a disproportionate response, within the framework
of a democratic society.
This guide recommends that the States of the region, in line with the standards of the inter-American human
rights system, should not establish new criminal types to sanction the dissemination of misinformation or false
news. Introducing criminal types, which due to the nature of the phenomenon would be vague or ambiguous,
could lead the region back to a logic of criminalizing expressions about officials or people involved in matters of
public interest and establishing a tool with a strong chilling effect on the dissemination of ideas, criticism, and
information for fear of being subjected to a criminal process, which would be particularly restrictive in the
context of the electoral contest.
Although the dissemination of misinformation deliberately seems to fit the so-called "actual malice" standard,
which refers to thepossibility of applying civil sanctions to those who distribute false or aggravating information
knowing that it is false or with absolute negligence regarding the truth, which causes a damage to the
aforementioned person, it should be noted that the offenses appear to be different.1721
In cases of defamation, which are the cases for which the standard of actual malice was developed, the remedy
and the liability regime proposed by the inter-American system implies the exercise of the right to rectification
or response as a less damaging measure of freedom of expression or, if the damage was serious, the attribution
of civil responsibilities.1722 Even in these cases, it should be remembered that this rule of attribution of
responsibility was established to respond to cases where there is a known issuer, usually a journalist or a
relevant political or social actor, and they acted with malice or manifest negligence, to damage the reputation of
an official or a publicperson.
diversity and pluralism---and even the notion of an open and free Internet---need regulatory guarantees so that they can be maintained as
values and paradigms of modern digital communications.
1720 OAS. OSCE, UN &ACHPR, “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and ‘Fake News,’ Disinformation and Propaganda,” (2017),
1.d.
1721 Cf. IACHR, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression. Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 2010, para.109.
1722 Cf. Ibid., para. 79.
279
This traditional response may be insufficient to deal with the problem of deliberate misinformation, for various
reasons. First, there are reasons of scale that make it difficult to project this liability regime to the phenomenon
of misinformation, as well as the possible anonymous nature of the diffuser (anonymity that - by the way - is
also protected by human rights standards1723).
Secondly, in the case of the dissemination of misinformation, it does not always seek to damage the reputation
of one of the participants of public life or an election, but to affect a more diffuse interest such as democratic
public order, involved in the integrity of the electoral process. In these cases, it is clear that the civil
responsibilities provided would not be suitable for safeguarding that interest and electoral law could develop
specific responses to this kind of phenomena. This is what happens, at the moment, when the internal legal
regimes establish specific regulations on their electoral processes and prohibit certain types of conduct such as,
for example, those that seek to “suppress” voting. When disinformation campaigns seek to promote such
practices, those who promote them incur in prohibited actions that receive a response within the framework of
the general electoral regime that each country implements.
On the other hand, disinformation can also have a global scale but the jurisdictions of the countries are limited
and the actions of the platforms restricted to their own services. When spreading in a decentralized network, it
can sometimes be very difficult if not impossible to identify the people behind a disinformation campaign. In
case of doing so, it is possible that these persons operate outside the territory of the affected country. But even
when states can reliably discover who is behind a disinformation campaign and can submit them to their
jurisdiction, it is possible that the judicial processes necessary to determine their civil liability are too slow to
provide an effective response, especially to protect the integrity of the electoral process.
These difficulties are what have pushed many countries to transfer on to intermediaries obligations to control
and suppress the "fake news" of their platforms1724. However, these responses are not in line with international
standards that seek to limit the responsibility of intermediaries to avoid generating incentives for greater
"private censorship." The rules that impose on intermediaries obligations to control and cancel certain contents,
generate incentives for them to censor a greater amount of content, to avoid economic sanctions, for example.
1725
Partly as a response to the new challenges posed by the Internet, inter-American human rights standards have
been developed taking into account the particularities of the network. Thus, for example, inter-American
standards protect all open expressions ab inito also on the Internet and only allow burdensome responses such
as blocking or filtering actions on the Internet in exceptional cases. Thus, the Office of the Special Rapporteur
has affirmed that in the face of "openly illicit contents or discourses not protected by the right to freedom of
expression (such as war propaganda and advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to violence, direct and
public incitement to genocide, and child pornography) it is permissible to adopt mandatory measures to block
and filter specific content", provided that the illegality of the content has been determined by an independent
judicial authority.1726
In these cases, the measure must undergo a "strict proportionality judgment and be carefully designed and
clearly limited in such a way that it does not reach legitimate discourses that deserve protection".1727 These
types of measures "must have safeguards that prevent abuse, such as transparency regarding the contents
1723 It is relevant to highlight that, although anonymity can present challenges, it cannot justify actions that tend to affect it.
Indeed, anonymous speech is a vital part of the democratic public debate. It allows to access, generate, and share opinions and
information in a safe way, away from social pressures or official controls, as well as from possible state or private reprisals. The
value of anonymous discourse is broad in democratic societies, but especially relevant and valuable in the framework of authoritarian
societies. This has been previously noted by the IACHR. See IACHR, Freedom of Expression and Internet. Washington D.C. Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR. 2013, para. 134
1724 Countries that have opted for this type of model include Germany and France, as well as China, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt,
Kenya, Malaysia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Thailand.
1725 On this point, see EFF’s input:
"EFF has pointed out that problems with censorship by direct hosts of speech are tremendously magnified when core infrastructure
providers are pushed to block or filter content. The risk of powerful voices silencing marginalized ones is greater, as are the risks of collateral
damage. Takedowns by infrastructural intermediaries—such as certificate authorities, DNS, or content delivery networks—are far more
likely to cause collateral censorship. For that reason, EFF has called these parts of the Internet free speech’s weakest links and believes that
the most consistent defense these links can take is to decline attempts to use them as a control point. Conduits such as ISPs should also not
be treated as publishers. Their legitimate scope to limit content is critically restricted by network neutrality principles that require them
not to discriminate online content". See EFF, Written Submission for the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR/RFOE), the OAS Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO) and
the Department of International Law (DIL). Electronic Frontiers Foundation. 2019, 14.
1726 IACHR, Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet, cit., para. 88.
1727 Ibid., para. 88.
280
whose removal has been ordered, as well as detailed information on their need and justification".1728 These
measures should be adopted "only when it is the only measure available to achieve an imperative purpose".1729
The Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression recently recalled that the "blocking of entire websites, IP addresses,
ports, or network protocols provided by the State is an extreme measure that can only be justified when
stipulated by law and is necessary to protect a human right or other legitimate public interest, which includes
that it is proportionate, there are no less invasive alternative measures that could preserve that interest and
respect minimum guarantees of due process".1730
The adoption of measures to combat disinformation could, however, be disproportionate. Moreover,
disinformation does not fall squarely within the category of “clearly illegal content or speech that is not covered
by the right to freedom of expression” that justifies such measures.1731 Information on matters ofpublic interest
enjoys a certain presumption of legitimacy, as it is a kind of specially protected speech.1732 When it is difficult to
determine the truthfulness or falsity of the information, that presumption is maintained. The presumption can
only be overcome when “contradicted by a competent authority that provides sufficient guarantees of
independence, autonomy and impartiality,1733 typically, a court that takes action after receiving a specific
complaint. In this regard, “General prohibitions on the dissemination of information based on vague and
ambiguous ideas, including ‘fake news’ or ‘non-objective information,’ are incompatible with international
standards for restrictions on freedom of expression […] and should be abolished".1734
On the other hand, the factual determination of the content deemed illegal is especially difficult in the case of
false information: sometimes, distinguishing what is true and what is not, requires a trial that demands to study
the case in question, contrast it with available evidence and make a decision. The judgment itself --- of truth or
falsehood --- may depend on possible readings of ambiguous materials.1735 When private Internet companies
are required to take charge of this trial under penalty of sanction, as in the laws recently approved by countries
such as Germany and France to deal with the phenomenon of misinformation, the main incentive for
intermediary companies is not be sanctioned, and that incentive controls their actions: experience in other less
controversial issues indicates that they can take actions aimed at detecting, in general automatically, the
allegedly unlawful content so as not to incur responsibility.1736 This produces the aforementioned phenomenon
of "private censorship", according to which the business response to legal claims is broader and more
comprehensive than the mandate they receive and ends upsilencing much more content than is really necessary
to comply with legal obligations. The existence of this dynamic in Germany was denounced after the approval at
the end of 2017 of a law that orders the platforms to remove the "manifestly illegal" content, once they have
"news" of this content by any means, even without the intervention of a public authority.1737
Likewise, it must be borne in mind that state’s responses to the phenomenon of misinformation must be
concerned about not affecting the integrity of the computer systems on which the Internet works and the
communications that are channeled through the network. Thus, for instance, the fact that it has been
documented that at least part of the disinformation campaigns use encrypted messaging systems could never
1728 Ibid., para. 89.
1729 Ibid., para. 89.
1730 OAS, OSCE, UN, and ACHPR, “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression. "Fake News", "Disinformation and Propaganda", cit.,
para. 1.f.
1731 IACHR, Standards for a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet, cit., para. 88.
1732 Cf. Ibid., para. 92.
1733 Ibid., para. 92.
1734 OAS, OSCE, UN, and ACHPR, “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression. "Fake News", "Disinformation and Propaganda", cit.,
para. 2.a.
1735 Cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION; NETWORKS, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. Report of the
independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation. Directorate-General for Communication Networks, Content;
Technology of the European Commission. 2018, p. 19 ("These general objectives should be pursued based on the recognition that
information can rarely be neatly categorized as simply true or false, the conviction that no authority has a monopoly on knowledge, and the
belief that free societies benefit from -- and are defined by the acceptance of -- free confrontation of diverse and sometimes uncomfortable
ide- as and information").
1736 Due to the volume of information circulating on the Internet, intermediary companies have stressed that actions should be abl e
to be automated, i.e. built using technological tools that make it possible to detect unlawful content automatically, without human
intervention. On this point, see GOOGLE INC., How Google Fights Disinformation. Palo Alto, California. Google Inc. 2019, p. 3.
1737 EFJ, Germany: Repeal NetzDG bill, deletion is not the answer. European federation of journalists, 2018, retrieved on: March 4, 2019,
from https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2018/01/09/germany-repeal-netzdg-bill-deletion-is-not-the-answer/ ; Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Germany. Flawed Social Media Law, 2018, retrieved on: January 16, 2019, from
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law.
281
lead to questioning the end-to-end encryption of communications, which are essential to protect privacy --and
consequently, freedom-- of citizens' communications.
As a consequence of the challenges presented by the phenomenon of misinformation and the special protection
that the inter-American system grants to the circulation of information of public interest or that encourages
public debate, particularly in electoral periods, most of the responses that this document recommends to deal
with thephenomenon of misinformation are non-regulatory in nature1738. They seek to strengthen the capacities
of citizens to distinguish false information from true information. They have the advantage of not generating a
risk for freedom of expression, since they operate within the ideal promoted by the inter-American system to
safeguard an open and uninhibited public debate.
In that sense, it’s fundamental the principle that there is no better response to an opinion formed on the wrong
basis or false information than an opposing or correct opinion or true information.1739 Therefore, State actions
must be aimed at raising public awareness about the existence of the phenomenon, awakening a critical spirit
in them when consuming and replicating that information, and developing the necessary resources to verify
information of doubtful origin.
The Panel of Experts highlighted this type of action taken in recent months in countries with important
traditions of defense of freedom of expression, such as Norway and Sweden.1740 There have also been similar
actions in the United States (at a state level) and in countries in the region such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay.
A good example of this are the actions of the National Electoral Institute of Mexico or of the Superior Electoral
Tribunal of Brazil during their 2018 presidential elections.1741 In these cases, the electoral authorities set up
efficient communication channels with the main platforms, media, and fact-checking agencies. Through this,
they were able to respond to false information, especially that which soughtto affectthe integrity of the electoral
process, with accurate information. This type of action consists, among other things, of (a) making citizens aware
of the phenomenon of disinformation; (b) drawing attention to it in order to encourage citizens not to repeat
false information; (c) offering tools and resources to verify information; and (d) contrasting specific false
information with accurate information. Many of these recommendations were especially supported by the
European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group, which suggests that most reactions to disinformation should
be “of a non-regulatory character and involve a wide range of different stakeholders".1742
1738 Cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION; NETWORKS, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation.
Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation., cit., p. 19.
1739 Cf. IACHR, Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, cit, par. 146. See also EFF,
Written Submission for the Office of the Special Rapporteur, cit, 6 ("Moreover, even assuming that it is possible to determine the truth about
everything, the debate and exchange of ideas clearly is the best method to uncover this truth and to strengthen democratic systems based
on plurality of ideas, opinions and information"). This approach is inspired by the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v.
California, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1927. Brandeis maintained the following in a paragraph that has since been part of the
canon of freedom of expression worldwide:
"Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties, and
that, in its government, the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end, and as a means. They
believed liberty to be the secret of happiness, and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;that, without free speech and assembly, discussion
would be futile; that, with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doct rine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty, and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government. They recognized the risks towhich all human institutions are subject. Butthey knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies, and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law — the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed”. See
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), 375-376 (J. Brandeis, concurring).
1740 Cf. POYNTER, A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world. Poynter, 2019, retrieved on: March 6, 2019, from
https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions/.
1741 L. CASADO, TSE falha no combate a fake news na campanha de primeiro turno, Folha de S. Paulo, 2018, retrieved on: October 17,
2018, from https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/tse-falha-no-combate-a-fake-news-na-campanha-de-primeiro-turno.shtml; I.
FERRAZ, TSE adia reunião de combate a fake news a pedido de Bolsonaro. Metrópoles, 2018, retrieved on: October 17, 2018, from
https://www.metropoles.com/Brazil/eleicoes-2018/tse-adia-reuniao-de-combate-a-fake-news-a-pedido-de-bolsonaro; Cf. INE, Nuevos
retos para la democracia Elecciones en tiempos de desinformación. Estrategia y acciones implementadas para enfrentar la desinformación
deliberada en las elecciones mexicanas de 2018 [“New challenges to democracy: Elections in times of disinformation. Strategy and Actions
Implemented to Confront Deliberate Disinformation in the 2018 Mexican Elections”]. National Electoral Institute. 2019; R. MORAES MOURA;
A. PUPO, TSE dá 48 horas para Facebook remover «fake news» contra Marina Silva, Estadão, 2018, retrieved on: October 25, 2018, from
https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/tse-da-48-horas-para-facebook-remover-fake-news-contra-marina-silva/.
1742 EUROPEAN COMMISSION; NETWORKS, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. Report of the
independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation., cit., p.8.
282
It should be noted that private actors with more capacity for action on this phenomenon - platforms, social
networks and intermediary companies - are also called to adopt various actions aimed at combating
disinformation campaigns in their spaces. In different documents, the Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of
Expression have insisted that Internet companies should mitigate the effects of their business models and adopt
and implement measures taking as reference the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and
solutions in international human rights law, especially the instruments and mandates referring to the right to
freedom of expression.
Thus, companies such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter have reacted to the international call with greater
transparency in relation to their content moderation policies, have increased levels of transparency regarding
the decision-making process and have supported initiatives that tend to counteract the phenomenon during
electoral periods, such as quality journalism and the work of fact-checking agencies1743.
It is important to remember that these actions are framed in self-regulation processes of these companies, but
they can have an impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, due to the central role they play
in the flow of information on the Internet. Therefore, it is necessary to insist on the need for their content
moderation practices to respect fundamental guarantees of due process, independent authority, transparency,
so that they are able to strengthen, enrich, and expand the public debate.
Finally, according to the international standards on the governance of the global network represented by the
Internet, it is recommended that countries wishing to take action to combat disinformation should convene all
interested parties to address phenomena that may affect its operation. This is not only a good generic practice
in relation to public policy development processes, but it is especially necessary in this case: we are facing a
complex problem, involving multiple variables and actors, and presenting --- accordingly --- great challenges.
Therefore, it is essential to develop open processes involving public authorities, private companies, academics
and researchers, political parties and electoral bodies, as well as civil society organizations, fact-checking
agencies, the media, and journalists.
III. Recommendations
Taking into account the arguments and background mentioned, the recommendations of the Panel of Experts of
multiple stakeholders convened especially for this purpose, and the inter-American standards of human rights,
in response to the request made by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, next are a
series of recommendations and good practices developed to deal with the phenomenon of misinformation in
electoral contexts, as a starting point, which should be periodically reviewed by the organization, summoning
again all the stakeholders.
1. To the OAS Member States
1.1 To the legislative branch
• Avoid establishing regulatory frameworks that hold intermediaries responsible for content produced by third
parties. Taking into account the background on the matter and the undesirable effects of regulatory
standards that seek to address the problem of misinformation through the establishment of fines and
sanctions directed at intermediaries, it is recommended that the legislative branches of the region refrain
from adopting punitive approaches on the matter. These approaches create incentives for private actors
with a central role in the circulation of information contrary to freedom of expression and the free debate
of ideas, since they will be inclined to censor more content to avoid being sanctioned, and thus affect
protected speeches. Likewise, these regulatory approaches are difficult to administer even when they are
developed taking into account the principles of proportionality and respect for dueprocess.
Avoid using criminal law tools, such as the creation of new broad and ambiguous criminal offenses to typify
the phenomenon of misinformation. Along the same lines, it is necessary to remember that those who
reproduce information of public interest that turns out to be false but do so without intent to infringe a
1743 In the consultation process it was pointed out that, many times, the measures adopted were not implemented in a transparent
manner; It is sometimes difficult to know what measures are being applied and where, how false or misleading contents are affected and to
what extent these solutions can be projected in the long term. Cf. Communication from CELE to the Office of the Special Rapporteur, dated
June 18, 2019. In this regard, it is pertinent to reiterate that this type of measures must be developed for the citizens and transparently.
283
damage or inadvertently cannot be sanctioned in any way1744. In any case, the States that are part of the
Inter-American system may only establish restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in accordance
with the test provided for in Article 13.2 of the American Convention and in other international treaties on
freedom of expression for such restrictions, which requires that they be stipulated by law, intended for
protect one of the legitimate interests recognized by international law, and are necessary and
proportionate to protect that interest, within the framework of the functioning of the democratic system.
• Strengthen the legal frameworks for personal data protection. The use of personal data for advertising
purposes by the various actors of the digital ecosystem is allowed by the different legal systems and is used
by Internet companies in their business model, as well as to facilitate access to diverse content, provided
that the general principles of international standards regarding data protection are complied with. In that
sense, there should not be general exceptions for the use of personal data for political purposes, but a
strengthening of the regulatory frameworks and the authority to control this data.
Legislative branches must strengthen local personal data protection frameworks, since the exploitation of
the data for advertising purposes by platforms and other actors in the digital ecosystem is also one of the
elements that, used improperly, indirectly promotes the phenomenon of misinformation. Proper
protection of personal data should ensure that citizens have final control over how their data is used to
offer them services.
Likewise, these frameworks should have efficient reporting and control mechanisms, in order to prevent
abusive use ofpersonal data. These mechanisms should - in addition - contain exceptions and guarantees
that protect fundamental activities in a democracy - such as journalism and the circulation of information
of public interest - and that allow the robust functioning of legal regimes for access to public information,
an essential dimension of the right to freedom of thought and expression. It is essential that the data
protection authorities have the resources, powers, and independence to be able to intervene and
effectively monitor compliance with the law.
• Strengthen the judicial processes of a civil nature through which subsequent liabilities in the area of freedom
of expression are channeled. The civil liabilities provided for possible abuses in the exercise of freedom of
expression are legitimate in cases where the reputation orprivate life of a public official or a public person
is at stake. In these cases, States must establish that the communicator in the dissemination of information
was intended to inflict damage or conducted themselves with manifest negligence in the search for the
truth or falsity of the news, respecting the principles of necessity and proportionality in the establishment
of the compensation,if applicable. An efficient and timely judicialprocess, without giving upthe guarantees
of due process, can become an effective tool to combat phenomena such as deliberate misinformation that
affects officials or candidates for public office. Likewise, it should be noted that citizens who participate in
the public debate usually do not have the same means as professional journalists to verify the truth or
falsity of information they access and may reproduce, comment, or share a false story. In these cases, this
circumstance should be evaluated to inhibit the responsibility for “manifest negligence” that the standard
of actual malice implies.
• Strengthen the legal frameworks regarding transparency in electoral advertising. One of the essential
conditions to combat the phenomenon of misinformation implies transparency and publicity of the entire
electoralprocess. Most electoral regimes in the region already include transparency obligations, especially
at the head of political parties. Likewise, many also include special obligations, such as pointing out that
certain messages or notices are issued within the framework of electoral campaigns, hired by a certain
political party, electoral alliance, or third parties, and so on.
These obligations must include that political parties transparent and report on the expenditure that is
invested in sites and platforms that operate online, entities involved in digital campaigns, data sources
(such as data brokers), advertising agencies, andproviders of digital tools. This can be established through
obligations to refer to the origin of the notice, the contracting entity orpoliticalparty, the amounts invested,
the criteria used to address the messages, and so on. These measures should not affect citizen’s right to
1744 In this regard, the Inter-American Commission has considered that the use of criminal law as a response to abuses committed in
the exercise of freedom of expression is an essentially disproportionate response (Cf.) and the Inter-American Court has so maintained this
in cases that it was resolved (Cf. IACHR, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, cit., para. 72).
On the “actual malice” standard, see IACHR, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, cit.,
Para. 109.
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express themselves anonymously, especially when that expression is channeled through the investment of
small sums of money by individual persons in socialnetworks.
• Review the legal frameworks that regulate electoral processes. Each country in the region organizes its
elections in a different way: some under national norms, in others, state regulations coexist with others of
federal order, and so on. Also, some countries regulate their processes more or less strictly: the range of
restrictions or prohibitions is very wide in some countries and is almost non-existent in others. The
expansion of electoral campaigns on the Internet and the appearance of the misinformation phenomenon
constitute good opportunities to review and strengthen these legal frameworks. In that sense, if there are
regulations that imply a limitation to freedom of expression, these regulations, in order to be legitimate,
must satisfy the demanding requirements set forth in the tripartite test that the inter-American system has
developed.
These legal frameworks should be reviewed so as not to unduly restrict the right to freedom of expression
in the traditional media and consider the changes that are being registered in electoral campaigns, the
Internet ecosystem, and the new advertising paradigm based on personal information. In that context, the
regulation of electoral advertising could address this advertising practice in a specific way: what may be
legitimate to sell marketable goods may not be legitimate to persuade voters. Third, legal frameworks
regarding electoral advertising could consider certain practices usually prohibited -such as, for example,
attempts to deceive the electorate to “suppress” their right to vote or interfere with the development of the
electoral process- when they are carried out through disinformation actions, in which case the same
remedies or sanctions that the electoral legislation provides for this type of behavior could be applied in
these cases.
1.2 To the Judiciary
• Consider the systemic impact of their decisions on the operation of the Internet. The judiciary must take
human rights standards into consideration when resolving cases in which the speech under scrutiny can
be classified as "misinformation", according to the definition offered in the preceding paragraphs. In this
sense, it is essential that the judges of the region understand that decisions that imply blocking or filtering
access to certain online content are only legitimate if they are established by means of a clear and precise
law, responds to an urgent need, and it can only be achieved through this type of actions and not others
that harm the freedom of expression to a lesser extent. Blocking or taking down content on the Internet
can have an effect similar to censorship.
Likewise, it is essential that within the framework of these processes the damage caused by the speech
under scrutiny is identified and adequate guarantees of due process are offered, in particular for the
producers or issuers of the speech under scrutiny. Judicial remedies, on the other hand, should be limited
and should not affect more speech than is strictly necessary. It is important that the judges of the region
understand the decentralized nature of the network and the unexpected or undesirable consequences that
may arise from generic and disproportionate court orders, which do not account for how the Internet
works.
1.3 To the executive branch and senior public officials
• Remember the special responsibilities that they have in the exercise of their own freedom of expression. The
executive branches of the region have special responsibilities regarding freedom of expression and the
fight against misinformation. In addition to legal and regulatory obligations, the executive as well as
elected authorities and officials, are also often central actors in the political debate in each of the countries.
Sometimes, they are also central actors in the election campaigns.
As the Office of the Special Rapporteur pointed out, when high-ranking public officials exercise their
freedom of expression "they are subject to certain limitations as to reasonably, although not necessarily
exhaustively, present the facts on which they base their opinions, and should do so with an even greater
diligence than that employed by individuals, in view of the high degree of credibility they enjoy and in
order to prevent citizens from receiving a manipulated version of the facts".1745 These responsibilities
apply especially to disinformation campaigns: it has been verified that the intervention of relevant public
actors, without adherence to these principles, promotes the dissemination of false information.
1745 IACHR, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, cit., para. 202.
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Likewise, public officials must be careful to ensure that their comments are accurate and avoid
stigmatization and discredit of the media using labels that refer to so-called fake news or other
qualifications that discredit them, they must also not threaten journalists or undermine respect for the
independence of the media.
• Carry out positive education, training, and awareness actions on the phenomenon of misinformation. In
general, the executive branches of the region control dimensions of the state that are essential for the
development of these types of campaigns. For example, from the management of the education system or
cultural promotion avenues. In these cases, it is essential that the authorities in charge of these
departments address the problem of misinformation through awareness, education, and training
campaigns. They should be focused on offering citizens tools to distinguish true from false information,
become aware of their own participation in the processes of replication of information, and warn about
the impoverishment of the public debate that misinformation generates. While this recommendation is
addressed to the executive branch, it would be desirable for all actors involved in the phenomenon to
develop education and awareness campaigns.
• Promote universal Internet access. One of the basic conditions to fight against misinformation is to be able
to access various sources of information to compare and check if the information received by people is
credible. That requires citizens to have access to all the possibilities offered by the Internet network. In
this regard, the Inter-American Commission has stressed that the principle of “universal access” must
guide state obligations in the matter, and this results in duties such as “the duty to progressively promote
universal access not only to the Internet infrastructure, but to the technology necessary for its use and to
the greatest possible amount of information available on the network; the duty to eliminate arbitrary
barriers to access to infrastructure, technology, and information online; and the duty to adopt positive
differentiation measures to allow the effective enjoyment of this right to persons or communities that so
require due to their circumstances of marginalization or discrimination".1746
• Protect the principle of net neutrality. It is essential to insist that States have the obligation to guarantee
the principle of net neutrality, in relation to the intermediaries that allow the operation of the Internet -
both those who manage the network, aswell asplatforms-. In this regard, States must respect and establish
rules that require intermediaries not to discriminate Internet flows based on the content, origin, recipient,
or device used; This principle has been identified as "a necessary condition for exercising freedom of
expression on the Internet under the terms of Article 13 of the AmericanConvention".1747
• Protect journalists and social communicators from violence. One of the main restrictions on the right to
freedom of expression in Latin America is the phenomenon of violence against journalists1748. Journalists
and the media may be subject to disinformation campaigns, a situation that would increase the risk they
themselves suffer in the exercise of their profession. In that context, it is relevant to remember the special
obligations of protection, prevention, and investigation that weigh on the state authorities in the fight
against violence against journalists and social communicators1749.
1.4 To the electoral authorities
• Strengthen the capacities of citizens to dismantle disinformation campaigns in electoral contexts. Electoral
authorities play a central role for modern democracy. Their role and responsibilities vary according to the
institutional design of each country. In some cases, they have administrative regulatory functions,in others
of investigation (e.g., specialized prosecutors) and in other cases of prosecution. Therefore, the field of
action to address the issue of misinformation is different in eachcase.
• Avoid holding intermediaries responsible for the fact that deliberate misinformation circulates on their
platforms, which can trigger the dynamics of "private censorship." Likewise, it is recommended that the
1746 Cf. IACHR, Standards for a Free, Open, and Inclusive Internet, cit., P. 14.
1747 IACHR, Standards for a Free, Open, and Inclusive Internet, cit., P. 14.
1748 Cf. IACHR. Violence against Journalists and Media Workers. Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. 2013.
1749 Cf. IACHR. Violence against Journalists and Media Workers. Washington, DC: Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. 2013, para. 259.
286
control they exercise meets the general requirements of the inter-American standards of human rights
regarding freedom of expression. That is, that the restrictions on this right are minimal, especially in the
context of the electoral debate, and only be applied as the result of provisions established through laws in
a formal and material sense, that areprecise enough and in compliance with compelling objectives through
which this means can only be achieved, and not by less restrictive ways of the law inquestion.1750
In this sense, the electoral authorities already have numerous contraventions or electoral crimes that they
can use to combat the phenomenon of misinformation; it would be desirable for existing legal frameworks
to be used instead of promoting innovations that threaten freedom ofexpression.
• Strengthen training on electoral processes. One of the patterns identified in disinformation campaigns
deployed in Latin America is the dissemination of false information about the electoral process. It is
especially worrying when the misinformation is relative to the places and date where you can vote, the
form and procedures to vote, or the results of the election itself. This requires the electoral authorities to
act preventively, strengthening, and activelyproviding information actively to citizens about the elections,
so that they have adequate information to exercise their rights and thus not be vulnerable to
disinformation campaigns.
• Collaborate with public authorities regarding data protection. As the misinformation is based, at least in
part, on the use of personal data for advertising purposes, it is important that the electoral authorities
collaborate with the data protection authorities to strengthen the guarantees of the right to privacy in the
face of electoralprocesses.
• Train public officials about the phenomenon of misinformation. It is essential that the electoral authorities
ensure that all relevant public officials in the context of an electoral process know the problem, know in
advance what are the actions planned before the distribution of false information that seeks to deceive the
electorate about the electoral process, and that know the planned procedures to be placed in action. In this
sense, it is relevant that people who participate in electoral observation processes, both internal and
external, are also trained.
• Generate instances of dialogue and cooperation of multiple stakeholders. Public electoral authorities are in
the bestposition to advance a "multi-stakeholder" modelin preparation for an electoralprocess. Theyplay
a role both limited and vitalin the democratic process, they are nonpartisan and can legitimately lead these
processes. They must be intended to (a) convene stakeholders in the phenomenon of misinformation; (b)
work to produce more information and a better understanding of the issue; (c) develop concrete and
staggered proposals for efficient and proportionate actions to counteract the negative effects of
disinformation campaigns.
• Explore the possibility of developing cooperation agreements with Internet platforms and intermediary
companies. One of the positive practices detected in the region is the development of agreements
established between electoral authorities and companies that provide services on the Internet to act
against the phenomenon of misinformation. These agreements allow authorities to better understand how
the Internet works and how the main companies deploy their content moderation policies. They also allow
the establishment of efficient communication channels that allow actions to be taken quickly and
effectively.
The experiences of the National Electoral Institute of Mexico and the Superior Electoral Court of Brazil,
which have been the first to explore this practice in the region, suggest that such agreements may be
positive in the development of proportionate responses and privileged communication channels with the
platforms. Within the framework of this consultation process, information was also received on the use of
these types of agreements in other jurisdictions such as in Argentina and Colombia.
These agreements must be transparent and must not establish regulations of any kind that imply
suppression of content related to information of public interest and debate in the electoral context; if they
do, they would be contrary to the American Convention because they lack the requirements established in
Article 13.2 and adequate mechanisms for questioning or accountability. The restrictions on the type of
response that states may display and that arise from the inter-American human rights standards must
1750 Cf. IACHR, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, cit., Para. 67.
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meet the strict requirements developed in this document, as well as the obligations that weigh on the
authorities in guaranteeing the exercise of freedom of expression during the elections and the rights of the
users of the platforms.
2. To intermediary companies
• Make transparent the criteria used to moderate, detect and prioritize content on platforms. Intermediary
companies play a fundamental role in the way we collectively address the phenomenon of misinformation.
The limitation of liability in legal terms for the contents that circulate on their platforms does not mean
that they do not have special responsibilities for the place they occupy in the free flow of information on
the Internet. In this sense, it is desirable that companies that moderate content continue their efforts to
transparent technological solutions that make possible the curation and algorithmic moderation of
content, including data that inform artificial intelligence. Also, clarify and inform users of the criteria they
use in their internal decision-making processes regarding content that they unsubscribe in application of
their communitypolicies.
Currently, many online platforms are offering information to users about the reasons why they see certain
political campaign notices in the framework of electoral processes: these practices should be consolidated
and even expanded, since they are especially relevant to combat campaigns misinformation in electoral
contexts1751.
• Ensure due process in content moderation. Both content moderation actions based on the internal policies
themselves and those based on legal requirements must be applied respecting elementary guarantees of
due process, including the possibility of questioning moderation decisions before an independent body,
the right to receive reasons of the decisions that exclude certain contents from the public debate, and the
right to have the contents restored if it is determined that the moderation decision was wrong1752.
In this sense, some practices developed in recent months by some intermediaries are positive, such as
creating institutional spaces between the platforms and the claims or appeals of the users, such as
supervisory or appeal advice for those cases in which users have been affected by unsubscribed content or
suspended accounts, etc. In the design of these spaces it is important to provide them with public
designation mechanisms, guarantees of independence of their members regarding corporate interests, and
have the power to influence the policies that the platforms deploy to moderate content.
When these spaces function as true instances of appeal to decision-making processes on content
moderation, they should have as reference the international human rights framework and have due
process guarantees. In this way, they can function as proportionate and suitable responses to guarantee
the right to freedom of expression on their platforms and establish the corresponding remedies when
disengagements protected by this right are written off. However, it is relevant to highlight the advisory
function of these councils, and that they should not aspire to fulfill legal or quasi-legal functions.
• Deepen transparency actions on political advertising, especially during election periods. It is essential that
intermediary companies operate with transparency regarding the phenomenon of disinformation, taking
actions aimed at making visible a phenomenon that is more effective the more it is hidden. Thus, for
example, actions aimed at making political propaganda visible, its origin and financing would allow - for
example - to quickly identify those responsible for the disinformation campaigns that are channeled in this
1751 Twitter expressed its general agreement with the principle and provided the following information: “In Twitter we’re
committed to providing meaningful context around all political entities who use our advertising products. That means enforcing
strict political advertising policies and ensuring ad disclosures on Twitter are transparent and informative. And we’re expanding our
political ads policy and transparency approach to global markets as well. Our teams will continue to build the operational and tooling
support to expand our political advertising policies to other key markets through 2019 and beyond, according to the applicable laws
in each jurisdiction and protecting freedom of speech fundamental principles. We strongly believe that meaningful transparency is
the best path forward for all advertising products we offer, particularly those used in a political context”.
1752 In this regard, Google noted that transparency, regarding their internal process, "cannot be total, as that could make it
easier for malicious actors to discover how to manipulate enforcement policies."
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way. In the same way,it is recommended toplatforms to adapt their electoral advertising offers to the legal
frameworks in force in each jurisdiction in the matter1753.
• Collaborate with independent researchers. Because disinformation is a complex phenomenon, companies
that provide services must collaborate with independent researchers, providing information to better
understand the phenomenon of disinformation. In this sense, there are varying degrees of access to
platform services -from broad access through an API (Application Programming Interface) to restricted
access, based on the periodic production of information that turns to transparency reports-. It is important
that companies deepen these practices, as long as this access occurs guaranteeing the privacy of users.1754
• Collaborate with electoral authorities. Within the good practices identified so far, the collaboration of
companies that provide Internet services with the electoral authorities allows efficient channels of
dialogue to be established that facilitate the legitimate action of the authorities in the face of
misinformation. Therefore,it is necessary for companies to continue their efforts to work with the electoral
authorities in all jurisdictions in which they operate and provide the service, provided they are legitimate
authorities that coordinate democratic electoral processes and are not questioned by the international
community.
• Support quality journalism. Among the self-regulation actions already undertaken by global companies,
those that support independent and quality journalism stand out for strengthening the regulatory ideal of
an open and robust public debate. In this regard, it would be desirable for these efforts to continue and
expand in the region.
• Review the content recommendation algorithms. In general, companies that offer Internet services want
their users toaccess relevant information. At leastin part,they seek to achieve that goalthrough algorithms
that - based on different information about what users are interested in - recommend similar content,
under the premise that this information is "relevant" to them. It is important that companies do not base
these criteria, which are used to build those algorithms, on purely commercial reasons such as, for example,
those that seek to expand the scope of the content or the "permanence" of the users on theplatforms.
• Adopt positive actions aimed at counteracting misinformation campaigns. Platforms should take positive
actions to counteract misinformation, such as - for example - promoting content from fact-checking
agencies. These types of actions are less risky than those that involve removing content and that may be
more effective in combating the worrying phenomena. Since algorithms are largely responsible for the
information that people "see" or "access" on platforms, it is advisable to increase transparency on the
criteria that companies use for the construction and implementation of these mechanisms.
• Review policies on bots and automated publishing tools. Automated publishing tools and bots - as accounts
not controlled by humans, but controlled by automated tools - have been identified as factors that helpthe
expansion of false information.1755 While bots are not problematic in themselves, when they operate as
part of disinformation campaigns they could be moderated by platforms. In this regard, platforms are
recommended to continue working on the identification of problematic uses of this type of technological
tools.
• Develop good practices at the level of self-regulation. Many of the recommendations indicated in the
previous paragraphs seek that the platforms exert the power that they actually have in the flow of
information on the Internet in a virtuous way from the point of view of the values of freedom of expression
that should guide the democratic debate. In this sense, if the platforms, for example, offer a channel for
citizens to express themselves, it is important that if the latter break internal content moderation policies
1753 Various civil society entities in the region have questioned the main actors in the world of platforms and intermediaries in
this regard. See ADC et. al., A call to Facebook, Google, and Twitter to deepen the transparency of online political advertising,
available at: https://adc.org.ar/2019/09/02/un-llamado-a-facebook-google-y-twitter-para-profundizar-la-transparencia-de-lapublicidad-politica-online/
1754 Cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION; NETWORKS, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation.
Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation., cit., p. 25.
1755 Cf. C. SHAO ET. AL, The spread of low-credibility content by social bots, Nature Communications, vol. 9, 1, 2018,4787.
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they can understand the policies, defend their behavior and their contents in a process that protects
elementary principles of due process.
The recommendations contained here and - in general - business practices that seek to align the responses
to the phenomenon of misinformation with the values of free democratic debate constitute, together, a
series of good practices that the industry should develop in that level; that is, as good practices that the
industry recognizes as regulatory ideals for itself. This type of development could have apositive long-term
impact and influence, positively, new companies and Internet services that would surely continue to
emerge in the years to come.
• Respect and proactively comply with the protection of personal data. Platforms feed on personal data to
profile their users and personalize content. It is essential that platforms proactively respect high data
protection standards for all their users.
3. To the political parties
• Avoid campaigns that use false information. Political parties are essential institutions of the democratic
system. They act as intermediaries between citizens and their representatives, and there is no time where
this intermediation is clearer and more efficient than during election campaigns.
It is essential that political parties refrain from promoting disinformation campaigns by themselves or by
third parties, which includes the duty not only to not promote them voluntarily, but to verify that this is
not done involuntarily, that the main actors do not contribute to the dissemination of false information and
that militants and activists reject suchpractices.
• Make the electoral campaign transparent. It is important that the political parties clarify their electoral
campaigns in the sense of informing the communication channels, the contents of the campaigns and the
main messages. This will allow citizens toproperly distinguish nonpartisan campaigns from those that are.
• Respect and proactively comply with the protection of personal data. Political parties must also comply with
the regulations on the protection of personal data and make transparent the sources of data used, the
elaboration of profiles, and the criteria to disseminate personalized messages.
4. To telecommunications companies
• Review zero rating agreements to combat misinformation. Telecommunications companies are
intermediary actors that only have an indirect relationship with the phenomenon. In Latin America, in
recent years, zero rating agreements have been expanded, these are contracts whereby certain social
networks, platforms, or messaging systems agree with telecommunications companies that their services
do not count for the computation of the "data" that their users consume in their mobile phone services.
This allows users with the most economical data plans to use almost exclusively those services, which do
not exceed the amount of data they have contracted.
While these agreements may affect the principle of net neutrality, this occurs under the premise that they
allow Internet access to expand, although at a very limited version of it. This has been problematic in the
face of disinformation campaigns: those who - for example - receive false information through social
networks or almost exclusive private messaging services and cannot verify that information because they
do not have access to the Internet in its entirety.
Without going into the analysis of these private commercial agreements with regards to the right to
freedom of expression, it is recommended that telecommunications companies expand their zero rating
agreements in a way that allows users to access only some of the services or platforms verify information
with media and organizations specialized in verification.1756
5. To the media and journalists
• Strengthen quality journalism against disinformation. It has been proven that the media are relevant actors
in the phenomenon of misinformation. Occasionally, their interventions have caused disinformation to
1756 In this regard, we ratify what was indicated by the IACHR in 2016 in the sense that the compatibility of these agreements
“with human rights must be measured in the light of the legality, necessity, and proportionality test” and taking into account,
especially, the impact they have on access to broad and diverse sources ofinformation.
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expand faster, in other cases, they have been effective in promoting checked information in response to
false information. In any case, political polarization affects them and - according to studies conducted in
the United States - the polarization of the media itself fuels the phenomenon of disinformation
campaigns.1757
It is important that the media and journalists remember their role in a democratic society of privileged
channels of public debate. This imposes a series of good practices that have proven to be significant
contributions to the democratic system, such as investigative journalism, editorial independence, and
certain objectivity as an ex officio regulatory ideal.
6. To Fact-Checkers
• Unify definitions of misinformation and strengthen regional networks. The fact-checking agencies that have
grown exponentially in our region in recent years play an important role in the fight against
misinformation. By verifying public discourse, they offer a service that can helpcitizens navigate a complex
public debate and - occasionally - contaminated with false information.
It is important that fact-checking agencies use precise definitions about their work and the qualifications
they use. In this sense, it is important to limit the phenomenon of misinformation based on the definition
offered above and not apply qualifying adjectives related to the falsity of content that does not strictly
deserve it, such as when some campaigns or information are labeled as “deceptive." Vague or ambiguous
definitions could produce unwanted effects, such as involuntarily increasing the dissemination of false
information or contributing to the discredit of professional media, possibilities especially present in
contexts of high political polarization. In this sense, it is necessary that the definition of misinformation be
limited to the false information distributed knowing its falsity, in the aforementioned terms. This excludes
from this category partial or incomplete information, misleading information (since this criterion is
excessively subjective), inaccurate information, and so on.
7. To companies that trade data for advertising purposes
• Respect existing legal frameworks and participate in the conversation about misinformation. As noted above,
the transformation of the Internet-driven advertising market is one of the elements that can have a broader
effect of misinformation in societies. Thanks to the use of personal data that users share with various
services they use, the industry has managed to develop tools to reach recipients with highly addressed
messages, based on precise profiles of preferences, age groups, income, and so on.
Therefore, it is important that companies that engage in digital advertising and design advertising
campaigns --- commercial and political --- participate in the discussion about misinformation in the
countries in which they operate. Although it seems obvious, it is important to insist on the need for these
companies to abide by the existing legal frameworks regarding data protection and, for example, to not use
personal databases outside of the cases in which it is allowed bylaw.
8. To universities and research centers
• Expand empirical research on disinformation. We still know very little about the extent of misinformation,
its scope, causes and effects. In this sense, it is essential that the academic world deepens its research on
disinformation, a particularly pressing need in Latin America, where research is scarce. These
investigations should have a solid empirical basis, should focus on specific events in the region and should
--- as far as possible --- be carried out in a comparative manner. For this, it is essential to expand the
collaboration networks between universities and research centers in the countries of the region.
1757 Cf. Y. BENKLER ET AL, Network Propaganda, cit.
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PROTEST AND HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS ON THE RIGHTS INVOLVED IN SOCIAL PROTEST AND THE OBLIGATIONS
TO GUIDE THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE
Social protest is a core element for the existence and consolidation of democratic societies and isprotected by a
constellation of rights and freedoms, which the inter-American system guarantees both in the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and in the American Convention on Human Rights.
Indeed, the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association guarantee and protect various
forms—individual and collective—of publicly expressing opinions, dissenting, demanding compliance with
social, cultural, and environmental rights, and affirming the identity of groups that have historically been
discriminated against. Protest also plays a central role in defending democracy and human rights. According to
the instruments of the inter-American system, the joint exercise of these fundamental rights makes the free
exercise of democracy possible.
The region, far from offering a picture of consensus regarding the protection of demonstrations and protests,
has been—and continues to be—the scene of repression, dispersal, and limitation of the exercise of these rights
in the public sphere, the product of a deep-rooted conception that considers citizen mobilization to be a form of
disruption of the public order or, even worse, a threat to the stability of democratic institutions. Hence, a central
objective of this report, prepared by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and its Office of the
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, is to contribute to a better understanding of State obligations
aimed at guaranteeing, protecting, and facilitating public protests and demonstrations, as well as the standards
that should frame the progressive use of force—and as a last resort—in protest contexts.
This report also acknowledges that in different circumstances protests cause disruption and affect the normal
course of other activities—but this fact does not make these forms of expression per se illegitimate. It is based
on the factthat one of the functions ofprotest is to channel and amplify the demands, aspirations, and grievances
of different segments of the population, including those that, due to their situation of exclusion or vulnerability,
cannot readily access traditional media and institutional mediation.
The report stresses that demonstrators have the freedom to choose the mode, form, place, and message for
peaceful protest, and States have the obligation to manage social conflict through dialogue. To this end, States
must respect the limits on their ability to place legitimate restrictions on demonstrations and protests.
The report also provides an update on the exercise of these rights in relation to the growing importance of
the Internet, the media, and the role of advertising, as well as the protection of the social control exercised by
journalists and media workers during the organization, announcement, and holding of protests.
The IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression emphasize that this report is the
result of the ongoing monitoring of the situation of these freedoms in the region and the opening of dialogue
with States and civil society. For more than two years the IACHR and its Office of the Special Rapporteur have
conducted academic visits and consultations with social and academic organizations, experts who have
contributed information and reflections to this report1758; in this regard, they are grateful for the contributions
1758 The Inter-American Commission and its Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression have paid special attention to the guarantee
of the rights involved in social protests and have refered to the matter on various occasions. As background we can mention that in his
2005 Annual Report, the IACHR dedicated a chapter to “Public demonstrations as an exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of
assembly”. The matter has also been the subject of various thematic audiences, has been part of annual reports, country repor ts and
communications. As a direct precedent of this document, in March 2015, at its 154th session, the Commission held the first regional
thematic hearing on human rights in the context of social protest, requested in light of regressions of varying severity in State responses
to public demonstrations in various countries of the region by organizations from different countries: American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), Article 19 Brasil, Article 19 México, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, Perú (APRODEH), Canadian Civil Liberties Association
(CCLA), Cauce Ciudadano A. C., México, Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Francisco de Vitoria, México, Centro de Derechos Humanos
MiguelAgustín Pro Juárez, México, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, Argentina, Centro de Justicia para la Paz y el Desarrollo, México,
Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social (CENCOS), México, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo, Colombia, Comité de
Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos- Honduras (COFADEH), Comité de Solidaridad con Presos Políticos, Colombia, Conectas Direitos
Humanos, Brasil, Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Perú, Corporación Humanas, Chile, Espacio Público, Venezuela, Fundar
Centro de Análisis e Investigación, México, Instituto de Defensores de Direitos Humanos, Brasil (DDH), Instituto de Estudios Legales y
Sociales (IELSUR), Uruguay, Instituto Mexicano de Derechos Humanos y Democracia, México (IMDHD), Justiça Global, Brasil, Núcleo
Especializado de Cidadania e Direitos Humanos de Defensoria Pública do Estado de São Paulo, Observatorio Ciudadano, Chile, Programa
Venezolano de Educación – Acción en Derechos Humanos, Venezuela (PROVEA), Propuesta Cívica, México, Red de Apoyo para la Justicia
y la Paz, Venezuela, Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos "Todos los derechos para todas y todos", México y
Servicios y Asesoría para la Paz, A. C. (SERAPAZ), México. The human rights organizations asked the Commission to address the regional
292
received and hope that these standards will be useful to those responsible for establishing adequate legal
frameworks or for judicial authorities who must adjudicate matters related to protest. In addition, we hope that
it will become a reference for the security forces that have the obligation to protect and manage the staging of
demonstrations andprotests.
trends that were exposed; develop new standards in the field; discuss with States ways to promote the incorporation into their national
laws and policies of the standards developed in the 2009 Citizen Security and Human Rights Report; and identify in a specific document
a series of guiding principles on the promotion and protection of human rights in social protest contexts. In October 2015, a follow-up
meeting was held between the organizations requesting the hearing and the Executive Secretariat of the IACHR. In its 2015 annual
report,the IACHR dedicated a section of its chapter 4A to the use offorce in social protest contexts, after conducting a public consultation
to which numerous organizations and states in the region replied. In 2016, the IACHR instructed the Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression to produce a broader thematic report, which would bring together different aspects of the right to social
protest, based on the relevant background of the Inter-American System and the international human rights system. Edison Lanza,
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Ona Flores, specialists from the Office ofthe Special Rapporteur, and Gustavo F. Palmieri,
specialized consultant, participated in the preparation of the document. On February 23, 2017, with a first draft of the document, the
Office held an experts’ meeting in Washington, DC. Participants included: Paulo Abrao, IACHR Executive Secretary, Heidy Rombouts
from the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, María Luisa Bascur, for the
Mexico Office of the UN Human Rights High Commissioner, Daniel Holder from the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) in
the UK, Catalina Botero, from Universidad de los Andes-Colombia and former IACHR Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,
Michael Hamilton from University of East Anglia/OSCE –Great Britain. In addition, the following organizations were represented: Centro
de Estudios Legales y Sociales/CELS Argentina; Article XIX, (Offices in Brasil and the UK), the Canadian Civil Liberties Association de
Canadá, Colectivo de AbogadosJosé Alvear Restrepo-Colombia; American Civil Liberties Union/ACLU de EEUU; Centro PRODH-México;
Universidad Católica Andrés Bello Venezuela; Centro para la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional/CEJIL; Due Process Law
Foundation/DPLF USA; International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights and The International Center for Not Profit
Law/ICNL, EEUU; Nicolás Hernández, Daniel Simons and Sandra Coliver, Mariana Mas, Roxane Cassehgari from Open Society Justice
Iniciative.
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CHAPTER I
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
294
I. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The Right to Protest: Definitions and modes
1. Protest1759 is a form of individual or collective action aimedat expressing ideas, views, or values of dissent,
opposition, denunciation, or vindication. Examples include the expression of political, social, or cultural
opinions, views, or perspectives; the vocalization of support or criticism regarding a group, party, or the
government itself; the reaction to a policy or the denunciation of a public problem; the affirmation of
identity or raising awareness about a group’s situation of discrimination and social exclusion.
2. The right to freedom of expression is strongly interconnected with freedom of assembly and the right to
protest. Assemblies, defined as any intentional and temporary congregation of a group of people in a
private or public space for a specific purpose,1760 “play a vibrant role in mobilizing the population and in
formulating grievances and aspirations, facilitating the celebration of events and, importantly, in
influencing States’publicpolicy.”1761 At the same time, the expression of individual and collective opinions
is one of the objectives of any protest.
3. The right to protest is also strongly associated with human rights activities, including demands for the
recognition, protection, or exercise of a right. In many cases, and in different countries in the region,
protests are used to react to specific acts of violence, evictions, labor issues, or other events that have
affected rights. Protests have been a means to achieve both the raising of the threshold to guarantee
fundamental rights at the national level and the inclusion of a large number of rights in the progressive
development of international human rights law.1762
4. Protest is also closely linked to the promotion and defense of democracy. In particular, the Inter-American
Court has recognized that in situations involving a breakdown of the democratic institutional order,
protest should be understood to “[correspond] not only to the exercise of a right, but also to compliance
with the obligation to defend democracy.”1763
5. In democratic societies, individuals and the general public organize and express their demands in
different ways and through strategies that vary from condemnation to direct pressure, and in more
institutional and structured forms, through formally established organizations—although this also
encompasses non-institutional strategies, and spontaneous and horizontally organized demonstrations
andprotests.
6. In this regard,protests may be led or supported by different types of actors or by a combination of actors.
Organized civil society, or NGOs; neighborhood associations, religious bodies, schools, research
institutions; trade unions and professional associations; political parties and social movements make
these processes of grievance and expression feasible, within the framework of their strategies for the
promotion of their ideas and interests or for the defense or promotion of rights.
7. However, spontaneousprotests are also a legitimate form of expression, denunciation,protest, or support
for various events. They may involve a singleperson, small groups of individuals, or multitudinous groups
in which thousands of people may be coordinated without any specific association with more structured
organizations such as those mentionedabove.
1759 Notwithstanding the substantive discussions on the terms used in this section, the concepts of “social protest” and “public
demonstrations” will be used interchangeably for the purposes of this report.
1760 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (21 May 2012) para. 51
1761 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (21 May 2012) para. 51
1762 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 23 May
2011, A/HRC/17/28, para. 31. It has also been stated that assemblies “play a critical role in protecting and promoting a broad range of
human rights.” Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies,
A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 6.
1763 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015.
Series C No. 302, paras. 148 et seq.
295
8. The Commission notes that although protests and demonstrations in general are associated with rallies
or marches in public spaces, they can take different forms and modes—as recognized by the various
international human rights protection systems. In its report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
in the Americas, the IACHR considered traditional forms of protest, but also made special mention of
roadblocks, , cacerolazos [drumming pots and pans], and vigils, as well as parades, conferences, and
sporting, cultural, artistic, and other events. 1764
9. In recent years, the United Nations Rapporteurs also included demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, and
peaceful occupations in their reports as part of the exercise of the rights to peaceful assembly and
association. National and international high courts have held that the right to peaceful and unarmed
assembly should not be interpreted narrowly, since it constitutes a fundamental element of
democracy.1765
10. In short, the Commission understands that some of these forms of protest present complexities for
purposes of harmonizing the rights at stake, and that they draw from a diverse repertoire that changes
under different conditions and contexts, both in urban and rural settings, as well as when carried out by
the most vulnerable groups. In any case, however, it is essential for State responses to the various modes
of protest to be guided by dialogue and guarantees for the exercise of all other associated rights.
11. For example, many protests are aimed at expressing opinions rejecting public policies or the officials
responsible for them, demanding new measures from the different branches of the State or levels of
government, supporting or amplifying public events, or commemorating historical events related to the
identity of a people or group, reinforcing the identity of social groups as actors on the public stage and
claiming their rights or the conditions of access to them, demanding justice, or protesting against
decisions of the Judiciary that they consider unjust, etc.
12. The IACHR also recognizes in this report that, whatever the form of protest, the inter-American
instruments establish that the right of assembly must be exercised peacefully and without arms. In the
same vein, the Commission recognizes that States have a duty to take the necessary measures to prevent
acts of violence and to guarantee public safety and order. However, when using force in these contexts,
States must use measures proportional to the accomplishment of these objectives and not arbitrarily
hinder the exercise of the rights at stake in protests.
13. Moreover, forms of protest must also be understood in relation to the subject and objective of the action,
the underlying theme it addresses, and the context in which it takes place. Some modes seek to create a
certain disruption of daily life or a response to practices and norms as a way to raise awareness of
proposals or issues or amplify voices that would otherwise be unlikely to be on the agenda or part of
public deliberation. Protests directed at private actors, whether an individual, an institution, or a
company, may also express grievances or opinions on matters of public interest. This is the case, for
example, in many of the public demonstrations condemning the environmental harm or pollution that
may result from the activity of large extractive companies, or from the operation of businesses that have
impacts on territories.
14. The IACHR recognizes that protest plays a fundamental role in the development and strengthening of
democratic systems, is protected by inter-American human rights instruments, and is instrumental in
enabling citizen participation in elections and referendums. They can also contribute to the full enjoyment
of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.1766
15. Protest as a form of participation in public affairs is also relevant because of the structural inequalities
that still characterize our region. As the IACHR’s Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
1764 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006.
1765 UN, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai, A-HRC20-27, para. 12.
1766 Human Rights Council, The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, 24 March 2014,
A/HRC/25/L.20; Human Rights Council, The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, 11 April
2014, A/HRC/RES/25/38. The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions have similarly stated with regard to the proper management of play a
fundamental role in public participation, holding governments accountable and expressing the will of the people as part of the
democratic processes.” Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies,
A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 5.
296
Expression has already pointed out, the most impoverished sectors of our continent face discriminatory
policies and actions and have just begun to have access to information on measures that affect their daily
lives. The traditional channels of participation to which they should have access in order to make their
demands public are often curtailed.1767
16. Although groups and sectors with greater representation and access to formal channels of complaint and
political participation also have broad access to the exercise of protest, the protection and guarantee of
this right deserve special attention when it is expressed by underrepresented or marginalized sectors or
groups that face institutional frameworks not conducive to their participation, or serious barriers to
access to other forms of mass communication. Protest isparticularly relevant “in amplifying the voices of
people who are marginalized or who present an alternative narrative to established political and
economic interests.1768
1767 IACHR, Annual Report 2005, Volume III, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February 27, 2006,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 7, Chapter V, “Public Demonstrations as an Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,”
para. 1.
1768 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 6.
297
CHAPTER II
APPLICABLE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
298
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1. Rights involved
17. In recent years, both in the inter-American human rights system and in the universal and other regional
systems, it has been held that States have obligations to respect, protect, and guarantee human rights in
the context of protest. This Commission observes that the international system1769 and the regional
systems have pointed out, on different occasions, the relationship of interdependence and indivisibility
of the rights exercised through public demonstrations and social protest actions. In particular, the interAmerican system has acknowledged the relationship between political rights, freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of association, and that these rights, taken together, make the
democratic process possible.1770
18. Right to freedom of expression. This right is enshrined in Article IV of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, and in Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights. This
Commission has on numerous occasions considered “public demonstrations as an exercise of freedom of
expression.”1771 This is because the expression of opinions, the dissemination of information, and the
articulation of demands are central objectives of protests. The IACHR and its Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have reiterated that, “Freedom of expression constitutes the
primary and basic element of the public order of a democratic society, which is not conceivable without
free debate and the possibility that dissenting voices be fully heard.”1772 In this regard, the right toprotest
is protected by the right to freedom of expression.1773
19. Freedom of assembly. Social protest is also protected by the freedom of assembly1774 enshrined in Article
XXI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and Article 15 of the American
Convention on Human Rights. Freedom of assembly protects the peaceful, intentional, and temporary
congregation of people in a given space for the achievement of a common goal, including protest. As such,
it is indispensable for the collective expression of people’s opinions and views. 1775 The exercise of
freedom of assembly is vitally important for the consolidation of democratic societies and is therefore of
compelling social interest.1776
20. Right to freedom of association. Protest is often an important means of action and the pursuit of legitimate
objectives by organizations and groups, and as such can also be protected by the right to freedom of
association1777 provided for in Article XXII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
1769 Human Rights Council, Res 19/35, of 23 March 2012; 22/10, of 21 March 2013; 25/38, of 28 March 2014; 31/37, of 24 March
2016; 38/11 of 16 July 2018.
1770 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015,
para. 160.
1771 IACHR, Annual Report 2005, Volume III, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February 27, 2006,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 7, Chapter V, “Public Demonstrations as an Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly.”
1772 IACHR, Annual Report 2005, Volume III, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February 27, 2006,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 7, Chapter V, “Public Demonstrations as an Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,”
para. 6, citing the Court’s opinion in Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory
Opinion OC 5/85, Series A, No. 5, of November 13, 1985, para. 69.
1773 Idem. IACHR 2005, para. 6, citing ECtHR, Vogt v. Germany, Judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A, No. 323, para. 64; ECtHR, Rekvényi
v. Hungary, Judgment of 20 May 1999, 1999-III Reports of Judgments and Decisions, para. 58; ECtHR, Young, James, and Webster v. United
Kingdom, Judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A,No. 44, para. 57;ECtHR, Refah Partisi(The Welfare Party) and others, v. Turkey Judgment
of 31 July 2001, para. 44, available at http://www.echr.coe.int; ECtHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Judgment
of30 January 1998, Report 1998-I, para. 42. See also: Supreme Court of Zambia, Christine Mulundika and 7 Others v. The People, Judgment
of February 7, 1996, 2 LCR 175 (where the Court held that the right to organize and participate in a public meeting is inherent in the
right to express and receive ideas and information without interference as well as to communicate ideas and information without
interference).
1774 In that report, the IACHR stated that, “the right of assembly (…) is essential to the enjoyment of various rights such as freedom of
expression, the right of association, and the right to defend human rights. Political and social participation through the ex ercise of
freedom of assembly is critical to the consolidation of democratic life in societies and thus contains a keen social interest.” In: IACHR,
Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, paras. 128-
129.
1775 See communication No. 1948/2010, Turchenyak et al. v. Belarus, views adopted on 24 July 2013.
1776 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, paras.
128-129.
1777 In relation to the duty of the States to ensure the right of association, the Inter-American Court has said that freedom of association
protects “the right to join with others in lawful common pursuits, without pressure or interference that may alter or impair the nature
299
and in Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights. This protection, moreover, has specific
dimensions, such as trade union rights and the right to strike.1778 The Human Rights Council has
recognized the link between freedom of association and protest, stating that “Other rights that may be
applicable in case of peaceful protests include, for instance, the right to freedom of association.”1779 The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, “Inter-American Court”) has held that freedom of
association “establishes the right of assembly and is characterized by authorizing individuals to create or
take part in entities or organizations in order to act collectively to achieve very diverse purposes,
provided they are legitimate.”1780 This entails “the right and the freedom to associate in order to seek
together a lawful purpose, without pressure or interference that can alter or [distort] thispurpose.”1781
21. This Commission underscores that the lawful and legitimate aims of freedom of association includepublic
demonstrations and social protests. The protection granted to the freedom of association extends
throughout the life of the association and includes enabling the exercise of the purposes for which it was
established.1782 Such protection may include associations that are not supported by a formalinstitutional
or legal structure. It should be noted that the formal organizations that make upourpluralistic democratic
societies arise, for the most part, through gradual processes of institutionalization.
22. Right to organize and right to strike: The right to freedom of association has particular dimensions when
it comes to specific groups and collectives or specific forms of protest. One example of this is trade unions
and strikes, respectively. In this field, the right of association is especially protected by Article 8 of the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights –
“Protocol of San Salvador.” The right to freedom of trade union association consists of “freedom of
association consists basically of the ability to constitute labor union organizations, and to set into motion
their internal structure, activities and action program, without any intervention by the public authorities
that could limit or impair the exercise of the respective right.” The right to strike is one of the expressions
of this right, and has been considered one of the most common forms of exercising the right to protest.
The specific protection afforded to indigenous peoples’ forms of association and organization under the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and their forms of demonstration and
protest when related to specially protected rights, such as their cultural identity and lands, should be
interpreted in the same regard.1783
23. Right to political participation: Protest in the context of the consolidation of democracies in the region is
a fundamentaltool ofpoliticalparticipation and of the right to “participate in the conduct ofpublic affairs,”
both in terms of the Inter-American Democratic Charter1784 and under Article 23 of the American
Convention. The Human Rights Council has also maintained that “Other rights that may be applicable in
case of peaceful protests include (...) the right (...) to take part in the conduct of public affairs (Article
25).”1785 Protest as a form of participation in public affairs is especially relevant for groups of people
historically discriminated against or marginalized.
of such purpose” (I/A Court H.R., Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series
C No. 196, para. 143).
1778 Article XXII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; Article 8 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention
in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights – “Protocol of San Salvador”); Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. See: General Assembly, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights defenders,
13 August 2007, A/62/225, para. 12.
1779 Human Rights Council, Effective measures and best practices to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of
peaceful protests, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 21 January 2013, A/HRC/22/28, para. 4.
1780 I/A Court H.R., Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 6, 2009, para. 169.
1781 Cfr. Case of Baena Ricardo, et al.,supra note 46, para. 156; Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru. Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 10, 2007. Series CNo. 167, para. 144; Case of Kawas Fernández,supra nota 35, para. 143;
I/A Court H.R., Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 6, 2009, para. 170.
1782 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66 (December 31, 2011),para.
155;ECHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, No. 19392/92, para. 33.
1783 United Nations General Assembly. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. (A/61/L.67 and Add.1). 107th plenary meeting, 13
September 2007.
1784 Article 2 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter states that “Representative democracy is strengthened and deepened by permanent,
ethical, and responsible participation of the citizenry within a legal framework conforming to the respective constitutional order.”
Article 6 states, “It is the right and responsibility of all citizens to participate in decisions relating to their own development. This is also
a necessary condition for the full and effective exercise of democracy. Promoting and fostering diverse forms of participation
strengthens democracy.”
1785 Human Rights Council, Effective measures and best practices to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of
peaceful protests, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 21 January 2013, A/HRC/22/28, para. 4. The
Human Rights Council has further stated, “Acknowledging also that participation in peaceful protests can be an important form of
exercising the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, of expression, of association and of participation in the conduct of public affairs,”
and “Recognizing that peaceful protests can make a positive contribution to the development, strengthening and effectiveness of
300
24. Economic, social, and cultural rights: Protest is also an essential mechanism for guaranteeing
economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights. The struggles for the right to land, the right
to a healthy environment, demonstrations against economic reforms and labor flexibilization,
among many other things, have led thousands of human rights advocates, as well as student, social,
and rural leaders to organize in order to fight for the enjoyment of their rights.1786 The most
impoverished sectors of our hemisphere face discriminatory policies and actions, their access to
information on the planning and execution of measures that affect their daily lives is in its infancy,
and in general the traditional channels of participation to publicly voice their complaints are often
limited. Against this backdrop, in many countries of the hemisphere, social protest and
mobilization have become tools for petitioning public authorities as well as channels for the public
condemnation of abuses or violations of human rights.1787
25. Other rights: A protest may encompass other specific rights linked to the groups, actors, or interests
involved, such as gender equality in women’s movements, or rights protecting migrants, children and
adolescents, or indigenous peoples. Protest has also been—and remains—a fundamental tool in the
region for different population groups to express their identity and challenge intolerance and
discrimination, such as LGBTIQ people and populations of African descent.
26. An analysis of the rights involved in demonstrations andprotests must also take into account the fact that
improper responses by the State may affect not only the abovementioned rights but also other
fundamental rights, such as the rights to life, physical integrity, personal safety, and the right to liberty.
This occurs when the State’s response leads to the deaths and injuries of demonstrators, mainly due to
acts of repression by government agents or a lack of State protection against assaults by other
demonstrators or third parties. In our region, participants in protests have often been victims of
extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, torture, ill-treatment, and illegal deprivations of liberty.
In some cases itis not only the State, butalsoprivate actors acting with the acquiescence ofpublic officials.
2. Legitimate restrictions to the rights involved in demonstrations and protests
27. The Inter-American Commission has documented on several occasions that States in the region have
perceived and implemented disproportionate responses to protests, as if they were a threat to the
stability ofthe government or to national security.In this regard, the failure to complywith the obligations
to respect and guarantee the rights involved in protest “has triggered widespread violence, which in turn
has led to serious violations of this right and violations of the rights to life,physicalintegrity, andpersonal
liberty and security of those participating in the social protest demonstrations.”1788
28. With regard to this situation, the Commission has pointed out that States are obliged to guarantee and
facilitate the exercise of the human rights at stake during demonstrations and protests, and to implement
measures and mechanisms to ensure that those rights can be exercised in practice, rather than hindered.
The Inter-American Court has also ruled that citizen security cannot be based on a use of force paradigm
aimed at treating the civilian population as the enemy, but must consist of the protection and control of
civilians participating in demonstrations.1789
29. The Inter-American Court has held that the obligation to respect the rights and freedoms recognized in
the American Convention, established in Article 1.1 thereof, entails “the duty of States Parties to organize
the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised,
so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.”1790
democratic systems and to democratic processes, including elections and referendums.” Whereas clauses of Resolution 25/38 adopted
by theHuman Rights Council. The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests. A/HRC/RES/25/38. 11
April 2014.
1786 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, March 7, 2006, para. 215.
1787 IACHR, Chapter IV, Annual Report 2002, Vol. III “Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,” OEA/Ser.
L/V/II. 117, Doc. 5 rev. 1, para. 29.
1788 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, paras.
130-131; IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57, para. 192.
1789 I/A Court H.R., Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, para. 78; Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2018. Series C No. 371, para. 167.
1790 I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 166; I/A Court H.R., Case
of Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5, para. 175.
301
30. At the same time, Article 2 of the Convention establishes the duty of the States “to adopt, in accordance
with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”1791 This duty entails “the
adoption of measures of two kinds: on the one hand, elimination of any norms and practices that in any
way violate the guaranteesprovided under the Convention; on the other hand, the promulgation of norms
and the development of practices conducive to effective observance of those guarantees.”1792
31. With respect to the scope of these rights, while freedom of peaceful assembly, expression, association,
and participation are not absolute, restrictions on them should be subject to a number of
requirements.1793 For restrictions on these rights to be legitimate they must be expressly established by
law and be necessary to ensure respect for the rights of others or the protection of national security,
public order, or public health or morals,1794 under the terms of Articles 13, 15, and 16 of the American
Convention, and Articles IV, XXI, and XXII of theDeclaration.1795
32. Before examining these requirements with respect to the rights at stake, the Commission wishes to stress
that the right to protest must be considered the general rule, and limitations to this right must be the
exception.1796 The protection of the rights and freedoms of others should not be used as a mere excuse to
restrict peaceful protests.1797 In turn, States must bear in mind that these rights are exercised
interdependently during a demonstration or protest; in the words of the Inter-American Court: “The
ability to protest publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways to exercise the right to
freedom of expression, and can contribute to the protection of other rights.”1798
33. A comprehensive analysis of the standards relating to restrictions on the main rights involved—freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association—makes it possible to identify common
elements in the application of the three-part “test” to assess restrictions on demonstrations and protests.
First, any limitation must be provided for in law. Second, it should pursue the legitimate objectives
expressly set out in the American Convention. Third, the restrictions must be necessary in a democratic
society—a criterion from which proportionality standards are also derived. The authority imposing
limitations on a public demonstration must demonstrate that these conditions have been met and all of
them must be respected simultaneously in order for the limitations imposed on social protest to be
legitimate under the American Convention.1799 1800
1791 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 2.
1792 I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 207; I/A Court H.R., Case of Baena
Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 108; I/A Court H.R., Case of Cantoral
Benavides v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, para. 178; I/A Court H.R., Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2006. Series C No. 162, para. 172.
1793 IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2002, Chapter IV, “Freedom of Expression and
Poverty,” para. 31; IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2005, Volume III, Report of the Office of
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February 27, 2006, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 7, Chapter V, “Public Demonstrations
as an Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,” para. 2; Human Rights Council, Report ofthe United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai, 21 May 2012, A/HRC/20/27, para. 15; Human
Rights Council, Effective measures and best practices to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful
protests, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/22/28, 21 January 2013, para. 5.
1794 IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2002, Chapter IV, “Freedom of Expression and
Poverty,” para. 31; IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2005, Volume III, Report of the Office of
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February 27, 2006, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 7, Chapter V, “Public Demonstrations
as an Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,” para. 2; IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
in the Americas, March 7, 2006, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev. 1, para. 55; Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai, 21 May 2012, A/HRC/20/27, para. 15; Human
Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina
Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39, para. 47; Human Rights Council, Effective measures and best practices to ensure the promotion and
protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
A/HRC/22/28, 21 January 2013, para. 5.
1795 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, para.
107; IACHR, Annual Report 2007, Chapter IV, paras. 260-261.
1796 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39, para. 47.
1797 Human Rights Council, Effective measures and best practices to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of
peaceful protests, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/22/28, 21 January 2013, para. 12.
1798 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015.
Series C No. 302, para. 167.
1799 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 68.
1800 The UN Human Rights Committee has expressed the same view. Under Article 19, para. 3 of the Covenant, certain restrictions on
freedom of expression are permitted, but only to the extent that they are established by law and are necessary to: a) ensure respect for
the rights or reputations of others; or b) the protection of national security, public order, public health, or morals. The criteria for
restrictions on the rights guaranteed in Articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant follow a similar logic. The mere existence of objective
302
34. The restrictions must be provided for in the law in advance, expressly, exhaustively, precisely and
clearly,1801 both procedurally and substantively.1802,1803 Only procedural law, the Inter-American Court
has held, “is capable of restricting the enjoyment or exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention.”
“The word ‘laws’ in Article 30 of the Convention means a general legal norm tied to the general welfare,
passed by democratically elected legislative bodies established by the Constitution, and formulated
according to the procedures set forth by the constitutions of the States Parties for that purpose.”1804 Laws
that restrict social protests should be drafted in the clearest and most precise terms possible, since the
legal framework that regulates freedom of expression must provide legal certainty to citizens.1805
35. The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has stated that “vague or ambiguous legal
provisions that grant, through this channel, very broad discretionary powers to the authorities, are
incompatible with the American Convention, because they can support potential arbitrary acts that are
tantamount to prior censorship or that establish disproportionate liabilities for the expression of
protected speech.”1806 Such provisions discourage the dissemination of information and opinions out of
fear of punishment, and can lead to broad judicial interpretations that unduly restrict freedom of
expression. As such, the State must specify the conduct that may be subject to subsequent liability in order
to prevent adverse impacts upon the free expression of protest and disagreement with the actions of the
authorities.1807
36. Limitations on social protests must seek to achieve the legitimate objectives authorized by American
Convention. Article 15 of the American Convention, which addresses the right of peaceful assembly,
establishes that this right may be subject to restrictions imposed “in the interest of national security,
public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedom of others.”
Article 16.2 provides the same substantive conditions for a legitimate restriction on freedom of
association. Article 13.2 states that restrictions placed on the exercise of freedom of expression are
legitimate only if they seek to ensure (i) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or (ii) the
protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. The restrictions imposed must
pursue one of the compelling objectives specified in the American Convention, and must be necessary to
achieve compelling public interests that, because of their importance in specific cases, clearlyprevail over
the social need for the full enjoyment of this right.1808 The IACHR has held that the States are not free to
interpret in any way the content of these objectives for purposes of justifying a limitation to freedom of
expression in specific cases.1809
justifications for limiting these rights is not sufficient. The State party must further demonstrate that the prohibition is necessary to
prevent a real, and not merely hypothetical, threat to national security or the democratic order, that less intrusive measures would not
be sufficient to achieve the same purpose, and that the restriction imposed is proportionate to the interest to be protected.(See: General
Comment No. 34 of the Human Rights Committee, on Freedoms of expression and opinion, para. 34; Communication No. 1119/2002,
Jeong-Eun Lee v. Republic of Korea, views adopted on 20 July 2005, para. 7.2; Belyatsky and Others v. Belarus, Communication No.
1296/2004, decision of 7 August 2007, para. 7.3).
1801 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 69; I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5,
paras. 39-40; I/A Court H.R., Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series
C No. 135, para. 79; I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 120; I/A Court H.R., Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations
and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. SeriesC No. 193, para. 117;IACHR.AnnualReport 1994. Chapter V:Report on the Compatibility
of “Desacato” Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights. Title IV. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995; IACHR.
ReportNo. 11/96. Case No. 11.230. Francisco Martorell. Chile. May 3, 1996, para. 55; IACHR. Arguments before the Inter-American Court
in the Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Reprinted in: I/A Court H.R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 72. a).
1802 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 69;
1803 ACHR, Arts. 13, 15, 16.2; See also IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal
Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 69.
1804 I/A Court H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, May 9, 1986, Series A No. 6.
1805 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 69. With regard to the legal requirement concerning restrictions on the right of assembly and
association, see: IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15 December 31, 2015, para.
120; Annual Report 2007, Venezuela, OEA.Ser.L/II.130, December 29, 2007, para. 260; Cf. I/A Court H.R., Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v.
Panama. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, paras. 168.
1806 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 70
1807 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 71.
1808 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 74
1809 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 75.
303
37. Exceptions such as “State security,” “public safety,” “public order,” and “protection of the rights of others”
must be defined and interpreted in accordance with the inter-American legal framework. The InterAmerican Court has defined “public order” as “the conditions that assure the normal and harmonious
functioning of institutions based on a coherent system of values and principles.”1810 The notion of “public
order” cannot be invoked to suppress a right guaranteed by the Convention, to change its nature or to
deprive it of its real content.1811 If this concept is invoked as a basis for limiting human rights, it must be
interpreted strictly in accordance with the just demands of a democratic society that takes into account
the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of
the American Convention.1812
38. Limitations on social protest must be necessary in a democratic society for the achievement of the
compelling aims they pursue, and strictly proportionate to those aims.1813 The requirement of necessity
“in a democratic society” is expressly provided for both in Articles 15 and 16 on freedom of peaceful
assembly and freedom of association, and in Articles 29 and 32 of the American Convention.1814 In the
opinion of the Court, “It follows from the repeated reference to ‘democratic institutions,’ ‘representative
democracy’ and ‘democratic society’ that the question whether a restriction on freedom of expression
imposed by a state is ‘necessary to ensure’ one of the objectives listedin subparagraphs (a) or (b) [of art.
13.2 of the ACHR] must be judged by reference to the legitimate needs of democratic societies and
institutions. […] The just demands of democracy must consequently guide the interpretation of the
[American Convention] and, in particular, the interpretation of those provisions that bear a critical
relationship to the preservation and functioning of democratic institutions.”1815
39. In addition, the adjective “necessary” does not mean “useful,” “reasonable,” or “timely.”1816 In order for
the restriction to be legitimate, it must be clearly established that there is a certain and compelling social
need to implement the restriction, meaning that such legitimate and compelling objective cannot
reasonably be achieved by means less restrictive of the human rights involved.1817 The Inter-American
Court has explained, in this regard, that necessity entails the existence of an overriding social need, and
that demonstrating the usefulness, reasonableness, or timeliness of the restriction is not sufficient, while
“the legality of restrictions [...] depend upon showing that the restrictions are required by a compelling
governmental interest. That is, the restriction must be proportionate and closely tailored to the
accomplishment of the legitimate governmental objective necessitating it.”1818
40. The requirement of “necessity” also means that restrictions on rights must not go beyond what is strictly
necessary, so as to ensure the full exercise and scope of these rights. This requirement suggests that the
least burdensome means available should be selected to protect fundamental (protected) legal interests
from the most serious attacks that harm or endanger them, otherwise itwould lead to the abusive exercise
1810 I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para. 64.
1811 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, paras. 80/82.
1812 I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para. 64.
1813 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 67.
1814 Cf. IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of “Desacato” Laws with the American Convention on Human
Rights. Title IV. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
1815 I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, paras. 42 & 44.
1816 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 85; /A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5,
para. 46; I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 122; IACHR. Annual Report
1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of “Desacato” Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights. Title IV. OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.88. doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
1817 European Court of Human Rights Dudgeon Case, Judgment of 22 October, 1981, Series A: v. 45, # 51; IACHR, Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Rightto Freedom of Expression, 2010, para.
85.
1818 I/A Court H.R., OC-5/85, para. 46; IACHR, Annual Report of the Office ofthe Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2002, Chapter
IV, “Freedom of Expression and Poverty,” para. 32.
304
of State power.1819 In other words, among several options to achieve the same objective, the one that least
restricts the rights protected by the American Convention should be chosen.1820
41. It is inherent to the functioning of a democratic society that the State must continuously weigh competing
or conflicting legitimate rights and interests against each other.1821 And this weighing, under the
requirement of necessity—understood as a compelling social need—means that at times the exercise of
freedom of assembly can alter daily routine routines, especially in large urban centers, and even create
nuisances or affect the exercise of other rights that should be protected and guaranteed by the State, such
as freedom of movement. Nevertheless, as the Commission has acknowledged, “such disruptions are part
of the mechanics of a pluralistic society in which diverse and sometimes conflicting interests coexist and
find the forums and channels in which to express themselves.”1822
42. Restrictions must also be strictly “proportionate” to the legitimate aim for which they are intended, and
closely tailored to the achievement of that aim, interfering as little as possible with the lawful exercise of
that right.1823 To determine the strict proportionality of the restrictive measure, it must be determined
whether the sacrifice of freedom of expression it entails is exaggerated or excessive in relation to the
advantages obtained through such measure.1824 In the opinion of the Inter-American Court, in order to
establish the proportionality of a restriction when freedom of expression is limited for purposes of
preserving other rights, the circumstances of the case must be examined, for instance: (i) the degree to
which the competing right is affected (serious, intermediate, moderate); (ii) the importance of satisfying
the competing right; and (iii) whether the satisfaction of the competing right justifies the restriction to
freedom of expression.1825
43. The principle of proportionality should also take into consideration the subprinciple of narrow tailoring.
That is, in order for protest to be limited by an instrument or means that suitably or appropriately meets
the objective pursued, such measure must be effectively conducive to achieving the legitimate and
compelling objectives sought. An application of this principle means that the States must avoid
widespread and indiscriminate measures to restrictprotest.1826
44. Finally, the fact that demonstrations and protests involve the right to freedom of expression, both in the
way in which they take place and in the content they express, can often result in speciallyprotected forms
of speech, the robustness of which is conducive to the development and strengthening of democratic
coexistence. In that regard, the imposition of subsequent liability is strictly enforceable (Article 13.2 of
the Convention). The Inter-American Court has held that “the guarantees contained in the American
Convention regarding freedom of expression were designed to be more generous and to reduce to a bare
minimum the restrictions impeding the free circulation of ideas.”1827
45. In view of the foregoing, States should be particularly strict when imposing restrictions on public
demonstrations. The widespread application of legal restrictions on the right to take part in peaceful
1819 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, paras. 86; I/A Court H.R., Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations
and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, para. 119.
1820 I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 de November 13, 1985, Series A, No. 5, para. 46; IACHR, Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Rightto Freedom of Expression, 2010, para.
86.
1821 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc57, para. 195.
1822 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc57, para. 198.
1823 I/A Court H.R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008 Series C No. 177, para. 83; I/A Court H.R., Case of Palamara Iribarne.
Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 85; I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 123; I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an
Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion
OC-5/85 ofNovember 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para. 46; IACHR. Arguments before the Inter-American Courtinthe Case ofHerrera Ulloa
v. Costa Rica. Reprinted in: I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 101.1.B). Cf. IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The
Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 88.
1824 Cf. IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 88; I/A Court H.R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Judgment of May 2, 2008 Series C No. 177, para. 83.
1825 IACHR, Office ofthe Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom
of Expression, 2010, para. 89.
1826 IACHR, Inter-American Legal Framework, para. 87.
1827 I/A Court H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
Series A, No. 5, of November 13, 1985, para. 50.
305
protests is inherently disproportionate, as it does not allow for the consideration of the specific
circumstances of each individual case.1828
3. Principle of nondiscrimination
46. The general principle of nondiscrimination applies especially to demonstrations and protests. Indeed,
States may not limit social protest on the basis of the prejudices and intolerance that governments or
societies have towards an individual or group. We should not lose sight of the fact that under Articles 13
and 16 of the American Convention, “everyone” has the right to freedom of expression and association,
and that restrictions to the right to protest “must not perpetuate prejudice or promote intolerance.”1829
47. Nor may they impose restrictions with discriminatory effects based on the type of complaint, content, or
demand that the participants in the demonstrations seek to assert. When States impose limits on social
protest based on prohibited grounds of discrimination,1830 Article 24 of the American Convention is also
violated.1831 On this point, Principle 2 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression states
that “All people should be afforded equal opportunities to receive, seek and impart information by any
means of communication without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinions, national or social origin, economic status, birth or any other social
condition.”1832
48. Pursuant to Article 1 of the American Convention, a State’s differentiated treatment of participants in a
socialprotest because of their membershipin a particular groupor because they have made critical claims
against governments or dominant sectors of society may fall within the prohibition of discrimination in
Article 1.1 of the ACHR.
49. In the universal sphere, Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes
that all people have the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. All individuals, groups, unregistered
associations, legal entities, and companies are free to organize and participate in publicmeetings.1833
50. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom ofpeaceful assembly and association has
recalled that thisprovision should be read in conjunction with Article 2 of the Covenant, which establishes
that “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status,”1834 and with Article 26, “which guarantees to all individuals
equal and effective protection against discrimination on grounds identified in Article 2.”1835 In this regard,
the Human Rights Council has recalled the obligation of States to respect and protect the rights of all
persons who hold minority or dissenting opinions or beliefs, human rights defenders, trade unionists, and
migrants.1836
1828 OSCE/ODIHR - Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd ed., 2010. Guiding principle 2.4.
1829 Cfr. IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of “Desacato” Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights.
Title III. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995.
1830 Article 1.1. ofthe ACHR prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth, or other status. The Court has established that the “other status” clause is merely illustrative and can be
expanded according to the changing circumstances of society, as it considers the ACHR to be a living instrument. With this
understanding, other prohibited grounds of discrimination such as sexual orientation have been established. On this point, see: Case of
Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, 2013. On this prohibited groundof differentiation, theECtHR held thatthe rightto freedom of assembly
and the prohibition of discrimination were violated in the case of Alekseyev v. Russia (Applications nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and
14599/09) by Russia’s ban on LGBTI pride marches in Moscow.
1831 Cfr. IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 93; I/A Court H.R., Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141
para. 170.
1832 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom
of Expression, 2010, para.93
1833 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February
2016, para. 15-16.
1834 ICCPR, art. 2.
1835 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,
21 May 2012, A/HRC/20/27, para. 13.
1836 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,
14 April 2014, A/HRC/26/29, paras. 16 & 22. See also: General Assembly, Report ofthe Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on human rights defenders, 5 September 2006, A/61/312, para. 80.
306
51. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
recognized that the most at-risk groups share the experience of discrimination, unequal treatment, and
harassment,1837 as well as a lack of visibility and systematic exclusion from public debate.1838 In this
regard, he highlighted the situation of women, children and young people, people with disabilities,
foreigners (including asylum seekers, refugees, and migrant workers), members of ethnic and religious
minorities, displacedpersons, indigenous peoples, people who are discriminated against because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity, and human rights defenders (including journalists, trade unionists,
environmental activists, among others).1839 In his opinion, if the exercise of these groups' rights to
freedom of assembly and association is restricted or excluded, their marginalization will be reinforced. In
turn, marginalization often means that these individuals and groups are less able to exercise these rights.
The ability to assemble and associate is, in fact, a key component for the empowerment of marginalized
communities and individuals.1840
52. The Commission has similarly stated that “Our hemisphere’s most impoverished sectors encounter
discriminatory policies and actions, their access to information about the planning and execution of
measures affecting their daily lives is nascent at best, and, cxxvi in general, the traditional channels of
participation for publicizing their complaints are frequently blocked off to them. Faced with this, in many
countries around the hemisphere, protests and social mobilizations have become a tool for petitioning
the authorities and a channel for publicly denouncing human rights abuses and violations.”1841 Along the
same lines, the IACHR has underscored that the lawful function of the security forces is toprotectpeaceful
demonstrators and to ensure public security, acting with complete impartiality towards all (...) citizens,
regardless of their political affiliation or the content of theirdemonstrations.”1842
53. It should also be noted that the State is not the onlyperpetrator of violations related topeaceful assembly
and association. The actions of non-state actors play a significant role in denying at-risk groups the space
to exercise their rights, often through patriarchal attitudes, stereotypes, assumptions, and social
constructs that keepthese groups at the margins of society. In this regard, the obligations of States extend
beyond respecting and guaranteeing rights toprotecting right holders from violations and abuses by third
parties.1843 The latter includes the duty to take positive measures to prevent a group of vulnerable
demonstrators from being threatened or intimidated for exercising their rights
1837 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,
14 April 2014, A/HRC/26/29, para. 10.
1838 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,
14 April 2014, A/HRC/26/29, para. 11.
1839 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February
2016, paras. 15-16; Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association, Maina Kiai, 14 April 2014, A/HRC/26/29, para. 10-11.
1840 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,
14 April 2014, A/HRC/26/29, para. 15.
1841 IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2002, Chapter IV, “Freedom of Expression and
Poverty,” para. 29; IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2005, Volume III, Report of the Office of
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February 27, 2006, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 7, Chapter V, “Public Demonstrations
as an Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,” para. 1.
1842 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela, para. 301.
1843 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,
14 April 2014, A/HRC/26/29, para. 9.
307
CHAPTER III
OBLIGATION TO RESPECT RIGHTS
309
III. OBLIGATION TO RESPECT RIGHTS
54. The general obligation to respect rights has a special application for the purpose of refraining from
preventing or hindering socialprotest. This Commission has previously maintained that the obligation to
respect rights “is defined as the State’s duty not to interfere with, hinder or bar access to, the enjoyment
of the resources that are the object of the right. The obligation to protect is the duty to prevent third
parties from interfering with, hindering, or barring access to the resources that are the object of that
right,”1844 the obligation to facilitate the exercise of a right includes obligations to “guarantee that the
[person entitled to] the right is able to gain access to the enjoyment of the right, when he or she is unable
to do it for him or herself, [and] the obligation to promote is the duty to create conditions so that the
[right-holder] can have access to the enjoyment of the right.”1845
55. The inter-American standards linked to the obligation to respect the right to participate in
demonstrations and protests are further discussed below:
1. The right to participate in protest without priorauthorization
56. The IACHR has considered that the exercise of freedom of assembly through social protest should not be
subject to government authorization or excessive requirements that make it difficult to carry out.1846
Legal requirements underlying the prohibition or limitation of a meeting or demonstration, such as the
requirement of prior permission, are not compatible with freedom of assembly1847 or the exercise of
freedom of expression in the inter-American system.
57. Prior notice, generally justified by States on the basis of the need to provide greater protection to a
demonstration, cannot function as a covert authorization mechanism. The IACHR maintained in its report
on the “Criminalization of the Work of HumanRightsDefenders”that the requirement ofprior notification
must not be confused with the requirement of prior authorization granted in a discretional manner,1848
which must not be established in the law orpractice of the administrative authorities, even when it comes
to public spaces.1849
58. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom ofpeaceful assembly and association has
been emphatic in stating that he “believes thatthe exercise of fundamental freedoms should not be subject
to previous authorization by the authorities (…), but at the most to a prior notification procedure, whose
rationale is to allow State authorities to facilitate the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and to take measures to protect public safety and order and the rights and freedoms of others.”1850 At the
same time, the existence of mechanisms requiring demonstrators to notify the authorities in advance of
the place, date, and time of the protest is only compatible with Article 13 of the ACHR when States require
it in order to be able to take measures toprotect demonstrators and thus facilitate socialprotest.1851
59. Similarly, when notification procedures are very bureaucratic or intervene unnecessarily or
disproportionately in determining the place, time, and manner of a protest, have a chilling effect on the
exercise of this right. With regard to the requirement of prior notice to hold a protest, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, has said that “such a
notification should be subjectto a proportionality assessment, not unduly bureaucratic.”1852 In particular,
1844 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57, para. 35.
1845 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57, para. 35.
1846 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15 December 31, 2015, para. 129.
1847 In that report, the IACHR found that laws requiring that a police permit be requested ten days in advance for any public event, assembly,
election, conference, parade, congress, or sporting, cultural, artistic, or family event constituted a restriction incompatible with the right
of assembly. Cfr. IACHR, Annual Report 1979-1980, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, October 2, 1980, pp. 119-121.
1848 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15 December 31, 2015, para. 129; IACHR,
Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, para. 137.
1849 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15 December 31, 2015, para. 129; IACHR,
Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, paras. 140 &
142.
1850 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 28; Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, p. 63. Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, para. 57.
1851 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV.A, “The Use of Force,” para. 66.
1852 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 28
310
prior notification should be requested only for large gatherings or events that could cause transit
disruptions1853 in order to facilitate their conduct and protect demonstrators.
60. In addition, the organizers’ failure to give prior notification to the authorities should not lead to the breakupof the gathering or to the imposition of criminal or administrativepenalties such as fines or deprivation
of liberty against the organizers, leaders, or their associations.1854 Under this same interpretation, the
European Court of Human Rights held that the dissolution of a peaceful demonstration for failure to
comply with the prior notification requirement constitutes a disproportionate restriction on the freedom
of peaceful assembly.1855
61. Spontaneous demonstrations are also protected. Spontaneous gatherings should be exempt from the
notification requirement and law enforcement should, to the extent possible, protect and facilitate
spontaneous gatherings as they would any other such event.1856 This Commission recommends that
States take account of the fact that there are events in which it is not possible to identify the organizers
and that, although announced in advance, take place in a highly improvised and spontaneous manner. The
impossibility of identifying the organizers of a demonstration cannot justify the prohibition, dissolution,
or repression of a demonstration. In addition, a spontaneous change in a march’s route does not negate
the obligation to facilitate protestand protect demonstrators and third parties present.
62. The notification procedure, moreover, cannot be regarded as a binding commitment by the organizers to
the time, place, and manner of a protest. Nor is it reasonable for the notification procedure to serve as a
basis for the imposition of penalties for acts committed by third parties against persons or organizations
that have assumed the functions of dissemination, organization, or dialogue with the State with respect
to a protest.
2. The right to choose the content and messages of the protest
63. The presumption of ab initio coverage of all types of speech has a direct application in social protests
because it is a right derived from freedom of expression and one that aims to disseminate social demands
in a democratic society. The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has stated that,
in principle, all forms of speech are protected by the right to freedom of expression, regardless of its
content and degree of acceptance by society and the State.1857 Freedom of expression within the
framework of social protests must be guaranteed not only in terms of the dissemination of ideas and
information received favorably or considered inoffensive or neutral, but also in terms of those that offend,
shock, disturb, are unpleasant, or disturb the State or any sector of the population because of the type of
complaint they involve.1858
64. This general presumption of coverage of all expressive speech is explained by the State’s primary duty of
content-neutrality and, as a consequence, by the necessity to guarantee that, in principle, there are no
persons, groups, ideas or means of expression excluded a priori from public debate.1859 The IACHR has
noted in several reports that Article 13 of the American Convention covers the right ofpersons to express
their sexual orientation and gender identity, and that this type of expression enjoys a special level of
protection under inter-American instruments, as it relates to an essential element of personal identity
and dignity.1860 Similarly, the IACHR has stressed the importance of freedom of expression to protect
women’s right to a life free from violence.
65. Within the framework of the Universal System, the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association has similarly stated that “Any restriction imposed on the nature or
1853 Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, p. 63.
1854 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 29
1855 Cf. ECtHR, Bukta and Others v. Hungary, application No. 25691/04 (2007).
1856 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 23.
1857 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 30.
1858 Cfr. IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 30.
1859 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 30.
1860 IACHR, Violence against LGBTI Persons, 2017, para. 80
311
content of the message the organizers and participants want to convey, especially in relation to criticism
of Government policies, should be proscribed, unless the message constitutes ‘incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.’”
1861
66. However, the IACHR has taken the view that, without prejudice to the presumption of ab initio coverage,
there are certain types of speech which, by virtue of express prohibitions embodied in international
human rights law, do not enjoy protection under Article 13 of the American Convention within the
framework of a social protest.1862 Specifically, this includes war propaganda and hate speech that
constitutes incitement to violence on discriminatory grounds such as sexual orientation, gender, race,
religion, or nationality.
67. Article 13.5 of the American Convention expressly provides that “any propaganda for war and any
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any
other similar action against anyperson or groupof persons on any grounds including those of race, color,
religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.”1863 Direct and
public incitement to genocide is outlawed both under conventional international law—by Article III(c) of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—and under customary
international law.1864
68. These restrictions must be backed up by actual, truthful, objective and strong proof that the person was
not simply issuing an opinion (even if that opinion was harsh, unfair, or disturbing), but that the person
had the clear intention of promoting illegal violence or any other similar action against LGBTI people, as
well as the ability to achieve this objective, and that this entails a real risk of harm to people belonging to
these groups. 1865
69. The United Nations Special Rapporteur has similarly stated that “only propaganda for war or advocacy
for national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
(art. 20 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) or acts aimed at the destruction of the rights and
freedoms enshrined in international human rights law (art. 5) should be deemed unlawful.”1866 In this
regard, the Special Rapporteur maintained that “Restrictions on the content of assemblies may be
imposed only in conformity with the legitimate limitations on rights (...), for example, where the message
advocates national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence. Where a content-based restriction is justified, authorities should take the least intrusive and
restrictive measures to address the issue.”1867
70. In the case of protest, the promotion of national, racial or religious hatred, advocacy of discrimination,
hostility, or violence should not be understood exclusively in terms of speech. In addition to promoting a
type of speech,protestinvolves a gathering ofpeople thattakesplace in a certain space and time,in direct
interaction with others present. This involves a potential threat to physical or psychological integrity, or
the exercise of rights by third parties depending on the chosen place, time, or manner ofprotest.
3. The right to choose the time and place of the protest
71. Restrictions on the time, place, or manner of a protest should be exceptional, defined on a case-by-case
basis and justified on the basis of the protection of persons. Any State interference in the time and place
of a demonstration should meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality in a democratic society.
1861 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39, para. 59.
1862 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, paras. 57 et seq.
1863 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 58.
1864 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression, 2010, para. 59.
1865 IACHR. Annual Report 2009. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Inter-American Legal
Framework of the Right to Freedom of Expression). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51. December 30, 2009, para. 59.
1866 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 18.
1867 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February
2016, para. 33.
312
72. Protests are indispensable for democratic consolidation and therefore constitute as legitimate a use of
public space as any other. Thus, they cannot be suppressed as a way of guaranteeing other more routine
uses of these spaces, such as commercial activity or the circulation of persons and vehicles.1868 In that
regard, the IACHRhas emphasized that streets and squares areprivilegedplaces forpublic expression.1869
73. The authorities should facilitate the holding of public gatherings, social protests, and demonstrations,
ensuring that they can be carried out, seen, and heard by the target public in the space chosen by the
organizers, in order to deliver the message that the organizers and participants wish to disseminate.1870
Therefore, as a general rule, the right to demonstrate and protest includes the right to choose the time,
place, and manner of doing so.1871
74. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
maintained that “States [have the] obligation to guarantee law and order, but restrictions on peaceful
assembly in relation to its ‘time, place, and manner’ should be limited to the extent that such restrictions
meet the aforementioned strict test of necessity and proportionality.”1872 The Rapporteur recommended
that, if enacted, laws governing freedom of assembly should avoid blanket time and location
prohibitions.1873 Informally or formally imposing on the organizers the expectation to negotiate the time
and place of the assembly with the authorities is equally inappropriate.1874
75. The choice of where to hold the protest is a substantial component of what is meant to be communicated
and is important to the demonstrators. Restrictions on where social protests can take place have a
negative impact on the transmission of the intended message to its intended recipients. The IACHR has
made it clear that notification of the demonstration cannot allow the authorities to arbitrarily dictate
dates, times, or places to demonstrate or protest, prohibiting any demonstration that fails to comply with
those determinations.
76. If a protest or demonstration seeks to deliver a specific message to a person, group, or organization, it
should, in principle, be able to be held at a place and time that allows for the visual and audio
dissemination of the message,in accordance with the principle known as sight and sound.
1875 With regard
to the place where public demonstrations are held, the UN Rapporteur has warned against the practice
whereby the authorities allow a demonstration to take place, but only in the outskirts of the city or in a
specific square, where its impact will be muted.1876 As the European Court of Human Rights has ruled,
such restrictions are disproportionate and unjustified because they affect the very purpose of the
protests.1877
77. The European Court of Human Rights has also held that the prohibition of a public demonstration on the
sole ground that there is anotherpublic event scheduled to take place at the same place and time, without
a clear indication that the events cannot be properly managed by the security forces, disproportionately
interferes with freedom of assembly.1878 Heated tensions or exchanges between opposing groups cannot
be used as the only justification for banning demonstrations, as this would be disproportionate and would
deprive society of the opportunity to hear different opinions. On the contrary, the State must take
reasonable and timely positive measures to protect participants in demonstrations and counterdemonstrations.1879
1868 OSCE/ODIHR - Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd ed., 2010, p. 32, para. 20.
1869 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Ch. IV A, para. 64.
1870 Cf. Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 60.
1871 European Court of Human Rights, Sáska v Hungary. Final 27/2/2013. p. 21.
1872 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39, para. 59.
1873 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 39.
1874 Cf. Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/23/39, 24 April 2013, para. 56.
1875 OSCE/ODIHR - Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd ed., 2010, p. 17, Guiding Principle 3.5: “Public
assemblies are held to convey a message to a particular target person, group or organization. Therefore, as a general rule, a ssemblies
should be facilitated within ‘sight and sound’ of their target audience.”
1876 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai,
A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 40.
1877 ECtHR, Lashmankin and Others v. Russia. Applications 57818/09 and 14 others. Judgment of 29 May 2017.
1878 ECtHR, Lashmankin and Others v. Russia. Applications 57818/09 and 14 others. Judgment of 29 May 2017, para. 422.
1879 ECtHR, Öllinger v. Austria, application No. 76900/01, Judgment of 29 June 2006; ECtHR, Plattform “Ärztefür das Leben” v. Austria,
application No. 10126/82, Judgment of 21 June 1988, para. 32.
313
78. In addition, counter-demonstrations may not interfere with the exercise of the right of third parties to
assemble.1880 People should be able to hold their demonstration without fear of being subjected to
violence by their opponents, as this fear may deter the expression of certain opinions or perspectives on
issues affecting a community. In other words, the State must not allow the right to hold a counterdemonstration to extend to the point where it interferes with other groups’ right to demonstrate.1881
79. When weighing the need to restrict a counter-demonstration, States should take into account the specific
protection to be accorded to socially excluded sectors or groups in vulnerable situations. Demonstrators
belonging to minorities, groups that are discriminated against, or in situations of vulnerability should be
especiallyprotected from groups that seek to threaten or intimidate them for exercising their rights.
80. The Commission has emphasized that if circumstances relating to time, mode, or space are considered to
pose a danger to protestors or third parties, the authorities should state the reasons for their decisions
with the goal of seeking a better alternative. In the event that the authority decides that it is appropriate
to modify the circumstances of time and place, an adequate and effective remedy must be provided to
challenge this decision, which must be adjudicated by an authority other than the one that issued the
decision.1882 The procedure for reviewing decisionsprohibiting a protest must be established in a manner
that ensures that the decision is made prior to the planned date of the protest. Considering that there may
be a short window of time, this may be achieved through interim measures.1883
4. The right to choose the mode of protest; Scope of the provision on “peaceful unarmed
exercise”
81. As for restrictions on modes ofprotest,“the right of assembly, as defined in internationalinstruments and
in the domestic laws that have the force of constitutional law in the countries of the region, is that it be
exercisedpeaceably and without arms.”1884 Given the State's obligation toprotect human rights in protest
contexts, including the life and safety of demonstrators, this qualification in Article 15 of the American
Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the State may restrict the participation in public
demonstrations and protests of persons who commit actsof violence or who carry weapons.
82. The Commission recognizes that States have a duty to take the necessary measures to prevent acts of
violence, to ensure the safety of persons, including demonstrators, and to maintain public order. Violent
actions by demonstrators or thirdparties thatpose a certain risk to the life orphysicalintegrity ofpersons
who may or may not be involved in the protest obliges the State to take action to prevent and avoid such
occurrences, limiting the protest rights of perpetrators of violence.1885
83. Neverthless, the Commission has stated that the peaceful and unarmed condition provided for in the
inter-American instruments as a requirement for the exercise of the right of assembly does not mean that
a demonstration can be deemed non-peaceful based on the actions of a few people. When some
individuals commit acts of violence in the context of a protest, they should be singled out; but other
demonstrators retain their right to peaceful assembly. Consequently, no gathering should be considered
unprotected.1886
84. The qualifier “peaceful” must be understood, in any case, in the sense that persons who commit acts of
violence may see their right to demonstrate restricted, temporarily and individually. The Commission
recognizes that the use of law enforcement can be an important factor in protecting the safety of
1880 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, 21 May 2012, A/HRC/20/27, para. 30; Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom
of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper
management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 24.
1881 ECtHR, Plattform “Ärztefür das Leben” v. Austria, application No. 10126/82, Judgment of 21 June 1988, para. 32.
1882 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15 December 31, 2015, para. 130.
1883 OSCE/ODIHR - Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd ed., 2010, p. 17, Guiding Principle 3.5.
1884 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57 December 31, 2009, para. 198.
1885 Human Rights Council, 25th Session, “Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development” A/HRC/RES/25/38, 11 April 2014, p. 3.
1886 United Nations. Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies,
A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 9; Statement by Maina Kiai, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association, at the conclusion of his visit to the Republic of Chile, 30 September 2015; Report of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights on ‘effective measures and best practices to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in
the context of peaceful protests,’ UN Doc A/HRC/22/28 of 21 January 2013, para. 10; Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines
for Implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, p. 148 c).
314
demonstrators as well as bystanders. Atthe same time, the IACHR has also documented thatthe excessive
use of force is often a major source of violations of these same rights.
85. This aspect is always a complex issue to resolve, especially in contexts of social orpolitical unrest. As such,
the use of force is viewed as “a last resort that, qualitatively and quantitatively limited, is intended to
prevent a more serious occurrence than that caused by the State’s reaction” (see Chapter IV.1). Within
that framework, characterized by exceptionality, both the Commission and the I/A CourtHR have agreed
that for the use of force to be justified one must satisfy the principles of legality, absolute necessity, and
proportionality.
86. The Commission has reiterated the need for the restriction related to the peaceful mode of protest not to
be used as a formula to arbitrarily andpermanently restrict the right of assembly and demonstration. For
example, the rights of demonstrators may not be restricted because of the mere creation of nuisances or
disruptions to the rights of others. On this matter, the IACHR has stated that it “is mindful of the fact that
the exercise of this right can sometimes be disruptive to the normal routine of daily life, especially in large
urban centers; it may even cause problems or affect the exercise of other rights that the State has an
obligation to protect and ensure, such as freedom of movement. However, such disruptions are part of
the mechanics of a pluralistic society in which diverse and sometimes conflicting interests coexist and
find the forums and channels in which to express themselves.”1887
87. The IACHR has also indicated that, in the face of a possible clash between freedom of assembly and, for
instance, freedom of movement, when the mode of protest involves cutting off or occupying part of a
roadway or route, “it should be borne in mind that the right to freedom of expression is not just another
right, but one of the primary and most important foundations of any democratic structure: the
undermining of freedom of expression directly affects the central nerve of the democraticsystem.”1888
88. Bandanas, masks, hoods, caps, backpacks, and other types of clothing and accessories are very common
at public demonstrations. These items cannot be considered sufficient indicators of a threat of violence,
nor can they be used as grounds for the dispersal, arrest, or repression of demonstrators. The IACHR has
stressed that, in a democracy, States must act based on the lawfulness of protests or public
demonstrations and on the assumption that they do not constitute a threat to public order. This entails
an approach centered on strengthening political participation and building greater levels of citizen
engagement.1889
89. The Commission has stated that a social protest can occur in many different ways. In the region, some of
them take the form of street closures, “cacerolazos” (pot-banging sessions), and vigils. Accordingly, “The
conditions in which many of these demonstrations and demands occur are complex and require
appropriate responses from the authorities for respecting and ensuring human rights.”1890
1887 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57 December 31, 2009, para. 198.
1888 Cf. IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2005, Chapter V “Public Demonstrations as
an Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,” para. 93.
1889 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Ch. IV A, para. 64.
1890 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15 December 31, 2015, para. 131.
315
CHAPTER IV
OBLIGATION TO PROTECT AND
FACILITATE
316
IV. OBLIGATION TO PROTECT AND FACILITATE
90. At the specific time when a protest occurs, State intervention must pay special attention to the duties of
protection and facilitation, in keeping with Articles 1 and 2 of the ACHR. Article 1 of the American
Convention establishes the obligation of the States to respect the rights and freedoms recognized therein.
This obligation includes “the duty of States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and,in general,
all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring
the free and full enjoyment of human rights.”1891 In turn, Article 2 requires States to take measures “of two
kinds: on the one hand, elimination of any norms and practices that in any way violate the guarantees
provided under the Convention; on the other hand, the promulgation of norms and the development of
practices conducive to effective observance of those guarantees.”1892
91. This Commission has previously stated that “the overriding social interest in the right to take part in
public demonstrations gives rise to a general presumption in favor of its exercise.”1893 This presumption
must be established in the States’ legal systems, clearly and explicitly, and apply to all without
discrimination.1894 These provisions must be clear in their formulations, consistent with each other, in
line with international standards, and must always be interpreted in favor of those who wish to exercise
this right.1895 If the legal provisions are not clear, they should be clarified or, where appropriate,
interpreted in favor of those exercising the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
expression.1896
92. The Human Rights Council of the United Nations has similarly urged the States “to promote a safe and
enabling environment for individuals and groups to exercise their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly,
of expression and of association, including by ensuring that their domestic legislation and procedures
relating to the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, of expression and of association are in conformity
with their international human rights obligations and commitments, clearly and explicitly establish a
presumption in favor of the exercise of these rights, and that they are effectively implemented.”1897
93. Ultimately, States must act on the basis of the lawfulness of protests and public demonstrations and on
the assumption that they do not constitute a threat to public order, even in cases where they are
unannounced.1898 The right to participate in public demonstrations should be permitted even in the
absence of a legal regulation, and those who wish to demonstrate should not be required to obtain
authorization to do so.1899 Spontaneous protests are also protected, so no meeting should be treated as
unprotected.1900
1891 I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 166; I/A Court H.R., Case of
Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5, para. 175.
1892 I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 207; I/A Court H.R., Case of Baena
Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 108; I/A Court H.R., Case of Cantoral
Benavides v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, para. 178; I/A Court H.R., Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2006. Series C No. 162, para. 172.
1893 Idem.
1894 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV.A, “The Use of Force,” para. 65; Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39, para. 50; Human
Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina
Kiai, 21 May 2012, A/HRC/20/27, para. 26.
1895 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66.
1896 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39, para. 50.
1897 Human Rights Council, The promotion and protection of human rightsin the context of peaceful protests, A/HRC/25/L.20, 24 March 2014,
para. 3; Human Rights Council, The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, A/HRC/RES/25/38, 11
April 2014, para. 3 (emphasis added).
1898 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39, para. 50.
1899 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV.A, “The Use of Force,” para. 65.
1900 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February
2016, para. 17.a.
317
94. In countries where there are systems of prior notification or announcement, which can be justified on the
basis of protecting this right, “this does not mean that the states only have the positive obligation to
1.facilitate and protect those assemblies notice of which is given.” In addition, the right to take part in
public demonstrations should not be subject to undue bureaucratic regulation.
95. The competent State institutions have a duty to design appropriate operational plans and procedures.
Police action, as considered by the IACHR in its 2015 annual report, “should have as its main objective
facilitating demonstrations and not containing or confronting the demonstrators. Hence, as a general rule
police operations organized in the context of protests should be geared to guaranteeing the exercise of this
right and to protecting the demonstrators and third persons who are present(…).”
96. The IACHR has stressed that States, when determining their actions in the context ofpublic manifestations,
tend to subordinate the exercise of the right to social protest to the purported upholding of collective
interests such as public order and social peace, based on the vagueness or ambiguity of these terms for
justifying decisions that restrict rights. The notion of public order and socialpeace that is imposed appears
to be concerned solely with guaranteeing order as an expression of the power of the state, and it accords
priority to the rights and interests of those who may be negatively impacted by theprotests.1901
97. As the Commission has maintained, the actions of the State in the unfolding of protests involves everything
from rerouting pedestrian and vehicular traffic in a certain area, to escorting those who are participating
in the mass gathering or demonstration in order to guarantee their safety and make it possible for the
activities involved to take place.1902 These actions should include measures to facilitate the timing of the
dispersal of demonstrators, precautions to prevent accidents, and measures to assist accident victims or
people with health issues during an event.
98. The State’s obligations necessarily include the protection of the lives, physical integrity, dignity, and other
rights of public servants responsible for operations carried out in the context of social protests. This
requires, among other measures, the provision to security agents of adequate equipment, items for
protection and intervention, and training commensurate with the complexity of the tasks they must
perform.
99. The authorities mustprovide for and use various forums for dialogue and exchange with the demonstrators
before and during the course of the protest. Accountability, recording the operation’s activities, and access
to records is a decisive element not only for the purpose of establishing subsequent liabilities but also for
the protection of human rights during the course of protests. These obligations to respect, protect, and
facilitate the right to protest include the prevention of actions that could harm the physical integrity of
persons; this Commission has held that “When a demonstration or protest leads to situations of violence it
should be understood that the state was not capable of guaranteeing the exercise of this right.”1903
100. The following key aspects of the management of a protest by State institutions are discussedbelow:
1. The general use of the police force in the context ofprotests;
2. The more specific regulations on the carrying and use of firearms, the use of so-called less lethal
weapons and the procedures for conducting arrests;
3. The police operations, protocols, and institutional structure of the security forces and the prohibition
against the Armed Forces intervening in public demonstrations;
4. Dialogue and negotiation bodies linked to the reduction of conflict and violence and the preservation of
life and physical integrity. Actions to provide security to demonstrators and third parties, particularly
when vulnerable or specially protected groups are involved;
5. The duty to not criminalize leaders and participants in demonstrations andprotests.
5. Use of force in the context of protests
101. The use of public force can be an important element in ensuring the right to protest and protecting the
safety of demonstrators. On the other hand, it can also give rise to major violations of these samerights.
1901 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 59.
1902 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 193.
1903 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 68.
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102. In its 2015 Annual Report, this Commission recalled, based on a number of reports1904 and on the case
law of the inter-American system,1905 the irreversibility of the consequences that may result from the use
of force. As such, the use of force is viewed as “a last resort that, qualitatively and quantitatively limited,
is intended to prevent a more serious occurrence than that caused by the State’s reaction. Within that
framework, characterized by exceptionality, both the Commission and the I/ACourt HR have agreed that
for the use of force to be justified one must satisfy the principles of legality, absolute necessity, and
proportionality.”
1906
103. The IACHR has defined the principle of legality as the obligation of the State to “to enact laws and comply
with international law on the subject” aimed at regulating the action of the agents of order in performing
their functions.1907 For its part, the Inter-American Court, in referring to the principle of legality, has
stated that the use of force “must be aimed at achieving a legitimate objective, and there must be a
regulatory framework which takes account of the form of action in sucha situation.”1908
104. The principle of absolute necessity refers to the possibility of resorting to “the defensive and offensive
security measures used should be those strictly necessary to carry out the lawful orders of a competent
authority in the event of acts of violence or crime that imperil the right to life or the right to personal
security.”1909 At the same time, according to the circumstances of the case, it is necessary to “verify
whether other less harmful means exist to safeguard the life and integrity of the person or situation that
it is sought to protect, according to the circumstances of the case.”1910 Specifically, it has also established
that this requirement cannot be invoked when people do not pose a direct danger, “even when the failure
to use force results in the loss of the opportunity to capture them.”1911
105. The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officialsprovides thatlaw enforcement officials
may use force “only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their
duty.”1912 The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials reaffirm
the principle of ultima ratio by providing that officers, in the performance of their duties, shall, “as far as
possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force
and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended
result.”1913
106. Finally, the Commission has understood the principle of proportionality as “moderation in the actions of
law enforcement officials in an effort to minimize the harm and injuries that may result from their
intervention, guaranteeing immediate assistance to the persons negatively impacted, and endeavoring to
inform next-of-kin or loved ones of the situation as soon as possible.”1914 Agents who may legitimately
make use of force should “apply a standard of differentiated use of force, determining the level of
cooperation, resistance, or aggressiveness of the person involved and, on this basis, use tactics of
negotiation, control or use of force, as appropriate.”1915 Circumstances such as “the level of intensity and
danger of the threat; the attitude of the individual; the conditions of the surrounding area, and the means
1904 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124. Doc. 5 rev. 1, adopted on March 7,
2006, para. 64; IACHR: ReportNo. 90/14, Admissibility and Merits, Luis Jorge Valencia Hinojosa, Ecuador, November 4, 2014, para. 181;
Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, October 22, 2002, para. 87; Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009,
para. 114.
1905 I/A Court H.R., Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015.
Series C No. 292, para. 265; Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013.
Series CNo. 275, para. 330; Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 24,
2012. Series C No. 251, para. 85.
1906 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 7.
1907 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 8; IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009, para. 97.
1908 I/A Court H.R., Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015.
Series C No. 292 (only in Spanish), para. 265.
1909 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009, para. 116.
1910 I/A Court H.R., Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, paras. 67-68; Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations
and Costs. Judgment of October 24, 2012. Series C No. 251, para. 85.
1911 I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 134; Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of October 24, 2012. Series C No. 251, para. 85; ECtHR, Kakoulli v. Turkey, No. 38595/97. Judgment of 22 November 2005,
para. 108.
1912 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979.
1913 UN, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 4.
1914 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 12; IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009, para.
119.
1915 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 12; IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2009, para.
119.
319
available to the agent to deal with the specific situation”1916 are determinants when it comes to evaluating
the proportionality of the interventions by the authorities, as their display of force must at all times aim
“to reduce to a minimum the harm or injuries caused to anyone.”1917
107. The generalprinciples on the use of force, applied to the context ofprotests and demonstrations, “require
that the security operations be carefully and meticulously planned by persons with experience and
training specifically for this type of situation and under clear protocols foraction.”1918
108. The decision whether or not to use any type of force requires consideration of the risks involved that may
lead to an escalation of tensions.1919 In particular, some States have made progress in defining minimum
criteria for all security forces, whose fundamental objective is not only to respect and protect the rights
of the participants in a demonstration, but also to protect the life and physical integrity of all those
involved.
109. It is important to note that the State has an obligation to protect participants in a demonstration against
physical violence by third parties and non-state actors, including persons who may hold opposing
views.1920 The use of force in demonstrations mayprove necessary andproportional in cases where there
are threats that pose a certain risk to the life or physicalintegrity of persons present, whether or not they
are participating in the protest.
110. The principles of moderation, proportionality, and progressivity must be observed both in situations
where the objective is to restrain and/or detain a person who is resisting the police authority’s lawful
action, and in police operations involving demonstrations or mass gatherings that may result in violence
or affect the rights of thirdparties.1921
111. The design of intervention plans should take into account the fact that the State institutions involved have
often had conflicting relationships with demonstrators. The design of these operations must also respect
aspects related to the socio-cultural values of those participating in the protest and/or their membership
in groups that must be speciallyprotected.
112. Some local regulations instruct personnel participating in protest-related operations to exercise the
utmost tolerance towards non-lethal attacks.1922 The approach in this type of situation should be oriented
toward facilitation, and not of containment or even confrontation.1923 In this regard,it has been reiterated
that the rationale for dispersing a demonstration must be the duty to protect people.1924 Moreover, the
mere dispersal of a demonstration does not, in itself, constitute a legitimate aim justifying the use of force
by security forces.
113. States need to make progress in regulating their actions, especially the use of force and police action in
the specific contexts of protest. These regulations should seek to include both the prevention and
prohibition of violations committed through the abuse of firearms or less lethal weapons and devices,
unlawful arrests, beatings, or any form of abuse of force that may be involved in a demonstration. They
should also cover the use of force to protect rights associated with social protest through actions that
facilitate the right to demonstrate, and prevent and deter harm to the safety or other rights of
demonstrators or third parties at the hands of State or non-stateactors.
6. Maximum restriction on firearms
114. As this Commission has underscored, the use of firearms is an extreme measure. They should not be used
except where police institutions are unable to use non-lethal means to restrain or detain persons who
1916 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 12; Basic Principles on the Use of Force, Principle No. 9.
1917 I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 136.
1918 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 79.
1919 Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officials Guideline 7 e).
1920 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, March 7, 2006, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev. 1, para. 50.
1921 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57, December 31, 2009, para. 133.
1922 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 80; South Africa: Police Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management, 2004.
1923 Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officials, p. 150.
1924 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 57, December 31, 2009, para. 133; IACHR, Annual Report
2015, Chapter IV A, para. 67.
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threaten the life or safety ofpolice officers or thirdparties.1925 This generalprinciple governing the use of
lethal force by the police has a particular application in the area of public protests or demonstrations.1926
115. International protection mechanisms have repeatedly stressed that the general principles on the use of
force, such as necessity and proportionality, make it clear that there are no grounds for the use of lethal
force to break up a protest or demonstration, or for firing indiscriminately into a crowd.1927
116. This Commission also considers that potentially lethal force cannot be used merely to maintain or restore
public order or to protect legal interests less valuable than life, such as property. Only the protection of
life and physical integrity from imminent threats can be a legitimate aim for the use of such force.1928 As
discussed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:
“The ‘protect life’ principle demands that lethal force may not be used intentionally merely to protect law and order or to serve
other similar interests(for example, it may not be used only to disperse protests, to arrest a suspected criminal, or to
safeguard other interests such as property). The primary aim must be to save life. In practice, this means that only the
protection of life can meet the proportionality requirement where lethal force is used intentionally, and the protection
of life can be the only legitimate objective for the use of such force. A fleeing thief who poses no immediate danger may
not be killed, even if it means that the thief will escape.”
1929
117. The use of firearms in the context of social protests is almost never justified by this criterion of
proportionality. As the IACHR has rightly considered, this means that The states should implement
mechanisms for effectively prohibiting recourse to the use of lethal force in public demonstrations.1930
Prohibiting officers who might come into contact with demonstrators from carrying firearms and lead
ammunition has proven to be the best measure to prevent lethal violence and deaths in the context of
social protests.1931 Accordingly, firearms and ammunition should be excluded from operations to control
social protests. 1932
118. Although operations may allow for the availability of firearms and lead ammunition somewhere outside
the demonstration’s radius of action in exceptional cases where there is a situation of real, serious, and
imminent risk to the life or physical integrity of persons that warrants their use,1933 there should be
1925 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 118; UN, OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 1 April 2014, A/HRC/26/36, para. 58.
1926 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 81; UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, Christof Heyns, “Use of force during demonstrations,” A/HRC/17/28, 23 May 2011 para. 75. For additional development of
these principles, see: Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation ofthe UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, pp 148 i).
1927 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 81. In its 25th Session, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued a
resolution on “The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests” (paras. 11 & 9), in which it:
“Affirms that nothing can ever justify ‘shoot to kill’ practices as well as indiscriminate use of lethal force against a crowd, acts
which are unlawful under international human rights law,” and “Urges all States to avoid using force during peaceful protests,
and to ensure that, where force is absolutely necessary, no one is subject to excessive or indiscriminate use offorce.”
1928 Human Rights Council, The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, A/HRC/25/L.20, of 24 March
2014, art. 10; Human Rights Council, The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests,
A/HRC/RES/25/38 of 11 April 2014, art. 10; United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and Interpretive
Commentary (art. 3):“The use of firearms is considered an extreme measure. Every effort should be made to exclude the use of firearms,
especially against children. In general, firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or
otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender.”
In addition, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state that: “Law
enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of
death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arres t a person
presenting such a dangerand resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, andonlywhen less extreme means are insufficient
to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to
protect life” (Principle 9).
1929 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 1 April 2014,
A/HRC/26/36, paras. 72-73.
1930 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 81, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57, December
31, 2009, para. 201.
1931 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 82; Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 68
a); UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, “Use of force during
demonstrations,” A/HRC/17/28, 23 May 2011 para. 75). Amnesty International has also noted that firearms should not be used as
tactical tools in the containment of public assemblies (Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation of the UN
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, p. 148 i).
1932 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 82.
1933 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 82; The United Nations Human Rights Council has called upon “…States, as a matter of
priority, to ensure that their domestic legislation and procedures are consistent with their international obligations and commitments
in relation to the use of force and are effectively implemented by officials exercising law enforcement duties, in particular applicable
principles of law enforcement, such as theprinciples of necessity and proportionality, bearing in mind thatlethal force may only be used
321
explicit rules concerning who has the power to authorize their use in such extreme cases and the ways in
which such authorization is to be documented.1934
119. In some cases, it has been found that police officers carry weapons and/or ammunition of their own,
without authorization or registration. The Commission considers that the States should clearly prohibit
police officers from carrying weapons and/or ammunition other than those provided under the rules and
regulations of the institution to which they belong, regardless of such privately-owned weapons being
duly registered for general use.1935
a) Acquisition, use, and control of less lethal weapons
120. The production,procurement, and use of so-called “less lethal weapons” have increased markedly, largely
due to technological advances in this field. There is today a huge variety of so-called “non-lethal” or “less
lethal” weapons available on the market, which are acquired by States and used by police and security
personnel. These include different types of rubber bullets, tear gas, electric shock projectiles, rubber
projectiles, hydrant trucks, and plastic bullets, sound and energy devices, among others. However, this
development has not been accompanied by regulations that oversee and monitor the production,
acquisition, and use of these types of weapons.1936
121. A bright line cannot be drawn between lethal and non-lethal weapons: “it must be remembered that
almost any use of force against the human person can under certain circumstances lead to loss of life or
serious injury.”1937 Empirical evidence shows that in many cases harm to physical integrity has been
caused by the misuse of these types of weapons. This is the case of rubber bullets fired at close range and
into the upper part of the body, tear gas fired directly at people, irritating gases used against children or
the elderly, or electric shock devices used against people with heart conditions. Therefore, consideration
should be given not only to the design or features of the weapon, but also to other factors relating to its
use and control.
122. The Commission has warned against the often indiscriminate impact of less lethal weapons in the context
of socialprotests. Such is the case of tear gas and of the devices that shoot repeatedly which, on occasion,
are used to shoot rubber projectiles covered with hard rubber, plastic, or soft rubber. The use of such
weapons should be considered ill-advised since it is impossible to control the direction of their impact.
The Commission considers it important to give impetus to studies to further available medical knowledge
about the impacts on health and integrity of each of the existing weapons. Moreover, studies should be
undertaken that specify how each type of weapon can be used safely.1938
123. It has also been noted that in some countries regulation weapons available in security institutions include
shotguns that can alternatively be loaded with lead, rubber, or flash bang ammunition cartridges.1939
These types of weapon is particularly elusive to current control mechanisms during operations and for
the administrative and/or judicial reconstruction of their use. The availability of these shotguns means
that the controls needed to exclude firearms be extended to ammunition aswell.
124. States must establish adequate evidence to authorize the acquisition and incorporation of new weapons
into their regulatory mechanisms, and have criteria for the type of multidisciplinary and independent
experts who can do so without having conflicts of interest with commercial activities. Standards should
be developed to regulate critical aspects of weapons safety. For instance, the composition and
concentration of chemical irritants, shock levels in electrical devices, volume and frequency of new
acoustic weapons, as well as the precision levels required for projectiles should all be regulated. In
to protect against an imminent threat to life and that it may not be used merely to disperse a gathering.” Human Rights Council,
Resolution A/HRC/25/L.20, 24 March 2014, para. 10.
1934 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 82.
1935 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 83.
1936 The gap in standards has been recognized by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns,
who stressed the need to “set out how the standards set by the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
and the relevant jurisprudence should be applied to the scenarios created by the new technology” (UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Note by the Secretary-General, A/69/265, 6 August 2014, para.73).
1937 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Note by the Secretary-General, A/69/265, 6 August
2014, para. 69.
1938 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 84.
1939 It has been noted that this type of weapon has been used in some cases in Argentina during operations that have resulted in deaths, although
their use and the problems of assigning responsibility that arise from their design are not exclusive to that country.
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addition, commercial trade in this type of weaponry should be subject to controls and regulations of the
same type as those applied to the conventional arms trade.1940
125. States must implement specific training protocols and contents for officers aimed at the safe use of each
particular weapon. The protocols should strengthen the prevention of inappropriate or abusive uses that
could result in the injury or death of persons, and should provide examples of cases in which the use of
these weapons isprohibited in certain contexts or against certain people where there are risks tophysical
integrity.1941 For instance, tear gas should not be used in enclosed spaces or against people who have no
way to disperse or evacuate.1942 The use of non-lethal weapons should be preceded by formal warnings,
which give people the opportunity to evacuate without causing panic or stampede situations. There
should be an obligation to explicitly define who should authorize their use, and guidelines should be
drawn up to assign liability for the incorrect use of each type of weapon or device inuse.
126. The Commission also believes it is important to pay attention to the development of unmanned, remotecontrolled system technologies (e.g., drones). This new field of technological development can be used in
the context of social demonstrations or in crowd control. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: “The availability of advanced technology implies higher
levels of obligation regarding the decisions on whether and how much force to use, and also accountability
and monitoring with regard to the exercise of that discretion.”1943
127. In light of the above, the Commission reiterates1944 that the law should clearly spell out the circumstances
that justify the use of force in the context of the protests, as well as the acceptable level of force for
addressing various threats. In particular, the states should implement mechanisms to effectivelyprohibit
the use of lethal force in public demonstrations, and guarantee the adequate andproportionate use of less
lethal weapons by drawing up protocols for action that are clear and respectful of the relevant
international standards.
b) Arrests
128. With regard to any arrests made by the security forces in the context of public demonstrations, this
Commission has held that they must comply with all the requirements imposed by domestic laws and
international standards.1945 In their joint report, the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions on the proper management of assemblies maintained that the authority to arrest can play an
important protective function in assemblies, by allowing law enforcement to remove from an assembly
individuals who are acting violently. The term “arrest” refers to any deprivation of liberty, and is not
limited to formal arrest under domestic law. It is critical that arrest powers are exercised consistently
with international human rights standards, including those relating to the rights to privacy, liberty, and
due process rights.1946
129. The force used by police officers to immobilize or arrest someone at a demonstration must be strictly
proportional to the intended objective and shall only be applied to the extent necessary according to the
resistance offered by the person against whom it is to be used. The IACHR additionally recalls that the
Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas should be
observed during arrests made at social demonstrations and protests. The deprivation of liberty has been
defined as “any form of detention, imprisonment, institutionalization, or custody of a person in a public
1940 See: Amnesty International & The Omega Foundation, The Human Rights Impact of Less Lethal Weapons and Other Law Enforcement
Equipment, p. 8. Amnesty International Ltd. 2015.
1941 Consideration should be given to restricting the use of this type of weapon against children, pregnant women, persons with a physical
disability or health impairment, and the elderly.
1942 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Note by the Secretary-General, A/69/265, 6
August 2014, para. 71.
1943 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Note by the Secretary-General, A/69/265, 6
August 2014, para. 67.
1944 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 120.
1945 I/A Court H.R., Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
ofNovember 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 51; Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008.
Series C No. 180, para. 89; IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66.
December 31, 2011. Para. 106; IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 121.
1946 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 44.
323
or private institution which that person is not permitted to leave at will, by order of or under de facto
control of a judicial, administrative or any other authority, for reasons of humanitarian assistance,
treatment, guardianship, protection, or because of crimes or legal offenses.”1947
130. Hence, allpersons detained at a public demonstration have the right to live in conditions of detention that
are compatible with their personal dignity and the State must guarantee their right to life and to humane
treatment. State authorities exercise total control over persons under their custody and therefore States
are guarantors of the physical integrity of detainees.1948 Persons detained in social protests shall not be
arrested or transferred with the intention of punishing, repressing, or discriminating against persons
deprived of their liberty; nor shallthey be carried out under conditions that cause them physical or mental
suffering, are humiliating or facilitate public exhibition.1949
131. The authorities may not compel persons detained in demonstrations to remain for an unreasonably long
period of time under climatic conditions posing a risk to health, nor deprive them of access to food and
water, nor of medical care in the event that they are injured1950 or belong to vulnerable or high-risk
groups, such as the elderly, women, children,persons with disabilities, orpersons with illnesses requiring
special attention.1951
132. Similarly, no participant in social protests may be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. Article 7 of
the American Convention provides that “No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the
reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned
or by a law established pursuant thereto,”1952 and that “No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment.”1953
133. In its Report on Citizen Security, this Commission stated that “The guarantee of the lawfulness of an arrest
established in Article 7 envisages substantive and other formal or procedural aspects. The substantive
aspect requires that persons may only be deprived of their liberty in cases and circumstances laid down
by the law. The formal or procedural aspect requires that in the arrest of persons fulfilling any of the
circumstances established by the law, the rules during the process of detention are observed.”1954
134. The Convention also provides that “Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his
detention and shall be promptly notified of the charge or charges against him,”1955 and that “Any person
1947 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 143; IACHR,“Principles and BestPractices on the Protection of Persons
Deprived of Liberty in the Americas,” approved by the Commission during its 131st regular period of sessions, held from March 3-14,
2008. See also: General Comment on Article 10 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance of the
United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/CN.4/1997/34.
1948 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, Art. 151.
1949 Cf. Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas: Principle I, “Humane Treatment - All
persons subject to the jurisdiction of any Member State of the Organization of American States shall be treated humanely, with
unconditional respectfor their inherent dignity, fundamental rights and guarantees, and strictly inaccordance with international human
rights instruments. In particular, and taking into account the special position of the States as guarantors regarding persons deprived of
liberty, their life and personal integrity shall be respected and ensured, and they shall be afforded minimum conditions compatible with
their dignity. They shall be protected from any kind of threats and acts of torture (…), cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, sexual violence, corporal punishment, collective punishment, forced intervention or coercive treatment, from any method
intended to obliterate their personality or to diminish their physical or mental capacities. Circumstances such aswar, states of exception,
emergency situations, internal political instability, or other national or international emergencies may not be invoked in order to evade
the obligations imposed by international law to respect and ensure the right to humane treatment of all persons deprived of liberty”;
Principle IX: “(…) The transfers shall not be carried out in order to punish, repress, or discriminate against persons deprived of liberty,
their families or representatives; nor shall they be conducted under conditions that cause physical or mental suffering, are humiliating
or facilitate public exhibition.” Approved by the Commission during its 131st regular period of sessions, held from March 3-14, 2008.
1950 In the case of persons injured by security forces during protests, it should be noted that the State has a special duty to provide health
care, as described in this report in the section on the planning of operations. See, United Nations, Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 5.
1951 Cf. Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas: Principle X: “Persons deprived of
liberty shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment ofthe highest possible level of physical, mental, and social wellbeing, including amongst other aspects, (...) measures to meet the particular health needs of persons deprived of liberty belonging to
vulnerable or high risk groups, such as: the elderly, women, children, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis,
and persons with terminal diseases”; Principle XI: “Food - Persons deprived of liberty shall have the right to food in such a quantity,
quality, and hygienic condition so as to ensure adequate and sufficient nutrition, with due consideration to their cultural and religious
concerns, as well as to any special needs or diet determined by medical criteria. Such food shall be provided at regular intervals, and its
suspension or restriction as a disciplinary measure shall be prohibited by law. Drinking Water: Every person deprived of liberty shall
have access at all times to sufficient drinking water suitable for consumption. Its suspension or restriction as a disciplina ry measure
shall be prohibited by law.”
1952 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7.2.
1953 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7.3.
1954 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, Art. 145.
1955 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7.4.
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detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time.”1956
135. With regard to the need for States to provide all necessary means to ensure that detained persons and
their family members receive accurate information regarding the grounds for detention and the location
of the detention facility,1957 the Inter-American Court has established that “the detainee and those with
legal custody or representation of the detainee have the right to be informed of the causes and reasons
for his or her detention at the time it occurs, which ‘constitutes a mechanism to avoid illegal or arbitrary
detentions from the very moment of imprisonment and, at the same time, ensures the individual’s right
to defense.’”1958 In the case of persons detained at demonstrations, such records should be publicly
accessible.
136. In addition, States must put in place mechanisms to ensure special protection for persons under the age
of 18, in particular with regard to immediate communication to the competent judge and the parents or
guardians, as well as the performance of a medical examination certifying their health status at the time
of detention.1959
137. The Inter-American Court has held that detentions must be reviewed by a judge without delay. This
oversight is a measure designed to prevent arbitrary or unlawful arrests, taking into account that in a
State governed by the rule of law it is up to the judge to guarantee the detainee’s rights, to authorize the
adoption of precautionary or enforcement measures—when strictly necessary—and to ensure, in
general, that the accused is treated in a manner consistent with the presumption of innocence. The judge
must hear the detainee personally and assess all the explanations that the latter provides, so as to decide
whether it is in order to release him or to maintain the deprivation of liberty. Otherwise, it would be
tantamount to stripping the judicial review established in Article 7(5) of the Convention of its
effectiveness.1960
138. In particular, States should refrain from mass, collective, or indiscriminate arrests in the context of social
protest. The Inter-American Court has found that police tactics involving collective arrests, such as socalled “razzias”1961 “are incompatible with respect for fundamental rights, including presumption of
innocence, existence of a court order for detention—except in situations of flagrancy—and the obligation
to notify those in charge of the minors.”1962
139. In another precedent on mass arrests, the Inter-American Court also held that “a massive and
programmed arrest of people without legal grounds, in which the State massively arrests people that the
authority considers may represent a risk or danger to the security of others, without substantiated
evidence of the commission of a crime, constitutes an illegal and arbitraryarrest.”1963
140. The Commission reiterates that also in relation to operations carried out in the context of protests, States
should adapt the domestic legal system and institutional procedures and practices so that they are able
to prevent and, where necessary, investigate and punish cases of arbitrary detentions by agents of the
State. This involves, inter alia, the following obligations:1964
i. stipulating that no person shall be deprived of his or her liberty except under the circumstances that
the law specifically prescribes;
ii. guaranteeing that persons in the custody of State authorities will receive decenttreatment;
iii. incorporating into its domestic laws the obligation of State agents to immediately inform the person
detained of the reasons for his or her detention;
1956 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7.5.
1957 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 57, December 31, 2009, Chapter V, C. “Right to Personal
Liberty and Security”; IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 122.
1958 I/A Court H.R., Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C No. 99, note 4, para. 96.
1959 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 232, “Specific recommendations,” p. 108.
1960 I/A Court H.R., Case of Bayarri v. Argentina. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 30, 2008. Series
C No. 187, para. 65.
1961 Police operations aimed at surrounding a property, a street, a neighborhood or an event, preventing the movement of people who are
trapped within this enclosure and depriving them of their liberty or transporting them to police facilities. I/A Court H.R., Case of Bulacio
v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 56.
1962 I/A Court H.R., Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Judgment of September 18, 2003, para. 137.
1963 I/A Court H.R., Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No.
152, para. 93.
1964 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 232, “Specific recommendations,” p. 108.
325
iv. immediately reporting the detention to the competent judge for a determination of the detained
person’s rights;
v. informing the detained person’s next of kin and loved ones of his or her whereabouts and the reasons
for the detention;
vi. guaranteeing the detained person the services of legal counsel from the moment of his or her arrest;
and
vii. organizing a public record of persons taken into custody.
c) Evictions
141. Some socialprotests take place in a context ofprior rights violations and may include actions of resistance
to State action, in which case demonstrators are particularly exposed to police repression. In this regard,
the Inter-American Commission has underscored that the authorities must provide appropriate
responses to the complex conditions under which many of the demonstrations and demands take place
in the region.1965
142. As previously stated, forms of protest are varied and include, but are not limited to, occupations—
whether of a public or private building or school campus1966—and roadblocks. The State often responds
to such actions with eviction operations.
143. In many cases forced evictions take place in the context of public or even private undertakings and are
resisted by the inhabitants, peasants, indigenous people, or workers who occupy the place. The high
concentration of land ownership in some countries of the region has also resulted in the mobilization of
social sectors seeking better distribution of agricultural land, which has provoked violent reactions from
large landowners who, in some cases, have enjoyed the acquiescence and complicity of local officials.1967
144. This Commission has repeatedly stated that, in accordance with international norms and standards,
States must restrict forced evictions and are obligated to take measures to protect persons and
communities harmed by such operations,1968 as cases of forced evictions are “prima facie incompatible”
with the principles of international law.1969 In the event that they are carried out, the necessary measures
must be taken to minimize their impact on the affected population,1970 in particular with respect to
vulnerable groups such as children, persons with disabilities, older adults, women, and indigenous
peoples, among other marginalized groups and sectors.1971
145. Since it generally involves an intensified use of force, the order in which such operations are to be carried
out and the manner in which they are to be carried out must meet specific criteria for guaranteeing rights,
particularly when the right to social protest is involved. States should assess these circumstances in such
a way that their response to protest situations can be geared, in each case, toward protecting persons in
vulnerable situations, including specific measures and guidelines for supervising the use of force by
security forces. In no case should State intervention lead to the violation of other rights, such as the right
to life and physical integrity, the rights of participation in public affairs, freedom of expression, freedom
of assembly and association, or the right to housing, among others.
1965 Cf. IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 59.
1966 See, e.g., thematic hearing “Brazil: Student protests in Sao Paulo.” IACHR, 157th Session (April 2016).
1967 See, e.g., IACHR Report No. 25/09, Case 12.310, Merits, Sebastiao Camargo Filho v. Brazil. March 19, 2009.
1968 American Convention (Articles 21 & 26), the American Declaration (Articles IX, XI, and XXIII), the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (art. 11); and other instruments and declarations, such as: General Comments No. 4 (1991) and No. 7 (1997)
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; the Basic Principl es and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/147; UN Basic Principles and
Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement.
1969 UN. ESCR Committee. General Comment No. 4 (1991), para. 18. See also: ESCR Committee. General Comment No. 7 (1997) (E/1998/22).
Annex IV, para. 18.
1970 States must provide compensation and alternative accommodation, or restitution, except in cases of force majeure; in addition to
guaranteeing “as a minimum” and “without discrimination”: “(a) essential food, potable water and sanitation; (b) basic shelter and
housing; (c) appropriate clothing; (d) essential medical services; (e) livelihood sources; (f) fodder for livestock and access to common
property resources previously depended upon; and (g) education for children and childcare facilities. States should also ensu re that
members of the same extended family or community are not separated as a result of evictions.” UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on
Development-based Evictions and Displacement. Annex I to the report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component
of the right to an adequate standard of living, para. 52.
1971 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Ch. IV A, para. 166.
326
146. The Commission has stated that when executing eviction or arrest warrants for persons in an occupation,
police officers cannot act with unlimited discretion in carrying out their law enforcement duties. The
occupation of another’s property and the existence of arrest warrants by virtue of that fact cannot, by
themselves, justify using lethal force or jeopardizing people’s physical integrity. The Commission has
stressed that crimes against property do not necessarily include an element of violence. The use of lethal
force merely to execute arrest warrants when acts of violence are not involved is unnecessary and
disproportionate.1972 It has further considered that the fact of negotiating with occupants for just a few
hours before undertaking a violent raid is not sufficient to establish that it is impossible to enforce the
law without resorting to the use of extreme force.1973
147. In the case of school takeovers and occupations as a way for students to voice their criticisms, demands,
and complaints to State authorities, the Commission has stressed that these are legitimate forms of
exercising the right to social protest, particularly in contexts where children and adolescents lack other
channels to express their grievances about policies that affectthem.1974
148. The Commission considers that guaranteeing the right to protest of children and adolescents means that
forced eviction from a building occupied as part of a social action must be carried out by means of an
express order based on a serious risk to the life or physical integrity of the person and where no other
less harmful measures are available to protect those rights. The special duty of protection that the State
has in relation to this group requires that dialogue and negotiation be the priority and predominant
method of action of State agents.1975 Even when the authorities make a lawful and legitimate decision to
vacate a building, the eviction order must be clearly communicated and explained, to allow the
demonstrators to understand and comply, giving them sufficient time to disperse without resorting to
police force.1976
149. Resistance to an eviction may, in some cases, constitute a form of protest when the operation amounts to
a violation of the right to housing. The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has considered
that “Tenure takes a variety of forms, including rental (public and private) accommodation, cooperative
housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency housing and informal settlements, including occupation of
land or property. Notwithstanding the type of tenure, all persons should possess a degree of security of
tenure which guarantees legalprotection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats.”1977
150. In such cases, evictions can only be justified in exceptional situations, with the caveat that they should not
result in people becoming homeless or exposed to violations of other human rights.1978 In the event that
children, elderly persons, indigenous people, or other vulnerable groups or persons are present, States
must exhaust all existing measures for the peaceful channeling of conflicts, dialogue, and negotiation, in
keeping with the principles of absolute necessity and proportionality in the use offorce.
151. In the case of a violent eviction of a landless people’s camp by private actors, the Inter-American Court
also stressed that when authorities have knowledge of a situation of real risk to an individual or group of
individuals due to the acts of third parties or individuals, they have a responsibility to prevent or avert
that risk.1979
d) Forced dispersal or break-up
152. This Commission has stated that certain regulations enabling the execution of police operations aimed at
dispersing or restricting protests can often lead to a number of human rightsviolations.1980
153. This is the reason why the dispersal or break up of demonstrations by force—which entails direct
interference with the legitimate exercise of a right and may affect the life or safety of persons—can only
be permitted in very exceptional cases, by means of an express order based on a serious risk to the life or
1972 Cfr. IACHR, Report No. 57/02, Case of Finca la Exacta v. Guatemala. Merits. October 21, 2002, paras. 38-41.
1973 Cfr. IACHR, Report No. 57/02, Case of Finca la Exacta v. Guatemala. Merits. October 21, 2002, para. 54.
1974 Cfr. IACHR thematic hearing “Brazil: Student protests in Sao Paulo.” IACHR, 157th Session (April 2016).
1975 Cfr. IACHR thematic hearing “Brazil: Student protests in Sao Paulo.” IACHR, 157th Session (April 2016).
1976 Amnesty International, “Good Practice for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations,” available at:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/good_practice_for_law_enforcement_for_policing_demonstrations2.pdf
1977 UN. ESCR Committee. General Comment No. 4 on “the right to adequate housing" (1991), para. 8 a).
1978 ESCR Committee. General Comment No. 7 on “the right to adequate housing," para. 16. Cited in: IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Ch. IV A,
para. 166.
1979 IACHR, Sebastião Camargo Filho v. Brazil, Report No. 25/09, 2009, paras. 80 & 83.
1980 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 67.
327
physical integrity of persons and where no other less harmful measures are available to protect those
rights.1981
154. Forced dispersal or break-up is often defended on the grounds that there is a need to free up traffic on
public roads. In this context, it is appropriate to reiterate the salient point made in chapter 4.1 of this
report, thatthe right toprotest is one of the cornerstones of any democratic structure.1982 Demonstrations
should be allowed to cause a certain level of disruption to daily life, for example in relation to traffic and
commercial activities, so as not to deprive the freedom of peaceful assembly of its essence.1983 Moreover,
imposing the requirement of prior authorization to hold gatherings and demonstrations cannot be an
argument for allowing the automatic dissolution, by the use of force, of those public demonstrations for
which permission has not been granted by the authorities.1984
155. When the authorities make a lawful and legitimate decision to break up a protest, the order to disperse
must be clearly communicated and explained, to allow the demonstrators to understand and comply,
giving them sufficient time to disperse without resorting topolice force.1985 The IACHR considers that the
indiscriminate persecution of demonstrators following the dispersal of a protest exacerbates tension and
is not justified by the criteria of necessity and proportionality in the use offorce.
7. Police operations, protocols, and institutional structure of the security forces and
exclusion of the armed forces
156. Proper use of the force necessary to respect, protect, facilitate, and promote the right to social protest
requires the organization of all the structures through which government power is exercised in such a
way that they are able to legally ensure the free and full exercise of human rights.1986 In turn, Article 2
requires States to take measures “of two kinds: on the one hand, elimination of any norms and practices
that in any way violate the guarantees provided under the Convention; on the other hand, the
promulgation of norms and the development of practices conducive to effective observance of those
guarantees.”1987 It is understood that the protection of these rights entails not only the obligation of the
State not to interfere with their exercise, but also the duty to take, under certain circumstances, positive
measures to ensure them.1988
157. The holding of meetings, demonstrations, and protests is a central activity of many associations and
organizations. In this regard, States have the duty to provide the necessary means for them to conduct
their activities freely; to protect them when they are threatened in order to prevent attacks on their life
and safety; to refrain from imposing obstacles that might hinder their work; and to investigate seriously
and effectively the violations committed against them, thus combating impunity.1989
158. As part of their obligations, States must design specific protocols of action for security forces operating in
situations of socialprotest andpublic demonstrations. The relevance of developing specific rules of action
derives from two empirical findings: First, the way in which political authorities and police institutions
work with regard to their actions in public demonstrations often follows a logic that is distinct from other
1981 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, paras. 61-63.
1982 IACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2005, Volume III, Report of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February 27, 2006, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 7, Chapter V, “PublicDemonstrations as an Exercise
of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,” para. 93.
1983 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 32. See also: IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57,
para.198; ECtHR, Kuznetsov v. Russia, 23 October 2008, para. 44.
1984 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 69.
1985 Amnesty International, “Good Practice for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations,” available at:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/good_practice_for_law_enforcement_for_policing_demonstrations2.pdf
1986 I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 166; I/A Court H.R., Case
of Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C No. 5, para. 175.
1987 I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 207; I/A Court H.R., Case of Baena
Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 108; I/A Court H.R., Case of Cantoral
Benavides v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, para. 178; I/A Court H.R., Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2006. Series C No. 162, para. 172.
1988 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 192; IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in the Americas, 2011, para. 133.
1989 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66. December 31, 2011, para.
161.
328
routines. These are operations with particular orders and design, for which it is necessary to have action
protocols that systematize the standards applicable to the use of force in said situations. Second, these
are circumstances involving practices that may violate a number of fundamental rights, and the definition
of clear rules of action therefore may lead to the development of more appropriate oversight mechanisms
and bodies.
159. These criteria and standards of action organize police operations and regulate the use of force. As the
Commission has previously maintained, these directives should be aimed at enabling police officers to act
“with the certainty that their job is to protect the participants in a public meeting or demonstration or
mass gathering so long as they are exercising their right.”1990 This development of national and local laws
contributes to the perception, both by security officers and the general population, of the scope of police
powers, and hence to the establishment of conditions forproper oversight and accountability.1991
160. The planning of operations must take into account, in particular, the duty of States toprotect the physical
integrity of demonstrators and nearby third parties during a protest, including in relation to acts
committed by private or non-state actors.1992 The protection of the life and physical integrity of police
officers should also be considered. Threats or actions of other demonstrators or third parties that pose a
certain risk to life, or to the physical integrity of persons—whether or not they are participating in the
protest—requires the State to take action toprevent them. In this case, the use of force may be necessary,
within the limits of legality andproportionality.1993
161. States must, in any event, do everything in their power to minimize harm and injury, whether caused by
State agents or by third parties. In particular, it should include an assessment of the impacts of all
measures taken on the physical integrity of persons. The Commission understands that the principle of
pre-eminence of the rightto life andphysicalintegrity means, for example, that operations shouldprovide
sufficient and safe pathways for the dispersal of demonstrators and third parties present. Police
operations should facilitate and refrain from obstructing major dispersal routes, including access to
means of transport, such as train stations or undergroundtransport.
162. Operations planning should also make provisions ensure that medical assistance is provided in cases
where persons are injured or killed in the course of a demonstration, whatever the cause and whoever is
responsible. The officers in charge of the operation shouldprioritize medical care and should alsoprovide
accurate and timely information about the events to the relatives or close friends of those affected. States
should, as a preventive measure, ensure that medical services and/or other health measures are provided
during the demonstration.1994
163. The Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions on the proper
management of assemblies makes clear that the State’s obligation to facilitate includes the responsibility
to provide basic services, including traffic management, medical assistance, and clean-up services.
Organizers should not be held responsible for the provision of such services, nor should they be required
to contribute to the cost of theirprovision.1995
164. A human rights approach to these protocols and to the design of operations also requires attention to the
security and rights of State agents, including members of the police.1996 Equipment is essential for the
protection of the rights of demonstrators, third parties, and police officers. On the basis of a risk
assessment, equipment for law enforcement officials deployed during assemblies should include both
appropriate personal protective equipment, and when necessary, officers should be appropriately
protected with equipment, such as shields, helmets, and stab-and/or bulletproof jackets, with a view to
1990 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 193; IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 79.
1991 UN, OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 1 April 2014,
A/HRC/26/36, para. 29.
1992 Report on Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road towards Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 34, June
28, 2007, para. 43; IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 63.
1993 UN, OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 1 April 2014,
A/HRC/26/36, para. 72
1994 UN, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 5. The State’s obligation to fa cilitate
includes the responsibility to provide basic services, including traffic management, medical assistance, and clean-up services. Organizers
should not be held responsible for the provision of such services, nor should they be required to contribute to the cost oftheir provision.
1995 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 40
1996 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 224.
329
decreasing the need for any use of weapons.1997 Police officers must be equipped and trained in such a
way that any provocations or attacks they may have to tolerate in the course of their activities do not
affect their dignity or professional performance. States have an obligation to protect and ensure the
professional rights of the members of itspolice force and toprovide them with the training,infrastructure
and equipment needed to perform their dutiesproperly.1998
165. In the design and implementation of operations, special attention should be paid to the disproportionate
and illegitimate ways in which the use of force may affect certain individuals and/or groups depending
on their particular characteristics, such as women,1999 children and adolescents,2000 persons with
disabilities, and older adults. Accordingly, protocols for police action and the implementation and
oversight of operations should contain provisions and establish special measures to prevent
discriminatory and aggravated effects. In particular, States must safeguard the physical integrity of
minors, as established in the UN Convention on the Rights of theChild.2001
166. At the same time, the Inter-American Court has pointed out the relationship between the activity of civil
society organizations and associations and the exercise of political rights established in Article 23 of the
ACHR, especially those groups that represent the interests of marginal sectors or those who face
difficulties in exercising their rights.2002
167. Similarly, provision should be made for specific actions for the special protection and care of persons
belonging to groups that must be specially protected or require special care. States are further under the
obligation to respect and guarantee the free and full exercise of the right to protest and to participate in
public demonstrations without discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status (art. 1 ACHR). Taking into
account the diversity of identities and groups expressing themselves in large social demonstrations and
protests, officers should make sure that their verbal communication, body language, gestures, and any
type of indirect communication are not perceived by the organizers and participants as intimidating,
offensive, or insulting.2003
168. Where necessary, arrangements should be made for the intervention of specially organized sections with
selected officials who undergo ongoing training to intervene in large demonstrations and At the same
time, the manner in which these departments coordinate and communicate with other sections of the
security institutions and with other State agencies should be regulated, as should the respective
democratic oversight of the operations.2004
169. The selection, education, and training of the government personnel andpolice officers involved must take
into account the complexity and variety of the tasks required of them. The selection of personnel with the
necessary qualities, initial training, and continuous retraining are essential for the development of
1997 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, paras. 53-54.
1998 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 224.
1999 In its Resolution on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, the Human Rights Council “Urges
States to pay particular attention to the safety and protection of women and women human rights defenders from acts of intimidation
and harassment, as well as gender-based violence, including sexual assault, in the context of peaceful protests” (A/HRC/25/L.20).
2000 In its Resolution on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, the Human Rights Counc il
“Reaffirms that States must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and protection of children, including while they exerc ise
their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, expression and association, including in the context of peaceful protests”
(A/HRC/25/L.20).
2001 The Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that the authorities of the State shall, in all actions taken by them, take into account
the bestinterests of the child and undertake to “ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or herwell-being, taking
into account [their] rights.” See: Convention on the Rights of the Child, art.3.
2002 I/A Court H.R., Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C
No. 127.
2003 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 38.
2004 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, para. 56: “The member states must put together reliable indicators so that
they are able to constantly evaluate the following, inter alia: (1) human resources, from the quantitative and qualitative standpoints;
(2) the mechanisms for selecting and providing basic and specialized training to the civil servants in the institutions in qu estion and
their career service; (3) the working conditions and pay of these civil servants, and (4) the equipment, means of transportation and
communications available to perform the assigned functions.”
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communication skills, use of force, use of deterrent and defensive equipment, organization of functions,
hierarchical division, and registration and supervision required for participation in these operations.2005
170. As discussed more extensively in the accountability chapter of this report, the design of operations should
include: a detailed record of orders, participating officials, respective responsibilities, and actions for the
purposes of prevention, subsequent assessment of actions taken, and any judicial and administrative
investigations into any situation involving abuse. The Commission believes that, where appropriate,
provision should be made for theprotection of the scene of the crime as a fundamentalpart of the concept
of due diligence.2006 The policy maker and/or police officer in charge of the operation must ensure the
preservation of the scene and the collection and preservation of all evidence. Of particular importance is
the preservation of the communications of thepersonnelinvolved in the operation2007 and of all the audio
and video recordings produced by the security institutions present in their original formats, both directly
related to the particular sequence of events and to the entire operation at its various levels.
171. The recording of orders and activities, as well as the visible identification of personnel and equipment is
not only effective for the purposes of possible administrative and judicial investigations, but is also
fundamental for the prevention of abuses and the intentional or accidental use of improperequipment.
172. In all cases involving the use of force, and in particular the use of weapons—whether justified or not—
the policy makers and/or police officers responsible for the operation must take a number of measures
to reduce the harm caused by the extreme measure they have taken and to submit such action to
administrative and/or judicial review. This requires the proper recording of any incident involving the
use of weapons, whether or not it affects the safety of anyperson.
173. Given the imperative social interest in the exercise of the rights involved in the contexts of protest for
peaceful demonstrations for the democratic life of a nation, the Commission considers that in this specific
sphere those considerations are all the more important for ruling out the participation of military and
armed forces in such situations.2008
174. The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has
expressed particular concern over the adverse effects of categorizing certain groups of demonstrators as
“domestic extremists.”2009 In some countries, the broad characterization, by different State agencies, of
people whoparticipate or organize protests as supposed threats to security has created the conditions to
allow the Armed Forces toparticipate in security operations or prior intelligence activities.
175. Police corps hold an “irreplaceable” mission for the proper functioning of the democratic system and to
ensure the safety of the population; in addition, the IACHR has stated that due to their “national coverage
and variety of its functions, it is one of the state institutions that are most frequently related to
citizens.”2010
176. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has said that
“The modern State [...] cannot function without the police. The human rights system as such also cannot
be effective without the police and,in some cases, without the use of force [since they] play an important
role in protecting society from violence, enforcing justice, and securing the rights ofpeople.”2011
2005 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, paras. 115, 120 & 193. Human Rights Council, Joint
report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, paras. 42,
52, & 55.
2006 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that, “The failure to protect the scene of a crime properly can impair the
investigation, since this is an essential element to enable it to be successful” (I/A Court H.R., Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala,
supra nota 4, para. 166), and the UN Human Rights Council has urged “States to investigate any death or significant injury committed
during protests, including those resulting from the discharge of firearms or the use of non-lethal weapons by officials exercising law
enforcement duties” (CDH ONU, A/HRC/25/L.20, para. 12).
2007 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 68 c).
2008 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 38
2009 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, on his mission to the
United Kingdom (14-23 January 2013) (A/HRC/23/39/Add.1).
2010 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 36; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela, 2003, chapter III, “State
Security: The Armed Forces and the Police,” para. 294; Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., Doc. 57,
December 31, 2009, para. 77.
2011 UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, A/HRC/26/36, 1 April 2014,
para. 22.
331
177. In this sense, the Commission has indicated that domestic situations of security and violence should be
handled by a civilian police force, effective and respectful of human rights, and not by turning to the armed
forces, who are trained and equipped for other types of external conflict.2012 “The history of the
hemisphere shows that, broadly speaking, the intervention of the armed forces in internal security
matters is accompanied by violations of human rights in violent circumstances. Therefore, practice
teaches us that it is advisable to avoid the intervention of the armed forces in matters of internal security
since it carries a risk of human rights violations.”2013
178. The IACHR has emphasized that the police bodies and armed forces are “two substantively different
institutions, insofar as the purposes for which they were created and their training and preparation are
concerned.”2014 As such, the clear and precise separation between domestic security as a function of the
Police and national defense as a function of the Armed Forces is fundamental.2015
179. The Inter-American Court reiterated this opinion in its decision in the case of Montero Aranguren et al.
(Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, holding that: “the States must restrict to the maximum extent the
use of armed forces to control domestic disturbances, since they are trained to fight against enemies and
not to protect and control civilians, a task that is typical of police forces.”2016
180. Another phenomenon that hinders the establishment of a citizen security policy is the militarization of
police forces. Police bodies, in their interventions aimed at preserving internal order, would appear to
have recourse to the use of force as a first resort, which is characteristic of military formations.2017 As the
IACHR noted with respect to the police in the United States, “[...] The main concerns related to excessive
or arbitrary use of force is focused on militarization of the police in terms of the equipment used, the type
of training they receive, the action protocols they use, and the difficulty with which police officers who
are guilty of abuse or excessive use of force are held criminally liable andprosecuted.”2018
8. Dialogue and negotiation bodies
181. The Commission has emphasized that, regardless of the format adopted by those who exercise this right,
the action of the police should have as its main objective facilitating demonstrations and not containing
or confronting the demonstrators. For this reason, police operations should be oriented towards
guaranteeing the exercise of this right.2019 It has similarly reiterated that “the State’s obligation is to
ensure theprocessing of the demands and the underlying social andpolitical conflicts so as to channel the
claims.”2020
182. The IACHR recommends the promotion of spaces for communication and dialogue prior to
demonstrations, and the engagement of liaison officers with demonstrators, in order to coordinate the
unfolding of demonstrations and protests and public security operations, avoiding conflict situations.2021
Consensus has been strengthened among experts and international institutions,2022 governmental
agencies, and civil society that dialogue and negotiation-focused approaches are more effective in
managing protests and preventing acts of violence.2023
2012 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 37.
2013 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 37; Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, pp. 42-43.
2014 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 49; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela, 2003, Chapter III, “State
Security: The Armed Forces and the Police,” para. 272.
2015 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 2009, pp. 42-43.
2016 I/A Court H.R., Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, para. 78.
2017 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 40.
2018 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 40; Report on Violence, Children, and Organized Crime. OAS/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 40/15,
November 2, 2015, para. 191.
2019 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 68.
2020 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV A, para. 68; Amnesty International, Use of force — Guidelines for implementation of the UN
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, August 2015, p. 150.
2021 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para.68 e).
2022 The UN Human Rights Council has underscored “the important role that communication between protestors, local authorities and
officials exercising law enforcement duties can play in the proper management of assemblies, such as peaceful protests, and calls on
States to establish appropriate channels in that regard” (A/HRC/25/L.20).
2023 The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, has called for a “negotiated” approach to
social protest, including the active use of communication, negotiation, cooperation, information gathering, and an emphasis on
preventive police policies ( A/HRC/17/28), and Amnesty International has stressed that dialogue with demonstrators plays an
important role in reducing levels of violence (Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials).
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183. In this regard, the political authority must provide the appropriate mechanisms for genuine channels of
communication with demonstrators in order to manage, first, the procedural aspects of the protest action
(use ofpublic space, duration, etc.) and, second, to direct complaints to the relevant institutional channels
in order to identify opportunities for communicating and coordinating with the interestedauthorities.
184. These means of coordinating and responding to demands are essential when it comes to marginalized,
vulnerable groups with limited access to existing channels of political representation.2024 These political
channels, moreover, should allow for the filing of complaints related to irregularities and non-compliance
with legal and regulatory provisions on the part of police and securityforces.
9. The duty to not criminalize leaders and participants in demonstrations and protests
185. The application of criminal law to the acts of participants in a demonstration constitutes a serious
restriction with far-reaching consequences for freedom of expression, as well as the rights of assembly,
association, and political participation, which under the principles developed above can only be used on
a very exceptional basis and is subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.
186. In its Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, the Commission noted
that “During the last years, there is a growing trend in some countries to bring criminal charges against
people whoparticipate in socialprotests,”2025 and in another report on the Criminalization of the Work of
Human Rights Defenders, the IACHR noted that social protests are one of the most common contexts in
which this serious problem arises.
187. Similarly, in its 2005 Annual Report, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the
IACHR maintained that:
“(...) in principle, criminalization per se of demonstrations in public thoroughfares is inadmissible when they are
carried out in exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly. In other words,
it must be examined whether the application of criminal sanctions is justified under the standard,
established by the Inter-American Court, that said restriction (criminalization) satisfies a pressing public
interest necessary for the operation of a democratic society. It is also necessary to examine whether the
imposition of criminal sanctions is, in fact, the least harmful means to restrict the freedom of expression,
exercised through the right of assembly, in turn exercised through a demonstration on a thoroughfare or
in a public space.”2026
188. The criminalization of socialprotest consists in the use of the punitive power of the State to deter,punish,
or prevent the exercise of the right to protest,2027 and in some cases, to social and political participation
more broadly, through the arbitrary, disproportionate, or repeated use of the criminal justice system
against demonstrators, activists, and social or political leaders for participating in or allegedly organizing
a social protest, or for being part of the organizing or convening group or entity. As the Inter-American
Commission has pointed out, its effects often include arbitrary and prolonged prosecution for
misdemeanor or criminal offenses, the imposition of fines, and/or arbitrary arrests with or without a
conviction.
189. The Commission has repeatedly observed that the prosecution of human rights defenders is a common
trend in Latin America. This misuse of the criminal law occurs more frequently where there are tensions
or conflicts of interest, including in the context of social protest, during or after the staging of a
demonstration, blockade, sit-in, or mobilization,for the simple fact of havingparticipated in these acts.2028
190. The IACHR has underscored in this regard that the people who promote and lead demonstrations are
often the hardest hit, and are used to send a message to other people and organizations that participate
2024 Charter of the Organization of American States. Article 45(f) & (g). I/A Court H.R., Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127. Concurring opinion of J. García Ramírez 25, 27; Concurring
opinion of J. Diego García Sayán, 31.
2025 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66 December 31, 2011, para.
107.
2026 IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 2005. Chapter V, “Public Demonstrations as an
Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly,” para. 96. Similarly, see: IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 2002, Ch. IV, para. 35.
2027 Cf. IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 12.
2028 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 4.
333
in the protests.2029 Some cases have gone so far as to accuse social leaders of acts carried out in
demonstrations where they were not even present. This reveals an application of the criminal law that is
explained less by the aim of regulating the use of public space and guaranteeing the rights of thirdparties,
than by a persecutory and restrictive purpose that seeks to curtail the social andpolitical activity of these
people and their organizations.
191. Criminal proceedings and judgments, as well as administrative penalties or fines and pecuniary
reparations, have a systemic effect on the general conditions for peaceful protest as an exercise of
freedom of expression. In addition to the individual and institutional(regarding organizations) dimension
of the impact of these measures, criminalization has a “chilling effect” on society as a whole, and may lead
to the prevention or inhibition of this type of expression.2030 As the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression has maintained, criminalization has collective and social effects:
192. “It should be recalled that (...) criminalization could have an intimidating effect on this form of
participatory expression among those sectors of society that lack access to other channels of complaint
or petition, such as the traditional press or the right of petition within the state body from which the
object of the claim arose. Curtailing free speech by imprisoning those who make use of this means of
expression would have a dissuading effect on those sectors of society that express their points of view or
criticisms of the authorities as a way of influencing the processes whereby state decisions and policies
that directly affect them are made.”2031
193. The criminalization of persons participating in or leading public demonstrations not only has an impact
on the right to freedom of expression and assembly, but also has serious and systemic effects on the
exercise of the rights to freedom of association and political participation. In particular, criminalization
has a number of repercussions on the free operation and coordination of the organizations, political
parties, trade unions, networks, movements, or other groups to which the accused persons belong.
194. By affecting the free development of political activities and the maximum plurality of speech on issues of
public interest, this abuse of the criminal law can constitute a serious infringement of political rights
(Articles 23 of the ACHRand 24 of the Declaration) given that, as this Commission has held, “governments
have, in the face of political rights and the right to political participation, the obligation to permit and
guarantee: the organization of all political parties and other associations, unless they are constituted to
violate human rights; open debate of the principalthemes of socioeconomic development; the celebration
of general and free elections with all the necessary guarantees so that the results represent the popular
will.”2032 Attacks on these organizations may also be contrary to the obligations imposed by Article 45 (c),
(f) and (g) of the Charter of the Organization of American States.2033
195. The criminalization of the right toprotest is often the result of applying criminal definitions that, because
of their vagueness or ambiguity, violate the principle of legality and inter-American standards. In other
cases, conduct that is part of a social protest is penalized directly, such as criminal penalties for lack of
prior authorization or contempt (desacato). It also tends to occur through a formalistic application of
criminal concepts, which isolates the behaviors it seeks to punish from the context in which they occur
(the exercise of the right to social protest), and develops a literal interpretation of the criminal texts that
contradicts constitutional norms, or unduly extends the scope of application of the criminalprovision.
196. The set of criminal definitions used to criminalize protest is similar in the different countries of the region.
Some of the most common offenses charged in this context are: obstruction of public roads; resistance to
2029 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 218.
2030 IACHR, “Matter of Fernando Alcibíades Villavicencio Valencia et al., Ecuador,” Precautionary Measure No. 30-14. March 24, 2014, paras.
34-36.
2031 IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 2002, Ch. IV, para. 35.
2032 IACHR, Annual Report 2002, Ch. IV, Cuba, para. 12.
2033 Charter of the Organization of American States. Article 45: The Member States, convinced that man can only achieve the full realization
of his aspirations within a just social order, along with economic development and true peace, agree to dedicate every effort to the
application of the following principles and mechanisms: […] c) Employers and workers, both rural and urban, have the right to associate
themselves freely for the defense and promotion of their interests, including the right to collective bargaining and the workers' right to
strike, and recognition of the juridical personality of associations and the protection of their freedom and independence, all in
accordance with applicable laws; […] f) The incorporation and increasing participation of the marginal sectors ofthe population, in both
rural and urban areas, in the economic, social, civic, cultural, and political life of the nation, in order to achieve the full integration of the
national community, acceleration of the process of social mobility, and the consolidation of the democratic system. The encouragement
of all efforts of popular promotion and cooperation that have as their purpose the development and progress of the community; g)
Recognition of the importance of the contribution of organizations such as labor unions, cooperatives, and cultural, professional,
business, neighborhood, and community associations to the life of the society and to the development process.”
334
authority and crimes of indecency and contempt; disturbance of public peace or public order; advocacy
of crime; damage to public or private property; sabotage; trespass and unlawful occupation of property;
criminal conspiracy and instigation to commit a crime; incitement to rebellion; sedition and mayhem;
riot; extortion or aggravated coercion; and even crimes of terrorism.
197. Criminalization may also be the product of criminal proceedings based on circumstances for which there
is no evidence or where the evidence is directly false and which lead to the authorization of measures that
are distressing to individuals, their families, and organizations, such as the unwarranted ordering of
pretrial detention, seizures, raids, and often violent searches.
a) The creation of broad, vague, or ambiguous criminal offenses in violation of the principle of
legality
198. In its report on the criminalization of human rights defenders in the Americas, the Commission stressed
that the formulation of criminal offenses contrary to the principle of legality can give rise to processes of
criminalization.2034 It noted that, although it is up to the State in the exercise of its crime policy to
determine which acts are to be classified as crimes, Article 9 of the American Convention enshrines the
principle of legality and entails elements that must be observed by States when exercising their power to
define criminal offenses.2035
199. The principle of legality requires the legislature to enact a provision in accordance with the procedure
required by the domestic law of each State (procedural legality);2036 and that criminal definitions are
formulated unambiguously, in strict, precise, and unequivocal terms, which clearly define the punishable
acts as crimes, establishing their specific elements and the factors that distinguish them from other
punishable acts under other criminal concepts (substantive legality). 2037
200. The Inter-American Court has stated that, “Ambiguity in describing crimes creates doubts and the
opportunity for abuse of power, particularly when it comes to ascertaining the criminal responsibility of
individuals and punishing their criminal behavior with penalties that exact their toll on the things that
are most precious, such as life and liberty.”2038 Furthermore, this type of ambiguity may lead to a number
of restrictions on due process guarantees since, depending on whether one offense or another is involved,
there is a variation in the penalty to be imposed.2039 The Court has held that in these situations there is a
lack of certainty about the criminal acts, their elements, the objects or interests against which they are
committed, and the effects on society as awhole.2040
201. This is notably the case with counter-terrorism laws. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has
stated that, “The adoption of overly broad definitions of terrorism therefore carries the potential for
deliberate misuse of the term—including as a response to claims and social movements of indigenous
peoples—as well as unintended human rights abuses. Failure to restrict counter-terrorism laws and
implementing measures to the countering of conduct which is truly terrorist in nature also pose the risk
that, where such laws and measures restrict the enjoyment of rights and freedoms, they will offend the
2034 Cf. IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 57.
2035 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 241.
2036 I/A Court H.R., The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 of May 9, 1986.
Series A No. 6, para. 29.
2037 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru (2000), OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev. 2, June 2, 2000, paras. 80,
168; IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116,Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, para. 225; I/A Court
H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 121; Case of
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, para. 157; Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series CNo. 111, para. 174; Case ofDe La Cruz Flores v. Peru. Judgment ofNovember
18, 2004. Series C No. 115, para. 79; Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137,
para. 188; Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009.
Series C No. 207, para. 55.
2038 I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 121; Case of Ricardo Canese v.
Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 174.
2039 I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 119; I/A Court H.R., Case of Lori
Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 119.
2040 I/A Court H.R., Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2004, para. 117.
335
principles of necessity and proportionality that govern the permissibility of any restriction on human
rights.”2041
202. The Inter-American Court has established that, when defining offenses of a terrorist nature, the principle
of legality requires that a necessary distinction be made between such offenses and ordinary offenses, so
that every individual and also the criminal judge have sufficient legal elements to know whether an act is
punishable under one offense or the other. This is especially important with regard to terrorist offenses
because they merit harsher prison sentences, as well as ancillary penalties and disqualifications with
major effects on the exercise of other fundamental rights.2042
b) Criminal definitions that violate inter-American standards by punishing activities typical of social
protest
203. This report has already pointed out that the provision of criminal penalties for failure to comply with a
requirement that contravenes international law, such as prior authorization, is incompatible with the
obligations arising from the American Convention because it violates the prohibition of prior
censorship.2043
204. The Commission has also received information on the use of the criminal offense of contempt (desacato)
to arrest and prosecute demonstrators when they respond verbally to police violence during protests.
The Commission and the Inter-American Court have been emphatic in maintaining that critical
expressions referring to public officials enjoy greater protection under the inter-American human rights
system.2044
205. In that regard, States may not detain or prosecute a demonstrator merely for expressing criticism, verbal
condemnation, or insults to a State agent in a situation of conflict or socialprotest. In fact,it bears recalling
that the mere criminalization of contempt (desacato) is an infringement of the right to freedom of
expression protected under Article 13 of the American Convention and Article IV of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.2045
206. In particular, when social protest falls within the scope of speech that criticizes or condemns public
officials and authorities or refers to matters of public interest, it is especially protected by Article 13 of
2041 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/16/51, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, 22 December 2010, paras. 26-27.
2042 I/A CourtH.R., Case of Norín Catrimán et al.(Leaders, Members and Activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile. Merits, Reparations
and Costs. Judgment of May 29, 2014. Series C No. 279, para. 163.
2043 ACHR, Art. 13.2: “The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be
subject to subsequent imposition of liability (…)”; The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, has indicated that the failure of organizers to give prior notice to the authorities should not result in the imposition of
criminal or administrative penalties resulting in fines or imprisonment, especially in the case of spontaneous assemblies whe re the
organizers are unable to comply with the requisite notification requirements, or where there is no existing or identifiable
organizer (A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 29).
2044 IACHR, Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of “Desacato” Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995; IACHR. Annual Report 2004. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI (“Desacato” Laws and Criminal Defamation). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122. Doc. 5 rev. 1. February 23, 2005,
paras. 155 et seq.; IACHR. Annual Report 2009. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III
(Inter-American Legal Framework of the Right to Freedom of Expression). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51. December 30, 2009, pp. 245 et seq.;
I/A Court H.R., Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74; Case of
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107; Case of
Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111; Case of Palamara Iribarne v.
Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment ofNovember 22, 2005. Series C No. 135; I/A Court H.R., Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008 Series C No. 177. Technical note on the international parameters regarding freedom of
expression and crimes against honor and the adequacyofthe provisions regarding crimes against honor present in the draft amendment
of the Brazilian Criminal Code. November 4, 2013, in: IACHR. Annual Report 2013. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression. Chapter 88 (Evaluation ofthe State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere), para. 125. November 4, 2013;
IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 101.
2045 Principle 11 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression adopted by the IACHR provides that: “Public officials are subject
to greater scrutiny by society. Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public officials, generally known as "desacato laws,"
restrict freedom of expression and the right to information”; IACHR, Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression Avail able at:
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=26&lID=1; Similarly, see: IACHR, Annual Report 1994. Chapter V:
Report on the Compatibility of “Desacato” Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. doc. 9 rev.
February 17, 1995; IACHR, Annual Report 2004. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter VI
(“Desacato” Laws and Criminal Defamation). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122. Doc. 5 rev. 1. February 23, 2005, paras. 155 et seq.; IACHR, Annual
Report 2009. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. Chapter III (Inter-American Legal Framework
ofthe Right to Freedom of Expression). OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51. December 30, 2009. pp. 245 etseq.;IACHR, Criminalization of the Work
of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 103.
336
the ACHR. The Inter-American Commission has asserted that in cases where there is “…a criminal
conviction or an arrest warrant which, in principle, results from the exercise of a fundamental right in a
specially protected area which, in turn, is one of the bases for the proper functioning of any democracy
(…),” it can be concluded that: (i) “there is an obvious connection between the protected conduct (the
exercise of freedom of expression and the right to lodge complaints against authorities) and the
conviction or arrest warrant” and that (ii) “the execution of the criminal sentence would have multiple
adverse effects because it could affect not only the personal freedom but also the right to freedom of
expression of the detainee, his peers, and society as a whole.”2046
c) The formalistic and broad application of the criminal law to criminalize socialprotest
207. Criminalization also tends to occur through the abusive or widespread application of criminal concepts
or forms of criminal participation, which is also characterized by a narrow, biased, or decontextualized
interpretation of the facts.
208. The Commission stresses that States should stop applying criminal definitions that characterize conduct
commonly observed in protests as criminal acts, such as roadblocks or disorderly acts that,in themselves,
do not affect interests such as the life, safety, or freedom of persons;2047 in the context of protests, these
acts constitute forms of exercising the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, andassociation.2048
209. As highlighted in the chapter on restrictions, justice authorities should make certain that any limitation
on the exercise of the right is necessary for the functioning of a democratic society. For instance, in
weighing the right to freedom of movement against the right to social protest, “t should be borne in mind
thatthe right to freedom of expression is not just another right, but one of theprimary and mostimportant
foundations of any democratic structure: the undermining of freedom of expression directly affects the
central nerve of the democratic system.”2049 On this issue, the IACHR has maintained that “(…) in principle,
criminalization per se of demonstrations in public thoroughfares is inadmissible when they are carried
out in exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly.2050
210. The Commission has also observed the manipulation of criminal law to arbitrarily detain and bring
unfounded criminal proceedings against persons who participate in, call for, or organize public
demonstrations. The Commission has stated that criminal offenses related to maintaining public order,
such as “incitement to rebellion,” “terrorism,” “sabotage,” “incitement to crime,” and “attack or resistance
to public authority,” tend to be arbitrarily applied by the authorities to criminalize the work of human
rights defenders.2051 In general, justice authorities have a duty to refrain from applying these criminal
definitions to acts typically carried out in these contexts.
211. The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR has underscored that, “The
criminalization of speech relating to terrorism should be restricted to instances of intentionalincitement
to terrorism, understood as a direct callto engage in terrorism which is directly responsible for increasing
the likelihood of a terrorist act occurring, or to actual participation in terrorist acts (for example by
directing them).”2052 This Commission has in turn stated that the same standard should apply to cases
where there is an intention to accuse a person for offenses such as treason or rebellion, or the
dissemination of ideas or information that is uncomfortable for government authorities.2053
212. Broad interpretations of forms of criminal involvement such as “instigation to commit crimes” also
deserve to be challenged. This concept has been used to criminalize social leaders on the grounds that
they organized protests for which—since they were not present—they could not be prosecuted as direct
perpetrators.
2046 IACHR, “Matter of Fernando Alcibíades Villavicencio Valencia et al., Ecuador.” Op. Cit., paras. 24 -25 (emphasis added).
2047 IACHR, A Hemispheric Agenda for the Defense of Freedom of Expression, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II IACHR/RELE/INF. 4/09, of February 25, 2009, para. 71.
2048 IACHR, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 2002, Ch. IV, para. 35.
2049 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, Para. 126.
2050 IACHR, Annual Report 2007, Chapter IV, para. 266.
2051 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 6.
2052 IACHR, Annual Report 2013, Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149
Doc.50, December 31, 2013, para. 391.
2053 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 144.
337
213. The IACHR has also noted that the criminal definitions of unlawful occupation enshrined in the
Guatemalan criminal code have reportedly been used excessively and unjustifiably against indigenous
peoples and peasants who occupy lands whose ownership is in dispute with landowners or companies.
The statutory definition of unlawful occupation does not clearly define the adverb “illegally, for any
purpose,” nor does it clearly describe the requisite intent of the perpetrator needed to meet the elements
of the crime. Consequently, indigenous people and peasants who—although lacking formal title—have
for years been in possession of the lands they consider to be their ancestral or rightful property, have
often been criminallyprosecuted.2054
d) Failure to observe fundamental guarantees
214. In addition to issues of legality or the interpretation of criminal definitions, the various actors involved in
the criminal proceedings often commit violations such as fabricating false evidence, holding defendants
in pretrial detention, or taking other excessive procedural measures. In its 2011 Annual Report, the
Commission underscored the tendency of some judges, prosecutors, ministers, and law enforcement
officers to manipulate the punitive power of the State for purposes of criminalization.2055 The authorities
in charge of investigating the crime—perhaps due to a lack of precision in the criminal codes themselves,
or due to a lack of diligence in the investigation—proceed with the criminal indictment before gathering
the necessary evidence to verify that the unlawful conduct has occurred.2056 There have also been
complaints of prosecutors obtaining false statements from witnesses receiving State benefits, and of
failing to individually identify each defendant’s role in the alleged facts when establishing the
circumstances of time, place, and manner.2057
215. The IACHR has noted in particular that in some cases human rights defenders been charged with crimes
like robbery, murder, and kidnapping based on false and fabricated evidence, and in the absence of any
unlawful or guilty conduct.2058 Similarly, in contexts of social protest, the authorities have accused
demonstrators of crimes such asproperty damage, coercion, threats, kidnapping, or terrorism, sometimes
adapting the criminal definitions so that they can be applied to the acts of demonstrators they wish to
punish in order to justify their arrest.2059 It is also common in protest contexts for prosecutors to
overcharge demonstrators in order to justify the use of pretrial detention.2060
216. The Inter-American Court has held that prosecutors must ensure the proper application of the law and
the search for the truth about the events that occurred, acting with professionalism, good faith, and
procedural fairness, considering both elements that can prove the crime and the guilt of the accused, as
well as any exculpatory evidence that mitigates his or her criminal responsibility.2061 Clear evidence of
guilt is a prerequisite for criminal punishment, in such a way that the burden of proof falls on the
prosecution and not on the accused. Thus, the lack ofpresentation of convincing evidence of responsibility
in a guilty verdict is a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, which is essential for the
effective realization of the right to a defense.2062
217. The violation of the presumption of innocence and due process in criminal proceedings affects not only
the human rights defenders who are criminally prosecuted, who must spend their time and resources on
their legal defense, neglecting his or her work or that of his or her organization; criminalization also has
a chilling and crippling effect on other human rights defenders who, for fear of retaliation, may stop
working to promote and protect human rights.2063
218. In particular, the Commission considered that lengthy criminal proceedings particularly affect human
rights defenders and have a discouraging effect on their ability to defend human rights.2064No human
2054 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2011. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.66, p. 37.
2055 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 55.
2056 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 58.
2057 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 61.
2058 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 180.
2059 The same dynamic has been identified in the more general framework of the criminalization of human rights work. Cf. IACHR,
Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 180.
2060 Cf. IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 200.
2061 I/A Court H.R., Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009.
Series C No. 193, para. 165.
2062 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2011. Series C No. 233,
para. 128.
2063 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 227.
2064 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 179.
338
rights defender may be subject to a criminal proceeding indefinitely; such a situation would infringe on
the guarantee of a reasonable time period. This guarantee, in addition to being a basic element for the
right to a trial in accordance with the rules of due process, is especially essential to prevent unwarranted
criminal proceedings from preventing defenders from doing their work.2065
219. At the same time, police officers and members of the security forces are active participants in
criminalization processes. They are generally in charge of conducting investigative activities and carry
out searches and arrests; in many cases, they also serve as witnesses in court. There have been numerous
complaints of arbitrary arrests, false testimony and evidence, and the unjustified collective attribution of
conduct in criminal proceedings related to socialprotests.
220. The Commission stresses that when justice authorities find themselves faced with manifestly unfounded
criminal accusations and complaints and the protection of the right to protest is involved, they have an
obligation to investigate the source or sources of this type of arbitrary complaint and impose the
appropriate penalties. This duty includes the obligation to ensure that no violation goes unpunished,
thereby preventing future abuses. The Commission recalls that the obligation of States to investigate
conduct affecting the rightsprotected in the American Convention and the AmericanDeclaration remains,
irrespective of the agent who may eventually be held responsible for the violation.2066
221. Finally, the Commission underscored in its 2015 Annual Report that the use, in criminal cases, of
precautionary measures such as the prohibition of public assembly or demonstration may constitute a
strategy toprevent participation in public demonstrations and therefore a misuse of the criminal law.2067
e) Prohibition of arbitrary arrests
222. Criminalization, understood as the abusive or arbitrary use of the criminal law against demonstrators,
often begins or occurs through arbitrary arrests of demonstrators during the course of protests. It is very
common for mass detentions of human rights defenders to take place, especially in contexts of social
protest. Many times when carrying out such arbitrary detentions, the persons affected are releasedwithin
a few hours, but in other cases they remain preventively deprived of their liberty for unreasonable
periods of time.2068
223. The right to personal freedom and safety and the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention are
established in Article XXV of the American Declaration and in Article 7 of the American Convention on
Human Rights. The IACHR has underscored that the exercise of personal liberty and its full guarantee that
it will not be restricted by unlawful action is a basic need for the full exercise of human rights defense.2069
224. Therefore, the Commission considers it vitally important to re-emphasize that arrests made by security
forces in connection with social protests must strictly comply with all requirements imposed by domestic
laws and international standards.2070
225. The IACHR recalls that the general requirements of the system for the prevention of arbitrary arrests also
apply in protest contexts. First, no one may be deprived of liberty except for reasons expressly defined in
the law, or in a manner contrary to the procedures objectively defined therein. In accordance with these
principles, no one may be arrested except on the grounds established under domestic law, and subject
strictly to allprocedural formalities which judicial and police authorities are required by law to follow. In
addition, States should ensure that noperson is subjected to detention or imprisonment based on reasons
and methods which, even if deemed legal, may be considered incompatible with respect for fundamental
individual rights because they are, inter alia, unreasonable, unpredictable, ordisproportionate.2071
2065 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 181.
2066 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 143; Case of Heliodoro
Portugal v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 186, para. 144;
Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2008. Series C No. 192, para. 101.
2067 Cf. IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 210.
2068 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 183.
2069 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 48.
2070 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, para. 121.
2071 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Peru. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C No. 68, paras. 52-56, para. 85; Case of the
“Street Children”(Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63; Case of Suárez Rosero,
Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 43; Case of Gangaram Panday, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16,
para. 47.
339
226. The Commission has found that, “A detention is arbitrary and unlawful if not done on the grounds and by
the formalities prescribed by law, when executed without observing the procedures that the law
prescribes, and when there has been an abuse of the powers of arrest, i.e., when the arrest is made for
purposes other than those that the law prescribes and requires. The Commission has also held that a
detention for improper purposes is itself a punishment constituting a sort of sentence without trial, or an
unlawful penalty that violates the guarantee against imposition of punishment without benefit of trial,
[and that] the term ‘arbitrary’ is synonymous with ‘irregular, abusive, contrary to law.’”2072 Similarly, the
deprivation of a person's liberty must be based on a specific act justifying the arrest. Such a specific act
must be criminal, as established by law, and the arrest therefore cannot be based on the danger that a
person may commit a crime.2073
227. According to the inter-American standards, a detention may be lawful and yet arbitrary and contrary to
Article 7.3 of the Convention. The Inter-American Court has held that all detentions must meet the
following criteria:i) the purpose of measures that deprive or restrict a person’s liberty is compatible with
the Convention; ii) the measures adopted are appropriate for complying with the intended purpose; iii)
the measures are necessary,in the sense thatthey are absolutely indispensable for achieving the intended
purpose and that no other measure less onerous exists, in relation to the right involved, to achieve the
intended purpose, and iv) the measures are strictlyproportionate.2074
228. An arrest based exclusively on the act of participating in a protest or public demonstration does not meet
the requirements of reasonableness and proportionality established by international standards. The
deprivation of liberty during a demonstration has the immediate effect of preventing the detainee from
exercising the right to protest and has a chilling effect on participation in public demonstrations, all of
which affects the enjoyment and exercise of the right to social protest.
229. States should also refrain from conducting mass, collective, or indiscriminate arrests at public
demonstrations. The Inter-American Court has ruled that, “a massive and programmed arrest of people
without legal grounds, in which the State massively arrests people that the authority considers may
represent a risk or danger to the security of others, without substantiated evidence of the commission of
a crime, constitutes an illegal and arbitrary arrest.”2075 These types of practices are incompatible with
respect for fundamental rights, including presumption of innocence, existence of a court order for
detention—except in situations of flagrancy.2076
230. The Commission also notes with concern the existence of cases in which lawyers have been attacked and
arbitrarily detained for representing clients accused of or detained in the context of social protests.
Principle 16 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers provides that “Governments
shall ensure that lawyers (...) are able to perform all of their professional functions without intimidation,
hindrance, harassment or improper interference.” Furthermore, Principle 18 states that “Lawyers shall
not be identified with their clients or their clients’ causes as a result of discharging their functions,” and
Principle 20 establishes that “Lawyers shall enjoy civil andpenal immunity for relevant statements made
in good faith in written or oral pleadings or in their professional appearances before a court, tribunal or
other legal or administrative authority.” For its part, the International Bar Association has affirmed that,
“No lawyer shall suffer or be threatened with penal, civil, administrative, economic or other sanctions or
harassment by reason of his or her having legitimately advised or represented any client or client’s
cause.”2077
231. All detainees and their relatives also have the right to receive—and the State has an obligation to
provide— accurate information regarding the reasons for detention and the place where detainees will
be taken, in simple, non-technical language. This right, as the Inter-American Court has stressed, “is a
mechanism to avoid illegal or arbitrary detentions, from the very moment when a person is deprived of
his or her liberty. It also ensures the right to defense of thedetainee.”2078
2072 IACHR, Report No. 35/08, Case 12.019, Admissibility and Merits, Antonio Ferreira Braga, Brazil, July 18, 2008, para. 68.
2073 United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 69th
session (22 April - 1 May 2014), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/9, para. 24.
2074 I/A Court H.R., Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010
Series C No. 218, para. 166.
2075 I/A Court H.R., Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Judgment of September 21, 2006, para. 93.
2076 I/A Court H.R., Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003, para. 137.
2077 International Bar Association, IBA Standards for the Independence of the Legal Profession, 1990.
2078 I/A Court H.R., Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C No. 99, para. 82.
340
f) Intelligence
232. A particularly serious aspect of the criminalization of protest is the State practice, reported in several
countries in the region, of conducting espionage, monitoring, infiltration, and a variety of covert
intelligence activities against demonstrators, public figures, leaders, lawyers, human rights defenders,
organizations, and their media, and against social or political movements that participate in or organize
public demonstrations or are linked in various ways—closely or not—to theseevents.
233. While the objective of the State’s intelligence activities is toprovide its authorities with input for decisionmaking in areas such as national defense and crime policy, their orientation towards social leaders and
organizations engaged in activities that are fundamental to democratic life seriously affects freedom of
expression, as well as the rights to assembly, association, and political participation. These covert
activities are usually disproportionate and excessive in relation to the legal interests to be protected or
the effects to be prevented, and constitute a discriminatory practice against social movements for
criticizing some aspect of public policy.
234. In its 2015 Report on the Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, the Inter-American
Commission noted that criminal cases are preceded on occasion by secret preliminary investigations.
These investigations “may include intelligence activities or collecting intelligence reports by the army or
police, prior to, as part of, or even in the absence of a criminal investigation against a human rights
defender.”2079 In fact, politically motivated cases of illegal espionage persist in the region. Victims include
human rights defenders and organizations of various kinds, such as trade unions, social movements, and
the media.
235. Illegal espionage practicespursue different objectives and may affect the rights of protesters in a number
of ways, such as the presence of undercover agents in a specific situation such as protests and the
activities leading up to them, as well as sustained infiltration and other espionage actions in political
parties, or in aparticular organization or movement over a period of time under a false identity. The Office
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has
expressed its concern over “the use of embedded undercoverpolice officers in groups that are non-violent
and take peaceful direct action by exercising their right to freedom of peaceful assembly.”2080
236. These practices often include filming and/or photographing demonstrators, resulting in data registries
on individuals or organizations. Their telephone conversations or their private communications through
digital media may also be monitored. Cases in which these clandestine records are used to produce
documents, files, and databases in intelligence, security, and justice institutions that stigmatize political
parties, organizations, and social movements are particularly serious. This kind of information has even
become part of judicial proceedings in cases that criminalize demonstrators and socialleaders.
237. The Commission takes the view that the monitoring of the regular activities of political and social
organizations and the recording and storage of information obtained by means of their infiltration is
unlawful and contrary to inter-American standards, and violates the rights to freedom of assembly and
association and political participation. What’s more, they constitute undue interference in a sphere of
private life. Requiring that actions of this type be approved by court order allows for their external
oversight.
238. The Commission has also considered on previous occasions that participation in security operations by
plainclothes police or without their respective identification presents problems for the administrative
and/or judicial review of possible irregularities and/or violations of rights. The lack of proper
identification is an additional obstacle to the assignment of responsibility in contexts where
reconstructing the events is complex in itself. The reconstruction of the facts and the value of audiovisual
records and testimony as evidence is severely limited if it is not possible to identify the officers directly
involved as State agents and with their personalidentity.2081
239. The uniform and identification of security officers in a protest have a preventive function, since officers
act with a higher expectation of accountability.
2079 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 59.
2080 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, on his mission to the
United Kingdom (14-23 January 2013) A/HRC/23/39/Add.1, para. 24.
2081 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, ch. 4A, para. 225.
341
g) Stigmatization and criminalization in the speech of political leaders
240. Often, the misuse of the criminal law is preceded by statements made by public officials in which human
rights defenders are accused of committing crimes and there is no ongoing proceeding or judicial decision
to confirm these allegations.2082
241. The Inter-American Commission has established that, based on the presumption of innocence, “States
must refrain from public incrimination of a defender whose alleged crimes have not been legally proven.
The governments should not tolerate any effort on the part of State authorities to cast in doubt the
legitimacy of the work of human rights defenders and their organizations. The IACHR has indicated that
public officials must refrain from making statements that stigmatize human rights defenders or that
suggest that human rights organizations act improperly or illegally, merely because of engaging in their
work to promote and protect human rights.”2083
242. Given the State’s obligation to guarantee, respect, and promote human rights, it is the duty of public
officials to ensure that when they exercise their freedom of expression they are not causing fundamental
rights to be ignored,2084 which includes not harming or inhibiting the right to social protest. They must
also make sure thattheir expressions do not constitute “forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful
pressure on the rights of those who seek to contribute [to] public deliberation through the expression
and [dissemination] of their thoughts.”2085
243. The Inter-American Court, in turn, has stated that “public officials, particularly the top Government
authorities, need to be especially careful so that their public statements do not amount to a form of
interference with or pressure impairing judicial independence and do not induce or invite other
authorities to engage in activities that may abridge the independence or affect the judge’s freedom of
action.”2086
244. The Inter-American Court has stated that the demands of independence and impartiality also extend to
the non-judicial bodies responsible for the investigation prior to the judicial proceedings;2087 “in the
absence of these requirements, the State cannot subsequently exercise effectively and efficiently its
authority to bring charges and the courts cannot conduct the judicial proceedings that this type of
violation calls for.”2088
2082 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 6.
2083 IACHR, “Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas,” 2011. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.66, para. 124.
2084 IACHR, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/IIIACHR/RELE/INF.2/09/,
December 30, 2009, para. 203.
2085 IACHR, Annual Report ofthe Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights 2013, Volume II, Report of theOffice of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression, OEA/ser.L/V.II/Doc.50, December 31, 2013, para. 911.
2086 I/A Court H.R., Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 131.
2087 I/A Court H.R., Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of July 10, 2007. Series C No. 167, para. 133.
2088 I/A Court H.R., Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of July 10, 2007. Series C No. 167, para. 133.
342
CHAPTER V
OBLIGATION TO GUARANTEE RIGHTS
343
V. THE OBLIGATION TO GUARANTEE RIGHTS
245. The need to implement oversight and accountability mechanisms over the actions of State agents in
protest contexts is derived from the general obligation to guarantee rights, established in Articles 1.1 of
the American Convention; the right to due process of law, provided for in Article 8 of the ACHR and in
Article XXVI of the American Declaration; and the right to access to justice for violations of fundamental
rights, provided for in Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as in Article XVIII
of the Declaration.
246. This obligation entails first and foremost the duty to investigate and punish any violation that occurs
within the framework of a public demonstration. In these contexts, the absence of an exhaustive
investigation when rights such as life and physical integrity have been violated has an intimidating effect
that is particularly serious because of the impact it has on the exercise of the rights to assembly, freedom
of expression, and association. Consequently, there is a compelling need for investigations to be carried
out with due diligence and within a reasonable period of time.
247. Oversight mechanisms are also a democratic mode of security governance, which should create the real
expectation of accountability and the assignment of various types of responsibility. By creating an
expectation of accountability, the oversight tools make it possible to model the actions of the security
forces on democratic standards consistent with international human rights law. In this respect, they play
an important role among the positive measures aimed at ensuring the right to protest, since in addition
to constituting a guarantee of non-repetition of violations of rights, they function as an instrument for
public policy assessment and improvement. The State’s obligation to supervise the performance of security
forces in protest situations has differentdimensions.
248. First, accountability creates responsibilities for governments. Executive branch officials should design
operations in such a way that they can be monitored and responsibility can be assigned for decisions and
actions taken, particularly in the event of violations of rights. A posteriori, they are responsible for
promoting and supporting administrative investigations and cooperating with judicial investigations,
facilitating access to all relevant documentation and information, such as regulations, internal protocols,
and the identification of witnesses and evidence.
249. A second dimension has to do with the institutional design of the security system, whose rules and
structures must function subject to administrative monitoring and investigation. To this end, it should
have a disciplinary code defining infractions and punishing practices that violate rights, as well as an
administrative procedure that provides the appropriate guarantees for victims and the public servants
under investigation. There should be bodies and mechanisms for the filing and referral of complaints,
both by members of the security forces and private individuals. With regard to the former, guarantees
must be provided so that the public servants can comply with their obligation to report any violation of
human rights, whether perpetrated by a member of the same security force or another.
250. A third dimension concerns the conditions for the design of police operations to allow day-to-day
oversight and the development of effective judicial and administrative investigations andpenalties. Some
of the measures implemented in this regard are: detailed inventories of the weapons and ammunition
assigned to personnel and their post-operational review; identification of those responsible for issuing
orders for the use of force; keeping and maintaining records of wireless and all other means of
communication used by personnel during operations.
1. The duty to investigate, prosecute, and punish
251. States have a duty to investigate violations committed within their jurisdiction in order to identify and,
where appropriate, punish those responsible.2089 The duty to investigate is one of the positive measures
that the State has to comply with in order to guarantee the human rights recognized in the ACHR,2090
2089 I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 174.
2090 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para.
153. CaseofGonzalezMedinaand familyv.DominicanRepublic.PreliminaryObjections,Merits,ReparationsandCosts.Judgmentof February27,
2012. Series C No. 240, para.127.
344
together with restoring the violated right, if possible, and, if appropriate, repairing the harm that the human
rights violations caused to the victim.2091
252. The IACHR and the Inter-American Court have repeatedly established that States have a legal duty to
prevent, in a reasonable manner, violations of human rights2092 and to create the conditions for
individuals to express their ideas without fear of reprisals or threats to their life or safety.2093
253. The consistent jurisprudence of the IACHR and the Inter-American Court has affirmed that the State’s
obligation to investigate human rights violations must be undertaken diligently in order to prevent
impunity and the repetition of such acts,2094 given that, as the Inter-American Court has held, “impunity
encourages the repetition of human rights violations.”2095 It is also imperative that the State, when
considering a possible human rights violation, prevent all officials involved, including police or judicial
personnel, from also being in charge of or having any connection with the investigation against them.2096
254. It has been held repeatedly that, “impunity has a strong chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of
expression, and its consequences for democracy—which depends on the free, open and dynamic
exchange of ideas and information—areparticularly serious.”2097 “it isparticularly important for the State
to adopt measures to investigate the events that may have arisen during the social protest as a result of
an abusive use of force by State agents, or else acts of aggression by thirdparties to the demonstration or
among participants themselves, so as to punish those responsible and provide adequate recourse to
anyone whose rights may have been violated.”2098
255. The case law of the inter-American system establishes that, when a public servant in charge of using
public force commits a human rights violation, his or her actions should be investigated before the
ordinary courts, and an administrative or disciplinary investigation should be carried out to establish his
or her responsibility. The disciplinary or administrative courts must determine the circumstances in
which the public official committed a “disciplinary offense when the infraction relates directly and
inseparably to a violation of international human rights law.”2099
a) Judicial investigation and penalties
256. When acts of violence committed against people in a protest—whether they are covering the event as
journalists or directly participating in it—go unpunished, this can lead to silence and self-censorship for
future protesters.2100
257. The State’s obligation to investigate means that, once its authorities have knowledge of the occurrence of
human rights violations, they must initiate ex officio and without delay, an investigation that is serious,
impartial, effective,2101 prompt, exhaustive, and complete, within a reasonable period of time,2102 by all
2091 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 214. Case of Véliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs. Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, para. 183.
2092 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 174.
2093 Cfr. IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, The Inter-American Legal Framework regarding the Right to
Freedom of Expression. OEA/Ser.L/V/II, IACHR/RELE/INF. 2/09, December 30, 2009, para. 180.
2094 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 216.
2095 I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 216. Cfr.I/ACourtH.R.,Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148, para. 319.
2096 Cfr. IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 201(h); IACHR, Report on
the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, para. 68.
2097 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II., IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 2.
2098 IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, para.
149.
2099 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163,
para. 207. I/A Court H.R., Case of González et al.(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. PreliminaryObjection, Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 374.
2100 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory
Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 30.
2101 Cfr. Case of the Afro-descendant Communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia. Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2013. Series C No. 270, para. 371.
2102 Cfr. IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 13. I/A
Court H.R., Case of Godínez Cruz v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 3, para. 20.
345
available legal means and aimed at the establishment of the truth and the prosecution, capture, trial, and
eventual punishment of all perpetrators of the alleged acts,2103 especially when State officials are or may
be involved.2104 The right to know the truth is a form of reparation2105 and gives rise to an expectation on
the part of the victims that the State must satisfy.2106 In addition, the State has an obligation to bring
criminal proceedings ex officio when prosecutable offenses are committed.2107
258. The Commission and the Inter-American Court have repeatedly stated that the duty to investigate is an
obligation that “is an obligation of means and not of results, which must be assumed by the State as an
inherent legal obligation and not as a mere formality preordained to be illusory or as a mere effort on the
part of private individuals that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer
of proof.”2108
259. The State therefore has the duty to identify and, where appropriate, punish all persons responsible for the
acts, including direct perpetrators, masterminds,2109 participants, and accessories.2110 The obligation to
investigate remains, “whosoever the agent who may eventually be [deemed responsible for] the violation,
even private individuals, because, if their acts are not investigated seriously, they would, to a certain
extent, be aided by the public authorities, which would involve the international responsibility of the
State.”2111
260. Aspart of the State's duty to directtheprocess of ascertaining human rights violations,it has an obligation
to provide effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations, pursuant to Article 25 of the
ACHR.2112 These remedies must be litigated in accordance with the rules of due process2113 established in
Article 8.1 of the Convention. This obligation ispart of the State’s duty to ensure the protection of the “the
free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention for allpeople under their jurisdiction,”2114
under Article 1.1 thereof.
261. The State must ensure “full access and capacity to act to the victims or their next of kin at all stages of the
investigation and prosecution of those responsible, in accordance with domestic law and the provisions of
the American Convention.”2115
262. Effective judicial protection requires judges to direct the proceedings in a way that avoids undue delays
and hindrances that could result in impunity 2116 “thus thwarting the due judicial protection of human
2103 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 216. I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29,
1988. Series C No. 4, para.177.
2104 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 216. I/A Court H.R., Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, para. 156.
2105 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Garibaldi v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 23, 2009.
Series C No. 203, para. 167; I/A Court H.R., Case of Escué Zapata v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007.
Series C No. 165, para. 165.
2106 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Garibaldi v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 23, 2009.
Series C No. 203, para. 167; I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Páez v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, para. 90.
2107 Cfr. IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 13; IACHR,
Report No. 52/97, Case 11.218, Admissibility, Arges Sequeira Mangas, Nicaragua, February 18, 1998, para. 99; IACHR, Annual Report
1997, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, February 17, 1998, paras. 96-97.
2108 IACHR, Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 43/15, December 31, 2015, para. 145; IACHR, Report No. 7/16,
Case 12.213. Merits (Publication). Aristeu Guida da Silva and family. Brazil. April 13, 2016, para. 187.
2109 Cfr. IACHR, Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 43/15, December 31, 2015, para. 145; I/A Court H.R., Case of
the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Series C No. 110.
2110 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C
No. 101, para. 217.
2111 I/A Court H.R., Case of Gutiérrez and family v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2013. Series C No.
271, para. 98; I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 177.
2112 Cfr. IACHR, Report No. 7/16, Case 12.213. Merits (Publication). Aristeu Guida da Silva and family. Brazil. April 13, 2016, pa ra. 178; I/A
Court H.R., Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para. 154.
2113 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para.
154; Case of Lysias Fleury et al. v. Haiti. Merits and Reparations. Judgment of November 23, 2011. Series C No. 236. para. 105.
2114 I/A Court H.R., Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para. 154;
Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 91.
2115 I/A Court H.R., Case of Rodríguez Vera et al. (The Disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 14, 2014. Series C No. 287, para. 559.
2116 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Gutiérrez and family v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2013. Series C
No. 271, para. 99; I/A Court H.R., Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
May 21, 2013. Series C No. 261, para. 93.
346
rights.”2117 In this connection, “judges, as conductors of the proceedings, are obliged to direct and guide
the judicialproceeding so as notto sacrifice justice and dueprocess of law to formalism and impunity.”2118
263. Aspart of access to justice for victims of human rights violations—in addition to the duty to undertake an
investigation with due diligence—the State has a duty to carry out an investigation to ascertain the truth
about what happened and topunish the perpetrators within a reasonable period of time.2119 Therefore, it
has been held that the reasonableness of the time limit must be assessed in relation to the total duration
of the proceedings until a final judgement is reached.2120 The Inter-American Court has stated that
“proceedings followed through upuntil their conclusion and that fulfill their purpose are the clearest sign
of zero tolerance for human rights violations, contribute to the reparation of the victims, and show society
that justice has been done.”2121
264. To ensure proper investigation, States have a duty to provide all relevant means to offer the necessary
protection to justice authorities, investigators, witnesses, and the victims’ next of kin from harassment
and threats aimed at obstructing the proceedings and preventing the establishment of the facts and the
identity the perpetrators,2122 “because, to the contrary, this would have an intimidating effect on those
who could be witnesses, seriously impairing the effectiveness of the investigation.”2123
265. The results of the investigation must be publicly disclosed in order for society to know the truth of the
facts.2124 The authorities responsible for undertaking investigations into human rights violations must
have the necessary and sufficient human and material resources,2125 and it is crucial that an adequate
institutional and regulatory framework is in place to investigate human rights violations.2126
266. When it comes to violations of the right to life due to the excessive use of force, the State has the duty to
initiate—ex officio and immediately—an investigation aimed at finding all those responsible for the
arbitrary deprivation of life, as well as to guarantee and protect the physical integrity and safety of
persons participating in demonstrations.2127
2117 I/A Court H.R., Case of Gutiérrez and family v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2013. Series C No.
271, para. 99; I/A Court H.R., Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May
21, 2013. Series C No. 261, para. 93.
2118 I/A Court H.R., Case of Gutiérrez and family v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2013. Series C No.
271, para. 99; I/A Court H.R., Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No.
100, para. 115, y Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 21, 2013.
Series C No. 261, para. 93.
2119 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para.
188; Cfr. Case of the 19 Merchants v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 5, 2004. Series C No. 109, para. 188. The
concept of reasonable time is established in Article 8 of the ACHR and is closely linked to the effective, simple, and prompt remedy
enshrined in Article 25. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and Court has established four aspects to examine
compliance with reasonableness: the complexity of the matter; the conduct of the authorities; the procedural activity of the interested
party; and the impact on the legal situation of the person involved in the process.
2120 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para.
188; Case of García Lucero et al. v. Chile. Preliminary Objection, Merits and Reparations. Judgment of August 28, 2013. Series C No. 267,
para. 121.
2121 I/A Court H.R., Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010.
Series C No. 213, para. 153; Cfr. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Monitoring Compliance with
Judgment. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of January 27, 2009, para. 21.
2122 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of the Afro-descendant Communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia.
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2013. Series C No. 270, para. 376; Cfr. Case of Myrna
Mack Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, para. 199.
2123 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Afro-descendant Communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia.
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2013. Series C No. 270, para. 376; Cfr. I/A Court H.R.,
Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series C No. 196, para. 106.
2124 I/A Court H.R., Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C
No. 114, para. 258.
2125 Cfr. IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: InterAmerican standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.,
IACHR/RELE/INF. 12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 175.
2126 Cfr. IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: InterAmerican standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.,
IACHR/RELE/INF. 12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 175.
2127 Inter alia, IACHR Expresses Concern over Detentions and Attacks on Demonstrators and Journalists in the Context of Protests in
Venezuela, Press Release No. 073/16, June 9, 2016; IACHR Expresses Concern Regarding Restrictions in the Exercise of Fundamental
Rights in Venezuela, PressRelease No. 132/16, September 14, 2016; IACHR Laments the Death of a Student during Protests in Venezuela,
Press Release No. 022/15, March 3, 2015;IACHR Condemns Violence in Oaxaca, Mexico, Press Release No. 083/16, June 22, 2016;IACHR
expresses deep concern over the situationwith respectto the rightto peaceful protest, freedom of association and freedom of expression
in Venezuela, Press Release No. 17/14, February 21, 2014.
347
267. The investigation of violations of life or integrity committed in the context of protests must be carried out
with the strictest adherence to due diligence and must be completed within a reasonable period of time,
given the seriousness of the crimes and the nature of the rights violated in connection with freedom of
expression,2128 association, and assembly. The failure to properly investigate sends a clear message of
intimidation and inhibition2129 to those who wish to exercise the right to social protest in the future.
268. In its Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, the IACHR recommended three specific measures to
States in relation to investigating perpetrators of crimes against life.2130 In addition, the Inter-American
Commission and the Court have established some necessary guidelines to follow in death investigations.
Cases of deaths in social protests should endeavor: “a) to identify the victim; b) to gather and preserve
evidence pertaining to the death so as to aid in the possible criminal investigation of the perpetrators; c)
to identify potential witness and obtain their statements regarding the death under investigation; d) to
determine the cause, manner, place and time of death, as well as any pattern or practice that might have
caused the death.”2131
269. In addition to the duty to have full knowledge of the scene and the material circumstances of the crime, it
is essential to “to analyze the awareness of the power structures that allowed, designed and executed it,
both intellectually and directly.”2132 There is also a duty to examine all the individuals who took part in
the said violations in different ways, together with their respective responsibilities.2133 In this way, the
crime is placed within a context that provides the necessary elements to understand the complexity of
the event,2134 such as a death that occurred during a socialprotest.
270. In addition, whenever a person has failed to return from a protest and there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that an individual has been subjected to forced disappearance,2135 it is essential that the
prosecution and judicial authorities take prompt and immediate action, ordering timely and necessary
measures to determine the whereabouts of the missing person.2136 Any State authority, public official, or
private individual who has received information of acts aimed at the forced disappearance of persons,
must report it immediately.2137
271. In cases of excessive use of police force resulting in injuries to persons participating in socialprotests, the
State must initiate, ex officio and immediately, an impartial, independent and meticulous investigation
that allows the nature and origin of the injuries observed to be determined, those responsible to be
identified, and their prosecution to commence.2138 Similarly, where a person arrested at a demonstration
alleges that he or she has been tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the State
must provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation,2139 backed by appropriate evidence.2140 There is a
2128 Cfr. IACHR, Report No. 7/16, Case 12.213. Merits (Publication). Aristeu Guida da Silva and family. Brazil. April 13, 2016, para. 203
2129 Cfr. IACHR, Report No. 7/16, Case 12.213. Merits (Publication). Aristeu Guida da Silva and family. Brazil. April 13, 2016, para. 203
2130 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, Specific recommendation No. 12.
2131 IACHR, Report No. 7/16, Case 12.213. Merits (Publication). Aristeu Guida da Silva and family. Brazil. April 13, 2016, para. 204; IACHR
Report No. 25/09, Case 12.310 Merits, Sebastião Camargo Filho, Brazil, March 19, 2009, paras. 111-112; Cfr. United Nations Manual on
the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, Doc. E/ST/CSDHA/.12 (1991).
2132 I/A Court H.R., Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010.
Series C No. 213, para. 119.
2133 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010.
Series C No. 213, para. 119; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 219.
2134 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010.
Series C No. 213, para. 119.
2135 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al.(“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20,
2012. Series C No. 253, para. 241; I/A Court H.R., Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and costs.
Judgment of September 22, 2009. Series C No. 202, para. 65.
2136 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al.(“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20,
2012. Series C No. 253, para. 241; I/A Court H.R., Case of Gonzalez Medina and family v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 27, 2012. Series C No. 240, para. 218.
2137 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al.(“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20,
2012. Series C No. 253, para. 241; Cfr. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, para. 65; Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, para. 223.
2138 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 130.
2139 I/A CourtH.R., Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru. PreliminaryObjections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series
C No. 289, para. 177; Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgmentof June 7, 2003. SeriesCNo. 99, paras. 99-100.
2140 Cfr. I/A CourtH.R., Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 7, 2003.
Series C No. 99, para. 111; I/A Court H.R., Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27,
2013. Series C No. 275, para.343.
348
presumption “that the State is responsible for ill-treatment exhibited by a person who has been in the
custody of State agents,”2141 and it is up to the State to prove otherwise.
272. In cases where it is suspected that a State agent has perpetrated gender-based or sexual violence against a
person in the context of a demonstration, the investigation must comply with a number of provisions in
order to identify, prosecute, and punish those responsible. Such an investigation must: “i) document and
coordinate the investigation procedures and process the evidence diligently, taking sufficient specimens,
performing tests to determine the possible perpetrator of the act, preserving other evidence such as the
victim’s clothes, inspecting the scene of the incident immediately, and ensuring the proper chain of custody;
ii) provide free legal assistance to the victim during all stages of the proceedings, and iii) provide both
emergency and, if necessary, continuing medical, prophylactic and psychological care to the victim, using a
treatment protocol aimed at lessening the consequences of the offense.”2142 In cases of alleged acts of
violence against women, the criminal investigation should include a gender perspective and be conducted
by officials with experience in similar cases and in providing attention to victims of discrimination and
gender-based violence.2143
273. The duty to investigate and punish also covers unlawful and arbitrary arrests. The Inter-American Court
has established that any improper action on the part of State agents in their interaction with the persons
they must protect, “represents one of the main threats to the right to personal liberty, which, when
violated, generates a risk of violation to other rights, such as humane treatment and, in some cases,
life.”2144 When the person is detained illegally or arbitrarily, he or she is in a state of total helplessness,
which can lead to the violation of other rights, such as the right to be treated withdignity.2145
274. The IACHR has expressed its deep concern about the numerous mass arrests of people in social protests.
It has demanded that the right to humane treatment be respected and that, in the event that the arrests
were not carried out in keeping with inter-American standards, a diligent investigation be undertaken
within a reasonable period of time in order to avoid impunity, thereby encouraging thispractice in future
protests and mass demonstrations.2146 Specifically in cases of mass arrests at protests, States should seek
to determine who was responsible for the decision to authorize multiplepolice officers to make a number
of simultaneous arrests.
b) Administrative investigation and penalties
275. The Inter-American Court has stated that disciplinary justice proceedings “can be assessed to the extent
that [they contribute] to clarifying the facts and that [their] decisions are relevant as regards the symbolic
value of the message of censure that this type of sanction can signify for public officials and members of
the armed forces.”2147 While a disciplinary investigation may complement a criminalinvestigation,it does
2141 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63,
paras. 95& 170; I/A CourtH.R., Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013. Series
C No.275, para. 343.
2142 I/A CourtH.R., Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru. PreliminaryObjections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series
CNo. 289, para.242;Cfr.I/A CourtH.R., Caseof FernándezOrtegaet al. v.Mexico.PreliminaryObjection, Merits,Reparations, andCosts.Judgment
ofAugust30, 2010. SeriesC No. 215, para. 194.
2143 I/A CourtH.R., Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru.PreliminaryObjections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series
C No. 289, para. 242;I/A CourtH.R., Case of Véliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. PreliminaryObjections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, para.188.
2144 I/A Court H.R., Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, para.
87.
2145 I/A CourtH.R., Case of Bulacio v.Argentina. Merits,Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series CNo. 100, para. 127; Cfr., I/A
Court H.R., Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C No. 99, para. 96; I/A Court H.R., Case of Bámaca
Velásquez v.Guatemala. Merits. Judgment ofNovember 25, 2000. SeriesC No. 70, para. 90.
2146 IACHR Annual Report 2015. Chapter IV A – Use of Force, para. 123; “IACHR Expresses Concern Regarding Restrictions in the Exercise of
Fundamental Rights in Venezuela,” Press Release No. 132/16, September 14, 2016. “IACHR Condemns Violence in Oaxaca, Mexico,” Press
Release No. 083/16, June 22, 2016. “IACHR expresses deep concern over the situation with respect to the rightto peaceful protest, freedom of
association and freedom of expression in Venezuela,” Press ReleaseNo. 17/14, February 21, 2014.JointDeclarationof the UnitedNations (UN)
SpecialRapporteurontheProtectionandPromotionoftheRighttoFreedom ofOpinionandExpressionandthe SpecialRapporteur forFreedom
of Expression of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,“Joint Declaration on Violence AgainstJournalists and Media Workers
inthe Contextof Protests,” September 13, 2013.
2147 I/A Court H.R., Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010.
Series C No. 213, para. 133; Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 215.
349
not replace it in cases of human rights violations;2148 rather, it serves as an additional accountability
mechanism.2149
276. In its Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, this Commission recommended that States put in
place internal control mechanisms that complement external oversight bodies, whether political or
parliamentary, judicial or quasi-judicial,2150 to ensure that all responsible authorities are held
accountable. The IACHR recently stated that these mechanisms are “autonomous mechanisms for states
to supervise their officials’ discharge of the public duties assigned to them.”2151
277. The Inter-American Court has stressed the importance of disciplinary proceedings as a means of
overseeing the actions of public officials.2152 As such, administrative penalties play “an important role in
creating the appropriate type of capability and institutional culture deal with” highly complex situations
of violence.2153 Allowing those responsible for serious offenses to remain in office or hold positions of
authority can create a climate of impunity, and “conditions that allow the factors that produce the context
of violence to persist or deteriorate.”2154 Internal control mechanisms to monitor the performance of the
police force “may result in a change or cessation of the function of the agents involved in the violation of
a human right, [and therefore are in the] public interest.”2155 Along these same lines, the Inter-American
Court has in various cases ordered States to conduct administrative or disciplinary investigations in
addition to criminal investigations in the regular justice system.2156 The obligations of oversight and
accountability should also be included in the design of police operations.
278. The rules and structures of security agencies and bodies must lend themselves to administrative
oversight and investigation. First, security institutions must have a disciplinary code that defines
infractions and punishes practices that violate rights. There should also be bodies and mechanisms for
the filing and referral of complaints, both by members of the security forces andprivate individuals.
279. For an administrative or disciplinary investigation to be effective, the persons in charge of it must be
independent both hierarchically and institutionally from the persons and agencies involved in the facts
under investigation.2157 The latter should not participate in the investigation of the case.2158 Victims
should be able to participate, if they so wish, in cases where their rights under the Convention have been
violated.2159
280. The IACHR has noted that, “In some countries, [administrative and disciplinary accountability
mechanisms] are exclusively employed to investigate disciplinary matters and are not considered a
remedy for inadequate policing. In such jurisdictions, victims are excluded from the proceedings on the
grounds that their interests are irrelevant to the institutional interests of the police force. The
Commission considers that even in those cases States must ensure the participation of the victims
2148 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV. A, The Use of Force, para. 228; Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 133; Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of the Pueblo
Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 203.
2149 Cfr. IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 163; IACHR, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 68.
2150 Cfr. IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 132.
2151 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV. A, The Use of Force, para. 228.
2152 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163,
para. 206;I/A Court H.R., Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. PreliminaryObjection, Merits, Reparations and Costs.
Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 373.
2153 I/A Court H.R., Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 377.
2154 I/A Court H.R., Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 377.
2155 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 163.
2156 I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Espinoza et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September
1, 2016. Series C No. 316, para. 225; I/A Court H.R., Case of Tenorio Roca et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs. Judgment of June 22, 2016. Series C No. 314, para. 275; Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela. Merits and
reparations. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 249, para. 250; Cfr. Case of the Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, para.
233(d).
2157 Cfr. IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 163; Cfr. Case of Baldeón
García v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 6, 2006. Series C No. 147, para. 95.
2158 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 163
2159 Cfr. IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 163; IACHR, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 68.
350
whenever these proceedings involve accountability for abuse of force, arbitrary detentions or other
conduct that may compromise the enjoyment of the rights protected in the American Convention.”2160
281. In order for the State’s obligation to investigate to be regarded as consistent with the American
Convention, it must be carried out with due diligence,2161 which entails the obligation of the fact-finding
body to perform all actions and investigations necessary to achieve the result sought.2162 This duty includes
all State institutions, both judicial and non-judicial.2163 In this connection, due diligence also extends to
non-judicial bodies whose purview includes pretrial investigations to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings.2164 In the absence of these requirements, “the State
cannot subsequently exercise effectively and efficiently its authority to bring charges and the courts
cannot conduct the judicial proceedings that this type of violation calls for.”2165
282. This Commission considers that police institutions should require all members of the security forces to
report and cooperate with the investigation of any human rights violations committed in the context of a
protest of that comes to their attention.2166 Otherwise, a culture of impunity and secrecy among officials
is created. Guarantees must be provided so that officials can comply with their duty to report, whether it
is an act perpetrated by a member of the same force or another.
283. Faster and stricter mechanisms for the triggering of disciplinary and administrative proceedings must be
in place for cases involving the use of lethal weapons. The IACHR recommended in its Report on Citizen
Security and Human Rights that, in relation to the use of lethal force by State agents, States should
“establish independent internal and external control systems to give effect to the State’s obligation to
investigate any cases in which law enforcement uses lethal means andmethods.”2167
284. It similarly recommended that they “create the internal and external systems and procedures that will
allow for an independent investigation of facts that may constitute torture or cruel,inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”2168 In cases of detention in connection with protests, the effective
investigation of alleged or suspected assaults is essential to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment,2169 most of which occurs when the victims are in the custody of the State. The
authorities should diligently investigate any case in which an act of torture is alleged to have been
committed, securing any evidence.2170 This includes the right to medical review and access to operational
records and video footage. In particular, the State must guarantee the independence of the medical and
healthpersonnel responsible for examining and treating injuredpersons arrested duringprotests, so that
they can freely perform the relevant medical evaluations.2171
285. The disciplinary codes must also respect the concept established by the IACHR that the “officials
responsible for the use of force may not allege that they obeyed orders from superiors if they were aware
that the order to use force—resulting in the death of a person or serious injuries to a person—was
manifestly illicit and they had a reasonable chance to refuse to obey it.”2172
2160 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2006, para. 68; IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and
Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 163.
2161 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 217.
2162 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 217; Cfr. Case of Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120, para. 83.
2163 Cfr. IACHR, Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 43/15, December 31, 2015, para. 145; I/A Court H.R., Case of
Castillo González et al. v. Venezuela. Merits. Judgment of November 27, 2012. Series C No. 256, para. 110.
2164 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment
of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, para. 217.
2165 Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 10, 2007.
Series C No. 167, para.133.
2166 In reference to acts of torture, see: IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57,
General recommendation No. 14.b.vi.
2167 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, General recommendation 13(d).
2168 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, General recommendation 14(b)(iii).
2169 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para.130.
2170 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc57, para. 130.
2171 IACHR, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, December 31, 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 57, para. 130; I/A Court H.R., Case of
Bayarri v. Argentina. Judgment of October 30, 2008. Series C No. 187, para. 92.
2172 IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV. A, The Use of Force, para. 233; Basic Principles on the Use of Force, Principle No. 26.
351
2. Response from the authorities
286. The political actors who are ultimately responsible for ensuring that a demonstration takesplace without
violence on the part of security forces must also respond when demonstrators’ rights are not respected,
when security forces exceed the limits on the use of force, or when demonstrators are attacked by third
parties.
287. Political leaders should refrain from expressing notions that detract from or stigmatize a protest or the
people who participate in or organize it, as it may place certain sectors of the population in a situation of
greater vulnerability and risk of further attacks.2173 The same is true when the authorities minimize the
seriousness of violations committed during socialprotests or find that there is no State responsibility for
violations committed against demonstrators as a result of the acts or omissions of State agents whose
duty is toprotect.
288. Along these same lines, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has stated that it
is essential that the authorities vigorously condemn attacks committed against media workers and
encourage the competent authorities to act with due diligence and speed to investigate such events and
punish those responsible,2174 including when political authorities express ideas that jeopardize or
stigmatize the work of journalists.2175 “Public officials have a duty to ensure that their statements are not
damaging the rights of those who contribute to the public debate through the expression and circulation
of their thoughts, such as journalists, media outlets, and human rights organizations, and must pay
attention to the context in which they express themselves in order to ensure that their expressions do not
constitute ‘forms of direct or indirect interference or harmful pressure on the rights of those who seek to
contribute [to] public deliberation through the expression and [dissemination] of their thoughts.’”2176
3.Monitoring and observation of protests
289. Offices of the people’s ombudsperson, public defender services, offices for the defense of indigenous and
peasant rights, and other state agencies specialized in the promotion and defense of rights also play an
important role in protecting demonstrators, building channels for dialogue, and monitoring and
supervising the actions of other public servants.
290. Organizations should be able to lodge complaints about crimes committed during social protests, even
when close relatives are unwilling or unable to do so, and to intervene in criminal proceedings.2177 As a
civil party or non-party intervenor in the criminal case, they can present evidence, propose lines of
investigation, refute theories and, in general and depending on each legal system, be actively involved in
the prosecution and punishment of those responsible for human rights violations.
291. Civil society organizations play a vital role in documenting and compiling statistics and information on
various acts of violence against journalists.2178 They are also instrumental in monitoring the measures
2173 The IACHR has expressed the same view with regard to journalists and media workers. See, e.g., “IACHR Expresses Deep Concern over
Acts of Violence in Venezuela and Urges the State to Ensure Democratic Citizen Security,” Press Release No. 13/14, February 14, 2014.
2174 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 37; IACHR. Annual Report 2010. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression. Chapter II: Mexico: 2010 Special Report on Freedom of Expression in Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5. March 7, 2011, para.
713.
2175 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, paras. 37-44.
2176 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 39. IACHR. Annual Report 2012. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression. Chapter II(Evaluation of the State of Freedom of Expression in the Hemisphere). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.147. Doc. 1. March 5, 2013,
paras. 198-215.
2177 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 225.
2178 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, paras. 256 & 257.
352
taken by States with regard to their duties to prevent crimes against journalists, protect journalists,
investigate these crimes, and punish those responsible.2179
292. The media themselves play a fundamental role in the accountability process regarding acts of violence
committed during social protests. They do this by condemning attacks, following up on the facts, and
monitoring the status of investigations into human rights violations as a means of exerting pressure to
combat impunity.2180
293. Although the State should generally refrain from using force in public demonstrations,it should formulate
specific policies to prevent, investigate, and punish violence against journalists, media workers, activists,
social movements, representatives, and social leaders in the context of protests, based on the role these
stakeholders have played in the prevention, monitoring, and oversight of State action.
294. The media themselves play a fundamental role in the accountability process regarding acts of violence
committed during social protests. They do this by condemning attacks, following up on the facts, and
monitoring the status of investigations into human rights violations as a means of exerting pressure to
combat impunity.2181
295. Although the State should generally refrain from using force in public demonstrations,it should formulate
specific policies to prevent, investigate, and punish violence against journalists, media workers, activists,
social movements, representatives, and social leaders in the context of protests, based on the role these
stakeholders have played in the prevention, monitoring, and oversight of State action.
2179 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 284.
2180 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 278.
2181 IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. IACHR/RELE/INF.
12/13, December 31, 2013, para. 278.
353
CHAPTER VI
PROTESTS AND THE INTERNET
354
VI. PROTESTS AND THE INTERNET
296. The Internet is now a fundamental communication tool that enablespeople to link upand connect in an
adaptable, fast, and effective manner, and is considered a tool with unique potential for the exercise of
freedom of expression. Among the new powers enabled by the Internet are the ability to associate and
assemble that people have acquired in the digital age, which in turn enhances the full realization and
enjoyment of other civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Meetings and associations in the
digital age can be organized and held without prior notice, on short notice, and at low cost. The Internet is
also now a fundamental tool for monitoring and reporting human rights violations during demonstrations
and meetings.
297. The Internet can be seen and analyzed as a means of organization or as an enabling platform for
protests.2182 In practice, it works as a means of disseminating, convening, and publicizing meetings and
physical gatherings (using social networks, blogs, or forums, for instance) to be carried out in a tangible
public place, expanding the boundaries of participation. The Internet also offers the possibility of
organizing an online protest, providing a common meeting space, shortening distances and times, and
simplifying formalities and agendas.428 Both settings must be protected and promoted to the extent that
they contribute to the full exercise of human rights.2183
298. The international standards developed within the inter-American system and the universal system on the
rights to freedom of expression, association, andpeaceful assembly are fully applicable to the Internet.2184
299. In recent years there have been various instances of protest on the Internet that include email chains,
petitions, demonstrations, and campaigns developed on social networks, etc. In the same way that States
must ensure access to public spaces—such as streets, roads, and public squares—for the holding of
gatherings, they must also ensure that the Internet is available and accessible to all citizens in order to
provide a space for the organization of associations and assemblies for purposes of taking part in the
political life of the country.2185
300. Limitations on access to the Internet before or after peaceful gatherings, including total or partial
disconnections, the slowdown of Internet service, and the temporary or permanent blocking of different
sites and applications, constitute unlawful restrictions on the rights of association and assembly.2186 The
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression has stressed the need to ensure access to the Internet at alltimes,including during periods
of political unrest.2187
2182 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
Maina Kiai, 24 April 2013, A/HRC/23/39. Association for Progressive Communication (APC), The Rightsto Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
and Association and the Internet, Submission to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and
Association, para. 14. Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (INDH), Internet y Derechos Humanos, Serie de Cuadernillos de Temas
Emergentes [National Human Rights Institute, Internet and Human Rights, Emerging Topics Booklet Series] (December 2013), p. 29..
(The Internet’s importance lies in its ability “to increase the opportunities and capabilities of the general public and net citizens to form
associations, improve the management and organization of associations, and expand the membership and reach of associations.”)
428 Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (INDH), Internet y Derechos Humanos, Serie de Cuadernillos de Temas Emergentes [National
Human Rights Institute, Internet and Human Rights, Emerging Topics Booklet Series] (December 2013), p. 29.
429 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Resolution 24/5, The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, UN Doc.
A/HRC/RES/24/5 (8 October 2013).See also: United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (21 May 2012), para. 84, recommendation
k.
430 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (24 April 2013), para. 82(d).
431 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (21 May 2012).
2187 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection ofthe right to freedom of opinion
and expression, Frank La Rue, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011), para. 79.
433 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rightsto freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (24 April 2013).
434 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (24 April 2013).
355
301. In no case can mere participation in protests, or in their announcement or organization, justify the
violation of the right to privacy with respect to private communications made by a person, whether in
writing, by voice or images, and regardless of the platform used. The right to privacy encompasses not
only individual communications, but also communications that take place in closed groups to which only
members have access.
302. There have been reports in the region of police and military officers infiltrating social networks or using
false identities in order to obtain information about social movements and the organization of
demonstrations and protests. Such a practice may be considered a serious violation of the rights of
assembly and freedom of association, and even of the right to privacy. Under no circumstances are online
intelligence actions allowed to monitor people who organize or take part in socialprotests.
303. States should permit and encourage the open and free use of the Internet, as well as all other forms of
communication, and exceptions to such access must be clearly established in law and satisfy the threepart test established in the inter-American system. The laws regulating so-called "cybercrime" must be
clearly and specifically drafted to ensure the principle of legality, have a legitimate purpose, be necessary
in a democratic society, and be proportionate; under no circumstances can they be used to prohibit,
obstruct, or hinder a peaceful assembly, demonstration, orprotest.2188
304. The guarantee of privacy and anonymity are also part of the rights of association and assembly.2189
Without prejudice to the foregoing, it does not cover all types of expressions or associations. On the
contrary, “the anonymity of the sender would in no way protect anyone who disseminates child pornography,
war propaganda, or hate speech that constitutes incitement to violence or publicly and directly incites
genocide.”2190 States should guarantee the fullprotection of anonymous speech and regulate specific cases
and conditions when such anonymity must be lifted. This requires sufficient judicial oversight and the full
application of the principle of proportionality with respect to measures aimed at identifying the person
in question.
435 IACHR, Freedom of Expression and the Internet, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
CIDH/RELE/INF.11/13 (December 31, 2013).
436 IACHR, Freedom of Expression and the Internet, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
CIDH/RELE/INF.11/13 (December 31, 2013).
356
CHAPTER VII
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
357
VII. ACCESS TO INFORMATION
305. Social protest is an essentially public event and constitutes the exercise of the rights to freedom of
expression and political participation, among other things. This results in broad criteria for access to
information and the subsequent obligation of the State to produce information and records. Broad access
to information is not only related to accountability and the way in which the State facilitates protest, but
is also crucial to helping channel, display, and disseminate the speech and actions of demonstrators.
306. Recording information and ensuring access to it are fundamental both for guaranteeing the right to
protest and for preventing violations of fundamental rights such as life, physical integrity, and freedom,
as well as for purposes of accountability. The production of, and access to, information in connection with
socialprotest is an essential component ofpositioning the exercise of the righttoprotest and demonstrate
as a core activity of political participation and democratic coexistence.
307. Access to information applies to both pre-protest matters and other matters arising during the protest,
as well as subsequent requests for information. This information has several dimensions, some of which
are discussed in this section, but the list is not intended to be exhaustive.
308. First and foremost, and as a general principle, the State must guarantee and facilitate the right of all
persons “to observe, and by extension monitor, assemblies. (…) The concept of monitoring encapsulates
not only the act of observing an assembly, but also the active collection, verification and immediate use of
information to address human rightsproblems.”2191
309. This duty of the State has special characteristics when it comes to “to protect the rights of assembly
monitors. This includes respecting and facilitating the right to observe and monitor all aspects of an
assembly, subject to the narrow permissible restrictions outlined in article 19(3) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,”2192 and States should “fully investigate any human rights violation
or abuse against monitors, and shouldpursue prosecution andprovide adequate remedy. The protections
afforded to monitors apply irrespective of whether an assembly ispeaceful.”2193
310. The right to access information includes the right to “to record the law enforcement operation. This also
includes the right to record an interaction in which he or she is being recorded by a State agent —
sometimes referred to as the right to ‘record back.’ The State should protect this right. Confiscation,
seizure and/or destruction of notes and visual or audio recording equipment without due process should
be prohibited andpunished.”2194
311. The State also has the duty to document and record the actions of its agents, in order to allow for the
review and improvement of their actions, as indicated in the previous chapter. The accessibility and
conservation of these records also facilitate the necessary oversight of any reportedirregularities.
All regulations governing social protest must be accessible and published. These regulations include not only
laws, decrees, and ordinances, but also general protocols, procedural manuals, and specific orders on how to
conduct operations.2195 The knowledge and disclosure of these protocols and ethical norms reduce the arbitrary
margins of decisions and actions of State agents in relation to social protests. The knowledge and dissemination
of these rules and orders is essential not only to guide police operations
2191 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 68.
2192 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 70.
2193 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 70.
2194 Human Rights Council, Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4
February 2016, para. 71.
2195 European Code of Police Ethics. Recommendation Rec(2001)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states. on the European Code
of Police Ethics. II 4) “Legislation guiding the police shall be accessible to the public and sufficiently clear and precise, and, if need be,
supported by clear regulations equally accessible to the public and clear.”
358
312. but also to allow monitoring and control by civil society organizations, journalists, and oversight
institutions.
313. The open disclosure of these regulations is necessary for democratic institutions and civil society to
monitor whether these orders are consistent with the constitutional and human rightsprinciples referred
to in this report. There is a need to develop and publish manuals for equipment training and use—both
deterrent and defensive—as well as to make available the respective training plans prepared by the
responsible officials.
314. It is the duty of the State to keep a detailed record of assigned weapons and ammunition. It is essential to
establish procedures and forms of supervision so that, in the context of demonstrations, only authorized
officials are assigned the weapons permitted for potential use. This is done by individually assigning
weapons and ammunition, as well as identifying the officers responsible for supervising and documenting
proper and effective compliance with these provisions. Detailed inventories of weapons and ammunition,
as well as their proper storage, are basic conditions for appropriately maintaining these records on the
allocation of material, weapons, and ammunition in the context of socialprotests.2196
315. Records should also include communications equipment and its assignment. These records and access to
them are essential elements for the reconstruction and clarification of events and those responsible for
them. The Commission has previously stated that in the context of protests the State should implement
“a communications records system to monitor operational orders, those responsible for them, and those
carrying them out.”2197 This obligation includes preserving these records for any further investigation
and prohibiting communication between officials by means that are not capable of beingrecorded.
316. The Commission has also noted the need for “the identification of political officials responsible for law
enforcement operations during marches, particularly in the case of scheduled marches or prolonged
social conflicts or circumstances in which potential risks to the rights of the demonstrators or others are
anticipated, so that such officials are tasked with supervising the field operation and ensuring strict
compliance with norms governing the use of force and police conduct.”2198 In addition, there should be a
record of the instructions given by these officials. This measure is fundamental for establishing an
appropriate line of responsibility for State action.
317. It is also important that the operational planning instructions identify the senior command officers
responsible for the operation and the participating units. The main orders and instructions given during
the operation must also be recorded and substantiated. Protocols should clearly set out the levels of
responsibility for different orders.2199
318. The names and positions of the judicial and supervisory authorities involved in or with jurisdiction over
the matter should be made public. Police officers being investigated for irregularities in operations
carried out in the context of social protests may not participate in security operations during
demonstrations until their respective administrative or criminal responsibilities are ascertained. The
State should take steps to document and allow monitoring of compliance with thisprovision.
319. Where permitted by law, any measure of cooperation or technical or financial support that private
companies provide to security institutions must be documented and publicly accessible, in order to
supervise and avoid conflicts, as well as to establish any potential civil or criminal liability of the private
actor.
320. Beyond the regulations and information to be published, access to the documents of public authorities—
including police forces—should only be restricted where there is a compelling reason for withholding
2196 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 11; IACHR, Report on Access to
Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road towards Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 34, June 28, 2007 Chapter I,
Introduction, para. 45 b).
2197 IACHR, Report on Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road towards Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 34, June 28, 2007 Chapter I, Introduction, para. 45 c); See also: IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in the Americas, para. 68.
2198 IACHR, Report on Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road towards Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 34, June 28, 2007 Chapter I, Introduction, para. 45 f). See also: IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in the Americas, para. 68.
2199 The Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies, OSCE/ODIHR 2016, p. 103, states, “When a decision is made to use force to
disperse a violent assembly, the authorization must come from the operational commander. The decision must be fully documented,
giving a full rationale for the options chosen.”
359
information, which is established by law and which overrides the public interest in having access to
information.2200 Such restrictions should not jeopardize the enjoyment of a right and restrictions should
not be used to conceal human rights violations or to promote any other improper purpose.2201
2200 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General CommentNo. 34 (2011) on Freedoms of opinion and expression, para. 18; Joint report
of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 81; Joint
Declaration by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (December
6, 2004).
2201 See: OSJI Guidelines.
360
CHAPTER VIII
STATES OF EMERGENCY
361
VIII. STATES OF EMERGENCY
321. The Inter-American Commission has documented that the dispersal and repression of social protest
often occurs under states of emergency that include the suspension of fundamental guarantees. Faced with
manifestations of social unrest or internal conflict, States tend to resort to the suspension of guarantees in
order to authorize the deployment of military forces to quickly repress the threat to order.
322. The inter-American human rights system has taken particular care to set out the strict conditions under
which the temporary suspension of some of the rights and guarantees enshrined in international treaties
may be admissible. The legal framework governing states of emergency in the inter-American human
rights system is contained in Article 27 of the Convention.2202 The European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms2203 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 2204 provide standards similar to those of theACHR.2205
323. In Advisory Opinion No. 8, the Inter-American Court addressed the requirements set out in Article 27 of
the ACHR, and it established some general guidelines for the imposition of states of emergency: 1) the
emergency must be invoked in order to preserve democracy; and 2) the need for declaring a state of
emergency must be objectively justifiable.2206
324. Similarly, this Commission has maintained that states of emergency should be reserved exclusively for
truly exceptional cases—extremely serious situations—that endanger the life of the nation. In all other
situations, routine administrative measures should be taken.2207
325. In the region, the suspension of guarantees has been ordered in various cases that severely limitedpublic
demonstrations and the rights of its participants, based on emergency grounds that do not conform to
inter-American standards. Some States tend to declare a state of emergency in the jurisdictions or areas
in which demonstrations take place, allowing for the suspension of rights, changes in the way rights are
guaranteed, or the intervention of the armed forces under their domestic law.
2202 ACHR, Article 27: “1. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party, it may
take measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article
4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Rightto Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws),
Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of
the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential
for the protection of such rights.
3. Any State Party availing itself of the right of suspension shall immediately inform the other States Parties, through the Secretary
General of the Organization of American States, of the provisions the application of which it has suspended, the reasons that gave rise
to the suspension, and the date set for the termination of such suspension.”
2203 Article 15 of the European Convention provides: 1. n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 2. No
derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall
be made under this provision. 3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully
executed.
2204 Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: 1 . In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided tha t such
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and
18 may be made under this provision. 3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall
immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be
made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.
2205 Although the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man does not explicitly provide for the possibility of restricting or
suspending the rights it prescribes, the IACHR has considered that the criteria for suspension derived from the American Convention
and the general principles of law are duly considered and applied in the context of the Declaration. Cfr. IACHR, Towards the Closure of
Guantánamo, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 20/15, June 3, 2015, para. 91.
2206 Cfr. IACHR, Report No. 48/00, Case 11.166, Walter Humberto Vásquez Vejarano – Peru, April 13, 2000, para. 24.
2207 Cfr. IACHR. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia 1993. Recommendation 2; See also: IACHR, Annual Report 2015,
Chapter IV. B Venezuela, para. 66.
362
326. This Commission considers that public protests and demonstrations, as legitimate and protected forms
of the exercise of various rights and a fundamental instrument of democratic coexistence—even when
they express social unrest—cannot be used as a justification for declaring states of emergency or for
suspending rights in other ways. Many of the nuisances caused by these events are inherent to the
exercise of the rights involved in protest, and any violent events that may occur in the context of
demonstrations should be prevented, investigated, and punished as they normally would, without the
need to resort to the suspension of rights.
327. Controlling disturbances that may be produced internally by social protest demonstrations is up to the
police, whose function is geared toward public security and not the security of the State.2208 The
declaration of states of emergency should not be used to circumvent the domestic proscription against
using the armed forces in the context of demonstrations.2209
328. The Commission has emphasized just how inadequate and dangerous it can be to decree a state of
emergency to address tense social conflicts or to fight crime in view of the numerous human rights
violations that consistently occur as a result, and considering that these are not sustainable or effective
responses for taking on and resolving such challenges.2210
329. Although the rights of assembly and association are among those that can be suspended under the states
of emergency authorized by the Convention2211 if the conditions accepted by international law for the
temporary suspension of certain rights are met, this does not mean the automatic and/or unlimited
interruption of protests and public demonstrations. Even in this context, States must respect the
restrictions that accompany the exceptional suspension of rights, including: the strict protection of rights
that cannot be suspended, as well as the necessity, proportionality, and limited duration of each
temporary impairment of rights that can be suspended.2212
2208 Cfr. IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, 2011. Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, para. 148.
2209 The Inter-American Court has had occasion to establish a violation of Article 27.1 because the State used measures that were not
necessary to control the alleged emergency situation. The Court emphasized the extreme care that States should exercise when using
the armed forces as a means of controlling social protest, holding that States should limit to the greatest extent possible the use of the
armed forces for the control of domestic disturbances, since their training is aimed at defeating the enemy rather than at protecting and
controlling civilians, which is what the police are trained to do.
2209 I/A Court H.R., Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166, para.
51; Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, para. 78.
2210 Cfr. IACHR, Annual Report 2015, chapter 4.A, Use of Force, para. 139. In its Follow-Up Report on Compliance by the Republic of Ecuador
with the Recommendations Offered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rightsin its 1997Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Ecuador, the IACHR stated that, while it was aware ofthe difficult economic situation facing the State of Ecuador and the social unrest
that this had produced, the State had an obligation to take the necessary measures to guarantee citizen security through methods that
respected human rights standards within the framework of a democratic society. The IACHR was of the opinion that alleviating the
social unrest arising from the economic situation and fighting crime through the suspension of individual guarantees under the state of
emergency did not meet the requirements of the American Convention for the declaration of an emergency; the State has—and is
required to have—other mechanisms for channeling social unrest and fighting crime that do not involve suspending the population’s
fundamental guarantees. Although, as has been mentioned in this Report, some forms of public demonstrations may create
inconveniences or disturbances, or even situations of violence that must be prevented and investigated, in a democracy these cannot be
considered exceptional situations that allow States to suspend guarantees. IACHR, Follow-Up Report on Compliance by the Republic of
Ecuador with the Recommendations Offered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its 1997 Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Ecuador, paras. 44 etseq.
2211 Most of the rights that the State cannot suspend, however serious the emergency, are mentioned in Article 27.2 of the ACHR. Along with
this enumeration the IACHR considers that there are other rights that are not subject to suspension, such as freedom of opinion. Cfr.
IACHR, Annual Report 2015, Chapter IV.B Venezuela, paras. 216-217; similarly, see: UN Human Rights Committee. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. General Comment No. 34. 12 September 2011.
2212 The Human Rights Committee established that if States intend to invoke the right to suspend obligations assumed under the Covenant
during, for example, a natural disaster, they must be able to show that a large-scale demonstration with incidents of violence not only
constitutes a danger to the life of the nation, but also that all provisions derogating from the provisions of the Covenant a re strictly
necessary according to the exigencies of the situation. “In the opinion of the Committee, the possibility of restricting certain Covenant
rights under the terms of, for instance,(...)freedom of assembly (art. 21) is generally sufficient during such situations and no derogation
from the provisions in question would be justified by the exigencies of the situation.” UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General
Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 31August 2001 para. 5. See also Report
of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai, A/HRC/20/27, 21
May 2012, para. 19. The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, Maina Kiai recalled that, “The
legitimate combat against terrorism, and other security considerations, has been used as a justification for the adoption of a state of
emergency or other stricter rules to void the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association,(…) and noted that, “On different
occasions, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism has stressed in a report to the General Assembly that ‘States should not need to resort to derogation measures in the area of
freedom of assembly and association. Instead, limitation measures, as provided for in ICCPR, are sufficient in an effective fight against
terrorism’ (A/61/267, para. 53),” UN, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 21. Within the framework of the domestic judicial oversight of provisions governing
states of emergency in Colombia, the Constitutional Court has held in evaluating Article 44 of Law 137 of 1994 that not even in states of
emergency can the Government establish formulas that generally limit the rights involved in social protest. In this regard, it held that,
363
330. The measures that may be taken in any of these emergencies must be tailored to “the exigencies of the
situation,” and what ispermissible in one context may not be permissible in another. The lawfulness of the
measures taken to deal with each of the special situations referred to in Article 27.1 will depend, moreover,
upon the character, intensity, pervasiveness, and particular context of the emergency and upon the
corresponding proportionality and reasonableness of the measures.2213
331. The Commission underscores that Article 27.2 of the ACHR also establishes that “the judicial guarantees
essential for the protection of such rights” cannot be suspended.2214 According to the case law developed
by the Inter-American Court, the judicial guarantees that cannot be suspended during states of emergency
are essentially: the writ of habeas corpus, the writ of amparo [petition for a constitutional remedy],
remedies for the preservation of the rule of law and, in general, other judicial procedures that are
ordinarily suitable for guaranteeing the full exercise of the non-derogable rights referred to in Article 27.2
of the Convention, which, even under a state of emergency, must always be adjudicated.2215 The
guarantees must be not only essential but also judicial; that is, they require the active involvement of an
independent and impartial judicial body having the power to pass on the lawfulness of measures adopted
in a state of emergency.2216
“In the exercise of the powers deriving from the declaration of a state of internal unrest, the Government cannot criminalize legitimate acts
of social protest.” Constitutional Court, Judgment C-179 of 1994, J. Carlos GaviriaDíaz.
2213 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory
Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 22; Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs.Judgment of November 27,2013. Series C No. 275, para. 139; Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 289, para. 117.
2214 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory
Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 23.
2215 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory
OpinionOC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series ANo. 8, para. 38. See also:IACHR, ReportNo. 48/00, Case 11.166, WalterHumberto Vásquez
Vejarano – Peru, April 13, 2000, para. 51.
2216 Cfr. I/A Court H.R., Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights).
Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 30.
364
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
365
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
332. The right to free demonstration andpeaceful protest is an essential element of the functioning and very
existence of the democratic system, as well as a channel that allows individuals and different groups in
society to express their demands, dissent, and complain about the government or their particular
situation, aswell as to demand access toand compliance withpolitical rights and economic, social, cultural,
and environmental rights.
333. States must ensure the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association to all
persons and to all types of organizations and associations without the need for prior authorization. They
should establish by law, clearly and explicitly, the presumption in favor of the lawfulness of
demonstrations and peaceful protest, which means that security forces should not act under the
assumption that protest constitutes a threat to public order.
334. In particular, States should take positive measures to guarantee this enjoyment to women; children and
adolescents; people of African descent; victims of discrimination based on their gender identity or sexual
orientation; migrants and non-nationals; indigenous peoples; and groups demanding access to economic,
social, and cultural rights.
a. General recommendations
335. It is essential that all levels and agencies of the State respect and ensure that no one will be criminalized
for exercising the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association in the context of
demonstrations and protests, nor be subjected to threats, harassment, violence, persecution, or
retaliation for participating in protests.
336. Any restrictions on the rights involved in demonstrations and protests may only be stipulated by law,
based on one of the legitimate interests recognized by the American Convention, and must be necessary
and proportionate to protect that interest, in accordance with the inter-American human rights
instruments.
337. Ensure that security forces intervening toprotect and control the conduct of demonstrations andprotests
prioritize the defense of individual life and safety by refraining from cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment of demonstrators, from arbitrarily depriving them of their liberty, or from otherwise violating
their rights.
338. Ensure that individuals and groups who are victims of violations and abuses of their fundamental rights
in the exercise ofprotest have effective access to justice and that any violations of their fundamental rights
will be redressed.
339. Investigate, identify, and punish the perpetrators of attacks, violence, threats, harassment, and the
excessive use of force in the context of protest, whether they are State or non-stateactors.
340. Respect and guarantee the exercise of freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right of
association through the Internet, applying the same guarantees as in offline spaces.
b. Recommendations to the Executive Branch and political authorities
341. The authorities should facilitate the exercise of the right to demonstrate and protest as the general rule
and should not regard them as a threat to public order or domestic security.
342. The armed forces should not participate in activities related to the protection of public demonstrations
or the control of any form of protest, occupation of land or housing, prison riots, etc.
343. The authorities should givepriority to dialogue and negotiation in the management of any form ofprotest,
and not resortto the use of force during demonstrations, occupations, orprotests, except when absolutely
necessary. In no case should force be used indiscriminately in the context ofprotests.
366
344. The holding of demonstrations andprotests must not be subject toprior authorization by the authorities.
Where prior notification is required by law, it must be simple, accessible, nondiscriminatory, and not
onerous; where a restriction is established,it must be in writing, and a timely and expedited appeal to an
independent tribunal must be available.
345. Spontaneous demonstrations and protests must not be prohibited by law and must be exempt from any
notification requirements.
346. Simultaneous counter-demonstrations andprotests cannot be prohibited simply because they are held at
the same time, and the State must take reasonable and timely positive measures to protect participants
in all of them. The State must ensure that they do not interfere with each other so that demonstrators will
not have cause to fear violence from their opponents.
347. Individuals, groups, and social or political movements participating in demonstrations andprotests must
be protected from undue interference in their right toprivacy.
348. Intelligence activities in the context ofprotests are in principle contrary to inter-American standards. Any
intelligence activity related to the political freedoms and rights involved in a protest must have a warrant
and external oversight.
349. States must ensure the free and unrestricted operation of organizations and associations without
discrimination of any kind, even in the absence of registration or legalpersonality.
c. Recommendations to security bodies and agencies acting in the context of demonstrations
and protests
350. The design of police operations that are ordered in connection with demonstrations and protests must
take into account the variety of aspects related to the protection of the rights of demonstrators, third
parties, and the safety of police officers.
351. States must, in any event, provide all means to protect the life and physical integrity of persons in the
context of protests, be it from acts committed by public officials or by thirdparties.
352. The use of force must adhere to strict principles of exceptionality, necessity, progressivity, and
proportionality. Under these principles, the use of firearmswith lethal ammunition has almost never been
justified in the context of demonstrations, and it is therefore recommended that the carrying of firearms
by security officers be restricted in these operations.
353. The use of less lethal weapons should be strictly regulated. Any incident involving the use of any type of
weapon by the security forces must be documented, whether or not the physical integrity of any person
is affected.
354. A detailed record should be kept of the orders given, the officers involved, and their levels and areas of
responsibility in the operation, and an the actions taken should be subsequently evaluated.
355. Security operations must take into account the protection of security agents and provide the police with
adequate protective equipment. A record must be kept of the weapons and equipment assigned to law
enforcement officers, and officers should receive ongoing training in their properuse.
356. State security operations and interventions should pay attention to the special protection that should be
afforded to certain individuals or groups such as women,2217 children, adolescents,2218 people with
disabilities, or older adults, as well as groups that defend the rights of LGBTI persons, in order to
guarantee their rights in the context of demonstrations.
2217 In its resolution on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, the UN Human Rights Council
“Urges States to pay particular attention to the safety and protection of women and women human rights defenders from acts of
intimidation and harassment, as well as gender-based violence, including sexual assault, in the context of peaceful protests”
(A/HRC/25/L.20).
2218 In its resolution on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests, the UN Human Rights Council
“Reaffirms that States must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and protection of children, including while they exercise
their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, expression and association, including in the context of peaceful protests” (A/HRC/25/L.20).
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357. It should be especially borne in mind that it is the job of journalists, film crews, photojournalists, and
media workers covering protests to gather and disseminate information on what happens in
demonstrations and protests, including the actions of security forces; freedom of expression protects the
right to record and disseminate any incident.
358. Journalists should not be detained for their work, or harassed or attacked by law enforcement; on the
contrary, the State has a duty toprotect them when they are the victims of acts of violence by thirdparties.
Their equipment and materials cannot be retained, confiscated, ordestroyed.
359. Prompt and effective medical attention must be guaranteed in caseswhere persons are injured or become
ill during a demonstration, whatever the cause and whoever is responsible.
360. Mass, collective, or indiscriminate arrests should not be made. Arrests based on the mere fact of
participating in a public demonstration or protest does not meet the standards of reasonableness and
proportionality.
361. When the use of force by law enforcement officers causes death or injury, an investigation should be
opened ex officio by independent and impartial authorities that have the necessary tools to determine the
facts within a reasonable period of time, and to identify the individuals involved and their degrees of
responsibility, in order to ensure accountability, prosecution, punishment, and appropriate reparation
for the victims’ next of kin.
362. Regularly and consistently gather disaggregated data to generate official statistics on investigations
opened and proceedings brought against law enforcement officers who have used force, specifying the
authority that took cognizance of the case, the charges brought, and the results obtained.
363. Take the necessary measures to ensure that law enforcement officers who are prosecuted—whether
administratively or judicially—for acts allegedly committed by the abusive or disproportionate use of
force are removed from public contact while their case ispending.
d. Recommendations to the federal or national legislature and local legislativecouncils.
364. Legislative bodies should bear in mind that it is in principle inadmissible to penalize street
demonstrations per se when they are carried out within the framework of the right to freedom of
expression and the freedom of assembly.
365. Laws on demonstrations and protests must comply with the three-part test established in the interAmerican human rights instruments: the provisions must be provided for by law, justified by one of the
legitimate interests recognized in the Convention, and must be necessary and proportionate to protect
that interest.
366. Organizations and organizers of a demonstration or protest should not be held responsible in their
capacity as such for any acts of violence that may be committed by participants and thirdparties.
367. Legislative bodies should refrain from creating vague criminal offenses or offenses that criminalize
conduct that is part of a social protest, such as criminal penalties for lack of authorization or contempt
(desacato), or for disrupting traffic. Such criminal definitions violate the principle of legality and interAmerican standards.
368. Any criminal law that may affect the right to hold demonstrations and protests must strictly comply with
the principle of legality. Policies against terrorism or organized crime should not be legislated in such a
way as to restrict human rights or create a widespread chilling effect on the exercise of the rights of
assembly, association, freedom of expression, andpolitical rights in the contexts mentioned in this report.
369. Regulate by law and in a detailed and precise manner the use of lethal and less lethal force by law
enforcement officials, in accordance with inter-American standards, the Principles on the Use of Force,
the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, and other relevant international instruments. Legal
regulations should include the scope of operation of private security companies, proscribing their
involvement in citizen security tasks.
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370. Adapt existing legislation to regulate situations in which states of emergency are declared, specifying that
they may be invoked only in the event of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
independence or security of the State party. Specify expressly which rights would be restricted—
excluding those non-derogable rights and guarantees—and when and where the state of emergency
would be in force to address the identified threat. Make it clear that the State has the obligation to
immediately notify the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States of the adoption of such
a measure.
e. Recommendations to justice institutions
371. Appropriately and effectively investigate and punish the arbitrary use of force by law enforcement
officers during protests, applying the aggravating circumstances prescribed by law when the force has
been directed against vulnerable groups that have been subjected to historical discrimination on the basis
of ethnicity, race, sex, sexual orientation, thought and expression, among other grounds.
372. Train justice authorities at all levels in the interpretation of the content and scope of the rights to freedom
of expression, peaceful assembly, and association in the context of demonstrations and protests, in
accordance with international human rights standards.
373. In general, justice authorities have a duty to refrain from applying criminal provisions that ambiguously
protect public order, such as “incitement to rebellion,” “terrorism,” “sabotage,” “advocacy of crime,” and
“attack or resistance to public authority,” “obstruction of traffic routes,” and other criminal offenses that
tend to be applied arbitrarily by authorities to criminalizeprotesters.
374. The Commission stresses that when justice authorities find themselves faced with manifestly unfounded
criminal accusations and complaints and the protection of the right to protest is involved, they have an
obligation to investigate the source or sources of this type of arbitrary complaint and impose the
appropriate penalties.
f. Recommendations to national human rights institutions
375. National human rights institutions should play a fundamental role in the promotion and implementation
of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association in connection withprotest.
376. These institutions should track and establish spaces to monitor demonstrations and protests as they
occur, as well as mechanisms to receive complaints of possible abuses and violations of human rights in
this type of context.
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TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY JOINT DECLARATION: CHALLENGES TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
THE NEXT DECADE
The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the
Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and
Access to Information,
Having discussed these issues together with the assistance of ARTICLE 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression,
and the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD);
Recalling and reaffirming our Joint Declarations of 26 November 1999, 30 November 2000, 20 November 2001,
10 December 2002, 18 December 2003, 6December 2004, 21 December 2005, 19December 2006, 12December
2007, 10 December 2008, 15 May 2009, 3 February 2010, 1 June 2011, 25 June 2012, 4 May 2013, 6 May 2014,
4 May 2015, 4 May 2016, 3 March 2017 and 2 May 2018;
Noting that, for twenty years, we, the inter-governmental mandates for freedom of expression and media
freedom, have issued Joint Declarations with the aim of interpreting human rights guarantees for freedom of
expression, thereby providing guidance to governments, civil society organisations, legal professionals,
journalists and media outlets, academics and the business sector;
Stressing that the Joint Declarations have contributed to the establishment of authoritative standards which
address a wide range of issues and challenges, and also underline the importance of freedom of expression to
democracy, sustainable development, the protection of all other rights, and efforts to counter terrorism,
propaganda and incitement to violence;
Alarmed by the ongoing violence against and prosecution of journalists, right to information activists, human
rights defenders and others for exercising their right to freedom of expression, as well as the fact that impunity
for killings and attacks prevails;
Welcoming the significant contributions that digital technologies have made to expanding global
communications and the possibility for people everywhere to access information and ideas and to speak and be
heard, while noting the continuing imperative of providing universal and affordable access to the Internet;
Acknowledging the need to address, within the framework of international human rights law, serious problems
that arise in the context of digital technologies, including disinformation; incitement to hatred, discrimination
and violence; terrorist recruitment and propaganda; arbitrary and unlawful surveillance; interference with the
use of encryption and anonymity technologies; and the power of online intermediaries
Expressing concern about the ongoing and deepening threats to media diversity and independence as a result,
among other things, of a significant reduction in advertising revenues for legacy media, undermining news
production and especially local and investigative journalism; increased concentration of media ownership;
political control over and insufficient financial allocations to public service media; a failure to develop
community broadcasting sufficiently ; and ongoing attempts to exert control over the private media, including
through regulation;
Denouncing the continued prevalence of undue legal restrictions on online expression and their abusive
application, and stressing the importance of States respecting the obligations set out in Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when imposing restrictions on freedom of expression, which
include ensuring that any restriction is necessary andproportionate, and the availability of independent judicial
oversight over the application of these restrictions;
Deploring arbitrary disruptions and shutdowns to restrict access to telecommunications networks and the
Internet;
Highlighting the importance of the right to access information held by public authorities, as reflected in the
Sustainable Development Goals Target 16.10;
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Observing that private companies have responsibilities to respect human rights and remedy violations, and that
addressing the challenges outlined above requires multi-stakeholder support and the active engagement of State
actors, media outlets, intermediaries, civil society and the generalpublic;
Adopt, in London, on 10 July 2019, the following Twentieth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Challenges to
Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade:
1. Creating an Environment that Enables the Exercise of Freedom of Expression
The protection and promotion of freedom of expression, especially but not only in the digital environment,
requires protection and appropriate legal rules and regulatory systems. To create enabling environments for
freedom of expression, States should:
a. Take immediate and meaningful action to protect the safety of journalists and others who are
attacked for exercising their right to freedom of expression and to end impunity for such attacks.
b. Ensure protection of freedom of expression as a matter of domestic legal, regulatory and policy
frameworks in accordance with international standards, including by limiting criminal law
restrictions on free speech so as not to deter public debate about matters of public interest.
c. Promote media diversity, including by supporting efforts to give voice to groups which are
marginalised and at risk of discrimination, developing rules on transparency of ownershipof the
media and telecommunication infrastructure, adopting and implementing effective rules on
access to information, and narrowly defining content restrictions to what is permissible under
international human rights law.
d. Ensure that regulatory bodies for the media are independent, operate transparently and are
accountable to the public, and respect the principle of limited scope of regulation, and provide
appropriate oversight of private actors.
e. Address the major economic challenges faced by independent journalists and media outlets,
including by supporting local media and regulating to mitigate the negative impacts caused by
the dominance of online advertising companies.
f. Respect international human rights standards, including those of transparency, when seeking to
regulate or influence expression on online mediaplatforms.
g. Refrain from arbitrary or unlawful restrictions on the use of encryption and anonymity
technologies.
h. Take both immediate and longer-term steps to prohibit unlawful or arbitrary surveillance and
the unaccountable trafficking in tools of the commercial spyware industry that have substantial
detrimental effects on the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression.
i. Devote significantly greater attention and resources to media-, information- and digital-literacy,
over the short- and long-term, to address the particular literacy challenges of the modern digital
communications environment.
2. Building and Maintaining a Free, Open and Inclusive Internet
The exercise of freedom of expression requires a digitalinfrastructure that is robust, universal and regulated
in a way that maintains it as a free, accessible and open space for all stakeholders. Over the coming years, States
and other actors should:
a. Recognise the right to access and use the Internet as a human right as an essential condition for
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.
b. Protect freedom of expression in accordance with international human rights law in legislation
that can have an impact on online content.
c. Refrain from imposing Internet or telecommunications network disruptions andshutdowns.
d. Expand significantly initiatives to provide universal and affordable Internet access.
e. Respect and reinforce the principle of network neutrality.
f. Ensure that major technological developments, such as the transition to 5G mobile networks and
expansion of the ‘Internet of Things’ (IOT), respect human rights, particularly through robust
human rights due diligence in the development of infrastructure, network service,
interoperability, andprivacy-by-design.
g. Avoid measures that risk fragmenting the Internet and limiting access to the globalInternet.
3. Private Control as a Threat to Freedom of Expression
A transformative feature of the digital communications environment is the power of private companies, and
particularly social media, search platforms and other intermediaries, over communications, with enormous
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power concentrated in the hands of just a few companies. In order to protect against unaccountable private
domination of the environment for freedom of expression, we urge the development of the following:
a. Independent and multi-stakeholder oversight, transparency and accountability mechanisms to
address private content rules that may be inconsistent with international human rights and
interfere with individuals’ right to enjoy freedom of expression.
b. Regulatory measures that address the ways in which the advertising-dependent business models
of some digital technology companies create an environment which can also be used for viral
dissemination of, inter alia, deception, disinformation and hateful expression.
c. Company implementation of responsibilities under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, backed up by State regulation or oversight, to mitigate human rights harms by
developing policy commitments and ongoing human rights impact assessments that are
disclosed to thepublic.
d. Legal and technological solutions that allow for transparent algorithmic curation and moderation
of content, and full disclosure and audit-ability of the data that informs ArtificialIntelligence.
e. Human rights sensitive solutions to the challenges caused by disinformation, including the
growing possibility of “deep fakes”, in publicly accountable and targeted ways, using approaches
that meet the international law standards of legality, legitimacy of objective, and necessity and
proportionality.
f. Effective rules and systems to address, in relation to companies providing digital
communications services, undue concentration of ownership and practices which represent an
abuse of a dominant market position.
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THE END
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